

## PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

505 VAN NESS AVENUE  
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94102-3298



October 4, 2023

GI-2023-07-PGE-04-02ABC

Ms. Christine Cowsert  
Senior Vice President, Gas Engineering  
Pacific Gas and Electric Company  
6121 Bollinger Canyon Road  
San Ramon, CA 94583

SUBJECT: General Order 112-F Gas Inspection of PG&E's Peninsula Division

Dear Ms. Cowsert:

The Safety and Enforcement Division (SED) of the California Public Utilities Commission conducted a General Order 112-F inspection of Pacific Gas & Electric Company's (PG&E) Peninsula Division (Division) on July 10 – July 21, 2023. The inspection included a review of the Division's records for the period of 2018 through 2022, as well as a representative field sample of the Division's facilities. SED staff also reviewed the Division's operator qualification records, which included field observation of randomly selected individuals performing covered tasks.

SED's findings are noted in the Post-Inspection Written Preliminary Findings (Summary) which is enclosed with this letter. The Summary reflects only those particular records and pipeline facilities that SED inspected during the inspection. SED discovered zero (0) violations and four (4) concerns during the inspection.

Within 30 days of your receipt of this letter, please provide a written response indicating the measures taken by PG&E to address the concerns noted in the Summary.

If you have any questions, please contact Mohammad Nouredine at (916) 208-2965 or by email at [Mohammad.nouredine@cpuc.ca.gov](mailto:Mohammad.nouredine@cpuc.ca.gov).

Sincerely,

Terence Eng, P.E.  
Program Manager  
Gas Safety and Reliability Branch  
Safety and Enforcement Division

Enclosure: Post-Inspection Written Preliminary Findings

cc: Susie Richmond, PG&E Gas Regulatory Compliance  
Jaime Hidalgo, PG&E Gas Regulatory Compliance  
Kristina Castrence, PG&E  
Frances Yee, PG&E  
Dennis Lee, SED  
Claudia Almengor, SED

# Post-Inspection Written Preliminary Findings

**Dates of Inspection:** 07/10/2023 – 07/21/2023

**Operator:** PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO

**Operator ID:** 15007 (primary)

**Inspection Systems:** Peninsula Division

**Assets (Unit IDs) with results in this report:** Peninsula Division (88609)

**System Type:** GD

**Inspection Name:** 2023 PG&E Peninsula inspection

**Lead Inspector:** Mohammad Nouredine

**Operator Representative:** Izzat Taha

## Unsatisfactory Results

None.

## Concerns

### Design and Construction : Design of Pipe Components (DC.DPC)

Question Title, ID Flanges and Flange Accessories, DC.DPC.FLANGE.O

Question 2. Do flanges and flange accessories meet the requirements of 192.147?

References 192.141 (192.147(a), 192.147(b), 192.147(c))

Assets Covered Peninsula Division (88609 (04))

Issue Summary SED team conducted field inspections at meter set regulation DR-B43 (Located at [REDACTED] Redwood City, CA) on 7/12/23 and found multiple flanges with stud bolts that are too short with the bolts not extending completely through the nut.

Title 49 CFR §192.147(a) states, "Each flange or flange accessory (other than cast iron) must meet the minimum requirements of ASME/ANSI B 16.5 and MSS SP-44 (incorporated by reference, see §192.7), or the equivalent."

American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) / American National Standards Institute (ANSI) B 16.5, section 6.10.2 states, "6.10.2 Bolt Lengths. Stud bolt lengths, including the height of two heavy hexagon nuts, are shown as dimension L in Tables 7, 10, 13, 15, 17, 19, and 21 (Tables F7, F10, F13, F15, F17, F19, and F21 of Annex F). The tabulated stud bolt length L does not include the height of end points. An end point is defined as an unthreaded length, such as a chamfer, which extends beyond the thread. The method of calculating bolt lengths is explained in Annex D. The tabulated bolt lengths are reference dimensions. Users may select other bolting lengths."

ASME B16.5-2003 Annex D requires that bolt length be calculated to include the length of the necessary nuts needed to connect the flange, plus the minimum flange thickness, plus the gasket thickness, plus the appropriate thickness tolerances.

Additionally, PG&E Gas Design Standard B-45.4: Flange Bolt-Tightening Sequence and Torque Values, section 2.1(E) states, "Bolts/studs must be fully engaged and extend completely through the nut, with a recommended minimum of one thread exposed. Any excess thread protruding beyond the nut face should be minimized with a recommendation, not to exceed ½ beyond nut face."

PG&E has already initiated a system wide self-report for the bolt thread engagement issue with Corrective Action Program (CAP) #126221073 having been created on 5/24/23. The bolt thread engagement issue was also included on the Q2 Internal Review Summary of Findings (IRSF) report which was submitted to SED on 7/13/23. PG&E created a work order for corrective action to be done on DR-B43 on the same date.

## Time-Dependent Threats : External Corrosion - CP Monitoring (TD.CPMONITOR)

Question Title, ID Test Stations, TD.CPMONITOR.TESTSTATION.R

Question 15. Do records identify the location of test stations and show a sufficient number of test stations?

References 192.469

Assets Covered Peninsula Division (88609 (04))

Issue Summary SED found several records of low Cathodic Protection (CP) measurements, in addition to a down rectifier in the Colma area.

PG&E provided a rationale for not doing a resurvey of Cathodic Protection Areas (CPAs), which are intended to find a representative sample of pipe-to-soil test locations within a CPA. In their document "Cancellation Notice for WP4133-02". This was a temporary stand down as stated in the "Background, Justification and Rationale for Cancellation" section of this document. This section states in part:

*"...Overtime, the purpose and value of the resurvey process has diminished and has largely been limited to a paperwork exercise which, alone, has not achieved the above stated goals. Additionally, there are currently a large number of distribution "down" CPA's which require troubleshooting and corrective work in order to restore appropriate CP levels. This restoration work is required to be performed not only for the safety and integrity of PG&E's system, but is also required prior to performing a resurvey for the results to be valid. Therefore, PG&E is temporarily standing down the resurvey process, effective immediately, in order to focus the corrosion mechanic resources on the critical CPA restoration work while corrosion engineering re-evaluates and revises the resurvey process in 2015."*

SED staff agrees that restoring CPAs is critical work that should be conducted before resurvey work. However, this temporary stand down was implemented in 2015 and the resurvey work has not yet been re-established. Also, Gas Safety and Reliability Branch (GSRB) staff and PG&E staff observed field work in the North Peninsula area that suggests that an additional step is needed in TD4181S and calls into question PG&E's decision to not perform resurveys.

GSRB and PG&E staff checked two random locations for Pipe-to-soil (P/S) reads in different CPAs. Each random location was near an identified CPA test point and was found to have low reads. The purpose of resurveys is to identify a representative sample of reads within a CPA that will ensure all other reads within the CPA are above the minimum requirements of -850mV. Therefore, the additional random reads should have been more negative than -850mV. However, they were not.

The locations and reads were as follows:

1. ██████████, Daly City (Random Read): -620mV
2. ██████████, South San Francisco (Random Read): -246mV.

SED recommends that PG&E include a process of doing one random check within each CPA when doing the yearly pipe to soil reads until PG&E can restore the resurvey process. Given that many CPAs are constantly changing, with steel pipe being replaced with Polyethylene (PE) pipe, the representative test points may no longer be valid. Random reads will ensure that low reads within a CPA have a better chance of being found since PG&E has temporarily suspended doing resurveys.

Question Title, ID Interference Currents, TD.CPMONITOR.INTFRCURRENT.R

Question 21. Do records document an effective program is in place to minimize detrimental effects of interference currents and that detrimental effects of interference currents from CP systems on other underground metallic structures are minimized?

References 192.491(c) (192.473(a))

Assets Covered Peninsula Division (88609 (04))

Issue Summary SED staff is concerned about interference currents from Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) or AC interference currents for the following reasons.

- PG&E staff stated that there is no leak cause category of interference currents. Therefore, leaks that may be caused by interference currents such as BART DC interference cannot be identified and analyzed.
- During field activities on July 20, 2023, SED staff observed the following at casing #44912806, which cases a pipe which runs directly below the BART tracks and Interstate 280, as confirmed by a PG&E corrosion engineer. A pipe-to-soil read taken by a corrosion tech varied between positive and negative values as the train passed through the station, which is evidence of interference currents coming from the BART train system.

SED staff believes there are interference currents on PG&E's distribution pipeline segments in and around the BART train system, especially on segments going directly underneath the BART tracks and segments of the distribution system directly adjacent to the BART tracks.

SED recommends that PG&E train their corrosion staff to identify corrosion caused by DC or AC interference and include a "corrosion caused by AC/DC interference" category on their leak form.

Question Title, ID Interference Currents, TD.CPMONITOR.INTFRCURRENT.O

Question 22. Are areas of potential stray current identified, and if found, the detrimental effects of stray currents minimized?

References 192.473(a)

Assets Covered Peninsula Division (88609 (04))

Issue Summary SED staff is concerned about DC interference currents from BART for the following reasons.

- PG&E staff stated that there is no leak cause category of interference currents. Therefore, leaks that may be caused by interference currents such as BART DC interference cannot be identified and analyzed.
- During field activities on July 20, 2023, SED staff observed the following at casing #44912806, which cases a pipe which runs directly below the BART tracks and Interstate 280, as confirmed by a PG&E corrosion engineer. A pipe-to-soil read taken by a corrosion tech varied between positive and negative values as the train passed through the station, which is evidence of interference currents coming from the BART train system.

SED staff believes there are interference currents on PG&E's distribution pipeline segments in and around BART train system, especially on segments going directly underneath the BART tracks and segments of the distribution system directly adjacent to the BART tracks.

SED recommends that PG&E collect data of cathodic protection pipe-to-soil reads on mains located or going directly under the BART tracks to quantify the extent of the interference currents going to the mains.