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September 15, 2023

VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL

Leslie Palmer
Director, Safety and Enforcement Division
California Public Utilities Commission
505 Van Ness Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94102

Dear Mr. Palmer:

As required by Resolution ESRB-8 and in accordance with Ordering Paragraph 1 of California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) Decision (D.) 19-05-042, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) respectfully submits a compliance report for the proactive de-energization event that was initiated on August 30, 2023 and fully restored for those who could receive power on August 31, 2023. This report has been verified by a PG&E officer in accordance with Rule 1.11 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads 'Meredith E. Allen'.

Meredith E. Allen

Vice President, Regulatory Relations

Enclosures

cc: Anthony Noll, SED
ESRB_CompilanceFilings@cpuc.ca.gov
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**Pacific Gas and Electric Company
Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) Report to the CPUC
August 30 – August 31, 2023 De-energization Event**

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**PG&E Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) Report to the CPUC
August 30 – August 31, 2023 De-energization Event**

Section 1 – Summary and Overview

Section 1.1 - Brief description of the PSPS event starting from the time when the utility's Emergency Operation Center is activated until service to all customers has been restored. (D.21-06-014, page 286, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

This report covers the initiation of PSPS protocols that occurred in PG&E's service area for the August 30 – August 31, 2023 PSPS Event. High winds can cause tree branches and debris to contact energized electric lines, and potentially damage our equipment and cause a wildfire. As a result, we may need to turn off power during severe weather to help prevent wildfires. This is called a PSPS. PG&E will not take any chances with customer safety. For the safety of our customers and communities, PSPS continues to be a necessary tool as a last resort. We know that turning off the power disrupts lives, and do not take this decision lightly.

On August 27, 2023, PG&E's Meteorology Team identified a potential fire weather event in weather forecast models and notified the acting Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Commander. On August 27, 2023, we activated our EOC for a potential PSPS event and began notifying state and local Public Safety Partners. On Monday, August 28; Tuesday, August 29, and Wednesday, August 30, we further refined the PSPS scope based on updated meteorological forecasts. Additionally, we began notifying customers in the areas anticipated to be impacted, readied the grid to mitigate the effects of the PSPS event on our customers, engaged with Community Based Organizations (CBOs) to transmit event-specific information, and prepared to open Community Resource Centers (CRCs). We closely monitored weather conditions across 12 Time Places (TPs) but only de-energized seven for the duration of the event (see Figure 1).

As wind gusts neared 49 mph on August 30, 2023 at 01:40 PDT, PG&E began de-energizing its assets and customers to mitigate catastrophic wildfire risk across the northern Sacramento Valley. For additional factors considered in the decision to shut off, including relative humidity, see Appendix A.

By August 30, 2023 at 15:20 PDT, the Weather "All-Clear" was given for all circuits in all clear zones. These circuits were declared all clear on August 30, 2023 once winds subsided. During this PSPS, we ultimately de-energized 3,928 customers¹ in seven TPs² spanning two tribal areas and seven counties.³

During this PSPS, PG&E mitigated impacts through use of sectionalizing devices, which prevented approximately 15,573 customers from being de-energized. For customers who required de-energization, PG&E sent notifications to the customers in scope and contacted more

¹ Customers refers to active service points (meters).

² A TP is a portion of the PG&E grid that is electrically and geographically coherent and is forecast to experience consistent timing for severe fire weather. TPs are identified for each PSPS event and receive consistent treatment for notifications and de-energization. Once actual weather conditions occur, Weather "All-Clear" and service restoration times may vary due to actual weather conditions within a TP.


³ The information, times, and figures referenced in this report are based on the best available information available at the time of this report's submission. The information, times, and figures herein are subject to revision based on further analysis and validation.

than 152 community representatives and emergency managers to ensure that communities could prepare before the PSPS.

For this PSPS, PG&E opened two indoor and six outdoor CRCs. These CRCs were operated within the impacted counties, which hosted approximately 808 visitors over the three-day span. To support Access and Functional Needs (AFN) customers, PG&E provided 10 individuals with hotel stays, worked with organizations, such as 211 to assist customers with resources and, in partnership with six local food banks in six counties, PG&E provided 300 boxes of food replacement for families.

Once the wind event had passed and it was safe to patrol and restore power, PG&E deployed approximately 156 personnel and 22 helicopters to patrol roughly 557 miles of distribution circuits and 34 miles of transmission lines and impacted assets. During this effort, we identified one incident of damage resulting from high winds experienced in the de-energized areas. We re-energized customers as fast and safely as possible. Within 24 hours of the wind event, 100% of customers' power had been restored. The average restoration time for this event was 6.7 hours.

Figure 1: Event Timelines



Section 1.2 - A table including the maximum numbers of customers notified and actually de-energized; number of counties de-energized; number of Tribes de-energized; number of Medical Baseline (MBL) customers de-energized; number of transmission and distribution circuits de-energized; damage/hazard count; number of critical facilities and infrastructure de-energized. Hazards are conditions discovered during restoration patrolling or operations that might have caused damages or posed an electrical arcing or ignition risk had PSPS not been executed (D.21-06-034, Appendix A, page A15, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

Table 1 identifies the maximum number of customers notified and de-energized; number of MBL program customers de-energized; number of counties de-energized; number of Tribes de-energized; number of transmission and distribution circuits de-energized; damage/hazard count; and number of critical facilities and infrastructure de-energized.

Table 1: Customers Notified and De-energized

Total Customers			MBL Customers	Number of Counties	Number of Tribes	Number of Circuits			Damage / Hazard Count	Critical Facilities and Infrastructure De-energized
Notified	De-energized	Cancelled	De-energized	De-energized	De-energized	Transmission De-energized	Unique Distribution Circuits in Any Version of Scope	Distribution Circuits De-energized		
8,444 ⁴	3,928 ⁵	4,527	324	7	2	3 ⁶	31	18	1 damage 0 hazards	135

Section 1.3 - A PDF map depicting the de-energized area(s) (SED Additional Information.)

Response:

During the August 30-31, 2023 PSPS Event, we de-energized 3,928 customers in seven TPs. The final de-energization footprint is shown below in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Map Depicting De-Energized Areas for the August 30-31 PSPS



⁴ Of the 8,444 customers notified in scope, 6 customers were notified but were not de-energized. See Table 9 for details.

⁵ Of the 3,928 customers de-energized, 16 did not receive notifications as their contact information was not available. Further explanation is provided in Table 9.

⁶ Of the 3 transmission lines de-energized, 1 circuit is considered a foreign line and was de-energized by the customer.

Section 2 – Decision Making Process

Section 2.1 - A table showing all factors considered in the decision to shut off power for each circuit de-energized, including sustained and gust wind speeds, temperature, humidity, and moisture in the vicinity of the de-energized circuits (*Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.*)

Response:

Please see Appendix A for a table of factors considered in the decision to shut off power for each circuit de-energized, including sustained and gust wind speeds, temperature, humidity, and moisture in the vicinity of the de-energized circuits.

Section 2.2 - Decision criteria and detailed thresholds leading to de-energization including the latest forecasted weather parameters versus actual weather. Also include a PSPS decision-making diagram(s)/flowchart(s) or equivalent along with narrative description (*D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A22, D.21-06-014, page 284, SED Additional Information.*)


Response:

This section provides an overview of the decision criteria and threshold evaluation process for determining when and where to de-energize per PG&E PSPS protocols, as implemented for the August 30–31, 2023 PSPS Event.

PSPS Preparation and Scoping Process

Figure 3 shows, at a high-level, the process we use to prepare for and conduct a PSPS. Appendix A includes anticipated parameters based on the latest meteorology forecasts used to develop the planned de-energization scope versus actual weather parameters for each circuit.

Figure 3: PG&E's High-level PSPS Process Steps



PG&E considers executing a PSPS when strong gusty winds, critically low humidity levels, and low fuel moisture levels pose an unacceptable risk of causing fast-spreading, catastrophic wildfires. Assessments begin several days before the weather event is forecasted to take place.

We identify the weather conditions that could create high fire potential by using a combination of high outage and ignition potential, high-resolution internal and external weather forecasting models and data from federal agencies that include the following:

- Ignition Probability Weather (IPW) - Determines the historical potential for ignitions from each analyzed weather event.
- Fire Potential Index (FPI) - Assists with fire model development and calibration.
- Technosylva - Provides fire spread modeling via data inputs.
- PSPS models - Provides guidance for operation decision-making.

Through partnerships with external experts, we developed our machine learning models using historic datasets and advanced forecast models that provide a better understanding of historical weather events and improve our weather forecasting. These models use the following:

- Precise location data points across our service area to conduct hourly weather analyses using high-resolution, historical data.
- Over 100 trillion data points of historical weather and fuel.
- Hourly weather data such as temperature, relative humidity, wind speed, precipitation, pressure, and dead and live fuel moisture.
- Data storage and processing via the PG&E-Amazon Web Services Cloud.

Our thresholds and guidance for identifying critical fire risk and outage/ignition potential are determined by analyzing and rigorously testing our current PSPS protocols and criteria through three decades of historical weather data in and around California. This process allows us to determine and test if historical fires from utility equipment may have been mitigated through PSPS while simultaneously understanding the scope and scale of PSPS events and customer impacts from PSPS.

External forecast information from the National Weather Service (NWS) (e.g., Red Flag Warnings) and other forecast agencies are examined carefully. Furthermore, we coordinate with these agencies during high-risk periods via daily conference calls to ultimately decide whether to de-energize portions of the grid for public safety. The main drivers considered for PSPS under the PSPS Protocols are described in the sections that follow.

Tools and Technology


PG&E has developed tools and models to better understand the impact of potential fire ignitions on communities. PG&E partners with Technosylva, an external expert in the wildfire modeling field to test and deploy cloud-based wildfire spread model capabilities. This helps us better understand where we might need to turn off power.

Each day, PG&E delivers our wildfire conditions datasets to Technosylva, who then perform over 100 million fire spread simulations. These are done every three hours, for the upcoming five days. These simulations provide fire spread scenarios that help to identify circuits that may be at risk during dry, windy weather.

Decision Criteria and Thresholds for PSPS Protocols: Distribution

When determining whether to turn off power for safety, we start with the distribution system. These powerlines are closer to communities and are generally more susceptible to dry, windy weather threats. The values presented here were developed using 10 years of PG&E's high-resolution climate data to help understand wildfire risk and the potential customer impacts of PSPS. Each of the three measures is evaluated within a small geographic area (four square kilometers). If any of the measures are forecasted to be met, circuit segments within that area are scoped for de-energization. Because powerlines travel across long distances, customers outside the affected area may also be impacted. This process is outlined in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Decision Criteria and Thresholds for PSPS Protocols: Distribution



Step 1: Minimum Fire Potential Conditions

The first step to determine the scope of a PSPS is evaluating the Minimum Fire Potential Conditions (mFPC). This ensures that PSPS is only executed during wind events when atmospheric conditions and fuels are dry. A PSPS event is evaluated if the following mFPC are true in the High Fire Risk Areas (HFRA)⁷:

- Sustained wind speeds above 19 mph
- Dead fuel moisture 10-hr less than 9%⁸
- Dead fuel moisture 100-hr, 1000-hr less than 11%⁹
- Relative humidity below 30%
- Herbaceous live fuel moisture below 65%
- Shrub (Chamise) Live Fuel Moisture below 90%
- FPI (the probability of large or catastrophic fires given an ignition) above 0.7

These values were established from an examination of historical fire occurrence in the PG&E service area, PSPS sensitivity studies using historical data viewed through the lens of both customer impacts and wildfire risk mitigated, as well as information published by federal agencies regarding fire behavior and criteria used to issue warnings to the public.

Step 2: In-Depth Review of Fire Risk

If all minimum fire conditions are met, we conduct an in-depth review of fire risk using three separate measures. If the criteria for any of these measures are met, we may need to turn off power for safety.

- Catastrophic Fire Probability (CFP):** This model combines the probability of fire ignitions due to weather impacting the electric system with the probability that a fire will

⁷ 2023 WMP, pp. 895-897.


⁸ 10-hr. Dead Fuel Moisture represents the modeled moisture content in dead fuels in the 0.25 to 1-inch diameter class and the layer of the forest floor about one inch below the surface.

⁹ 100-hr. Dead Fuel Moisture represents the modeled moisture content of dead fuels in the 1-to-3-inch diameter class. It can also be used as a very rough estimate of the average moisture content of the forest floor from 0.75 inches to 4 inches below the surface.

be catastrophic if it starts. It is the combination of the FPI Model and the IPW Model. The CFPD model accounts for changes over time based on actual performance data. Thus, the model will address positive and negative trends in grid performance and reliability year-over-year, incorporating grid improvements such as system hardening, and enhanced vegetation management based on their performance at mitigating outages over time.

- IPW Model: A machine learning model that uses 10 years of weather data to correlate approximately 500,000 outages occurring on PG&E's distribution grid. The model analyzes the potential for several types of power outages in a given weather event, as well as the potential for that outage to be the source of an ignition. IPW learns from and accounts for changes on the grid from year-to-year.
- FPI Model: This model outputs the probability that a fire will become large or catastrophic and is used as a daily and hourly tool to drive operational decisions to reduce the risk of utility caused fires. It was enhanced in 2021 with additional data and improved analytic capabilities.
- **Tree Considerations:** Our PSPS protocols utilize a machine learning model to integrate the potential for trees to strike the lines into our IPW Model. This helps our meteorology teams more accurately analyze risk posed by trees and how that translates to increased ignition probability. The graph featured in Figure 5 shows how PG&E ranks scenarios based on the IPW risk and the FPI value. Scenarios with a high risk of an IPW and a high FPI value will always warrant a PSPS. However, power may be turned off in other scenarios to avoid catastrophic wildfires.

Figure 5: Catastrophic Fire Probability Model



- **Catastrophic Fire Behavior (CFB):** We also consider environmental conditions of significant wildfires, like dead and dying trees or drought conditions when determining to de-energize customers. This allows us to capture potential ignition events that are rarer and more difficult to forecast, such as animal contact and external debris impacting electrical lines. These locations are only considered once the mFPC are met. This is based on fire spread simulations using dynamic weather and fuel data for the event.

- Fireline Intensity: The U.S. Forest Service Rocky Mountain Research Station did a study of fireline intensity which is determined by the size and components of flames. It is measured as the rate of heat energy released (Btu) per unit length of the fireline (ft) per unit(s). It is also calculated by estimating the flame length, which is the distance measured from the average flame tip to the middle of the base of the fire. We use probable fireline intensity to evaluate the potential need to turn off power.
- Vegetation and Electric Asset Criteria Considerations: We review locations from recent inspections where high-priority trees or electric maintenance status may increase the risk of ignition. If an area is forecast to experience minimum fire conditions and there are known issues with equipment or vegetation that have not yet been addressed, we may need to turn off power.

Decision Criteria for PSPS Transmission Protocols

In addition to analyzing distribution circuits that may need to be de-energized for safety, we also review the transmission lines and structures in areas experiencing dry, windy weather conditions. Transmission lines are like the freeways of the electric system, carrying high voltage energy across long distances. Similar to our distribution protocols, there is no single criterion or threshold that will require turning off power to a transmission line.

Step 1: mFPC

When determining whether to turn off power for safety on transmission lines, we review the same mFPC as with distribution circuits.

If these conditions are met, we will then look at the below criteria to determine whether a transmission line must be turned off.

Step 2: In-Depth Review of Fire Risk

Once PG&E identifies the initial scope, we work with the California Independent Service Operator (CAISO) to ensure the initial scope is appropriate. This includes analyzing whether it will compromise the power supply to other jurisdictions, utilities or facilities connected to our system. This important step can last several hours, which is why the potential scope of a PSPS may change as we get closer to the forecasted weather event.

- Catastrophic Fire Probability – Asset (CFP_T – Asset): We use machine learning to assess the likelihood of equipment failure during a given weather event, and the subsequent risk of catastrophic wildfires if a failure occurs. This model uses a combination of the Operability Assessment (OA) and FPI Models, both in time and space, at every transmission structure to form the Transmission Catastrophic Fire Probability model for asset failures. The OA Model combines historical wind speeds for each structure, historical outage activity, Bayesian updating, and the condition of assets based on inspection programs to help understand the wind-related failure probability of each structure. The OA Model can be driven with forecast wind speeds to output the probability of failure at the structure level.
- Catastrophic Fire Probability – Vegetation (CFP_T – Veg): The transmission-specific vegetation risk model was derived by a collaborative effort between PG&E vegetation management and external contractors such as NV5 and Formation Environmental. This model leverages aerial LiDAR data to map the location and attributes of trees near transmission lines. The transmission vegetation risk model is based on several factors such as overstrike, the amount of unobstructed fall paths to a wire, the slope between tree


and conductor, and tree exposure. The transmission vegetation risk model is combined with the FPI Model in space and time to form $CFP_T - Veg$.

- **CFB:** We may de-energize customers where the consequence of a potential wildfire ignition would be extreme, even if the probability of a power line or equipment failure is low.
- **Vegetation and Electric Asset Criteria Considerations:** We review locations from recent inspections where high-priority trees or electric compliance issues are present that may increase the risk of ignition.

In addition to the meteorological models, we also evaluate the impacts of de-energization against the risk of wildfire should de-energization not occur, as outlined in Section 2.4. This information is reviewed at key decision points in the PSPS process and supports the ultimate decision to de-energize our customers and our communities.

Figure 6 provides a quantitative summary of the decision criteria for our PSPS Protocols for Transmission.

Figure 6: Decision Criteria for PSPS Transmission Protocols



Step 3: Determining the Outage Area

Transmission lines meeting the criteria above then pass to the next stage of review. We conduct a Power Flow Analysis on the in-scope transmission lines (if applicable) to analyze any potential downstream impacts of load shedding. Once PG&E identifies the initial scope, we work with the CAISO to ensure system setups to support the line outages are appropriate. This includes analyzing whether it will compromise the power supply to other jurisdictions, utilities or facilities connected to our system.

After Determining the Outage Area for Distribution and Transmission

After determining the outage area both for Distribution and Transmission, PG&E reviews the forecasted customer impacts of each circuit against the forecasted wildfire risk of each circuit. If there's reasonable risk for ignition on the distribution circuits or transmission lines during the forecasted weather event, it is included in the PSPS scope. We then share this analysis internally during key decision-making points to inform PSPS decision making and further risk modeling.

Starting 12 hours before the forecasted PSPS de-energization time, we transition from evaluating forecast data to observing the weather in real-time. Based on real-time observations and analysis, we continually evaluate all the outage areas identified in the previous steps to determine whether to initiate PSPS de-energization. PG&E also uses external tools and analysis to provide input to the decision to de-energize, as described in the next sections.

Decision-Making and Analysis to Validate if PSPS is Necessary

During high-risk periods, PG&E Meteorologists participate in daily interagency conference calls that commonly include multiple NWS local offices, the NWS western region headquarters, and representatives from the Geographic Area Coordination Center (GACC), also known as Predictive Services. This call is hosted by the Northern California and/or Southern California GACC offices.

During these calls, the external agencies present their expert assessment on the upcoming periods and locations of risk, wind speeds and fuel moisture levels, and any other relevant factors to consider. PG&E appreciates these conference calls and the opportunity to coordinate with external and independent forecast agencies on upcoming risk periods.

During PSPS events, PG&E's Lead Meteorologist for the event, called the Meteorologist-in-Charge (MIC), summarizes these forecasts and discussions for the PG&E Officer-in-Charge (OIC), who ultimately makes the decision to execute a PSPS event. If external agencies are not in agreement with PG&E's analysis and do not see an upcoming event as high risk for large fires, the OIC may use this intelligence to decide if a PSPS event is warranted.

The following sources and tools are considered before initiating a PSPS event by the MIC:

- Fire Weather Watches and Red Flag Warning (NWS - Federal)
- Significant fire potential for wind (GACC - Federal)
- Storm Prediction Center (part of NOAA - Federal)
- Daily interagency conference call with agencies during high-risk periods
- Live weather data from weather stations
- Location of existing fires
- External weather model data

Based on the above analyses, we can determine how many customers may be subject to de-energization, and further investigate mitigation options—such as advanced switching solutions, sectionalization, the use of islanding, alternative grid solutions, and temporary generation—to support customers who could lose upstream power sources but are in areas that may be safe to keep energized.

We monitor and forecast weather over a multi-day horizon, so we can anticipate when a PSPS may be needed and activate our EOC as far in advance as possible. Our internal weather model and external modeling are updated multiple times per day. PG&E's meteorology team constantly evaluates both internal and external weather models for changes in weather event timing, strength, and potential locations impacted; our meteorology then incorporates these changes into a new weather scope generally once per day.

Weather shifts may force changes to PSPS scope and impacts at any point in time during PSPS planning and execution; this may allow us to avoid de-energization in some areas if fire-critical

conditions lessen but can also cause some areas and customers to move into de-energization scope late in the process if forecasted fire-critical weather footprints change or increase. Possible changes in PSPS scope and impact are driven by the inherent uncertainty in weather forecast models.

PG&E utilized and referenced these protocols and tools during the August 30-31, 2023, PSPS Event to determine the latest forecasted weather parameters versus actual weather. Additional information is included in Appendix A.

Section 2.3 - A thorough and detailed description of the quantitative and qualitative factors it considered in calling, sustaining, or curtailing each de-energization event including any fire risk or PSPS risk modeling results and information regarding why the de-energization event was a last resort, and a specification of the factors that led to the conclusion of the de-energization event. (D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 9, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

For each distribution circuit and transmission line de-energized in the final scope of this PSPS event, the quantitative PSPS model values and weather station observations are provided in Appendix A. Below is a detailed description that was recorded by our Meteorologists analyzing the event.

August 30-31, 2023 PSPS Event

On Saturday, August 26, 2023, some weather forecast models began to show the potential for a dry, northerly wind event developing midweek, around August 30, 2023. On Sunday, August 27, 2023, PG&E's Meteorology team, Emergency Planning and Response team, and EOC Commander met to discuss any evolution in weather models and monitor any changes.

Based on the emerging risk of a PSPS, we entered into EOC readiness posture on August 27, 2023 at 1330 and then activated the EOC at 18:00 PDT the same day.

The first PSPS scope was developed during the afternoon on August 27, 2023 and reflected the risk of dry winds mostly along the northern and western sides of the Sacramento Valley.

The weather forecast and PSPS models were closely monitored leading up to the event and the scope of the event was adjusted on the evening of Sunday, August 27, and Monday, August 28, 2023.

By mid-day on Monday, August 28, 2023, federal forecast agencies began to highlight the upcoming event. NWS Sacramento issued a Fire Weather Watch for the Sacramento Valley for Tuesday evening through Wednesday evening due to forecasted gusty winds and low humidity recovery. The NWS Eureka office issued a similar Watch for a small portion of their adjacent territory.

On Tuesday, August 29, 2023, the Fire Weather Watches issued by Sacramento and Eureka were upgraded to Red Flag Warnings. The San Francisco Bay Area office also issued a Red Flag Warning for a small section of the North Bay elevated terrain, specifically highlighting the Vaca Mountains adjacent to the Sacramento Red Flag Warning. Additionally, North Ops Predictive Services issued their forecast with high risk due to wind for the Sacramento Valley (Predictive Service Area NC05) for August 30, 2023.

In the early morning of August 30, 2023, our Meteorology team continued to monitor forecasted and real-time weather conditions between the decision to de-energize and the planned de-energization start time. Dry, northerly winds began to develop, and real-time conditions began trending towards PG&E's PSPS Models guidance as detailed in Section 2 for some TPs. Throughout the morning, our Meteorology team recommended the de-energization of TPs 1,2, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 12 while the remaining TPs were recommended to delay as relative humidity values and/or wind speeds were failing to reach mFPC.

In the afternoon, we concluded that conditions in TPs 3, 7, 9, 10 and 11 were not going to meet the criteria for de-energization. Meteorology made a recommendation to cancel these TPs at a 1300 cancellation meeting, which was approved by the EOC Commander. As the afternoon progressed, real-time and forecasted conditions began to improve in the de-energized TPs. Meteorology recommended the in-scope TPs be put into an all-clear status, indicating that the areas were no longer experiencing dangerous fire weather conditions and that restoration efforts could begin.

PSPS Scope Adjustments Based on High Resolution PSPS Models Guidance




The tools and models outlined in Section 2.2 are part of the decision criteria that PG&E's Meteorologists consider for the scope of PSPS. Longer range weather forecast model data are used to determine the location and timing of a PSPS event. Typically, these weather forecasts are less certain the farther the observed date is. This is akin to the well-known hurricane "cone of uncertainty" in which the potential track of a hurricane is represented by an area that expands farther out in time, which resembles an expanding cone. Thus, there is an inherent tradeoff between the farther out the forecasts are for a PSPS event and the uncertainty in the PSPS scope and waiting until forecasts become more certain. This ultimately leads to changes in PSPS scope as weather forecast models are updated and the scope is refined.

During PSPS events, PG&E's Meteorologists track weather forecasts over time and compare weather forecast models against one another to gauge the level of uncertainty in the forecast. Forecasts of PSPS are routinely updated ahead of the PSPS.

As the event unfolds in real-time, PG&E's Meteorologists transition to real-time observations of weather stations, satellite data, pressure gradients, and live feeds from Alert Wildfire Camera. These observations help to evaluate if the event is unfolding as expected. In many instances, models trend stronger or weaker with each model iteration leading up to a PSPS. This dictates changes in event scope and decisions to de-energize or cancel areas.

Figure 7: PSPS Scope Changes as Weather Forecasts Change

Each color indicates the geographic location of a different TP for this PSPS event.

<p>Scope as of 08/28/2023 15:00 PDT</p> <p>Forecasted Event Data: Fire Weather Timing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Start: 08/30 03:00 ● End: 08/31 16:00 <p>~ 8,045 Customers</p> <p>11 TPs 7 Counties</p> <p>31 Distribution Circuits 3 Transmission Lines</p>	
<p>Scope as of 08/29/2023 10:20 PDT</p> <p>Forecasted Event Data: Fire Weather Timing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Start: 08/30 02:00 ● End: 08/30 16:00 <p>~ 8,476 Customers</p> <p>12 TPs 8 Counties</p> <p>33 Distribution Circuits 3 Transmission Lines</p>	
<p>Scope as of 08/30/2023 20:00 PDT</p> <p>Forecasted Event Data: Fire Weather Timing:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Start: 08/30 02:00 ● End: 08/30 16:00 <p>~ 3,928 Customers</p> <p>7 TPs 7 Counties</p> <p>20 Distribution Circuits 3 Transmission Lines</p>	

External PSPS Decision Inputs

Meteorological analyses establish that high winds combined with low relative humidity and dry fuel conditions in California create significant fire threat and exacerbate fire spread. The NWS issues a Red Flag Warning to indicate critical fire weather conditions under which any fire that develops will likely spread rapidly. CAL FIRE states, “the types of weather patterns that cause a watch or warning include low relative humidity, strong winds, dry fuels, the possibility of dry lightning strikes, or any combination of the above.” As noted previously, PG&E’s PSPS events consistently occur during periods and in areas where federal, state, and local authorities have identified as having extreme fire risk including the presence of strong winds.

We compare PG&E’s fire risk forecasts against those of external agencies to validate there is shared recognition of high fire risk across the California meteorology community. On August 30, 2023, our analysis of fire risk justifying a PSPS event was validated by numerous sources and warnings:

- North Ops Predictive Services issued their 7-day Significant Fire Potential Outlook, showing High Risk due to wind for one Predictive Service Area, which covered the Sacramento Valley and adjacent terrain.
- Red Flag Warnings from the NWS were issued from 3 local NWS offices: Sacramento, Eureka, San Francisco Bay Area (Figure 8).
- The NWS summary of weather conditions and hazards supported severe fire weather risk. (Figure 9).

Figure 8: NWS Red Flag Warning Coverage from the Sacramento Weather Office



Figure 9: NWS Summary, Weather Conditions and Hazards Supporting Conclusion of Severe Fire Weather Risk on August 30, 2023

California	Begins	Ends	Last Updated
Red Flag Warning (MTR) +	Tue Aug 29 11:00pm	Wed Aug 30 8:00pm	4hrs ago
Red Flag Warning (EKA) +	Tue Aug 29 11:00pm	Wed Aug 30 8:00pm	2hrs 32mins ago
Red Flag Warning (STO) +	Tue Aug 29 11:00pm	Wed Aug 30 8:00pm	2hrs 32mins ago

We also review forecasted wind speeds in the potential PSPS-impacted counties to evaluate the need for a PSPS. Figure 10 also shows the Utility Fire FPI Ratings for Fire Index Areas (FIAs) in PG&E’s service area for August 30, 2023. We determine the scope for PSPS events within those FIAs with fire risk rating R5-Plus from PG&E’s FPI model. In Figure 11, the event scope can be compared with other agencies to vet the fire weather risk. Notably, through PG&E’s focused de-energization approach and its mitigation efforts, only 3,928 customers were de-energized despite approximately 601,467, and 305,132 being under GACC’s High Risk weather forecast and NWS’s Red Flag Warning respectively.

Figure 10: PG&E Utility FPI Ratings for August 30, 2023





Figure 11: Comparison of Federal Agency Severe Fire Weather Warning Footprints to Final PSPS Scope



Section 2.4 - An explanation of how the utility determined that the benefit of de-energization outweighed potential public safety risks, and analysis of the risks of de-energization against not de-energizing. The utility must identify and quantify customer, resident, and the general public risks and harms from de-energization and clearly explain risk models, risk assessment processes, and provide further documentation on how the power disruptions to customers, residents, and the general public is weighed against the benefits of a proactive de-energization (D.19-05- 042, Appendix A, page A24, D.21-06-014, page 284, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

PG&E's PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool addresses the CPUC's requirements presented in the 2019 PSPS Order Instituting Investigation (OII)¹⁰, which requires California investor-owned utilities (IOUs) to quantify the risk and benefits associated with initiating or not initiating a PSPS event for our customers, residents and the general public.¹¹ PG&E ran the PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool to analyze the risk of de-energization during the August 30-31, 2023 event and the results determined the benefit of a PSPS outweighed the risk. For further details on the analysis, see Figure 14 below.

PG&E incorporated the aforementioned risk-benefit analysis into our PSPS execution process to help inform our PSPS decision-making process. Our risk-benefit tool aligns with the California IOUs and the current industry-standard Multi-Attribute Value Function (MAVF) framework, as defined through the Safety Modeling Assessment Proceeding (SMAP), which specifies how various consequences are factored into a risk calculation. Utilizing this framework, we incorporate event forecast information into our PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool, which is further described under the "Risk Assessment" section below.

The output of the tool is a ratio that compares the calculated PSPS potential benefit from initiating a de-energization event (i.e., mitigation of catastrophic wildfire consequence) to the risks associated with PSPS event (i.e., impact to customers resulting from a PSPS outage). Key inputs in the risk-benefit analysis include results from Technosylva wildfire simulations specific to the distribution circuit and transmission lines in scope for a potential de-energization, the number of customers anticipated to be de-energized, and the forecasted number of customer minutes across each identified circuit in scope for a potential de-energization.

After the potential de-energization scope is determined, including the identification of potentially impacted circuits for the potential PSPS event in question, this scope and the Technosylva wildfire simulation outputs are used as inputs into the Risk-Benefit tool. This tool quantifies the potential public safety risk and wildfire risk resulting from the forecasted impacts of the pending weather that may lead to a potential PSPS. The Wildfire Risk Score is based on an 8-hour simulation from Technosylva that can, at times, understate the risk significantly. To account for this, the MIC may still recommend to de-energize circuits where the Risk-Benefit tool shows higher PSPS risk than Wildfire risk.

¹⁰ Decision (D.) 21-06-014

¹¹ This tool was developed in collaboration with PG&E's Risk Management and Safety team and Joint IOU PPS Working Group ahead of the 2021 PPS season, with alignment on the industry-standard methodology described in PG&E's Risk Assessment and Mitigation Phase (RAMP) and General Rate Case workpapers. Please see PG&E response to CPUC Energy Division Data Request GRC-2023-Ph1-DR_ED_001_Q01Supp01.

Risk Assessment

As stated, PG&E's PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool utilizes the state-wide standard MAVF framework that captures the safety, reliability, and financial impact of identified potential risk events, as outlined in our Enterprise Risk Register¹². The tool's calculations use a non-linear scaling of consequences, reflecting our focus on low-frequency/high-consequence risk events without neglecting high-probability/low-consequence risk events. The PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool's MAVF scores are used to compare the potential de-energization risk from a forecasted PSPS against the potential risk of catastrophic wildfires that may occur if circuits remain energized. This analysis is specific to the potentially impacted circuits being considered for PSPS de-energization.

The following inputs are factored in MAVF risk scores for PSPS events and wildfires, which are weighed against one another:

- Technosylva Wildfire Simulation Data: Fire simulation, like the maps shown in Figure 12 below, forecasts the consequences of a potential wildfire's impact on customers, wildlife, and infrastructures on each circuit for every three hours. These values are based on Technosylva's proprietary and sophisticated wildfire modeling, using real-time weather models, state-of-the-art fuel, and 8-hour fire spread modeling.
- Forecasted Circuits: The final list of the distribution circuits and transmission lines identified to be in-scope for a potential PSPS.
- Customer Minutes: Forecasted outage duration the customers will face by the potential PSPS.
- Customers Impacted: Forecasted number of customers anticipated to be impacted by the potential PSPS.
- Customer Category and Critical Customer Adjustment Factor: The type of customer (e.g., MBL program, etc.) is incorporated into the analysis through the use of a "critical customer adjustment factor," which is applied to the customer outage duration to reflect a higher risk score for customers who are at a greater adverse risk of a potential de-energization event.

Once the above data is made available and incorporated into the tool, the modeling considerations described as follows are used to estimate the consequence of the: (1) potential wildfire risk and (2) PSPS risk at a circuit level. Throughout the tool, a variety of modeling considerations are made to facilitate calculations which are included in Table 2 and summarized in Figure 12.

¹² Full details of the MAVF methodology are provided through the Risk Assessment and Modeling Phase (RAMP) Report RAMP Report, pp. 3-3 to 3-15 and General Rate Case (GRC) workpapers in response to Energy Division GRC-2023-Phi_DR_ED_001_Q01Supp01.

Table 2: PSPS Risk-Benefit Consequence Modeling Considerations

Consequence Type	Wildfire Consequence Considerations	PSPS Consequence Considerations
Safety	Calculated based on maximum population impacts derived from Technosylva wildfire simulation models and a fatality ratio based on National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) data.	Calculated from an estimate of Equivalent Fatalities (EF) per Million Customer Minutes Interrupted (MMCI). The EF/MMCI ratio is estimated from previous PG&E PSPS events and other large external outage events ¹³ .
Reliability	N/A	Calculated directly from the potential number of customers impacted and outage duration based on customer minutes interrupted.
Financial	Calculated based on maximum building impacts derived from Technosylva wildfire simulation models and a cost per structure burned previously evaluated in 2020 RAMP Report ¹⁴ .	Calculated based on two financial estimates 1) distribution of a lump sum cost of execution across all relevant circuits and 2) an estimated proxy cost per customer in scope per PSPS event ¹⁵ .

Potential Wildfire Risk

Wildfire consequence impacts are calculated based on the outputs of the Technosylva simulations. Variables include 1) population (e.g., customers, residents and general public) impacted by wildfire and 2) structure impacted by wildfire used to calculate natural unit values for two consequence components:

- Wildfire Safety Consequence: EF
- Wildfire Financial Consequence: Financial Cost of Wildfire (in dollars)

Potential PSPS Risk

PSPS consequence impacts are based on the following values: duration of de-energization by circuit, and number of customers impacted by de-energization on each circuit. These input values are used to calculate natural unit values for three consequence components:

- PSPS Safety Consequence: EF as an output of Customer Minutes Interrupted
- PSPS Electric Reliability Consequence: Customer Minutes Interrupted × Critical Customer Adjustment Factor
- PSPS Financial Consequence: Financial Cost of PSPS event (in dollars) × Critical Customer Adjustment Factor


¹³ Previous PG&E PSPS events include 2019-2021 events, and other large external outage events include the 2003 Northeast Blackout in New York City, 2011 Southwest Blackout in San Diego, 2012 Derecho Windstorms, 2012 Superstorm Sandy, 2017 Hurricane Irma, 2021 Blackout event.

¹⁴ See A.20-06-012.

¹⁵ The assumptions used in these calculations, including the proxy cost per customer per PSPS event, are subject to be updated and are not intended to prejudice or create precedent with regard to the development of more precise values of resiliency or cost of PSPS metrics being considered in other ongoing proceedings at the California Public Utilities Commission, such as the Risk-Based Decision-Making Rulemaking [R.20.07.013] and the Microgrid and Resiliency Strategies.

Once the consequence values (safety, reliability, financial) are estimated, they are converted into MAVF risk scores. Once the Risk-Benefit tool calculates the impacts between the PSPS event and a wildfire, it is summarized by indicating if the adverse impact from a PSPS event outweighs the risk of a wildfire.

Figure 12: Visual Representation of PSPS Risk-Benefit Tool




August 30-31, 2023 PSPS Event


For the August 30-31 PSPS, PG&E ran the PSPS Risk Model using the latest scope prior to the first potential de-energization, shown below in Figure 1413, which supported initiating a PSPS based on the forecasted impact information and indicated that 31 of 32 distribution circuits¹⁶ and three transmission lines in the latest scope surpassed the analysis threshold of 1 to support a PSPS. One Distribution circuit (Pit No7 1101) had no fire impact (population or building consequence) simulated by the Technosylva consequence model and therefore no defined wildfire risk score. Note the PSPS Risk Model calculations are based on forecasted conditions. Additional findings for the August 30-31, 2023, PSPS Event, can be found in Figure 13 and Table 3.

¹⁶ There are 31 unique distribution circuits, however, Cottonwood 1102 is accounted for twice as it spanned two TPs for a total of 32 distribution circuits.


Figure 13: Fire Simulation Maps



Surface Fuels





Rate of Spread (ch/h)




Flame Length (ft)

Fireline Intensity (btu/ft/s)



Crown Type



Firepaths





Table 3: Impact Analysis during August 30-31, 2023 PSPS Event

Impact Analysis	
Size (ac)	4,696.23
Initial Attack Assessment	3-High
No. of Buildings	86
Total Population	65
No. Places	4

Figure 14: PSPS Potential Benefit Versus PSPS Potential Risk Consequence



Section 2.5 - Explanation of alternatives considered and evaluation of each alternative. (D.19-05-042 Appendix A, page A22.)

Response:

After reviewing the meteorological information that indicated a potential for catastrophic wildfire and the impacts on customers through de-energization, we considered whether alternatives to de-energizing, such as additional vegetation management and disabling automatic reclosers, could adequately reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfire thus lowering the need for de-energization. We determined these measures alone did not reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfire in areas within the PSPS scope sufficiently to protect public safety.

Leading up to the August 30–31, 2023 PSPS, PG&E readied de-energization mitigations, reviewed alternatives to de-energization and took the following steps:

- Our Operations team reviewed asset and vegetation tags that included incremental customers into PSPS scope and worked to correct these tags.
- We conducted hazard tree mitigation efforts on circuits potentially in PSPS scope in the days leading up to the event. Tree-trimming near a utility line can keep limbs and trunks from nearby trees from falling into a line, but it does not mitigate against broken limbs from distant trees outside the vegetation management perimeter that could blow into a line or break utility equipment.
- Pre-patrols of potentially impacted transmission facilities were also ongoing in the days leading up to the time of anticipated de-energization. While pre-patrols can help identify and correct asset tags on impacted transmission lines, even transmission lines in fully healthy condition may still pose a wildfire risk. Thus, pre-patrol of potentially impacted transmission facilities was not considered a sufficient alternative to PSPS.
- We enabled Enhanced Powerline Safety Setting (EPSS) and disabled automatic reclosing in Tier 2/Tier 3 High Fire Threat District (HFTD) areas. This reduces the ignition risk from attempts to re-energize circuits via automatic reclosing.
- To minimize PSPS public safety impacts, we employed a granular scoping process. This allows us to de-energize smaller segments of the grid within the close confines of the

fire-critical weather footprint, rather than de-energizing larger amounts of customers in more populated areas.

- To reduce PSPS public safety impacts, we reviewed the total count of impacted customers and impact of potential de-energization to our MBL program customers and critical facilities; we factored the back-up generation capabilities of critical facilities and infrastructure that pose societal impact risks if de-energized.
- We reviewed opportunities for islanding, sectionalization, temporary generation, backup-generation, and alternate grid solutions to reduce and mitigate the number of customers de-energized. Due to the outage locations for this PSPS, there were no opportunities for islanding.
- To relieve PSPS public safety impacts, we provide local CRCs to support customers in impacted communities.
- We support vulnerable customers through California Foundation for Independent Living Centers (CFILC) and CBO resource partners that offered various services to customers impacted by this PSPS. Further information is detailed in .
- We utilize Priority Notifications and established information sharing processes to notify impacted customers of the expected de-energization.
- We increased our restoration efforts with the use of resources, such as helicopters to conduct line safety patrols after the Weather “All-Clear,” and accessibility equipment for patrols, repairs, and restoring service safely.

Section 3 – De-energized Time, Place, Duration and Customers

Section 3.1 - The summary of time, place and duration of the event, broken down by phase if applicable. (Resolution ESRB-8 page 3, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

The PSPS event occurred over the timeframe of August 30 – 31, 2023 in seven TPs located in seven counties. Affected counties include Butte, Colusa, Glenn, Lake, Shasta, Tehama, and Yolo. PG&E began de-energizing customers on August 30, 2023 at 01:40 PDT and restored the final customer on August 31, 2023 at 11:39 PDT. For additional information regarding the time, place and duration of the PSPS, please see Figure 1 and Appendix B.

Section 3.2 - A zipped geodatabase file that includes PSPS event polygons of de-energized areas. The file should include items that are required in Section 3.3. (SED Additional Information.)

Response:

A zipped geodatabase file that includes PSPS event polygons of final de-energized areas combined with the event data can be found in the attachment “PGE_PSPS_EVENT_09152023_CONF.gdb.zip”

Section 3.3 - A list of circuits de-energized, with the following information for each circuit. This information should be provided in both a PDF and excel spreadsheet. (Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.)

- County
- De-energization date/time
- Restoration date/time
- “All Clear” declaration date/time
- General Order (GO) 95, Rule 21.2-D Zone 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3 classification or non-HFTD
- Total customers de-energized
- Residential customers de-energized
- Commercial/Industrial Customers de-energized
- MBL customers de-energized
- AFN other than MBL customers de-energized
- Other Customers
- Distribution or transmission classification

Response:

A list of circuits de-energized, including the information listed above, can be found in Appendix B.

Delayed restoration time due to reclassification and/or damages are further noted for each circuit. A total of 3,928 customers were de-energized during the PSPS event. Of the circuits de-energized, 18 were distribution and 3 were transmission.¹⁷ There were 3,395 residential customers, including 324 MBL program customers, 1,077 AFN Customers other than MBL, 457

¹⁷ MBL program and AFN customers are included within the count of residential customers affected.

commercial/industrial, and 75 customers in the “Other¹⁸” category. While one transmission-level entity was de-energized, we do not classify this as a transmission customer outage as the entity requested to be de-energized and did not have downstream impacts.

¹⁸ ‘Other’ includes customers that do not fall under the residential or commercial/industrial categories such as governmental agencies, traffic lights, agricultural facilities, and prisons.

Section 4 – Damages and Hazards to Overhead Facilities

Section 4.1 – Description of all found wind-related damages or hazards to the utility’s overhead facilities in the areas where power is shut off. (*Resolution ESRB-8, page 3, SED Additional Information.*)

Response:

On August 30, 2023, weather stations near the PSPS areas recorded wind gusts as high as 49 miles per hour. These are shown in Table 21 and Figure 25 in Section 12.

During patrols of the de-energized circuits prior to restoring power, PG&E found 1 incident of wind-related damage and no hazards.¹⁹ Damages are conditions that occurred during the PSPS event, likely wind-related, necessitating repair or replacement of PG&E’s asset, such as a wire down or a fallen pole. Hazards are conditions that might have caused damages or posed an electrical arcing or ignition risk had PSPS not been executed, such as a tree limb found suspended in electrical wires. The damage and hazard locations are illustrated in Figure 15 below and mapped in Figure 16. Please see Figure 13 for our wildfire simulation analysis based on the damage identified.

¹⁹ All reported PSPS-related damages and hazards are conditions that might have caused an electrical arcing or ignition risk. PG&E defines PSPS damages as issues requiring repair/replacement, and hazards as issues requiring mitigation that does not involve repair/replacement.

Figure 15: Vegetation-Damage in Shasta County – Broken tie wire



Section 4.2 - A table showing circuit name and structure identifier (if applicable) for each damage or hazard, County that each damage or hazard is located in, whether the damage or hazard is in a HFTD or non-HFTD, Type of damage/hazard of damage. (SED Additional Information.)

Response:

A table of damages and hazards within the de-energized areas can be found in Appendix C.

Section 4.3 - A zipped geodatabase file that includes the PSPS event damage and hazard points. The file should include items that are required in Section 4.2. (SED Additional Information.)

Response:


A zipped geodatabase file that includes the PSPS event damage points can be found in attachment, "PGE_PSPS_EVENT DAMAGES_HAZARDS_09152023_CONF.gdb.zip". Please note no hazard points are included as none were identified for this PSPS.

Section 4.4 - A PDF map identifying the location of each damage or hazard. (*SED Additional Information.*)

Response:

Please see Figure 16 below for a map identifying the location of the damage. Please note no hazard points are included as none were identified for this PSPS.

**Figure 16: Map of Damage/Hazard Incidents in PSPS Footprint During August 30-31, 2023
PSPS Event**



Section 5 – Notifications

Section 5.1 - A description of the notice to public safety partners, local/tribal governments, paratransit agencies that may serve all the known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons that may need access to a community resource center, multi-family building account holders/building managers in the AFN community, and all customers, including the means by which utilities provide notice to customers of the locations/hours/services available for CRCs, and where to access electricity during the hours the CRC is closed. (Resolution ESRB-8, page 3. D21-06-034, Appendix A, page A2, A9-A10, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

Throughout the PSPS event, PG&E made significant efforts to notify Public Safety Partners, Tribal/Local Governments, CBOs (including paratransit agencies) and impacted customers²⁰ in accordance with the CPUC PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines.²¹

PG&E followed the Notification Plan discussed in our 2023 Pre-Season Report. This information can be found in [PG&E's 2023 Pre-Season Report, Appendix C: Notification Plan](#), pp. 50-60.

In addition to the processes noted in the plan, PG&E completed the following:

- PG&E worked closely with telecommunications service providers throughout the event to effectively coordinate, share information, and manage the PSPS. PG&E also provided telecommunications service providers with a dedicated PG&E contact in the EOC known as the Critical Infrastructure Lead (CIL), who shared up-to-date event information and answered specific, individual questions. These partners could reach the CIL 24/7 during the event by e-mail or phone. In addition, PG&E proactively reached out to seven telecommunications service providers²² via email or phone as weather changed or new information regarding the PSPS became available.
- In accordance with the Phase 3 PSPS Guidelines²³, PG&E provided proactive call, text and email notifications and impacted zip code information to paratransit agencies that served known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons that may have needed access to a CRC during the PSPS. All notifications to paratransit agencies included a link to the PSPS emergency website event updates page, pge.com/pspsupdates. This site also directs users to other webpages, such as the CRC page, which includes CRC information such as locations, hours, and services available for CRCs (see Section 9). The PSPS emergency website event updates page also includes two prominent buttons at the top of the page, allowing customers to look up an address to determine if it could be impacted, as well as to the map showing areas potentially affected by the shutoff.
- PG&E considers multi-family building account holders/building managers in the AFN community as part of our All Customers (including MBL program customers

²⁰ For this event, two customers normally served by the Pit No. 7 circuit, were already being served by their own temporary generation. These customers received all required notifications throughout the event regarding the outage despite not being de-energized due to their existing mitigation. For more information, see Section 10.

²¹ D.19-05-042.

²² American Tower Corporation, AT&T, Charter, Frontier, Happy Valley Telephone Co/TDS telecom, T-Mobile, Verizon

²³ D.21-06-034.

and Self-Identified Vulnerable [SIV]²⁴ customers) recipient group. For information on PG&E’s outreach and community engagement with master-metered owners, property managers, and building account holders, refer to [PG&E’s AFN Quarterly Progress Report](#) for activities between April 1, 2023, and June 30, 2023.

Table 4 below provides a description of the notifications PG&E sent to Public Safety Partners, Tribal/Local Governments and all customers in accordance with the minimum timelines set forth by the CPUC PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines²⁵.

Table 4: Notification Descriptions

Type of Notification	Recipients	Description
<p>PRIORITY NOTIFICATION: 48-72 hours in advance of anticipated de-energization</p>	<p>Public Safety Partners²⁶, CBO²⁷, transmission level customers</p>	<p>On August 27, 2023, PG&E’s Meteorology Team noted a potential PSPS and updated the weather forecast on pge.com/weather to “elevated” in certain parts of the service area. At this time, local PG&E representatives called each County Office of Emergency Services (OES) in PG&E’s electrical service area and select Tribes and cities to inform them that PG&E is monitoring an increased potential of PSPS outages.</p> <p>Following PG&E’s activation of its EOC, the following was completed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PG&E submitted a PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them that PG&E’s EOC has been activated and that PG&E is monitoring for potential PSPS outages. • PG&E sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners²⁸ via call, text and e-mail; these notifications included the following information: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Estimated window of the de-energization time. ○ When weather is anticipated to pass. ○ Estimated Time of Restoration (ETOR). ○ For Public Safety Partners only: Links to the PSPS Portal where event-specific maps and information are available.

²⁴ SIV is inclusive of customers who have indicated they are “dependent on electricity for durable medical equipment or assistive technology” as well as customers that are not enrolled or qualify for the MBL program and “certify that they have a serious illness or condition that could become life threatening if service is disconnected.” In accordance with D.21-06-034, PG&E includes customers who have indicated they are “dependent on electricity for durable medical equipment or assistive technology” in an effort to identify customers “above and beyond those in the medical baseline population” to include persons reliant on electricity to maintain necessary life functions including for durable medical equipment and assistive technology. This designation remains on their account indefinitely.

²⁵ D.19-05-042.

²⁶ Transmission level customers were not notified during the 48-72 hour notification timeframe as they were not in scope. PG&E executed Priority Notifications for transmission level customers as soon as they were brought into scope.

²⁷ Phase 3 D.21-06-034, Appendix A, page A9, Section G. MBL and AFN Communities, No. 4, Each electric investor-owned utility must provide proactive notification and impacted zip code information to paratransit agencies that may serve all the known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons that may need access to a community resource center during a proactive de-energization event.

²⁸ Other Public Safety Partners refers to first/emergency responders at the local, state, and federal level, water, wastewater, and communication service providers, affected community choice aggregators, publicly-owned utilities/electrical cooperatives, the CPUC, the California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, and the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection.

<p>WATCH NOTIFICATION: 24-48 hours in advance of anticipated de-energization</p>	<p>Public Safety Partners, CBOs, All Customers (including MBL program customers and SIV customers), and transmission level customers</p>	<p>During this time, the following was completed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PG&E submitted a PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them of a scope change. • PG&E sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners, transmission level customers, and all customers via call, text message and e-mail; these notifications included the following information: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Estimated window of the de-energization time. ○ When the adverse weather is anticipated to pass. ○ ETOR ○ For Public Safety Partners only: Links to the PSPS Portal where event-specific maps and information are available. ○ For Customers only: Potentially impacted addresses, links to PSPS Updates webpage with Community Resource Center information, and resources for customers with AFNs, including but not limited to information on the MBL program, Meals on Wheels, language support, and the Portable Battery Program (PBP). ○ For transmission-level customers only: Transmission Substation Name and Line name serving substation. • PG&E sent notifications via call, text and e-mail to MBL program customers, including tenants of master metered accounts, and SIV customers every hour until the customer confirmed receipt of the notification. • PG&E also attempted to send Cancellation Notifications to Public Safety Partners and customers within two hours of being removed from scope; this was to inform them that power would not be shut off. <p>Customer notifications were provided in English, with information on how to receive event information in 15 non-English languages, referred to herein as “translated languages”²⁹. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications were provided in English.</p>
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²⁹ Translated languages refers to Spanish, Chinese (Mandarin and Cantonese), Vietnamese, Tagalog, Korean, Russian, Arabic, Punjabi, Farsi, Japanese, Khmer, Hmong, Thai, Hindi, and Portuguese. A language is prevalent if it is spoken by 1,000 or more persons in the utility’s territory or if it’s spoken by 5 percent or more of the population within a “public safety answering point” in the utility territory (D.20-03-004). Details on the community outreach efforts for PSPS and wildfire-related outreach including efforts to reach all languages prevalent in PG&E’s service area can be found in PG&E’s Notification Plan, include in our [2023 PSPS Pre-Season Report](#).

<p>WARNING NOTIFICATION: 1-4 hours in advance of anticipated de-energization, if possible</p>	<p>Public Safety Partners, CBOs All Customers (including MBL program customers, SIV customers), and transmission level customers</p>	<p>When forecasted weather conditions showed that a safety shutoff was approved to move forward, and power would be de-energized in approximately 1-4 hours, the following was completed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PG&E submitted a PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them that PG&E has made the decision to de-energize. • PG&E sent notifications via call, text and e-mail to other Public Safety Partners, transmission level customers, and customers; these notifications included the same the following information: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Estimated window of the de-energization time. ○ When the adverse weather is anticipated to pass. ○ ETOR ○ For Public Safety Partners only: Links to the PSPS Portal where event-specific maps and information are available. ○ For Customers only: Potentially impacted addresses, links to PSPS Updates webpage with Community Resource Center information, and resources for customers with AFNs, including but not limited to information on the MBL program, Meals on Wheels, language support, and the PBP. ○ For transmission-level customers only: Transmission Substation Name and Line name serving substation. • PG&E sent notifications via call, text and e-mail to MBL program customers, including tenants of master metered accounts, and SIV customers every hour until the customer confirmed receipt of the notification. • PG&E also attempted to send Cancellation Notifications to Public Safety Partners and customers within two hours of being removed from scope; this was to inform them that power would not be shut off. <p>Customer notifications were provided in English, with information on how to get event information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications were provided in English.</p>
<p>POWER OFF NOTIFICATION: When de-</p>	<p>Public Safety Partners, All Customers</p>	<p>When shut off was initiated, the following was completed:</p>

<p>energization is initiated</p>	<p>(including MBL program customers and SIV customers) and transmission level customers</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PG&E submitted a PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC to notify them that de-energization has been initiated. • Agency Representatives of PG&E conducted a live call and/or sent an e-mail, as appropriate, to County OES that were within the potential PSPS scope area and select Tribes and cities to inform them that customers within their jurisdiction were beginning to be de-energized. • PG&E Grid Control Center (GCC) conducted live agent calls to impacted transmission level customers. • PG&E sent notification to other Public Safety Partners, transmission level customers, and customers via call, text messages, and e-mail, which included: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Impacted addresses (for customers only). ○ De-energization time. ○ When the adverse weather is anticipated to pass. ○ For Customers Only: Links to the PSPS Updates webpage with Community Resource Center information, and resources for customers with AFNs, including but not limited to information on the MBL program, Meals on Wheels, language support, and the PBP. <p>Customer notifications were provided in English, with information on how to receive event information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications were provided in English.</p>
<p>WEATHER “ALL-CLEAR”/ETOR UPDATE NOTIFICATION: Immediately before re-energization begins</p>	<p>Public Safety Partners, All Customers (including MBL program customers and SIV customers) and transmission level customers</p>	<p>After the weather passed and the area is deemed safe to begin patrols and restoration, PG&E completed the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Submitted a PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES and sent an e-mail to the CPUC notifying them that PG&E is initiating re-energization patrols. • Sent notifications to other Public Safety Partners, transmission level customers³⁰ and customers via call, text message and e-mail; these notifications included the ETOR.

³⁰ Transmission lines serving impacted Transmission-level Customers and Municipal Utilities may cut across multiple Fire Index Areas (FIAs) and will only be notified when all those FIAs that the line cuts across have been given the All-Clear.

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sent “event update” notifications via call, text and e-mail to customers if their ETOR changed; two ways that an ETOR may change include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ New field or meteorology conditions. ○ Damage was found during patrols and repair is needed. <p>Customer notifications were provided in English, with information on how to receive event information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications. Public Safety Partner notifications were provided in English.</p>
<p>RESTORATION NOTIFICATION: When re-energization is complete</p>	<p>Public Safety Partners, CBOs, All Customers (including MBL program customers and SIV customers), and transmission level customers</p>	<p>PG&E Grid Control Center (GCC) conducted live agent calls to notify impacted transmission level customers of restoration.</p> <p>Once customers, including MBL program customers and SIV customers, were restored, they received notifications via call, text and e-mail. This was done using an automated process that issued customer notifications every 15 minutes upon restoration of service. Customer notifications were provided in English, with information on how to receive event information in translated languages. Customers with their language preference selected in their PG&E accounts received in-language (translated) notifications.</p> <p>Once all customers were restored, PG&E submitted the final PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES, sent an e-mail to the CPUC confirming restoration of PSPS outages and reclassification of customers if applicable, and sent a notification to Public Safety Partners via call, text and e-mail. Public Safety Partner notifications were provided in English.</p>

Section 5.2 – Notification timeline including prior to de-energization, initiation, restoration, and cancellation, if applicable. The timeline should include the required minimum timeline and approximate time notifications were sent. (D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A8-A9, D.21-06-034, page A11)

Response:

Table 5 below describes notifications PG&E sent for this PSPS event, including approximate times of notifications in accordance with the minimum timelines set forth by the CPUC PSPS Phase 1 Guidelines³¹, to Tribal/Local Governments, Public Safety Partners, and all customers prior to de-energization, initiation, restoration and cancellations³². Tribal/Local Governments and Public Safety Partners are notified of scope changes and cancellations via the PSPS Portal. See Table 10 for information on when the PSPS Portal updates occurred.

Table 5: Customer Notification Timeline Summary Prior to De-energization for August 30-31, 2023 PSPS Event

Event Order	Minimum Timeline ³³	Notification Sent to:	Approximate Time Sent (PDT)	Message	Notes	Who made the Notification
Prior to De-energization	72-48 hours	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	8/27/2023 9:33:00 PM	Priority		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	8/27/2023 8:34:00 PM	Priority		PG&E
	48-24 hours	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	8/28/2023 3:16:00 PM	Watch		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	8/28/2023 3:22:00 PM	Watch		PG&E
		All Customers***	8/28/2023 3:20:00 PM	Watch		PG&E
	24-12 hours ³⁴	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	8/29/2023 11:32:00 AM	Watch		PG&E
				Watch		PG&E

³¹ D.19-05-042.

³² D.21-06-034.

³³ D.19-05-042, Appendix A, Timing of Notification.

³⁴ While not a CPUC requirement, PG&E provides an additional 24-12 hour notification to Tribal/Local Governments, Public Safety Partners and Customers.

		Public Safety Partners**	8/29/2023 11:35:00 AM			
		All Customers***	8/29/2023 11:31:00 AM	Watch		PG&E
	4-1 hours	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	8/29/2023 11:15:00 PM	Warning		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	8/29/2023 10:30:00 PM	Warning		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	8/30/2023 12:11:00 AM	Warning		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	8/30/2023 1:40:00 AM	Warning		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	8/29/2023 10:53:00 PM	Warning		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	8/29/2023 11:34:00 PM	Warning		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	8/30/2023 12:24:00 AM	Warning		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	8/30/2023 1:52:00 AM	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	8/29/2023 10:48:00 PM	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	8/29/2023 11:40:00 PM	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	8/30/2023 12:20:00 AM	Warning		PG&E
		All Customers***	8/30/2023 1:51:00 AM	Warning		PG&E

Initiation (During)	When de-energization is initiated (Power Off)	Public Safety Partners**	8/30/2023 6:45:00 AM	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	8/30/2023 8:32:00 AM	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	8/30/2023 8:37:00 AM	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	8/30/2023 8:38:00 AM	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	8/30/2023 8:40:00 AM	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	8/30/2023 8:41:00 AM	Power Off		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	8/30/2023 9:23:00 AM	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	8/30/2023 6:45:00 AM	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	8/30/2023 8:32:00 AM	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	8/30/2023 8:37:00 AM	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	8/30/2023 8:38:00 AM	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	8/30/2023 8:40:00 AM	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	8/30/2023 8:41:00 AM	Power Off		PG&E
		All Customers***	8/30/2023 9:23:00 AM	Power Off		PG&E
		Immediately before re-energization (All-Clear/ETOR)	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	8/30/2023 8:01:00 PM	Inspecting/Weather All-Clear	
	Public Safety Partners**		8/30/2023 4:19:00 PM	Inspecting/Weather All-Clear		PG&E
	Public Safety Partners**		8/30/2023 4:33:00 PM	Inspecting/Weather All-Clear		PG&E
	Public Safety Partners**		8/30/2023 4:48:00 PM	Inspecting/Weather All-Clear		PG&E
	All Customers***		8/30/2023 4:19:00 PM	Inspecting/Weather All-Clear		PG&E

		All Customers***	8/30/2023 4:33:00 PM	Inspecting/W eather All- Clear		PG&E
		All Customers***	8/30/2023 4:48:00 PM	Inspecting/W eather All- Clear		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	8/30/2023 10:45:00 AM	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	8/30/2023 11:45:00 AM	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	8/30/2023 5:14:00 PM	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	8/30/2023 5:30:00 PM	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	8/30/2023 5:44:00 PM	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	8/30/2023 6:00:00 PM	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	8/30/2023 6:15:00 PM	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	8/30/2023 6:29:00 PM	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	8/30/2023 6:51:00 PM	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	8/30/2023 7:03:00 PM	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	8/30/2023 7:17:00 PM	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	8/30/2023 7:31:00 PM	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	8/30/2023 7:44:00 PM	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	8/31/2023 8:01:00 AM	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	8/31/2023 9:00:00 AM	ETOR Update		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	8/31/2023 9:59:00 AM	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	8/30/2023 10:45:00 AM	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	8/30/2023 11:45:00 AM	ETOR Update		PG&E

		All Customers***	8/30/2023 5:14:00 PM	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	8/30/2023 5:30:00 PM	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	8/30/2023 5:44:00 PM	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	8/30/2023 6:00:00 PM	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	8/30/2023 6:15:00 PM	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	8/30/2023 6:29:00 PM	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	8/30/2023 6:51:00 PM	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	8/30/2023 7:03:00 PM	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	8/30/2023 7:17:00 PM	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	8/30/2023 7:31:00 PM	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	8/30/2023 7:44:00 PM	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	8/31/2023 8:01:00 AM	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	8/31/2023 9:00:00 AM	ETOR Update		PG&E
		All Customers***	8/31/2023 9:59:00 AM	ETOR Update		PG&E
Restoration (After)	After re-energization was completed (Restoration)	Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	8/30/2023 9:35:00 PM	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	8/30/2023 9:42:00 PM	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	8/30/2023 9:47:00 PM	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	8/30/2023 9:50:00 PM	Restore		PG&E

		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	8/30/2023 9:51:00 PM	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	8/31/2023 11:50:00 AM	Restore		PG&E
		Tribal/Local Governments and CCAs*	8/31/2023 12:45:00 PM	Restore		PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	8/30/2023 5:17:00 PM	Restore	First initial Restoration Notification sent.	PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	8/31/2023 12:02:00 PM	Restore	Last Restoration Notification sent.	PG&E
		All Customers***	8/30/2023 5:17:00 PM	Restore	First initial Restoration Notification sent.	PG&E
		All Customers***	8/31/2023 12:02:00 PM	Restore	Last Restoration Notification sent.	PG&E
Cancellation	Cancellation within 2-hours of decision to cancel****	Public Safety Partners*	8/30/2023 1:45:00 PM	Cancel	Completed via PSS Agency Representative 50 or less customer impact live call.	PG&E
		Public Safety Partners**	8/29/2023 8:30:00 PM	Cancel	Only Public Safety Partners removed from scope received the cancel notification. The Decision to descope these customers was 08/29/2023 19:44.	PG&E

		Public Safety Partners**	8/30/2023 1:35:00 PM	Cancel	Only Public Safety Partners removed from scope received the cancel notification. The Decision to descope these customers was 08/30/2023 13:10.	PG&E
		All Customers***	8/29/2023 8:30:00 PM	Cancel	Only Customers removed from scope received the cancel notification. The Decision to descope these customers was 08/29/2023 19:44.	PG&E
		All Customers***	8/30/2023 1:35:00 PM	Cancel	Only Customers removed from scope received the cancel notification. The Decision to descope these customers was 08/30/2023 13:10.	PG&E

*A subset of Public Safety Partners, including Tribes, cities, counties, and community choice aggregators.

**A subset of Public Safety Partners, including water, wastewater, and communication service providers.

***All Customers, including MBL program customers and SIV customers.

**** For Cancellation sent 2 hours after the decision to cancel, see Table 9.

Section 5.3 - For those customers where positive or affirmative notification was attempted, use the following template to report the accounting of the customers (which tariff and/or AFN population designation), the number of notification attempts made, the timing of attempts, who made the notification attempt (utility or public safety partner) and the number of customers for whom positive notification was achieved. (D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A23, SED Additional Information.) “Notification attempts made” and “Successful positive notification” must include the unique number of customer counts. When the actual notification attempts made is less than the number of customers that need positive notifications, the utilities must explain the reason. In addition, the utilities must explain the reason of any unsuccessful positive notifications. (SED Additional Information.)

Response:

Table 6 includes metrics associated with PG&E notifications provided to customers where positive or affirmative notification was attempted. PG&E is unable to track and report on notifications made by Public Safety Partners, as notification systems and/or platforms used by Public Safety Partners are out of PG&E’s purview; PG&E encourages Public Safety Partners to include PSPS messages on all of their platforms. PG&E describes its engagement with Public Safety Partners in Section 6.

PG&E interprets the number of customers that need positive or affirmative notification as customers the company seeks confirmation from, namely MBL program customers and SIV customers.

Table 6: Notifications to Customers where Positive or Affirmative Notification was Attempted³⁵

Designation	Total Number of customers ³⁶	Notification Attempts Made	Timing of Attempts ³⁷	Who made the Notification Attempt	Successful Positive Notification ³⁸
MBL ³⁹	803	803 Watch Notifications	08/28/2023 3:20 PM PDT	PG&E	775 Watch Notifications
		794 Warning Notifications ⁴⁰	08/29/2023 7:47 AM PDT		533 Warning Notifications

³⁵ Counts of “Notification Attempts Made” will not reflect the actual total of customers notified as both MBL and SIV customers can appear in both subset groups.

³⁶ Total number of customers notified where notification was attempted. Count includes customers that may have been removed from scope or received Cancellation Notifications prior to de-energization, but still received Watch and/or Warning notifications.

³⁷ Initial start time notification was sent.

³⁸ PG&E considers successful positive notifications as those in which the notification was successfully delivered to the customer (i.e., no bounce back) and the customer acknowledges receipt of the notification.

³⁹ Residential tenants of master-metered customers can also qualify for MBL quantities. The MBL category for the purposes of Table 6 does not include MBL program customers who are master meter tenants. The MBL category for the purposes of Table 6 does not include MBL program customers who are master meter tenants.

⁴⁰ Count of Warning Notifications includes doorbell rings and Live Agent phone calls.

Designation	Total Number of customers ³⁶	Notification Attempts Made	Timing of Attempts ³⁷	Who made the Notification Attempt	Successful Positive Notification ³⁸
		1,597 Overall Notifications	08/28/2023 3:20 PM PDT		1,308 Overall Notifications
MBL behind a master meter ⁴¹	1	1 Watch Notifications	08/28/2023 3:21 PM PDT	PG&E	1 Watch Notifications
		1 Warning Notifications	08/30/2023 12:22 AM PDT		0 Warning Notifications
		2 Overall Notifications	08/28/2023 3:21 PM PDT		1 Overall Notifications
SIV	205	204 Watch Notifications	8/28/2023 03:20 PM PDT	PG&E	188 Watch Notifications
		205 Warning Notifications	8/29/2023 07:57 AM PDT		127 Warning Notifications
		409 Overall Notifications	8/28/2023 03:20 PM PDT		315 Overall Notifications

During this PSPS event, MBL program customers and SIV customers received automated calls, texts, and emails at the same intervals as the general customer notifications. PG&E provided unique PSPS Watch and PSPS Warning Notifications to MBL program customers⁴² and SIV customers. These customer groups also received additional calls and texts at hourly intervals until the customer confirmed receipt of the automated notifications by either answering the phone, responding to the text, or opening the email. If confirmation was not received, a PG&E representative visited the customer's home to check on the customer (referred to as the "doorbell ring" process) while hourly notification retries continued. If the customer did not answer the check-in, the representative left a door hanger at the home to indicate PG&E had visited. In each case, the notification was considered successful⁴³. At times, PG&E also made Live Agent phone calls in parallel to the automated notifications and doorbell rings, as an additional attempt to reach the customer prior to and/or after de-energization.

⁴¹ PG&E has additional processes in place to ensure MBL customers are notified. Master meter tenants are contacted directly to be considered a positive notification. Contacting the property or building manager does not count as a positive notification.

⁴² Including MBL program customers who are master-metered tenants (e.g., renters or tenants in mobile home park).

⁴³ For MBL program customers and SIV customers, the in-person door ring visit where a door hanger is left, but no contact made with the customer is considered "successful contact," but not confirmed as "received." If the representative makes contact with the customer, then it is considered "received."

PG&E shared the lists of the MBL program customers and SIV customers who had not confirmed receipt of their notifications with appropriate county and Tribal emergency managers twice daily via the PSPS Portal. PG&E proactively notified agencies that the data was available on the PSPS Portal and encouraged them to inform these customers of the resources available to them.

PG&E did not receive positive notification from MBL and/or SIV customers as they were unresponsive to the automated notifications, “doorbell ring” process or hourly notification retries. A door hanger was left at these customers’ homes to indicate PG&E had visited. Table 7 and Table 8 include metrics associated with the notifications to de-energized MBL program customers.

Table 7: Outcomes of Notifications to De-energized MBL Program Customers

Count	Type of Notifications to De-energized MBL Customers (based on Service Point ID [SPID])	Description
324	Total De-energized MBL Program Customers	The number of customers de-energized who participate in PG&E’s MBL Program
324	Total Notifications Attempted / Sent	The total sum of automated notifications attempted via call, text, and e-mail, in-person doorbell ring visit attempts and/or Live Agent phone calls.
0	<i>Total Notifications Not Attempted / Sent</i>	<i>Total MBL program customers de-energized that PG&E did not attempt to notify.</i>
324	Total Notifications Delivered	The total sum of automated notifications sent via call, text, and e-mail, in-person doorbell ring visit attempts and/or Live Agent phone calls that were executed (i.e., active phone number, deliverable e-mail address, and/or accessible to deliver in-person doorbell ring).
0	<i>Total Notifications Not Delivered</i>	<i>Total MBL program customers de-energized whose notification was not delivered.</i>
319	Total Notifications Received	Customers who acknowledged their notification by taking one of the following actions: answered an automated or Live Agent phone call, responded to a text message, opened an e-mail, or greeted an in-person doorbell ring (excludes voicemails left, text message delivered only and not confirmed, door hanger left).
5	<i>Total Notifications Not Received</i>	<i>Total MBL program customers de-energized who did not confirm receipt / acknowledge their automated notifications, Live Agent phone calls or in-person doorbell ring. Customers who did not answer a doorbell ring were left a door hanger.</i>

Table 8: Count and Type of Additional Notifications to De-energized MBL Program Customers

Count	Type of Additional Notifications to Impacted MBL Customers (based on SPID)	Description
103	Total In-Person Visits / Doorbell Rings	Doorbell ring attempts to impacted MBL program customers where PG&E made contact with the customer (either in person or via phone call in advance of visit) or left a door hanger. ⁴⁴
87	Live Agent Phone Calls	Call attempts made by Live Agent representatives to MBL program customers that had not yet confirmed receipt of their automated notification or answered the door during PG&E's in-person visit.

Section 5.4 - A copy or scripts of all notifications with a list of all languages that each type of notification was provided in, the timing of notifications, the methods of notifications and who made the notifications (the utility or local public safety partners). (D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A23, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

Please reference *PGE PSPS Event Notifications 20230915.pdf* for templates of notifications PG&E sent during the event via call, email, and text message.

PG&E provides Tribal, city, county, Community Choice Aggregators, Public Safety Partner, transmission-level customers, and municipal utility notifications in English only.

All other customer notifications are delivered in-language (translated) if a customer's language preference is on file. If there is no language preference on file, the notification is delivered in English, with information on how to get event information in translated languages. Although PG&E offers notifications in 15 non-English languages (Spanish, Chinese [Mandarin and Cantonese], Vietnamese, Korean, Tagalog, Russian, Portuguese, Arabic, Farsi, Punjabi, Japanese, Khmer, Hmong, Thai and Hindi), only five non-English languages (Spanish, Mandarin, Cantonese, Hmong and Vietnamese) were requested for this PSPS event. For more information on notifications provided to customers in the customer-set language preferences, see Table 11. The timing of notifications sent during this event can be found in Table 5.

⁴⁴ Customers may have confirmed receipt of their notifications in multiple channels (e.g., automated notification and/or doorbell ring); therefore, the counts of total attempted and successful notifications are not mutually exclusive.

Section 5.5 - If the utility fails to provide notifications according to the minimum timelines set forth in D.19-05-042 and D.21-06-034, using the following template to report a breakdown of the notification failure and an explanation of what caused the failure. (D.21-06-014 page 286, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

PG&E makes a substantial effort to provide notifications whenever possible in accordance with the PSPS Phase 1⁴⁵, 2019 PPSO OII⁴⁶, and additional notification guidelines in Phase 3⁴⁷, weather and other factors permitting.

In accordance with Phase 3, we make every attempt to provide cancellation notifications within two hours of the decision to cancel those customers. These notifications are distributed when customers are removed from scope due to rapidly changing forecasted or observed weather conditions.

During this event, 17 customers did not receive a call, text or email notification as no valid contact information was provided by the customer to PG&E. One of these customers was a SIV customer and received a successful door knock notification.

As reflected in Table 9A-9L below, PG&E provides a detailed breakdown and analysis of the notification timing and an explanation of what caused the notification delays for this event.

Table 9: Notification Failure Causes

Notifications Sent to:	Notification Type	Notification Delays	Timing of Notifications	Explanation of Delay	Notification Failures	Explanation of Failure
Public Safety Partners excluding Critical Facilities and Infrastructure ⁴⁸	Entities who did not receive 48-to-72-hour priority notification	0	No notification delays	No notification delays	0	No notification failures
	Entities who did not receive 24-48-hour notification	0	No notification delays	No notification delays	0	No notification failures
	Entities who did not receive 1-4-hour imminent notification	0	No notification delays	No notification delays	0	No notification failures

⁴⁵ D.19-05-042.

⁴⁶ D.21-06-014.

⁴⁷ D.21-06-034.

⁴⁸ Only includes Tribes, cities, counties, CBOs and Community Choice Aggregators.

Notifications Sent to:	Notification Type	Notification Delays	Timing of Notifications	Explanation of Delay	Notification Failures	Explanation of Failure
	Entities who did not receive notifications at de-energization initiation	0	No notification delays	No notification delays	0	No notification failures
	Entities who were not notified immediately before re-energization	0	No notification delays	No notification delays	0	No notification failures
	Entities who did not receive notification when re-energization was complete	0	No notification delays	No notification delays	0	No notification failures
	Entities who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel	0	All entities received 2-hour cancellation notifications	All entities received 2-hour cancellation notifications	0	All entities received 2-hour cancellation notifications
Critical Facilities and Infrastructure ⁴⁹	Facilities who did not receive 48-to 72-hour priority notification	17	See Table 9A for timing	See Table 9A for explanation	0	No notification failures
	Facilities who did not receive 24-48-hour notification	9	See Table 9B for timing	See Table 9B for explanation	0	No notification failures
	Facilities who did not receive 1-4-hour	0	All Facilities received 1-4 hour	All Facilities received 1-4 hour	0	All Facilities received 1-4 hour

⁴⁹ Includes Public Safety Partners who are critical facilities and infrastructure customers.

Notifications Sent to:	Notification Type	Notification Delays	Timing of Notifications	Explanation of Delay	Notification Failures	Explanation of Failure
	imminent notification		imminent notifications	imminent notifications		imminent notifications
	Facilities who were not notified at de-energization initiation	133	See Table 9C for timing	See Table 9C for explanation	1	See Table 9D for explanation
	Facilities who were not notified immediately before re-energization	0	No notification delays	No notification delays	1	See Table 9E for explanation
	Facilities who were not notified when re-energization was complete	0	No notification delays	No notification delays	1	See Table 9F for explanation
	Facilities who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel	0	No notification delays	No notification delays	0	No notification failures
All other affected customers	Customers who did not receive 24–48-hour watch notifications	339	See Table 9G for timing	See Table 9G for explanation	0	No notification failures
	Customers who did not receive 1–4-hour imminent notifications	0	No notification delays	No notification delays	0	No notification failures
	Customers who were not notified at de-	3,768	See Table 9H for timing	See Table 9H for explanation	8	See Table 9I for explanation

Notifications Sent to:	Notification Type	Notification Delays	Timing of Notifications	Explanation of Delay	Notification Failures	Explanation of Failure
	energization initiation					
	Customers who were not notified immediately before re-energization	0	No notification delays	No notification delays	8	See Table 9J for explanation
	Customers who were not notified when re-energization was complete	0	No notification delays	No notification delays	9	See Table 9K for explanation
	Customers who did not receive cancellation notification within two hours of the decision to cancel	0	No notification delays	No notification delays	5	See Table 9L for explanation

Table 9A: Explanation of Delayed Priority Notifications (48-72 Hour) to Critical Facilities and Infrastructure

Facility Count	Time Notifications Sent	Explanation for Delay
1	42 hours ahead of planned outage start time	In this PSPS event, transmission impacts were not in scope 72-48 hours before de-energization was anticipated. This transmission customer was notified once they were added to scope.
7	38 hours ahead of planned outage start time	Due to changing weather conditions, these facilities were not in scope 72-48-hours before de-energization was anticipated. These facilities were notified once they were added to scope.
9	15 hours ahead of planned outage start time	Due to changing weather conditions, these facilities were not in scope 72-48-hours before de-energization was anticipated. These facilities were notified once they were added to scope.

Table 9B: Explanation of Delayed Watch Notifications (24-48 Hour) to Critical Facilities and Infrastructure

Facility Count	Time Notifications Sent	Explanation for Delay
9	15 hours ahead of planned outage start time	Due to changing weather conditions, these facilities were not in scope 48–24 hours before de-energization was anticipated. These facilities were notified once they were added to scope.

Table 9C: Explanation of Delayed Power-Off Notifications to Critical Facilities and Infrastructure

Facility Count	Time Notifications Sent	Explanation for Delay
7	2-3 hours after actual outage start time	We experienced a delay to the initial “Power Off” notifications for customers stemming from an internal process error. While our internal outage platform automation was turned on, automating the generation of notification files, we identified a gap that the vendor was not notified of the automation being turned on. This resulted in the vendor not immediately processing the notification files despite PG&E providing the files in a timely manner. During a staffing shift change this error was discovered and immediate requests were made to the vendor to process and launch all de-energization customer notifications that were delayed. These customers received the “Power Off” notifications prior to the “All Clear” notifications being launched. The timing variances of these delays were dependent on each facilities’ outage start time. The closer the facility’s outage start time was to the time the issue was resolved, the shorter the delay.
74	4-5 hours after actual outage start time	
8	5-6 hours after actual outage start time	
41	6-7 hours after actual outage start time	
3	7-8 hours after actual outage start time	

Table 9D: Explanation of Failed Power-Off Notifications to Critical Facilities and Infrastructure

Facility Count	Explanation for Failure
1	Our internal outage platform did not capture the de-energization of one facility (Communications). As automated notifications rely on this platform’s data, notifications sent after de-energization, including a “Power Off” notification, were not sent. Once the error was detected, impacted customer and critical facility counts were corrected. The root cause of this issue is under evaluation.

Table 9E: Explanation of Failed All-Clear Notifications to Critical Facilities and Infrastructure

Facility Count	Explanation for Failure
1	Our internal outage platform did not capture the de-energization of one facility (Communications). As automated notifications rely on this platform’s data, notifications sent after de-energization, including an “All Clear” and “ETOR” notifications, were not sent. Once the error was detected, impacted customer and critical facility counts were corrected. The root cause of this issue is under evaluation.

Table 9F: Explanation of Failed Restoration Notifications to Critical Facilities and Infrastructure

Facility Count	Explanation for Failure
1	Our internal outage platform did not capture the de-energization of one facility (Communications). As automated notifications rely on this platform's data, notifications sent after de-energization, including a "Restoration" notification, were not sent. Once the error was detected, impacted customer and critical facility counts were corrected. The root cause of this issue is under evaluation.

Table 9G: Explanation of Delayed Watch Notifications (24-48 Hour) to All Other Affected Customers

Customer Count	Time Notifications Sent	Explanation for Delay
339	15 hours ahead of planned outage start time	Due to changing weather conditions, these customers were not in scope during the 48-24-hour window in advance of anticipated de-energization. These customers were notified once they were added to scope. This count includes 23 MBL customers.

Table 9H: Explanation of Delayed Power-Off Notifications to All Other Affected Customers

Customer Count	Time Notifications Sent	Explanation for Delay
43	2-3 hours after actual outage start time	We experienced a delay to the initial "Power Off" notifications for customers stemming from an internal process error. While our internal outage platform automation was turned on, automating the generation of notification files, we identified a gap that the vendor was not notified of the automation being turned on. This resulted in the vendor not immediately processing the notification files despite PG&E providing the files in a timely manner. During a staffing shift change this error was discovered and immediate requests were made to the vendor to process and launch all de-energization customer notifications that were delayed. These customers received the "Power Off" notifications prior to the "All Clear" notifications being launched. Of all the customer power off notifications, 323 were MBL customers.
0	3-4 hours after actual outage start time	
2,012	4-5 hours after actual outage start time	
122	5-6 hours after actual outage start time	
1,457	6-7 hours after actual outage start time	
133	7-8 hours after actual outage start time	
1	8-9 hours after actual outage start time	

Table 9I: Explanation of Failed Power-Off Notifications to All Other Affected Customers

Customer Count	Explanation for Failure
2	These customers were on a Remote Grid and experienced an outage on the secondary, with no corresponding primary outage. As a result, this outage was not included in our internal outage platform that tracks primary outages. As a result, these customers did not receive automated notifications sent through that system. No MBL customers were affected by this notification failure.
3	Our internal outage platform did not capture the de-energization of these three customers. As automated notifications rely on this platform's data, notifications sent after de-energization, including a "Power Off" notification, were not sent. Once the error was detected, impacted customer and critical facility

Customer Count	Explanation for Failure
	counts were corrected. The root cause of this issue is under evaluation. No MBL customers were affected by this notification failure.
2	These customers did not receive any automated notifications triggered through PG&E's internal outage platform as they are not listed as active customers used for tracking outages. These service points were planned for de-energization and counted as de-energized customers for this report but were not counted as impacted customers in our internal outage platform. As a result, they did not receive the automated notifications triggered by the platform. Customer count includes one MBL customers. The root cause of this issue is still being investigated.
1	This customer was not included in the table of customer contact information used to launch automated notifications through our internal outage platform. As a result, they could not be notified. The root cause of this customer's exclusion from this table is under evaluation. No MBL customers were affected by this notification failure.

Table 9J: Explanation of Failed All Clear Notifications to All Other Affected Customers

Customer Count	Explanation for Failure
2	These customers were on a Remote Grid and experienced an outage on the secondary, with no corresponding primary outage. As a result, this outage was not included in our internal outage platform that tracks primary outages, and thus these customers did not receive automated notifications sent through that system. No MBL customers were affected by this notification failure.
3	Our internal outage platform did not capture the de-energization of these customers. As automated notifications rely on this platform's data, notifications sent after de-energization, including a "Power Off" notification, were not sent. Once the error was detected, impacted customer and critical facility counts were corrected. The root cause of this issue is under investigation. No MBL customers were affected by this notification failure.
2	These customers did not receive any automated notifications triggered through PG&E's internal outage platform as they are not listed as active customers used for tracking outages. These service points were planned for de-energization and counted as de-energized customers for this report but were not counted as impacted customers in our internal outage platform. As a result, they did not receive the automated notifications triggered by the platform. Customer count includes one MBL customers. The root cause of this issue is still being investigated.
1	This customer was not included in the table of customer contact information used to launch automated notifications through our internal outage platform. As a result, they could not be notified. The root cause of this customer's exclusion from this table is under investigation. No MBL customers were affected by this notification failure.

Table 9K: Explanation of Failed Restoration Notifications to All Other Affected Customers

Customer Count	Explanation for Failure
2	These customers were on a Remote Grid and experienced an outage on the secondary, with no corresponding primary outage. As a result, this outage was not included in our internal outage platform that tracks primary outages, and thus these customers did not receive automated notifications sent through that system. No MBL customers were affected by this notification failure.

Customer Count	Explanation for Failure
3	Our internal outage platform did not capture the de-energization of these customers. As automated notifications rely on this platform's data, notifications sent after de-energization, including a "Restoration" notification, were not sent. Once the error was detected, impacted customer and critical facility counts were corrected. The root cause of this issue is under investigation. No MBL customers were affected by this notification failure.
2	These customers did not receive any automated notifications triggered through PG&E's internal outage platform as they are not listed as active customers used for tracking outages. These service points were planned for de-energization and counted as de-energized customers for this report but were not counted as impacted customers in our internal outage platform. As a result, they did not receive the automated notifications triggered by the platform. Customer count includes one MBL customers. The root cause of this issue is still being investigated.
1	This customer was not included in the table of customer contact information used to launch automated notifications through our internal outage platform. As a result, they could not be notified. The root cause of this customer's exclusion from this table is under investigation. No MBL customers were affected by this notification failure.
1	This customer was not included in the table of customer contact information used to launch automated notifications through our internal outage platform at the time of restoration. This customer discontinued service with PG&E during the PSPS Event. The table was updated to reflect this change and the customer received all previous automated notifications. No MBL customers were affected by this notification failure.

Table 9L: Explanation of Failed Cancellation Notifications to All Other Affected Customers

Customer Count	Explanation for Failure
5	These customers had valid contact information during earlier phases of the PSPS event, so they were notified that they were in PSPS scope. At the time, these customers were descope later in the PSPS event, they no longer had valid contact information, which meant they could not be notified of cancellation. Of these customers, two had service agreements that ended partway through the PSPS event. One of these customers is included in our de-energized customer count because their service point was de-energized in the PSPS event even though the customer is no longer active. This customer is not counted as a false positive as they were de-energized. Customer counts include one MBL customer.

Section 5.6 - Explain how the utility will correct the notification failures. (D.21-06-014, page 286.)

Response:

We have reviewed the notifications for this PSPS, as listed in Table 9, and have identified or are in the process of identifying corrective actions. Please note Public Safety Partners, excluding critical facilities and infrastructure, received all required notification from PG&E within the required timeline, as noted in Table 9. Below are the corresponding actions.

Delayed Power-Off Notification

We updated internal guidance and training materials to ensure the customer notification lead notifies the vendor when our internal outage platform automation is turned on. The training guide used for customer notification leads has been updated to include the step of notifying the vendor that post de-energization notification automation has been turned on.

Customers Not Detected in Internal Outage Platform

We are still working with internal teams to understand the root cause of customers who did not receive any automated notifications triggered through our internal outage platform and working to correct them going forward.

Remote Grid Customers Not Detected in Internal Outage Platform

Due to the unique configuration of remote grids, we are reviewing the associated process and will be developing a way to ensure accurate notifications. In the interim we have incorporated a manual process to ensure correct notifications are deployed by the EOC CSO team.

Invalid Contact Information

Following the event, we sent postcards, mailed on September 9, 2023, to customers that did not receive a notification directly from PG&E due to invalid or missing contact information and encouraged them to update their contact information for future notifications.

PG&E has dedicated substantial efforts to providing notifications whenever possible in accordance with PSPS OII⁵⁰ and Phase 3⁵¹ Guidelines, weather and other factors permitting. In addition, PG&E is actively reviewing the scoping and notification processes to find further opportunities to send notifications to all customers in a timelier manner. Refer to Table 9 for a breakdown of customer notification failures.

⁵⁰ D.21-06-014.

⁵¹ D.21-06-034.

Section 5.7 - Enumerate and explain the cause of any false communications citing the sources of changing data. (D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 4.)

Response:

No instances of false communication were identified for the August 30-31, 2023 PSPS.

Section 6 – Local and State Public Safety Partner Engagement

Section 6.1 - List the organization names of public safety partners including, but not limited to, local governments, Tribal representatives, first responders and emergency management, and critical facilities and infrastructure the utility contacted prior to de-energization, the date and time on which they were contacted, and whether the areas affected by the de-energization are classified as Zone 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3 as per the definition in CPUC GO 95, Rule 21.2-D. (Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

Please see Appendix E for a list of Public Safety Partners including Tribal representatives, local governments, first responders and emergency management, and critical facilities notified with the date and time of the initial notification.

As stated in our [2022 Safety Outage Decision Making Guide](#), we use a HFRA classification which PG&E utilizes in addition to HFTD to determine PSPS scope. In Appendix E, we begin by identifying HFTD area assigned to Public Safety Partners. Any area outside of HFTD is re-classified as HFRA. PG&E's circuits can run miles long and span across multiple jurisdictions. Some Public Safety Partners outside of HFRA and HFTD were also de-energized in order to de-energize areas within HFRA and HFTD for safety.

Section 6.2 - List the names of all entities invited to the utility's EOC for a PSPS event, the method used to make this invitation, and whether a different form of communication was preferred by any entity invited to the utility's emergency operation center. (D.21-06-014, page 289.)

Response:

PG&E invited, via email, the following entities to virtually embed themselves into PG&E's EOC:

- **Federally Recognized Tribes:** Grindstone Rancheria and Pit River Tribes
- **State Agencies:** Cal OES and CPUC
- **Counties:** Butte, Colusa, Glenn, Lake, Napa, Shasta, Tehema, and Yolo

Filsinger Energy Partners, Inc., an independent safety monitor, embed one consultant into PG&E's EOC from August 29–31, 2023.

In September 2022, PG&E sent a letter to water infrastructure and communication service providers within PG&E's electrical service area with information on how to request representation during a PSPS at the PG&E EOC in Vacaville or remotely. Alternatively, some partners may also request PG&E representation at their jurisdiction's activated Operations Emergency Center (OEC)⁵². The letter also invited water infrastructure and communication service providers to Daily Systemwide Cooperator Calls that are held at noon daily for each PSPS event to provide situational awareness updates directly from the leadership within PG&E's

⁵² D.19-05-042.

EOC. Updates shared at any location or during the Daily Systemwide Cooperator Calls⁵³ were the same as those shared during the daily operational briefing to ensure all partners receive consistent information. PG&E sent the letter to the following water infrastructure and communication service providers:

Water Infrastructure Providers:

- Alleghany Water District, Amador Water Agency, American Water Works Company Inc., American Water Works Service Company Inc., Army Corp Of Engineers, Aromas Water District, Bear Valley Water District, Bodega Bay Public Utility District, Calaveras County Water District, California American Water, California Department of Corrections, California Department of Forestry, California Department of Water Resources, California Water Service Company, Cambria Community Services District, Central Coast Water Authority, Central Contra Costa Sanitary District, Central Marin Sanitation Agency, Chicken Ranch Rancheria, City and County of San Francisco, City of Oakland Public Works, Contra Costa Water District, CPPA CCWD Water Treatment, Cuyama Community Service District, Delta Diablo, Department Of The Army, Downieville Public Utilities District, Dublin San Ramon Services District, East Bay Municipal Utility District, EL Dorado Irrigation District, Fall River Mills Community Service District, First Mace Meadow Water Association Inc., Haskell Creek Tract Association, Laguna County Sanitation District, Lake Don Pedro Community Service District, Lebec County Water District, Leland Meadows Water, Marin Municipal Water District, Mi Wuk Village Mut Water Co, Mineral Mountain Estates, Mission Hills Community Services District, Modesto Irrigation District, Murphy's Sanitary Distribution, Napa Sanitation District, Nipomo Community Services District, Novato Sanitary District, Oakdale Irrigation District, Oaks Mobile Home Homeowners Association, Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Placer County Water Agency, Port of Redwood City, River Pines Public Utility District, San Andreas Land Disposal System, San Jose Water Company, San Lorenzo Valley Water District, San Luis Obispo County, San Rafael Sanitation District, Sausalito Marin City Sanitary District, Scotts Valley Water District, Sewer Agency of Southern Marin, Sonoma County Water Agency, Soquel Creek Water District, Stockton East Water District, Tiburon Sanitary District, Tuolumne Utilities District, Valley Springs Public Utility District, Vandenberg Village Community Services District, Washington County Water District, Yocha Dehe Wintun Nation, Yosemite Springs Park Utility Company Inc., Zone 7 Alameda County Flood Control District.

Communication Service Providers:

- Altice/SuddenLink, American Tower, AT&T Corporation, Calaveras Telephone Co., Calneva Broadband, Charter Communications, Comcast, Consolidated Communications, ExteNet, Frontier Communications, Mediacom California LLC, Northland Cable Television Inc., Ponderosa Telephone Co, Qwest/CenturyLink/Lumen, SBA Towers, Sebastian Corp, Sierra Telephone, TDS Telecom, T-Mobile, US Cellular, Verizon, Volcano Communications, Wave Broadband.

PG&E provides communication service providers a dedicated PG&E contact in the EOC known as the CIL, who shares up-to-date event information and answer specific, individual questions.

⁵³ The Daily Systemwide Cooperator Calls are open to Tribal and local elected officials, staff and emergency managers, telecommunication providers, water agencies, emergency hospitals, publicly owned utilities, community choice aggregators, transportation authorities, and community-based organizations within PG&E's electrical service area.

They can reach the CIL 24/7 during an event by e-mail or phone at PG&E’s Business Customer Service Center.

Section 6.3 - A statement verifying the availability to public safety partners of accurate and timely geospatial information, and real time updates to the GIS shapefiles in preparation for an imminent PSPS event and during a PSPS event. (D.21-06-014, page 289.)

Response:

In preparation for the August 30-31, 2023 PSPS event, PG&E sent automated notifications with links to the PSPS Portal, which provides PDF maps and GIS data to Public Safety Partners at the times outlined in Section 5. PDF maps and GIS data were updated on the PSPS Portal when scope changed; users were notified of these updates via e-mail. For this event, PG&E provided updated PDF maps and GIS layers to Public Safety Partners at times outlined below in Table 10.

Table 10: PSPS Portal Time & Date for Map Sharing

Date	Time PDF Maps Shared	Time GIS Layers Shared
8/27/2023	8:06 PM PDT	8:06 PM PDT
8/28/2023	2:02 PM PDT	2:02 PM PDT
8/29/2023	10:28 AM PDT	10:28 AM PDT
8/29/2023	8:13 PM PDT	8:13 PM PDT
8/30/2023	1:38 PM PDT	1:38 PM PDT

After the EOC was activated, PDF maps and GIS data on the PSPS Portal were determined accurate and updated in a timely manner following changes to geographic scope or customer impacts.

Section 6.4 - A description and evaluation of engagement with local and state public safety partners in providing advanced outreach and notification during the PSPS event. (D.19-05-042, Appendix, page A23.)

Response:

Below is a description of the engagement with local (i.e., Tribes, cities, counties) and state (CPUC, Cal OES, CAL FIRE) Public Safety Partners:

- Submitted the PSPS State Notification Form to Cal OES twice a day (07:00 PDT and 15:00 PDT), if there was a significant change to scope and at least once for each of the five PSPS stages: Activating PPS Protocols/Potential to De-energize (Stage 1), Decision to De-energize (Stage 2), De-energization Initiated (Stage 3), Initiating Re-energization Patrols (Stage 4) and All PPS Lines Re-energized (Stage 5).
 - 08/27/2023 at 20:10 PDT
 - 08/28/2023 at 06:54 PDT
 - 08/28/2023 at 14:04 PDT
 - 08/29/2023 at 06:40 PDT
 - 08/29/2023 at 10:57 PDT
 - 08/29/2023 at 15:04 PDT
 - 08/29/2023 at 23:00 PDT
 - 08/30/2023 at 01:44 PDT
 - 08/30/2023 at 04:13 PDT
 - 08/30/2023 at 05:55 PDT
 - 08/30/2023 at 08:40 PDT


- 08/30/2023 at 13:53 PDT
- 08/30/2023 at 16:29 PDT
- 08/31/2023 at 06:59 PDT
- 08/31/2023 at 12:08 PDT
- Sent e-mails to the CPUC at least once for each of the five PSPS stages listed above; this includes:
 - 08/27/2023 at 20:31 PDT
 - 08/27/2023 at 21:18 PDT
 - 08/28/2023 at 13:40 PDT
 - 08/29/2023 at 11:08 PDT
 - 08/29/2023 at 22:16 PDT
 - 08/30/2023 at 01:28 PDT
 - 08/30/2023 at 14:23 PDT
 - 08/30/2023 at 16:39 PDT
 - 08/31/2023 at 12:36 PDT
- Hosted daily State Executive Briefings with Cal OES, CPUC, CAL FIRE, Governor’s Office, U.S. Forest Service, Department of Interior, and other state agencies to provide the latest event information and answer questions. A deck with key event information was provided to participants ahead of the call.
- Hosted the daily Systemwide Cooperators Call, where all Public Safety Partners in the service area were invited to join for situational awareness.
- Hosted Tribal Cooperators Calls with potentially impacted Tribes to provide the latest event information and answer questions.
- Hosted Operational Areas Cooperators Communication Calls to provide situational awareness updates and answer questions.⁵⁴
- Conducted ongoing coordination with Tribal and local County OES contacts through dedicated Agency Representatives. This includes but is not limited to providing the latest event information, coordinating on CRC locations, and resolving local issues in real-time.
- Provided links to the PSPS Portal that included planning and event-specific maps, situation reports, critical facility lists, and MBL program customer lists at each notification and when scope changed. Note that the Situation Report was provided twice a day and at scope changes prior to de-energization and hourly once restoration began.
- Sent automated and live call notifications to agency partners before, during and after de-energization.
- Offered local and state agencies to be embedded in PG&E’s EOC, as well as offered PG&E Agency Representatives to be embedded virtually in local EOCs. Due to COVID-19, in-person EOC support was dependent on health and safety considerations.
- A dedicated State Operations Center Agency Representative provided ongoing support to Cal OES to ensure all questions were addressed.

PG&E considers the advanced outreach and notification to local and state Public Safety Partners during this PSPS event successful but with minor improvements needed. This is based on the number and various types of outreach conducted (see list above), the feedback received from Public Safety Partners through the post-event survey and the success rate of automated agency notifications.

⁵⁴ May vary in cadence & type based on County OES.

During this PSPS event, we sent 100% of our automated notifications to Tribal and local governments within the required timeframes. Figure 17 below shows the post-event survey results when Public Safety Partners were asked to “evaluate PG&E engagement with your agency during the outage.”

Figure 17: Evaluation of Public Safety Partner Engagement



Summary Data	
Rating	% Total Public Safety Partner Response
Excellent	50%
Very Good	12.5%
Good	37.5%
Fair	0%
Unsatisfactory	0%

Section 6.5 - Specific engagement with local communities regarding the notification and support provided to the AFN community. (D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 8, SED Additional Information)

Response:

To ensure PG&E provides adequate support to AFN communities, we engage with local communities through paratransit agencies, media partnerships, and CBOs to share coordination efforts, notifications plans, CRC information, event-specific information, and more. See below for details on this engagement.

Engagement with Paratransit Agencies

In accordance with the Phase 3 Guidelines⁵⁵, PG&E provided proactive notifications and impacted zip code information to paratransit agencies that may serve all the known transit- or paratransit-dependent persons that may need access to a Community Resource Center during this event. For this PPS event, PG&E provided proactive notifications⁵⁶ to 132 paratransit agencies. All notifications included a link to the PPS emergency website event updates page, pge.com/pspsupdates with two prominent buttons at the top. These buttons gave customers the option of searching other addresses that could be impacted as well as a link to a map showing areas potentially affected by a shutoff. For more information on ADA compliant CRC locations, see Section 9.

⁵⁵ D.21-06-034.

⁵⁶ For this PPS event, paratransit agencies received the Watch, Warning, Cancellation, and Restoration Notification. A list of zip codes was provided three times.

Media Engagement

To alert the public in advance of the PSPS event, we used both media and online efforts. From the time PG&E publicly announced the potential PSPS event until customers were restored, PG&E engaged with customers and the public through the media as described below.

- Issued four local news releases containing information and updated details about the PSPS and wind events.
- Identified approximately 66 unique print, online, and broadcast stories.
- Provided regular, ongoing news releases to more than 120 California news outlets and reporters, as well as several syndicated national outlets. Also, our Integrated Multicultural Communications team reached out to 39 multi-cultural news outlets.
- Coordinated directly with 22 multicultural media organizations with coverage in the impacted areas to issue event updates on their in-language platforms (e.g., radio, TV, social media) in over 12 languages, including languages spoken by communities that occupy significant roles in California’s agricultural economy (e.g., Mixteco).
- Handled approximately 35 media inquiries, either from media outlets that contacted PG&E’s 24-hour media line or direct calls to field media representatives, and participated in 13 media interviews to provide situational updates and preparedness messages for the PSPS event.

Our online content, stability, and navigation have improved since 2019 PSPS events. We also engaged with additional key stakeholders, including CBOs and critical facilities.

Other Channels of Communication and Additional Community Engagement

We engaged with over 309 “information-based” CBOs during the event, sharing courtesy notification updates, fact sheets, and other relevant information that they could share with their constituents to expand our reach of communications, including infographic videos with relevant PSPS updates in 16 languages and American Sign Language (ASL) that the organizations could use to educate their consumers.

CBO resource partners were invited to once-daily cooperator calls for Public Safety Partners, which was hosted by members from PG&E’s EOC who provided a situational update about the latest scope of the event and an overview of the services available to customers. We hosted additional daily coordination calls with the CBO resource partners supporting the event to provide an open forum to answer questions, offer suggestions regarding how they can best support their consumers, and facilitate more localized coordination among the partners.

Event Support for Customers with AFNs

PG&E provided a variety of resources to customers with AFNs before and during this event. These resources include:

- Disability Disaster Access and Resource Program⁵⁷: We continued our collaboration with the CFILC to implement the Disability Disaster Access and Resources (DDAR) Program during the event. Through this program, four local Independent Living Center (ILCs) provided aid to impacted seniors and/or people with disabilities who rely on power for medical or independent living needs in eight counties during this event. Through DDAR, we have supported AFN customers with delivery of approximately 57 backup portable batteries (since July 2020) to qualifying customers who need power during a PSPS. During this event, 57 batteries that were previously distributed and one additional

⁵⁷ For more information about the DDAR Program, refer to [PG&E’s 2023 AFN Plan for PSPS Support](#).

batteries were delivered in the event provided support to impacted customers. In addition, the DDAR program also provided 10 individuals with hotel stays, along with 10 food vouchers. Some of these resources provided through DDAR were an outcome of MBL customer-related escalations called in to PG&E during the event. DDAR alerted their constituents about the available resources. During this event, DDAR engaged directly with approximately 136 PG&E customers related to the PSPS event.

- **Portable Battery Program**⁵⁸: Our PBP provides free portable battery systems for customers who have experienced at least five EPSS in 2022 or at least one PSPS in 2021 and are either MBL or SIV (prior eligibility included living in Tiers 2 and 3 HFTDs and enrolled in the MBL Program.) During this event, 285 impacted customers were supported by batteries received through the PBP (delivered in 2020-2023 YTD). Since July 2020, a total of approximately 19,280 battery units have been delivered through the PBP across the entire PG&E service area.
- **Food Bank Partnerships**: We continued to fund local food banks to provide food replacement to families during the event and three days following service restoration. For this event, we partnered with six local food banks⁵⁹ that serve six of the six impacted counties to provide 300 boxes of food replacement for families. We provided fact sheets with details about food bank partnerships at PSPS CRCs.
- **Meals on Wheels Partnerships**: We continued our partnership with Meals on Wheels to provide additional support and services to customers in need during PSPS events. For this event, we partnered with nine Meals on Wheels Organizations⁶⁰ that would be able to provide services to customers in scope for the de-energization in six counties.
- **211 Referral Services**: PG&E has a long-standing relationship with 211 through our charitable grant program. As of August 13, 2021, PG&E has a partnership with the California network of 211s to connect customers with resources before, during, and after PSPS events. For this event, PG&E worked with 211 to assist customers with resources.
- **Accessible Transportation Partnerships**: We are partnered with Accessible Transportation organizations to provide customers with transportation to and from PG&E's CRCs. For this PSPS, we partnered with one organization⁶¹ to provide assistance in Shasta County.

Communications to Customers with Limited English Proficiency

PG&E provided translated customer support through its customer notifications, website, call center, social media and engagement with CBOs, and multicultural media partnerships. Notifications were provided to customers in English, with information on how to get event information in five non-English languages. Customers with their language preference set received in-language (translated) notifications. The notifications were provided to customers in the customer-set language preferences shown below in Table 11.

⁵⁸ For more information about the PBP Program, refer to [PG&E's 2023 AFN Plan for PSPS Support](#).

⁵⁹ Community Action Agency of Butte County, Redwood Empire Food Bank, Clear Lake Gleaners Food Bank, Community Action of Napa Valley Food Bank, Dignity Health Connected Living, Yolo Food Bank

⁶⁰ Tehama County Community Action Agency, Dignity Health Connected Living, Community Action Agency of Napa Valley, Lakeport Senior Center, Middletown Senior Center, Clearlake Senior Center, Liveoak Senior Center, Passages, Chico Meals on Wheels

⁶¹ Dignity Health Connected Living

Table 11: Customer Notifications Based on Language Preference

Language	Total Notifications ⁶²	Percent
English	602,753	99.159%
Spanish	4,297	0.707%
Chinese – Cantonese	263	0.043%
Chinese – Mandarin	359	0.059%
Hmong	100	0.016%
Vietnamese	93	0.015%
Total	607,865	100%

Customers with limited English proficiency have access to translation phone numbers on our PSPS website, highlighting that translation services are available in over 200 languages. Table 12 below includes call center-related metrics associated with this PSPS event.

Table 12: Call Center Support Services⁶³

Total Calls Handled	PSPS Calls Handled	Average Response Time for PSPS-related Calls (seconds)	Number of calls handled by Call Center Translation Services	Number of languages Supported by Call Center Translation Services
79,873	783	19	4,841	290+

PG&E continued support and engagement with multi-cultural media organizations and in-language CBOs to maximize the reach of in-language communications to the public during the event. Before the PSPS event, we reached out to 39 multicultural media organizations. These organizations covered the translated languages above and languages spoken by communities that occupy significant roles in California’s agricultural economy (e.g., Nahuatl). Throughout the event, we shared information and updates on PSPS with these media outlets, including news releases and social media infographics in English, as well as in translated languages and American Sign Language (ASL), for their use and distribution. We also shared a new 211 infographic in 16 languages with organizations to share with their constituents. Highlights from our coordination with multicultural media organizations and CBOs during this event include:

- KCSO-Telemundo in Sacramento interviewed PG&E’s Evelyn Escalera in Spanish to provide PSPS updates. See Figure 18 below.

⁶² Total notifications do not include doorbell rings and Live Agent phone calls.

⁶³ Metrics are provided from August 28 - 31, 2023.

Figure 18: KCSO Telemundo interview with PG&E’s Evelyn Escalera in Spanish



- KSQQ-Sound of Hope Radio shared PSPS update over the air and on its website. See Figure 19 below.

Figure 19: PSPS update on KSQQ-Sound of Hope Radio in Chinese



PG&E Website

During this PSPS, PG&E placed an alert in the “Current Alerts” box on the [pge.com](https://www.pge.com) home page that drove traffic to PG&E’s PSPS event site, and implemented tools to drive traffic to, and maintain stability of, the PSPS emergency website event updates page, [pge.com/pspsupdates](https://www.pge.com/pspsupdates). PG&E also placed a link to the PSPS emergency website on the [pge.com/psps](https://www.pge.com/psps) program page and ensured that the online site search also sent PSPS keywords to that page. During this event, visits to the emergency website peaked on Wednesday, August 30, 2023, with approximately 45,894 visits. Page views to the emergency website peaked on Tuesday, August 29, 2023, with approximately 100,020 page views. The emergency website saw a total of 158,553 visits and 320,155 page views from the time the event began to the time all customers had been restored to power.

We remain committed to the continuous improvement of our websites to better meet the diverse needs of its customers. As we launch new features and functionality to [pge.com](https://www.pge.com) and to the emergency web site, [pgealerts.pge.com/](https://www.pgealerts.com/), we test to help ensure compliance with WCAG 2.0 AA or WCAG 2.1AA standards. We also seek to improve the customer experience with user

testing for key components. Where possible, we remediate accessibility issues that customers or stakeholders have brought to our attention.


On Wednesday, August 30, PG&E noticed that some customers experienced a loading issue where outage maps were displaying as blank if the map was refreshed. This did not impact the first-time map load or any address search tools. The error was resolved the same-day before noon.

The following content was available on PG&E's PSPS event updates pages or on links from those pages:

- Straightforward, simplified event information available in 16 languages, with clear updates about the planned scope of the event, including location (e.g., list of impacted Tribes, cities, and counties), duration of the event, including estimated times of de-energization and re-energization at the individual address level, and overall, for the event.
- Address look-up tool that a customer and the public could use to identify specific PSPS impacts.
- PG&E's Public Safety Partners could download PDFs of impacted areas, shape and KMZ files for use with their own mapping applications, and city/county lists with shutoff and restoration summaries.
- Details of CRCs made available as soon as sites were confirmed (up to two days before de-energization for some locations), including locations listed by county, resources available at each center, type of CRC (e.g., indoor, outdoor), COVID-19 policies, and operating dates and hours. CRC locations were also indicated on the PSPS impact map.
- Links to additional resources for customers, including links to PG&E's Electric Vehicle (EV) charging location map, videos in ASL, locations of ILCs, resources for customers with accessibility, financial, language, and aging needs, backup power safety tips, MBL program information, and more.
- PG&E is partnering with WeaveGrid for an electric vehicle resiliency pilot. The pilot will be leveraging proactive communication and managed charging of electric vehicles. PG&E provided customer information to Weave Grid during the Watch Notifications.
- Webpage available in 16 languages that describes our language support services for customers during PSPS events at [pge.com/pspslanguagehelp](https://www.pge.com/pspslanguagehelp).
- Survey to provide input about the website and event communications.

- Address-level alerts that allow non-PG&E-account holders to receive notifications via a phone call or SMS text for any address where they do not receive a bill, such as their workplace or child’s school. This is also a valuable communication tool for renters and tenants of master metered accounts, such as mobile home parks. See pge.com/addressalerts and Figure 20. Address Alerts are available in 16 languages.

Figure 20: PG&E PSPS Address Alert Sign-Up Webpage



This year, PSPS-related improvements to pge.com include:

- Reducing the reading level for content on our PSPS resources webpage to better serve individuals with AFNs. The page is available in 15 non-English languages.
- Updates to our User Interface (UI) for a consistent experience across webpages.
- Backend automation of files used during PSPS events to improve speed and reduce possibility of human error.

PG&E’s website offers PSPS preparedness information in 15 non-English languages covering topics including the MBL program application and fact sheets on PSPS, Community Wildfire Safety Program, MBL program, and more. PG&E’s emergency website with PSPS event update information was fully translated in the same 15 languages. See Table 13 below for information on PG&E’s web traffic, Table 14 for the number of unique visitors to the translated versions of PGE’s Website (pge.com) for this event, and Table 15 for the number of unique visitors to the translated versions of PG&E’s Emergency Website (pgealerts.alerts.pge.com).

Table 13: PG&E Website Traffic for August 30 – 31, 2023 PSPS Event⁶⁴

Web Page	Unique Visitors	Visits	Page Views
PG&E's Website (pge.com)	750,031	938,703	1,492,821
PG&E's Emergency Website (pgealerts.alerts.pge.com) ^{65, 66}	106,065	158,553	320,155

Table 14: Unique Visitors to the Translated Versions of PG&E's Website for the August 30 – 31, 2023 PSPS Event^{67,68}

Language	Unique Visitors	Percent
English	478,639	99.99%
Spanish	54	0.01%
Chinese	6	0%
Hindi	2	0%
Farsi	2	0%
Thai	1	0%
Japanese	1	0%
Portuguese	0	0%
Russian	0	0%
Vietnamese	0	0%
Korean	0	0%
Panjabi	0	0%
Arabic	0	0%
Tagalog	0	0%
Hmong	0	0%
Khmer	0	0%
Grand Total⁶⁹	750,031	100%

⁶⁴ Website traffic from August 27-31, 2023

⁶⁵ The PSPS Event Updates page is at the following link: pgealerts.alerts.pge.com/updates. PG&E also uses the following shortened URL for the same site: www.pge.com/pspsupdates.

⁶⁶ The emergency website metrics are a subset of the pge.com/ website traffic reported.

⁶⁷ Not all webpages within PG&E's Website are offered in the translated languages listed. If the language is not included in the selector on the webpage, the visitor can call 1-833-208-4167 for assistance in 250+ other languages.

⁶⁸ Unique visitors from August 27-31, 2023.

⁶⁹ There is some overlap in unique visitors by language because some visitors viewed webpages in different languages.

Table 15: Unique Visitors to the Translated Versions of PG&E’s Emergency Website for the August 30 – 31, 2023 PSPS Event⁷⁰

Language	Unique Visitors	Percent
English	105,209	99.2%
Spanish	571	0.5%
Chinese	29	0.0%
Portuguese	3	0.0%
Panjabi	3	0.0%
Hindi	2	0.0%
Farsi	2	0.0%
Thai	1	0.0%
Vietnamese	1	0.0%
Russian	1	0.0%
Arabic	0	0.0%
Tagalog	0	0.0%
Korean	0	0.0%
Japanese	0	0.0%
Hmong	0	0.0%
Khmer	0	0.0%
Grand Total⁷¹	106,065	100%

Section 6.6 - Provide the following information on backup power (including mobile backup power) with the name and email address of a utility contact for customers for each of the following topics: (D.21-06-014, page 300.)

Response:

The information requested is included in Sections 6.6a – 6.6f. Any questions related to this information may be directed to TempGenPSPSSupport@pge.com.

Section 6.6a. Description of the backup generators available for critical facility and infrastructure customers before and during the PSPS.

Response:

Table 16 lists the generators available for critical facility and infrastructure customers before and during the PSPS.

Table 16: Generators Available for Critical Facilities and Infrastructure Customers

Generator Type	Number of Units	Individual Size (MW)	Run Time (Hrs.) ⁷²	Description
Diesel Generator	2	0.032	3	2 units on reserve in Sacramento.

⁷⁰ Unique visitors from August 27-31, 2023.

⁷¹ There is some overlap in unique visitors by language because some visitors viewed webpages in different languages.

⁷² Estimated based on a 75% load. Barring mechanical failure and refueling the temporary generators have the ability to operate continuously throughout a typical PSPS event.

Generator Type	Number of Units	Individual Size (MW)	Run Time (Hrs.) ⁷²	Description
Diesel Generator	3	0.065	28.5	3 units on reserve in San Leandro.
Diesel Generator	9	0.100	31.9	1 unit pre-staged at ICU Hospital; 8 units on reserve in Sacramento
Diesel Generator	1	0.125	36	1 unit on reserve in San Leandro.
Diesel Generator	6	0.150	30	1 unit on reserve in Sacramento; 5 units on reserve in San Leandro.
Diesel Generator	3	0.200	29	3 units on reserve in San Leandro.
Diesel Generator	4	1.0	21	3 units pre-staged at ICU Hospital; 1 unit on reserve in Sacramento.
Diesel Generator	7	1.50	14	7 units on reserve in Benecia.

Section 6.6b. The capacity and estimated maximum duration of operation of the backup generators available for critical facility and infrastructure customers before and during the PSPS.

Response:

Table 16 lists the power capacity and maximum duration of operation of the generators available for critical facility and infrastructure customers before and during the PSPS.

Section 6.6c. The total number of backup generators provided to critical facility and infrastructure customer's site immediately before and during the PSPS.

Response:

During and immediately before the PSPS event, two backup generators were activated to energize the critical facility and infrastructure customers that did not have an existing mitigation in place.

Section 6.6d. How the utility deployed this backup generation to the critical facility and infrastructure customer's site.

Response:

As a general policy, PG&E does not offer backup generation to individual facilities. However, PG&E's policy allows for granting exceptions for critical facilities when a prolonged outage could have a significant adverse impact to public health or safety.

Deployment of temporary generation is contingent upon the following circumstances: expected duration to perform permanent repairs is significantly longer than the expected duration to install backup generation, the expected customer outage is 50,000 or more customer minutes, and the outage affects a distribution circuit serving multiple customers without a functional back-tie⁷³.

PG&E has pre-arranged commitments with critical facility and infrastructure customers to provide temporary generation in case of a PSPS event and evaluated requests received during the event according to the prioritization described in Section 6.6e below.

Section 6.6e. An explanation of how the utility prioritized how to distribute available backup generation.

Response:

PG&E prioritizes the deployment of available generation by first meeting existing commitments to individual facilities in the following order.

- Intensive care unit (ICU) hospitals, pre-identified by PG&E in partnership with the California Hospital Association (CHA) and Hospital Council of Northern and Central California (HC).
- Additional facilities prepared to support public safety such as, but not limited to: First/emergency responders at the Tribal, local, state, and federal level, water, wastewater, and communication service providers, affected community choice aggregators, publicly-owned utilities/electrical cooperatives, the CPUC, the California Governor's Office of Emergency Services and the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection⁷⁴.

Deployment of available generation is then followed by AFN customers and customers with specific needs in the following order:

- Life support, MBL, and temperature sensitive.
- Large customers, economic damage customers, and danger to health and safety customers.

Deployment of available generation is then followed by other customers based on maximizing relief by calculating the number of customers multiplied by expected duration.

Section 6.6f. Identify the critical facility and infrastructure customers that received backup generation.

Response:

During this PSPS, PG&E utilized its rental fleet of temporary generators to mitigate the impacts of PSPS on its customers. During this event, this fleet was used to support two stand-alone facilities serving public safety and two indoor CRCs.

Table 16 describes the generators available for critical facility and infrastructure customers before and during the PSPS.

⁷³ 50,000 customer minutes is approximately equivalent to 100 customers for about 8 hours.

⁷⁴ The term "emergency response providers" includes federal, state, and local governmental and non-governmental public safety, fire, law enforcement, emergency response, emergency medical services providers (including hospital emergency facilities), and related personnel, agencies, and authorities.

Critical facility and infrastructure customers that received backup generation are listed in Table 17 below.

Table 17: Critical Facility and Infrastructure Customers Energized with Backup Generation

County	Site Type	Generation Deployed	Duration of Operation	Reason Deployed
Tehama	Radio Repeater	0.200 MW	46 hours	Public safety
Glenn	Community Service Water	0.300 MW	47 hours	High risk to environment

Section 7 – Complaints and Claims

Section 7.1 - The number and nature of complaints received as the result of the de-energization event and claims that are filed against the utility because of de-energization. The utility must completely report all the informal and formal complaints, meaning any expression of grief, pain, or dissatisfaction, from various sources, filed either with CPUC or received by the utility as a result of the PSPS event. (Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, D.21-06-014, page 304.)

Response:

Complaints received due to the August 30-31, 2023 PSPS Event are provided below. There were no claims filed against PG&E for this event as of August 31, 2023.

Complaints

Table 18 provides the number and nature of complaints received from customers, Public Safety Partners and the CPUC, submitted to both the CPUC and PG&E, for the August 30-31, 2023 PSPS Event.

Table 18: Number and Nature of Complaints due to the August 30-31, 2023 PSPS Event

Nature of Complaints	Number of Complaints
Communications/Notifications Including, but not limited to complaints regarding lack of notice, excessive notices, confusing notice, false alarm notice, problems with getting up-to-date information, inaccurate information provided, not being able to get information in the prevalent languages and/or information accessibility, complaints about website, Public Safety Partner Portal, Representational State Transfer (REST)/Digital Asset Manager (DAM) sites (as applicable).	19
PSPS Frequency/Duration Including, but not limited to complaints regarding the frequency and/or duration of PSPS events, including delays in restoring power, scope of PSPS and dynamic of weather conditions.	19
Safety/Health Concern Including, but not limited to complaints regarding difficulties experienced by AFN/MBL populations, traffic accidents due to non-operating traffic lights, inability to get medical help, well water or access to clean water, inability to keep property cool/warm during outage raising health concern.	3
General PPS Dissatisfaction/Other Including, but not limited to complaints about being without power during PPS event and related hardships such as food loss, income loss, inability to work/attend school, plus any PPS-related complaints that do not fall into any other category.	7
Outreach/Assistance Including, but not limited to complaints regarding CRCs, community crew vehicles, backup power, hotel vouchers, other assistance provided by utility to mitigate impact of PPS.	6

Section 8 – Power Restoration

Section 8.1 - A detailed explanation of the steps the utility took to restore power. (Resolution ESRB-8 page 5)

Response:

The first step that is taken to restore power during a PSPS is referred to as a Weather “All Clear.” This happens when the PG&E Incident Command and Meteorology teams monitor real-time and forecast weather conditions based on weather models, weather station data, and field observations. A Weather “All-Clear” is based on pre-defined, geographic areas and mapping of each weather station in each zone to that area. This is known as the All-Clear Zone methodology, which is based on past PSPS outages.

All-Clear Zones align with known meteorological phenomena, such as mountain tops and wind gaps which may experience longer periods of extreme weather. This allows for further granularity in calling Weather “All-Clears” and helps areas less prone to wind gusts or adverse conditions be cleared faster, compared to issuing Weather “All-Clear” by Fire Index Areas (FIAs). PG&E monitors the conditions in each of these All-Clear Zones. Once they fall below our mFPC, the PG&E Meteorologists will recommend areas for restoration.

Once Weather “All-Clears” are issued, the next step is for restoration crews to patrol electrical facilities to identify and repair or clear any damage or hazard before re-energizing. Using the Incident Command System (ICS) as a base response framework, each circuit is assigned a taskforce consisting of supervisors, crews, trouble men, and inspectors. This structure allows PG&E to patrol and perform step restoration in alignment with the centralized control centers. As patrol completion is verified, the final step is to restore power to customers.

For the August 30–31, 2023 PSPS, PG&E issued three Weather “All-Clears” and deployed approximately 156 personnel and 22 helicopters to patrol the lines in advance of restoration. Patrols were conducted on approximately 557 miles of distribution circuits and 34 miles of transmission lines that had been de-energized. Power was restored to customers as patrol completion verified the safe condition of each line.

Figure 21 shows the All-Clear Zones and the areas de-energized during the August 30-31 PSPS.

Figure 21: Map of All-Clear Zones and TPs De-energized for the August 30 – 31, 2021 PSPS



Section 8.2 - The timeline for power restoration, broken down by phase if applicable. (D.19-05-042, Appendix A, page A24, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

The first phase toward power restoration is when PG&E issues Weather “All-Clears” for All-Clear Zones. Once these are issued, the next phase is PG&E to patrol and perform step restoration.

The Weather “All-Clear” dates and times issued for All-Clear Zones for the August 30-31, 2023 PSPS are noted in Table 3. The last customer restored for this event was at 11:39 PDT on August 31, 2023. For date and time of full restoration by circuit, please refer to Appendix B.

Table 3: Weather All-Clear Times

All-Clear Zones	Weather All-Clear Date and Time
245C, 241A	08/30/2023 13:45 PDT
248A, 280H, 280G, 280C, 246C, 246F, 244A, 244B, 247A, 247B, 175F, 177B, 170B, 177A, 246A, 245A	08/30/2023 14:51 PDT
170A, 245B, 246B	08/30/2023 15:20 PDT

Section 8.3 - For any circuits that require more than 24 hours to restore, the utility shall explain why it was unable to restore each circuit within this timeframe. (D.20-05-051, Appendix A, page 6.)

Response:

PG&E was able to restore all impacted circuits within 24 hours of their Weather All-Clear time.

Section 9 – Community Resource Centers

Section 9.1 - The address of each location during a de-energization event, the location (in a building, a trailer, etc.), the assistance available at each location, the days and hours that it was open, and attendance (i.e., number of visitors) (*Resolution ESRB-8, page 5, SED Additional Information.*)

Response:

During this event, PG&E opened two indoor and six outdoor CRCs which were visited by 808 people. The full list of CRC locations, including addresses, assistance available at each location, operating days and hours, and attendance is reported in Appendix G.

Every PSPS notification directs recipients to pge.com/pspsupdates, which includes a link to CRC information. This website prominently highlights the dedicated CRC page, which includes:

- Open CRC locations and addresses
- Days and hours of operation
- Services available at each site
- A note that the PSPS outage map can be used to find local CRC locations and identify where to access electricity during the hours CRCs are closed.

CRCs are typically open from 08:00 PDT to 22:00 PDT during the time the power is shut off until customers are restored. Visitors were provided ADA-compliant restrooms, power strips to meet basic charging needs for personal medical devices and other electronics, snacks, bottled water, Wi-Fi, cellular service access, and PSPS event information via dedicated staff. For visitors who did not wish to remain on site, “Grab and Go” bags with a PSPS information card, water, non-perishable snacks, a mobile battery charger, and a blanket were available. Bagged ice and privacy screens were also available at indoor locations.

Lake, Yolo, and Napa locations declined to have CRCs set up in their counties due to low customer impact.

Additional information about our CRC operations, including coordination with Tribal and local governments, CRC types and resources, COVID-19 and other safety considerations, and more is available in the CRC Plan located in Appendix A of [PG&E’s 2023 Pre-Season Report](#).

Section 9.2 - Any deviations and explanations from the CRC requirement including operation hours, ADA accessibility, and equipment. (*SED Additional Information.*)

Response:

At approximately 10:50 PDT on August 30, 2023, CRC staff at the Happy Valley Community Center CRC were informed of a small fire that had started behind the building on a neighboring property. Security called 911 and on-site staff notified the EOC. All staff and visitors evacuated the building. The fire moved quickly due to winds and set the field behind the CRC building on fire. Emergency services arrived on scene and contained the fire. A few of the neighboring properties were also evacuated, and staff handed out “Grab and Go” bags to those who requested them while evacuating. They were cleared to be back inside at approximately 11:25 PDT and reopened the site at 11:30 PDT.

At 08:00 a.m. on August 30, 2023, PurpleAir’s AQI readings closest to three CRCs registered the air as unhealthy. This applied to Stonyford Community Hall (AQI of 154), Elk Creek Junior Senior High School (AQI of 154), and Flourney Elementary School (AQI of 171). These CRC locations remained open as Stonyford Community Hall is an indoor site with an HVAC that provides filtration; Elk Creek Junior Senior High School and Flourney Elementary School were outdoor CRCs, but remained open as no alternative indoor CRCs were available nearby. Our safety team provided guidance that N95 masks should be available to staff, and customers upon request, but were voluntary, not mandated. We ensured at least 200 N95 masks were available at each site. The AQIs fell to moderate levels by 11:30 PDT.


At approximately 13:30 p.m. on August 30, 2023, the CRC team received notice that TP 11 was canceled and removed from scope. Our Public Safety Specialists informed Tehama County’s OES and confirmed to move forward with closing Noland Park CRC at 14:00 p.m.

Section 9.3 - A map identifying the location of each CRC and the de-energized areas. (SED Additional Information.)

Response:

See Figure 22 below for a map identifying the location of each CRC and the de-energized areas.

Figure 22: Location of CRCs for the August 30-31, 2023 PSPS Event



Section 10 – Mitigations to Reduce Impact


Section 10.1 - Mitigation actions and impacts (both waterfall graph and map) including: sectionalization devices, temporary generation, microgrids, permanent backup generation, transmission switching, covered conductor, and any other grid hardening that mitigated the impact of the event. (D.21-06-014, page 285, SED Additional Information.)

Response:

Mitigations to Reduce Impact

PG&E employed multiple measures, including community microgrids, transmission line segmentation, distribution switching, sectionalization, islanding, temporary microgrids, backup generation, and covered conductor, to avoid de-energizing approximately 15,584 customers. Figure 23 below depicts the impact each mitigation measure had on the total number of customers. Two customers, normally served by their own temporary generation, were in scope for this event. These customers were ultimately not de-energized due to their existing mitigation. However, they were notified throughout the event to clarify that PG&E would be unable to restore power due to the outage in their area if their temporary generation failed.

Figure 23: Reduction in Number of Impacted Customers Driven by Mitigation Efforts



Community Microgrids

A community microgrid is a group of customers and Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) within clearly defined electrical boundaries with the ability to disconnect from and reconnect to the grid. These microgrids are typically designed to serve the portions of communities that include community resources, like hospitals, police and fire stations, and gas stations and markets. PG&E continues to own and operate the distribution system within the microgrid. More information about PG&E's microgrid solutions or how to begin developing a community microgrid can be found at www.pge.com/cmep. No community microgrids were utilized during the August 30-31, 2023, PSPS Event.

Transmission Line Segmentation

Transmission lines are segmented using switches enabled with Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA), when possible, if only a portion of a line is required to be de-energized due to PSPS. Leaving segments of transmission lines energized allows PG&E to still reduce fire risk where needed and provide service to stations fed off the non-impacted segments during the PSPS. One Transmission line was segmented during this event to keep a transmission level customer energized. However, the line was only in scope due to distribution impact. The line would not have been de-energized if it had downstream customer impacts.

Distribution Switching

Depending on fire risk patterns, distribution switch locations and switching plans maintain service to customers on lines that fall outside the high-risk area but are served by lines that pass through the fire risk area. Depending on event scope, we may be able to use back-tie switching to bypass the distribution circuits that pass through the de-energization area to keep customers energized from a different set of lines. During this event, distribution switching was not used as a mitigation as no opportunities were identified.

Sectionalization

PG&E has installed new sectionalization devices near the borders of the CPUC-designated Tier 2 and 3 High Fire-Threat Districts to reduce the number of customers affected by PSPS events. PG&E used sectionalization devices on 13 circuits which reduced the customer impact by approximately 15,573 customers for this event. Of these devices, no newly installed “greenfield” devices were in scope for this event.

Islanding

In some cases, PG&E can leverage islanding capabilities to keep some customers islanded apart from the rest of PG&E’s transmission system and energized by generation located within the island. During this event, there were no islanding opportunities in scope for energization.

Temporary Microgrids

PG&E temporary distribution microgrids were not in scope for this event. The objective of temporary microgrids is to enable some community resources to continue serving the surrounding population during PSPS events where it is safe to do so, using pre-installed interconnection hubs to safely and rapidly interconnect temporary generation.

While temporary microgrids do not often support large numbers of customers, the community resources served by the temporary microgrids include fire stations, local water and waste companies, markets, post offices, and medical facilities. On average, customers served by the temporary microgrids experience de-energization periods of under 45 minutes for the switch-over from grid to microgrid and go-back from microgrid to the grid.

Twelve temporary microgrid sites are currently ready for immediate operation in PG&E’s service area and others are in development.

Backup Power Support

PG&E used temporary generation to support two stand-alone customers. Table 17 lists the facilities that received backup power support during the August 30-31, 2023 PSPS event.

Covered Conductor

The effects of grid-hardening and covered conductors are accounted for in our IPW model, which predicts the probability of utility-caused ignitions. Overhead system hardening is expected to reduce the probability of outages and ignitions in recently hardened sections. The IPW model more heavily weighs ignition and outage rates in recent years which will result in areas with fewer ignitions (e.g., areas that may have been recently hardened, being less likely to be de-energized for PSPS as there is a lower chance of ignition based on historical ignitions and outages).

Section 11 – Lessons Learned from this Event

Section 11.1 - Threshold analysis and the results of the utility’s examination of whether its thresholds are adequate and correctly applied in the de-energized areas. (D.21-06-014, page 305-306.)

Response:

This section addresses our examination of the adequacy of our PSPS protocols and guidance thresholds. PG&E believes our thresholds were accurate, adequate and correctly applied to the de-energized areas for the August 30-31, 2023 PSPS Event. See Appendix A for additional meteorological information.

PG&E began its threshold evaluation with a robust historical analysis that is described below. This established the guidance values are properly applied for PSPS events and optimized to capture data from past catastrophic fires to mitigate future fire potential and minimize customer impacts in the future. To do so, meteorologists use internal and external tools to evaluate the weather and determine if the PSPS is reasonable.

Before de-energization, PSPS customer risk is evaluated against wildfire risk by circuit. During the PSPS, the advanced weather modeling systems from our network of over 1,500 weather stations can forecast and track weather conditions in real time. Data and post-event analysis results are collected and provided as part of the PSPS Post-Event Report.

Establishing Threshold through Historical Analysis

Our PSPS guidance was established by calibrating a granular, historical dataset. We built our verification dataset by creating, or “backcasting,” the PSPS guidance through our historical dataset. We extracted values for all recent fires that have occurred in PG&E’s service area from 2012 to 2020. We aimed to capture as many historical fires as possible that were caused by PG&E equipment during high wind events (e.g., Camp, Nuns, Kincade, Zogg) while limiting the number of historical PSPS events to minimize customer impacts. Our analysis included:

- Hourly review of past incidents
- Verification of hypothetical PSPS event dates
- PSPS guidance values testing
- A robust guidance sensitivity and calibration analysis

Historical Analysis: CFP_D Quantification

Based on this analysis, PG&E uses a CFP_D value of nine as the quantitative threshold guidance value to consider for PSPS on PG&E’s distribution system.

To establish the CFP_D threshold of nine, we performed multiple sensitivity studies in “backcast” mode for calibration and validation. This involved running 68 different versions of the combined distribution PSPS guidance through hourly historical data throughout multiple years to calibrate PSPS guidance. This included simulating and learning from more than 2,500 virtual PSPS events. Through this “lookback” analysis, we evaluated:

- The potential size, scope, and frequency of PSPS events
- Potential customer impacts
- The days PSPS events would have occurred
- Whether utility infrastructure would have qualified for de-energization


The mFPC and CFP_D guidance that is determined from Technosylva was also evaluated using this process.

The CFP_D guidance value of nine is shown in Figure 24 below with respect to recent large fires since 2012.

Any fires above nine that met the basic mFPC indicate PSPS would have been executed, had these models and guidance been in use during these historic events. The results show that deployment of this model could have prevented wildfires, such as Camp, Tubbs, Nuns, Atlas, Kincade and Zogg fires, if implemented in 2012. Please note that the inclusion of a fire in this analysis does not indicate that PG&E is directly responsible for or caused a fire. Instead, the fires are included for the purpose of analyzing the impact of PG&E's current PSPS Protocols.

The red "X" symbols in Figure 24 below represent fires that were captured by both the CFP_D and Technosylva CFB. The blue dots under the line represent fires below the CFP_D guidance. Blue dots "•" above the line represent events that did not meet the mFPC criteria.

Figure 24: CFP_D Guidance



This analysis was a critical step to ensure the most catastrophic historical incidents are identified by PSPS guidance while considering the significant impacts to customers from PSPS events across multiple dimensions (e.g., duration and frequency). This ensures that future PSPS events will capture conditions similarly during the most catastrophic fires while also balancing impacts to customers.

Historical Analysis: Execution

To execute the analysis at this scale, we utilized cloud computing resources to run PSPS model guidance for every hour at every 2 x 2 km grid cell across the historical data set to determine the number of times and locations PSPS guidance is exceeded. Each location exceeding guidance is

then grouped into events to determine the location and size of each PSPS event given the weather and fuels present at that time under the parameters of the study version. This allows us to determine if synoptic-driven events (e.g., Diablo wind events) are being identified, and if historical fires attributable to PG&E equipment may have been mitigated.

Verification of PSPS Protocols

In addition to these sensitivity studies, PG&E performed extensive verification of the PSPS protocols using several internal and external datasets. The goal of these analyses was to first determine if certain weather events are being captured (e.g., Diablo and offshore wind events), and second, to determine if lines that have been implicated in historic catastrophic fires would have been identified by the guidance.

The following internal datasets were used in the analysis:

- Climatology of Diablo wind events
- Hourly high-resolution wind maps from the climatology data set
- Distribution and transmission outage history
- The weather signal database
- Exploratory and dynamic dashboards created with internal and external data

The following external datasets were used in the analysis:

- National Center for Environmental Prediction (NCEP) North American Regional Reanalysis Archive (NARR) synoptic weather maps
- Historical fire occurrence data compiled by federal agencies
- RFWs from the NWS
- High risk of potential large fires due to wind from the GACC

The paragraphs below explain how we leveraged external and internal data to verify our PSPS protocols guidance thresholds.

NARR Archive

PG&E acquired the NARR archive data, which dates to 1995 and made over two million maps that can be utilized to study past events. These maps are also useful to study the past conditions leading up to the event, such as the extent of precipitation events and heat waves. When the PSPS models are run through the climatology, each event identified is compared against the NARR archive by a Meteorologist to determine the large-scale atmospheric features present for each event.

Climatology of Diablo Wind Events

PG&E also leverages the latest academic research on Diablo wind events that use surface-based observations to create a climatology of Diablo wind events. We adapted the criteria and processed it hour-by-hour through the 31-year weather climatology to determine the frequency, magnitude, and timing of Diablo winds. The output of this analysis was a 31-year calendar of Diablo wind events experienced in the PG&E service area. As it relates to PSPS directly, the strongest Diablo wind events were evaluated to verify if PSPS guidance also selects these days for potential PSPS events. Using the days identified by PSPS guidance and the Diablo event list, a high-level comparison was completed to evaluate overlap of the events.

Any events that did not meet PSPS guidance were evaluated further using additional data sources described in this section. For example, the NARR archive proved useful, as antecedent conditions such as rainfall before an event and the magnitude of the event could be evaluated.

PG&E's Weather Signal Database

PG&E's Meteorology team built, and continues to maintain, a 'weather signal' database that identifies each day from January 1, 1995, to present that experienced any weather-related outages on the distribution system. It also lists the main weather driver (e.g., heat, low-elevation snow, northeast wind, winter storm, etc.) for these outages. If distribution outage activity is not driven by weather, the day is classified as a "Blue Sky"⁷⁵ day. This dataset combines weather and distribution outage activity that allows rapid filtering of events based on the main weather drivers. To validate PSPS guidance, we used a combination of "Northeast" wind days and "Blue-Sky" days.

The PSPS guidance was validated against all Northeast wind days in the database. This is similar, but complimentary to the Diablo event analysis as it also accounts for outage activity observed on those days. Events were also compared against "Blue Sky" days to ensure that PSPS would not be recommended for a high percentage of non-weather-impact days where little to no outage activity was observed.

Red Flag Warnings from the NWS

PG&E also validated PSPS guidance against RFWs from the NWS. Red Flag Warnings (RFW) mean warm temperatures, very low humidity, and stronger winds are expected to combine to produce an increased risk of fire danger. These RFWs were collected for the past six years (2015 – 2020) in shapefile format and used to evaluate the timing and spatial extent of historical RFWs against PSPS guidance. It should be noted that each NWS office in the PG&E service area has different RFW criteria, making direct and quantifiable comparison challenging. However, this dataset is used to evaluate whether RFWs were issued when PSPS guidance was met. Based on historical PSPS analysis, RFWs are expected to occur more frequently and cover a broader area than the area covered by PSPS events.

High Risk of Potential Large Fires due to Wind from the GACC

PG&E also validated PSPS guidance against historical "High Risk" days from the GACC. The GACCs issue High Risk Day alerts when fuel and weather conditions are predicted that historically have resulted in a significantly higher than normal chance for a new large fire or for significant growth on existing fires. Examples of critical weather conditions are high winds, low humidity, an unstable atmosphere, and very hot weather. Similar to the RFW analysis, this dataset was used to evaluate if High Risk days were issued when PSPS guidance was high. Similar to RFWs, based on historical PSPS analysis, High Risk Days are expected to occur more frequently and cover a broader area than PSPS.

Hourly High-Resolution Wind Maps from PG&E Climatology Data Set

PG&E created hourly maps from high-resolution climatology and a web-based application to display any hour across 30 years. For each event that meets PSPS guidance in the climatology, these maps were evaluated by a Meteorologist to better understand the nature of the event, wind speeds, antecedent conditions, and the spatial extent of strong winds. It's important to note

⁷⁵ Blue Sky Day is defined as "The same as a non-weather impact day (no or very limited impacts due to weather)".

forecast wind speeds are available in the same exact format, allowing Operational Meteorologists to put forecast events in perspective with historical events using the same model.

Detailed Event Dashboards

To evaluate the thresholds, Meteorologists and data scientists utilized the data sources described above to evaluate historical PSPS events hour-by-hour to verify the locations and times that are being flagged as meeting PSPS guidance. These dashboards determine if historical fire events would have been flagged by PSPS guidance. Meteorologists evaluated these data sources hourly to verify model performance of the IPW model and suitability for operations. The PSPS guidance can be evaluated spatially using the dashboard map integration, while the size and timing of the event can be evaluated using the timeseries integration.

Section 11.2 - Any lessons learned that will lead to future improvement for the utility. (SED Additional Information.)

Response:

PG&E collects lessons learned input from personnel during and after every PSPS event to identify best practices and biggest opportunities for improvement. The insights described in Table 20 below have been contributed by individual EOC members and cover the August 30-31, 2023 PSPS event.

Table 20: Lessons Learned from the August 30 -31, 2023 PSPS Event

Issue	Discussion	Resolution
Data Sharing and Reporting	An update of PG&E’s 7-day forecast update was out of sync with internal processes resulting in Counties included before approved scope.	Continue further synchronization of updates with trainings and job aids.
Data Sharing and Reporting	While statuses were being updated on PG&E’s website, Cities and Counties observed information that had not yet been updated but were in the process of being updated.	To address this timing issue, we are updating the website language to provide clarification and redirect customers to the Address Look Up tool to view real-time status during PSPS.
Customer Notification	Power Off notifications were delayed due to coordination issues with vendor. See Table 9C and 9H for more information.	Updated internal guidance and training materials to ensure the customer notification lead notifies the vendor when our internal outage platform automation is turned on and updated.

Section 12 – Other Relevant Information


Maximum Wind Gusts

Table 21 and Figure 25 below show the maximum wind gust speeds recorded by weather stations in each county within PSPS scope.

Table 21: Maximum Wind Gusts Recorded August 30, 2023 in Impacted Counties

County	Maximum Wind Gust (mph)	Station ID	Station Name
Butte	49	JBGC1	Jarbo Gap
Colusa	28	PG280	Huffmaster Road
Glenn	39	PG845	Road 65
Lake	39	PG126	Mt St Helena East
Shasta	41	PG070	Round Mountain
Tehama	40	PG599	Tuscan Buttes
Yolo	44	PG490	Bald Mountain Tower

Figure 25: Maximum Wind Gusts Recorded August 30, 2023 in Impacted Counties



APPENDIX

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

APPENDIX A

DECISION MAKING PROCESS

Appendix A: DECISION MAKING PROCESS

Table A-1.1: Factors Considered in the Decision to Shut Off Power for Each Distribution Circuit De-energized During the August 30 – 31, 2023 PSPS Event

* Please see Table A-1.2 for the description of each column header, as well as the unit and value provided

** Note: PSPS decision making on Distribution does not occur at a per-circuit level, and instead occurs at the level of our 2 x 2 km weather and fuels model grid. These outputs are used in a GIS system to visualize the areas of concern by area, which meteorologists and Distribution Assets Health Specialists review to scope the event. The data provided here is representative of our high-resolution weather model data, which is driven by the Weather Research and Forecasting model. It is not inclusive of other model information reviewed by meteorologists that include external, public global and high-resolution weather models. This temporal and areal review of the risk, the operational timeline required to create the scope as well as any areas that were added based on subject matter expertise of meteorologists may lead to some circuits being de-energized that do not strictly exceed PSPS guidance.

Circuit Name	Time Place	Forecast																	Agency Observed				Observed																																																																																																											
		w1 mph	w2 mph	w3 mph	w4 mph	w5 mph	w6 mph	w7 mph	w8 mph	w9 mph	w10 mph	w11 mph	w12 mph	w13 mph	w14 mph	w15 mph	w16 mph	w17 mph	w18 mph	w19 mph	w20 mph	w21 mph	w22 mph	w23 mph	w24 mph	w25 mph	w26 mph	w27 mph	w28 mph	w29 mph	w30 mph	w31 mph	w32 mph	w33 mph	w34 mph	w35 mph	w36 mph	w37 mph	w38 mph	w39 mph	w40 mph	w41 mph	w42 mph	w43 mph	w44 mph	w45 mph	w46 mph	w47 mph	w48 mph	w49 mph	w50 mph	w51 mph	w52 mph	w53 mph	w54 mph	w55 mph	w56 mph	w57 mph	w58 mph	w59 mph	w60 mph	w61 mph	w62 mph	w63 mph	w64 mph	w65 mph	w66 mph	w67 mph	w68 mph	w69 mph	w70 mph	w71 mph	w72 mph	w73 mph	w74 mph	w75 mph	w76 mph	w77 mph	w78 mph	w79 mph	w80 mph	w81 mph	w82 mph	w83 mph	w84 mph	w85 mph	w86 mph	w87 mph	w88 mph	w89 mph	w90 mph	w91 mph	w92 mph	w93 mph	w94 mph	w95 mph	w96 mph	w97 mph	w98 mph	w99 mph	w100 mph	flame length ft	rate of spread ch/hr	area acres	rh 2m	vpd2m_mb	prob_cat	din 10hr	din 100 hr	din 1000 hr	fm herb	fm woody	fm channel_new	sum tree ovr	prob ignition	cpd	HWW	HWA	RFW	CACC High Risk	Observed wt mph	Observed wz mph	Observed temp f	Observed RH %	Observed wt mph AC	Observed wz mph AC	Observed temp f AC	Observed RH % AC	open pops tags	Tx impacts yes_no
BIG BEND 1101	TP 12	19	31	43	94	9.6	45.5	3210.1	9.6	48.7	0.894	0.035	0.061	0.084	36	72	67	54176.2	0.002021	14.7	No	No	No	Yes	30	49	97	13	11	17	97	13	Yes	No	0.60030	26.8																																																																																														
CEDAR CREEK 1101	TP 1	28	38	58	95	14	40.2	2239.3	7.3	51.2	0.82	0.032	0.066	0.083	40	79	71	87136.2	0.004618	20.9	No	No	No	No	22	41	97	12	11	20	97	12	Yes	Yes	1.70979	43.8																																																																																														
CLARK ROAD 1102	TP 12	27	34	43	96	12.4	45.5	2686.8	9.3	52.1	0.906	0.033	0.059	0.083	36	79	70	21285.1	0.002021	14.7	No	No	No	Yes	30	49	97	13	10	17	98	13	Yes	No	0.37790	78.9																																																																																														
CORNING 1101	TP 4	23	29	44	99	8.8	85.9	18716	9	57.9	0.842	0.035	0.064	0.08	33	72	67	6259.9	0.001451	10	No	No	Yes	Yes	24	34	98	10	17	24	99	10	Yes	No	2.18012	325.7																																																																																														
CORNING 1102	TP 4	23	29	44	99	10.5	124.8	26658	9	56.5	0.919	0.033	0.06	0.073	34	63	66	1979	0.000993	7.8	No	No	Yes	Yes	24	36	98	7	14	24	99	9	Yes	No	0.76211	121.5																																																																																														
CORNING REMOTE 001	TP 4	20	28	43	98	8.1	75.5	10414	9.7	54.5	0.77	0.035	0.063	0.078	37	70	67	14.1	0.001149	8.8	No	No	Yes	Yes	21	34	98	10	14	21	99	11	Yes	No	N/A ¹	N/A ¹																																																																																														
CORNING REMOTE 002	TP 4	20	28	42	98	6.9	41.2	5422.1	9.5	55.2	0.634	0.035	0.063	0.079	40	71	67	408.6	0.000923	5.8	No	No	Yes	Yes	21	34	98	10	14	21	99	11	Yes	No	N/A ¹	N/A ¹																																																																																														
COTTON WOOD 1102	TP 2	15	21	34	99	10.5	47.9	7563.8	8.7	58.7	0.809	0.036	0.068	0.078	34	61	65	5633.3	0.00064	3.1	No	No	Yes	Yes	19	29	98	11	11	22	98	12	Yes	No	0.42172	319.3																																																																																														
ELK CREEK 1101	TP 4	23	29	45	98	14.8	77.7	11496	9.1	55.5	0.928	0.033	0.059	0.072	34	62	64	1421.4	0.001142	9.4	No	No	Yes	Yes	25	38	109	6	13	20	109	8	Yes	Yes	2.28496	136.1																																																																																														
GIRVAN 1101	TP 2	20	28	43	99	10.6	79	13187	8.8	57.3	0.913	0.035	0.066	0.076	30	70	65	23867.7	0.001269	9.4	No	No	Yes	Yes	19	36	100	12	10	17	100	13	Yes	No	0.84772	209.1																																																																																														
GLENN 1101	TP 4	23	29	39	98	8.5	83.7	14099	9.6	54.8	0.708	0.034	0.06	0.075	36	70	66	-99	0.000881	4.2	No	No	Yes	Yes	23	36	98	7	12	19	98	10	Yes	No	0.09211	32.2																																																																																														
HIGHLANDS 1103	TP 8	19	30	46	94	11.6	50.5	5337.3	9.4	47.1	0.9	0.04	0.068	0.077	38	61	72	11499.6	0.001142	8.5	No	No	Yes	No	22	37	98	9	9	16	98	9	Yes	No	0.13552	131.4																																																																																														
JESSUP 1101	TP 2	16	23	36	99	8.4	36.8	3107.6	8.8	57.3	0.882	0.035	0.068	0.078	35	74	65	7072.7	0.000843	6.3	No	No	Yes	Yes	19	29	96	12	10	20	97	14	Yes	No	0.39706	262.4																																																																																														

¹ Due to no customer impact, PSPS Potential Risk Consequence and Potential Benefit was not calculated for CORNING REMOTE 001 and CORNING REMOTE 002 circuits.

LOGAN CREEK 2102	TP 5	19	26	39	99	9.5	106.6	29275	8.7	56.8	0.844	0.034	0.062	0.075	34	66	63	547	0.00086	6.2	No	No	Yes	Yes	20	33	809	10	11	18	1 109	10	Yes	No	0.09723	23.3
MADISON 2101	TP 6	20	26	35	99	6.5	34.3	3165.3	7.7	57.2	0.728	0.033	0.061	0.072	35	64	67	108.2	0.000545	3.9	No	No	Yes	Yes	35	44	801	11	10	17	101	11	Yes	No	0.30891	132.1
MAXWELL 1105	TP 5	21	27	39	100	8.7	83	14387	8	58.5	0.865	0.032	0.059	0.071	31	64	64	261	0.000949	9.9	No	No	Yes	Yes	19	28	97	11	7	13	97	15	Yes	No	0.30891	132.1
ROUND MOUNTAIN 1101	TP 1	22	28	36	90	29.2	30.3	15124	8.1	44.6	0.365	0.034	0.072	0	0.0047	85	72	9575.7	0.0008	2.3	No	No	No	No	22	41	90	13	11	20	90	13	Yes	No	0.15221	14.3
WHITMORE 1101	TP 1	21	32	48	92	13.6	30.7	1530	7.8	47.5	0.727	0.032	0.065	0.081	43	84	76	58930.2	0.003288	15.2	No	No	No	No	21	41	95	10	10	20	94	13	Yes	No	0.92080	9.4

Table A-1.2: Description, Units, and Value provided for Factors Considered in the Decision to Shut Off Power for Each Distribution Circuit De-energized During the August 30 – 31, 2023 PSPS Event

Forecast / Agency / Observed	Value	Name	Unit	Value Provided	Description
Observed	Observed wg_mph	Observed Peak Wind Gust during Event	mph	max	The maximum wind gust recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from planned de-energization time to anticipated all-clear time.
Observed	Observed temp_f	Observed Temperature during Event	degrees F	max	The maximum temperature recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from planned de-energization time to anticipated all-clear time.
Observed	Observed RH_%	Observed Relative Humidity During Event	%	min	Minimum relative humidity recorded by all weather stations mapped to each circuit from planned de-energization time to anticipated all-clear time.
Observed	Observed ws_mph_AC	Observed Sustained Wind Speed at All Clear	mph	max	The maximum sustained wind speed recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit at the all-clear time.
Observed	Observed wg_mph_AC	Observed Peak Wind Gust at All Clear	mph	max	The maximum wind gust recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit at the all-clear time.
Observed	Observed temp_f_AC	Observed Temperature at All Clear	degrees F	max	The maximum temperature recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit at the all-clear time.
Observed	Observed RH_%_AC	Observed Relative Humidity at All Clear	%	min	Minimum relative humidity recorded by all weather stations mapped to each circuit at the all-clear time.
Observed	open_pspstags	Open PSPS Qualified Tags	N/A	Yes/No During Event	PSPS-Qualified Tags include P1 (tree represents an immediate risk) and P2 (tree is damaged or diseased and could fall into nearby power lines) tree tags and Electric Corrective tags (Priority A - emergency, B - urgent, and E/F - risk-based)
Observed	Tx_impacts_yes_no	Impacted by Transmission	N/A	Yes/No During Event	Distribution lines that would have been de-energized due to de-energization of upstream transmission lines, regardless of whether those distribution lines would have also been de-energized due to direct distribution PSPS.
Forecast	ws_mph	Sustained wind speeds	mph	max	Sustained windspeed in miles per hour at 10 meters above ground level.
Forecast	ws_mph_50m	Sustained wind speeds at 50 m	mph	max	Sustained windspeed in miles per hour at 50 meters above ground level.

Forecast	wg_10_mph	Forecasted Peak Wind Gust	mph	max	Wind gust in miles per hour at 10 meters above ground level.
Forecast	temp_2m_f	Temperature	degrees F	max	Temperature in Fahrenheit at 2 meters above ground level.
Forecast	flame_length_ft_2hr	Flame length	ft	max	Flame length in feet on fire front for first 2 hours of fire spread simulation from Technosylva.
Forecast	rate_of_spread_chhr_2hr	Rate of spread	chains/hr	max	Rate of fire spread in chains per hour for first 2 hours of fire spread simulation from Technosylva.
Forecast	area_acres_8hr	Acres burned	acres	max	Acres burned in the 8-hour fire spread simulation from Technosylva.
Forecast	rh_2m	Relative Humidity	%	min	Relative Humidity in percent at 2 meters above ground level.
Forecast	vpd2m_mb	Vapor Pressure Deficit	mb	max	Vapor Pressure Deficit in millibar at 2m above surface.

Table A-2.1: Factors Considered in the Decision to Shut Off Power for Each Transmission Circuit De-energized During the August 30 – 31, 2023 PSPS Event

* Please see Table A-2.2 for the description of each column header, as well as the unit and value provided.

** Note: PSPS decision making on Transmission does not occur at a per-circuit level and instead occurs at the granularity of each transmission structure. These outputs are used in a GIS system and dashboard to visualize the areas of concern by area, which meteorologists and Transmission Asset Health Specialists review to scope the event. This includes a review of lines that have little to no impact to customers and electric grid reliability. The data provided here is representative of our high-resolution weather model data, which is driven by the Weather Research and Forecasting model. It is not inclusive of other model information reviewed by meteorologists that include external, public global and high-resolution weather models. This temporal and areal review of the risk, the operational timeline required to create the scope as well as any areas that were added based on subject matter expertise of meteorologists may lead to some circuits being de-energized that do not strictly exceed PSPS guidance.

Circuit Name	Time Place	Forecast										Agency				Forecast										Observed										PSPS Risk v.s. Benefit	
		ws mph	ws mph 50m	wc ec mph	temp 2m f	flame length ft 2hr	rate of spread c/hr 2hr	area acres 8hr	rh 2m	spd2m mph	HWW	HWA	RFW	GACC High Risk	prob_cat	dfo 10hr	dfo 100hr	dfo 1000hr	lfn herb	lfn woody	lfn chamise_new	mm tree avr	OA	cdf	Observed ws mph	Observed wg mph	Observed temp f	Observed RH %	Observed ws mph AC	Observed wg mph AC	Observed temp f AC	Observed RH % AC	High Fire Risk Area (Y/N)	High Risk Vegetation Present on Circuit (Y/N)	Transmission Impacts yes/no	PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	PSPS Potential Benefit
ELK CREEK TAP	TP 5	20	N/A	36	95	7	46	8129	9	51	No	No	Yes	Yes	0.791	0.04	0.064	0.076	34	N/A	66	N/A	3.08E-07	0.000229	23	35	105	8	13	22	105	8	Y	N	Yes	0.08444	20.3
ELK CREEK TAP (CITY OF SANTA CLARA)	TP 5	20	N/A	36	95	7	46	8129	9	51	No	No	Yes	Yes	0.791	0.04	0.064	0.076	34	N/A	66	N/A	3.08E-07	0.000229	13	24	98	8	10	18	99	8	Y	N	No	0.08444	20.3
KILARC-CEDAR CREEK	TP 1	23	N/A	49	79	10	26	1135	21	27	No	No	No	No	0.625	0.05	0.07	0.08	45	N/A	73	N/A	0.00031	0.17	22	41	92	8	14	26	93	14	Y	N	Yes	0.08444	21.7

Table A-2.2: Description, Units, and Value provided for Factors Considered in the Decision to Shut Off Power for Each Transmission Circuit De-energized During the August 30 – 31, 2023 PSPS Event

Forecast / Agency / Observed	Value	Name	Unit	Value Provided	Description
Forecast	ws_mph	Sustained wind speeds	mph	max	Sustained windspeed in miles per hour at 10 meters above ground level.
Forecast	ws_mph_50m	Sustained wind speeds at 50 m	mph	max	Sustained windspeed in miles per hour at 50 meters above ground level.
Forecast	wg_ec_mph	Gust wind speeds	mph	max	Wind gust in miles per hour at 10 meters above ground level.
Forecast	temp_2m_f	Temperature	degrees F	max	Temperature in Fahrenheit at 2 meters above ground level.
Forecast	flame_length_ft_2hr	Flame length	ft	max	Flame length in feet on fire front for first 2 hours of fire spread simulation from Technoslyva.
Forecast	rate_of_spread_chhr_2hr	Rate of spread	chains/hr	max	Rate of fire spread in chains per hour for first 2 hours of fire spread simulation from Technoslyva.
Forecast	area_acres_8hr	Acres burned	acres	max	Acres burned in the 8-hour fire spread simulation from Technoslyva.
Forecast	rh_2m	Relative Humidity	%	min	Relative Humidity in percent at 2 meters above ground level.
Forecast	vpd2m_mb	Vapor Pressure Deficit	mb	max	Vapor Pressure Deficit in millibar at 2m above surface
Agency	HWW	High Wind Warning	N/A	Yes/No during event	High Wind Warning from the Federal National Weather Service.
Agency	HWA	High Wind Advisory	N/A	Yes/No during event	High Wind Advisory from the Federal National Weather Service.
Agency	RFW	Red Flag Warning	N/A	Yes/No during event	Red Flag Warning from the Federal National Weather Service.
Agency	GACC_HighRisk	GACC High Risk	N/A	Yes/No during event	High Risk issued by the Federal North or South Operations Predictive Services.
Forecast	prob_cat	Fire Potential Index (FPI)	probability outputs	max	Fire Potential Index (FPI) Model Output - Probability of a catastrophic fire if an ignition were to occur. FPI component of the CFP ₀ model.
Forecast	dfm_10hr	Dead Fuel Moisture Content 10 hrs (%)	fuel moisture fraction	min	Dead Fuel Moisture in 10-hour fuel moisture class. Can be scaled to percentage by multiplying by 100.
Forecast	dfm_100hr	Dead Fuel Moisture Content 100 hrs (%)	fuel moisture fraction	min	Dead Fuel Moisture in 100-hour moisture class. Can be scaled to percentage by multiplying by 100.
Forecast	dfm_1000hr	Dead Fuel Moisture Content 1000 hrs (%)	fuel moisture fraction	min	Dead Fuel Moisture in 1000-hour moisture class. Can be scaled to percentage by multiplying by 100.
Forecast	lfm_herb	Live Fuel Moisture Content-herbaceous	%	min	Live Fuel Moisture Percentage of herbaceous plant species. (% of species that is comprised of water)
Forecast	lfm_woody	Live Fuel Moisture Content-woody	%	min	Live Fuel Moisture Percentage of woody plant species. (% of species that is comprised of water)
Forecast	lfm_chamise_new	Live Fuel Moisture Content-shrub	%	min	Live Fuel Moisture Percentage of Chamise (shrub) plant species. (% of species that is comprised of water)
Forecast	sum_tree_ovr	Tree Overstrike	ft	max	Sum of tree overstrike in a 2 x 2 km grid cell area in ft.
Forecast	OA	Transmission Operability Assessment (OA)	Probability	max	Ignition Probability Weather (IPW) Model Output - Probability of Ignition based on the probability of outages by cause. Ignition component of the CFPD model. Ignition Probability Weather Model - A model that provides estimates of the probability of an ignition given an outage on an hourly basis
Forecast	cfpt	Catastrophic Fire Potential (CFP ₀)	Scaled Probability	max	The product of probability of catastrophic fire (Prob_Cat) and IPW - probability of ignition (prob_ignition). This product is called the (CFP ₀) Catastrophic Fire Probability distribution model. Scaled by 1000 to convert to an integer value
Observed	Observed ws_mph	Observed Sustained Wind Speed during Event	mph	max	The maximum sustained wind speed recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from de-energization time to all-clear time.

Forecast / Agency / Observed	Value	Name	Unit	Value Provided	Description
Observed	Observed wg_mph	Observed Wind gust during Event	mph	max	The maximum sustained wind gust recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from de-energization time to all-clear time.
Observed	Observed temp_f	Observed Temperature during event	degrees F	max	The maximum temperature recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit from de-energization time to all-clear time.
Observed	Observed RH_%	Observed Relative Humidity During Event	%	min	Minimum relative humidity recorded by all weather stations mapped to each circuit from de-energization time to all-clear time.
Observed	Observed ws_mph_AC	Observed Sustained Wind Speed at All Clear	mph	max	The maximum sustained wind speed recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit at the all-clear time.
Observed	Observed wg_mph_AC	Observed Sustained Wind gust at All Clear	mph	max	The maximum sustained wind gust recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit at the all-clear time.
Observed	Observed temp_f_AC	Observed Temperature at All Clear-	degrees F	max	The maximum temperature recorded by weather stations mapped to each circuit at the all-clear time.
Observed	Observed RH_%_AC	Observed Relative Humidity at All Clear	%	min	Minimum relative humidity recorded by all weather stations mapped to each circuit at the all-clear time.
Observed	High Fire Risk Area	High Fire Risk Area	N/A	Yes/No During Event	Labeled 'Yes' when Circuit goes through High Fire Risk Area.
Observed	High Risk Vegetation Present on Circuit	High Risk Vegetation Present on Circuit	N/A	Yes/No During Event	High risk vegetation present on the circuit
Observed	transmission_impacts_yes_no	Impacted by Transmission	N/A	Yes/No During Event	Distribution lines that would have been de-energized due to de-energization of upstream transmission lines, regardless of whether those distribution lines would have also been de-energized due to direct distribution PSPS.
Observed	PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	PSPS Potential Risk Consequence	MAVF Score	Yes	Measure of the adverse impact to customers due to de-energization.
Observed	PSPS Potential Benefit	PSPS Potential Benefit	MAVF Score	Yes	Measure of the adverse impact to customers due to a catastrophic fire.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
APPENDIX B
DE-ENERGIZED TIME, PLACE, DURATION AND CUSTOMERS

Appendix B: DE-ENERGIZED TIME, PLACE, DURATION, AND CUSTOMERS

Circuits labeled as “non-HFTD” are located outside of the CPUC High Fire-Threat District (HFTD). These circuits or portions of circuits are impacted for one of two reasons: (1) indirect impacts from transmission lines being de-energized or (2) the non-HFTD portion of the circuit are conductive to the HFTD at some point in the path to service.

Circuits with an asterisk (*) were sectionalized during the event to further reduce customer impact. The de-energization date and time represents the time the first customer was de-energized on the circuit and the restoration time represents the date and time of the last customer restored on a circuit by circuit.

Table B-1. Circuits De-Energized During the August 30-31, 2023 PSPS Event

Distribution / Transmission	Circuit Name	De-Energization Date and Time	All-Clear Date and Time	Restoration Date and Time	County	HFTD Tier(s)	Total Customers	Residential Customers	Commercial / Industrial Customers	Medical Baseline Customers	APN other than MBL Customers	Other Customers
Distribution	BIG BEND 1101*	8/30/2023 1:42	8/30/2023 14:51	8/30/2023 18:34	BUTTE	Tier 3, Tier 2	198	176	20	12	53	2
Distribution	CEDAR CREEK 1101*	8/30/2023 2:00	8/30/2023 14:51	8/31/2023 11:21	SHASTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	697	624	68	59	181	5
Distribution	CLARE ROAD 1102*	8/30/2023 1:40	8/30/2023 14:51	8/30/2023 17:41	BUTTE	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3	151	136	12	11	38	3
Distribution	CORNING 1101*	8/30/2023 4:06	8/30/2023 15:20	8/30/2023 19:15	TEHAMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	827	754	70	101	362	3
Distribution	CORNING 1102*	8/30/2023 4:05	8/30/2023 15:20	8/30/2023 20:10	TEHAMA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	287	228	51	19	69	6
Distribution	CORNING REMOTE 0001	8/30/2023 5:05	8/30/2023 15:20	8/30/2023 17:50	TEHAMA	Tier 2	1	1	0	0	0	0
Distribution	CORNING REMOTE 0002	8/30/2023 5:17	8/30/2023 15:20	8/30/2023 17:33	TEHAMA	Tier 2	1	1	0	0	0	0
Distribution	COTTON WOOD 1102*	8/30/2023 2:29	8/30/2023 14:51	8/30/2023 18:39	SHASTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	65	57	5	7	15	3
Distribution	ELK CREEK 1101*	8/30/2023 4:09	8/30/2023 15:20	8/31/2023 10:31	COLUSA, GLENN	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	839	683	128	56	181	28
Distribution	GIRVAN 1101*	8/30/2023 2:00	8/30/2023 14:51	8/30/2023 18:48	SHASTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	332	287	40	19	58	5
Distribution	GLENN 1101*	8/30/2023 4:10	8/30/2023 15:20	8/30/2023 18:14	GLENN	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	5	3	1	0	0	1
Distribution	HIGHLAN DS 1103*	8/30/2023 5:54	8/30/2023 14:51	8/30/2023 17:19	LAKE	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	50	35	11	3	10	4
Distribution	JESSUP 1101*	8/30/2023 2:03	8/30/2023 14:51	8/30/2023 19:11	SHASTA	Tier 2	137	133	3	13	40	1
Distribution	LOGAN CREEK 2102*	8/30/2023 4:04	8/30/2023 14:51	8/30/2023 17:08	GLENN	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	9	3	4	0	1	2
Distribution	MADISON 2101*	8/30/2023 4:16	8/30/2023 14:51	8/30/2023 17:31	YOLO	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	20	9	11	1	3	0
Distribution	MAXWEL L 1105*	8/30/2023 4:06	8/30/2023 14:51	8/30/2023 17:53	COLUSA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	44	29	9	1	2	6
Distribution	ROUND MOUNTAIN 1101	8/29/2023 14:05	8/30/2023 14:51	8/30/2023 19:23	SHASTA	Outside HFTD	0	0	0	0	0	0
Distribution	WHITMOR E 1101*	8/30/2023 2:01	8/30/2023 14:51	8/31/2023 11:39	SHASTA	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 3, Tier 2	264	236	24	22	64	4
Transmission	KILARC-CEDAR CREEK	08/30/2023 03:34	08/30/2023 14:51	08/30/2023 17:46	Transmission Line	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	ELK CREEK TAP	08/30/2023 04:36	08/30/2023 14:51	08/30/2023 17:58	Transmission Line	Partially Outside HFTD, Tier 2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transmission	ELK CREEK TAP (CITY OF SANTA CLARA)	08/30/2023 04:36	08/30/2023 14:51	08/30/2023 17:58	Transmission Line	Tier 3	1 ¹	0	0	0	0	0
Total							3,928	3,395	457	324	1,877	75

¹ Customer Line de-energized with Elk Creek Tap per TOTL WC #T23-014873

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
APPENDIX C
DAMAGE AND HAZARDS TO OVERHEAD FACILITIES

Appendix C: DAMAGE & HAZARDS TO OVERHEAD FACILITIES

Table C-1. DAMAGES & HAZARDS FOUND WITHIN THE DE-ENERGIZED AREAS

Circuit Name	County	Structure Identifier	Tier 2/3 or Non-HFTD	Damage / Hazard	Type of Damage/Hazard	Description of Damage
Cedar Creek 1101	Shasta	104054736	Tier 2	Damage	Wind related	Broken tie wire

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

APPENDIX D

CUSTOMER NOTIFICATION SCRIPTS

**Note: Appendix D is provided as a separate file;
please see *PGE PSPS Event Notifications 20230915.pdf*.**

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
APPENDIX E
PUBLIC SAFETY PARTNERS CONTACTED

Appendix E: PUBLIC SAFETY PARTNERS CONTACTED

Table E-1. Public Safety Partners Contacted

Organization/Jurisdiction	Title	HFTD Tier	Date/Time Contacted
Butte County Communication Facility	AT&T MOBILITY	Tier 3	08/29/2023 11:32 PDT
Butte County Communication Facility	AT&T SERVICES INC	Tier 3	08/29/2023 11:32 PDT
Butte County Emergency Services Facility	COUNTY OF BUTTE	Tier 3	08/29/2023 11:32 PDT
Butte County Other Facility	CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FORESTRY	Tier 3	08/29/2023 11:32 PDT
Butte County	Assistant OES Director	Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1, HFRA	08/29/2023 11:26 PDT
Butte County	Board Chair	Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1, HFRA	08/29/2023 11:26 PDT
Butte County	Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1, HFRA	08/29/2023 11:26 PDT
Butte County	Chief Administrative Officer	Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1, HFRA	08/29/2023 11:26 PDT
Butte County	County Administrative Officer	Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1, HFRA	08/29/2023 11:26 PDT
Butte County	County Clerk-Recorder	Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1, HFRA	08/29/2023 11:26 PDT
Butte County	Director	Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1, HFRA	08/29/2023 11:26 PDT
Butte County	Division Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1, HFRA	08/29/2023 11:27 PDT
Butte County	General	Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1, HFRA	08/29/2023 11:26 PDT
Butte County	General CAL FIRE	Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1, HFRA	08/29/2023 11:26 PDT
Butte County	General Services Director	Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1, HFRA	08/29/2023 11:26 PDT
Butte County	Lieutenant	Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1, HFRA	08/29/2023 11:26 PDT
Butte County	OES Director	Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1, HFRA	08/29/2023 11:26 PDT
Butte County	Probation Officer	Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1, HFRA	08/29/2023 11:26 PDT
Butte County	Public Health Director	Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1, HFRA	08/29/2023 11:26 PDT
Butte County	Senior Contracts/Procurement Agent and EOC Logistics Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1, HFRA	08/29/2023 11:26 PDT
Butte County	Sergeant	Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1, HFRA	08/29/2023 11:26 PDT
Butte County	Supervisor	Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1, HFRA	08/29/2023 11:26 PDT
Butte County Tribal	Casino Director of Security	Tier 2, Tier 3, HFRA *	08/29/2023 11:26 PDT
Butte County Tribal	Chairman	Tier 2, Tier 3, HFRA *	08/29/2023 11:26 PDT
Butte County Tribal	Chairwoman	Tier 2, Tier 3, HFRA *	08/29/2023 11:26 PDT
Butte County Tribal	Land Manager	Tier 2, Tier 3, HFRA *	08/29/2023 11:26 PDT
Butte County Tribal	Tribal Administration	Tier 2, Tier 3, HFRA *	08/29/2023 11:26 PDT
Butte County Tribal	Tribal Administrator	Tier 2, Tier 3, HFRA *	08/29/2023 11:26 PDT

Butte County Tribal	Tribal Chairman	Tier 2, Tier 3, HFRA *	08/29/2023 11:26 PDT
Butte County Tribal	Vice Chairwoman	Tier 2, Tier 3, HFRA *	08/29/2023 11:26 PDT
Colusa County Communication Facility	AT&T	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Colusa County Communication Facility	AT&T MOBILITY LLC	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Colusa County Communication Facility	AT&T SERVICES INC	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Colusa County Communication Facility	FRONTIER COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION DIP	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Colusa County Communication Facility	GTE MOBIL.NET OF CALIFORNIA LP	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Colusa County Emergency Services Facility	CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FORESTRY	N/A **	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Colusa County Emergency Services Facility	COUNTY OF COLUSA	N/A **	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Colusa County Energy Sector Facility	CITY OF SANTA CLARA	N/A **	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Colusa County Water and Waste Water Facility	CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FORESTRY	N/A **	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Colusa County Water and Waste Water Facility	COUNTY OF COLUSA	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Colusa County	Board Chair	Tier 2, Tier 3, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Colusa County	County Clerk/Recorder	Tier 2, Tier 3, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Colusa County	County Supervisor	Tier 2, Tier 3, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Colusa County	Deputy Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Colusa County	Director	Tier 2, Tier 3, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Colusa County	Division Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Colusa County	Emergency Service Technician	Tier 2, Tier 3, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Colusa County	MHOAC	Tier 2, Tier 3, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Colusa County	OES Coordinator/Sergeant	Tier 2, Tier 3, HFRA	08/28/2023 09:00 PDT
Colusa County	OES Director	Tier 2, Tier 3, HFRA	08/28/2023 09:00 PDT
Colusa County	Sheriff	Tier 2, Tier 3, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Colusa County	Supervisor	Tier 2, Tier 3, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Colusa County	Vice Chair	Tier 2, Tier 3, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Glenn County Communication Facility	AMERICAN TOWER CORPORATION	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Glenn County Communication Facility	AT&T SERVICES INC	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Glenn County Communication Facility	VERIZON	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Glenn County Emergency Services Facility	COUNTY OF GLENN	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Glenn County Emergency Services Facility	ELK CREEK FIRE DISTRICT	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:35 PDT
Glenn County Water and Waste Water Facility	ELK CREEK COMMUNITY SERVICE	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Glenn County	CAO	Tier 2, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Glenn County	County Administrative Officer	Tier 2, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Glenn County	Deputy Director OES	Tier 2, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT

Glenn County	Director of Public Works Agency	Tier 2, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Glenn County	Fire Chief	Tier 2, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Glenn County	General	Tier 2, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Glenn County	Sheriff	Tier 2, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Glenn County Tribal	Chairman	Tier 2, HFRA *	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Glenn County Tribal	Interim Tribal Secretary	Tier 2, HFRA *	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Glenn County Tribal	Tribal Administrator	Tier 2, HFRA *	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Lake County	OES Manager	Tier 2	08/28/2023 08:55 PDT
Lake County Communication Facility	AT&T SERVICES INC	Tier 2	08/28/2023 15:20 PDT
Lake County Tribal	Chairman	Tier 2, Tier 3, HFRA *	08/28/2023 15:08 PDT
Lake County Tribal	Cultural Resources	Tier 2, Tier 3, HFRA *	08/28/2023 15:08 PDT
Lake County Tribal	Environmental Director	Tier 2, Tier 3, HFRA *	08/28/2023 15:08 PDT
Lake County Tribal	Tribal Administrator	Tier 2, Tier 3, HFRA *	08/28/2023 15:08 PDT
Lake County Tribal	Vice Chairperson	Tier 2, Tier 3, HFRA *	08/28/2023 15:08 PDT
Napa County	OES Officer	Tier 2	08/28/2023 11:29 PDT
Napa County Communication Facility	AT&T MOBILITY LLC	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Napa County Communication Facility	CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Napa County CCA	General	N/A **	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Shasta County Communication Facility	AT&T MOBILITY LLC	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Shasta County Communication Facility	AT&T SERVICES INC	Tier 3	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Shasta County Communication Facility	CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS HOLDING COMPANY LLC	Tier 2	08/28/2023 15:20 PDT
Shasta County Communication Facility	FRONTIER COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION DIP	Tier 3	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Shasta County Communication Facility	GTE MOBILNET OF CALIFORNIA LP	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Shasta County Communication Facility	HAPPY VALLEY TELEPHONE CO	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Shasta County Communication Facility	METRO PCS INC	N/A **	08/28/2023 15:20 PDT
Shasta County Communication Facility	SPRINT CORPORATION	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Shasta County Communication Facility	T-MOBILE WEST LLC	Tier 2	08/28/2023 15:20 PDT
Shasta County Communication Facility	TDS TELECOM	Tier 2	08/28/2023 15:20 PDT
Shasta County Emergency Services Facility	CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FORESTRY	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Shasta County Emergency Services Facility	COUNTY OF SHASTA	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Shasta County Other Facility	CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FORESTRY	Tier 3	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Shasta County Other Facility	HAPPY VALLEY TELEPHONE CO	N/A **	08/28/2023 15:20 PDT

Shasta County	Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Shasta County	Emergency Command Center	Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Shasta County	Fire Chief	Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Shasta County	General	Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Shasta County	Lieutenant	Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Shasta County	RDMHS	Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Shasta County	Sergeant	Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Shasta County	Sheriff-Coroner	Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Shasta County	Supervisor	Tier 2, Tier 3, Zone 1, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Shasta County Anderson	Chief Treatment Plant Operator	Tier 2, HFRA	08/28/2023 15:08 PDT
Shasta County Anderson	City Manager	Tier 2, HFRA	08/28/2023 15:08 PDT
Shasta County Anderson	Deputy Public Works Director	Tier 2, HFRA	08/28/2023 15:08 PDT
Shasta County Anderson	Fire Chief	Tier 2, HFRA	08/28/2023 15:08 PDT
Shasta County Anderson	Police Chief	Tier 2, HFRA	08/28/2023 15:08 PDT
Shasta County Anderson	Public Works Superintendent	Tier 2, HFRA	08/28/2023 15:08 PDT
Shasta County Tribal	Administrative Assistant	Tier 2, HFRA *	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Shasta County Tribal	Chairman	Tier 2, HFRA *	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Shasta County Tribal	Interim Tribal Administrator	Tier 2, HFRA *	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Shasta County Tribal	Maintenance Supervisor	Tier 2, HFRA *	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Shasta County Tribal	OES Director	Tier 2, HFRA *	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Shasta County Tribal	Tribal Chairwoman	Tier 2, HFRA *	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Shasta County Tribal	Senior Director	Tier 2, HFRA *	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Shasta County Tribal	Tribal Leader	Tier 2, HFRA *	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Tehama County Communication Facility	AT&T MOBILITY	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Tehama County Communication Facility	AT&T MOBILITY LLC	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Tehama County Communication Facility	AT&T SERVICES INC	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Tehama County Communication Facility	DUCOR TELEPHONE CO	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Tehama County Communication Facility	DUCOR TELEPHONE CORP	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Tehama County Communication Facility	GTE MOBILE NET OF CALIFORNIA LP	Tier 2	08/28/2023 15:20 PDT
Tehama County Communication Facility	T MOBILE WEST A DELAWARE CORP	Tier 2	08/28/2023 15:20 PDT
Tehama County Communication Facility	T-MOBILE WEST LLC	Tier 2	08/28/2023 15:20 PDT
Tehama County Communication Facility	VERIZON	Tier 2	08/28/2023 15:20 PDT
Tehama County Emergency Services Facility	CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FORESTRY	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT

Tehama County Emergency Services Facility	COUNTY OF TEHAMA	N/A **	08/28/2023 15:20 PDT
Tehama County Government - Jail Facility	CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Tehama County Other Facility	BURNS, SHERRI	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Tehama County Other Facility	CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FORESTRY	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Tehama County Other Facility	DUCOR TELEPHONE CO	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Tehama County	Chief Administrator	Tier 2, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Tehama County	Communications Supervisor	Tier 2, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Tehama County	County Clerk / Recorder	Tier 2, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Tehama County	OES Deputy Director	Tier 2, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Tehama County	Sheriff	Tier 2, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Tehama County Corning	City Clerk	N/A **	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Tehama County Corning	City Manager	N/A **	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Tehama County Corning	Police Chief	N/A **	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Tehama County Red Bluff	Chief of Police	Tier 2, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Tehama County Red Bluff	City Manager	Tier 2, HFRA	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT
Yolo County	OES	Tier 2	08/27/2023 19:00 PDT
Yolo County Communication Facility	AT&T MOBILITY LLC	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Yolo County Communication Facility	GTE MOBILNET OF CALIFORNIA LP	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Yolo County Communication Facility	SPRINT CORPORATION	Tier 2	08/27/2023 20:34 PDT
Yolo County CCA	General	N/A **	08/27/2023 21:29 PDT

* Impacted federally and non-federally recognized Tribes' HFRA/HFTD classifications reflect county designations.

** Some Public Safety Partners are outside of HFTD/HFRA boundaries but were also de-energized for safety. We mark these as N/A in Appendix E as they do not have classifications assigned.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

APPENDIX F

ALL-CLEAR ZONE MAP

Appendix F: ALL-CLEAR ZONE MAP

Figure F-1. All-Clear Zone Map



PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
APPENDIX G
COMMUNITY RESOURCE CENTER LOCATIONS

Appendix G: LIST OF PG&E COMMUNITY RESOURCE CENTERS

Table G-1. Community Resource Centers Provided by PG&E

The table below provides details of the eight CRCs that PG&E mobilized during the August 30-31, 2023 PSPS event, including specific locations, dates and times opened and closed, total attendance for each location, and amenities provided.

#	County	Site Name	Address	Operating Hours (PDT)		Total Visitors	Indoor / Outdoor	Amenities Provided
				Day 1 8/30	Day 2 8/31			
1	Butte	Concow Elementary School	11679 Nelson Bar Rd	0800-2200	N/A	24	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, Restrooms, Water and Snacks, Blankets, Device Charging, Medical Device Charging
2	Colusa	Stonyford Community Hall	229 Market St	0800-2200	0800-1130	86	Indoor	Wi-Fi, Restrooms, Water and Snacks, Blankets, Device Charging, Medical Device Charging, Cooling & Heating, Ice
3	Glenn	Elk Creek Junior Senior High School	3430 Co Rd 309	0800-2200	N/A	73	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, Restrooms, Water and Snacks, Blankets, Device Charging, Medical Device Charging
4	Shasta	Happy Valley Community Center	5400 Happy Valley Rd	0800-2200	N/A	36	Indoor	Wi-Fi, Restrooms, Water and Snacks, Blankets, Device Charging, Medical Device Charging, Cooling & Heating, Ice
5	Shasta	Hill Country Health and Wellness Center	29632 CA-299	0800-2200	N/A	187	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, Restrooms, Water and Snacks, Blankets, Device Charging, Medical Device Charging
6	Tehama	Rancho Tehama Association	17605 Park Terrace Rd	0800-2200	N/A	337	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, Restrooms, Water and Snacks, Blankets, Device Charging, Medical Device Charging
7	Tehama	Noland Park	19001 Bowman Rd	0800-1400	N/A	2	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, Restrooms, Water and Snacks, Blankets, Device Charging, Medical Device Charging
8	Tehama	Flournoy Elementary School	15850 Paskenta Rd	0800-2200	N/A	63	Outdoor	Wi-Fi, Restrooms, Water and Snacks, Blankets, Device Charging, Medical Device Charging

VERIFICATION

I, undersigned, say:

I am an officer of PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, a corporation, and am authorized to make this verification for that reason.

I have read the foregoing "PG&E Public Safety Power Shutoff Report to the CPUC" for the August 30-31, 2023, and I am informed and believe the matters stated therein to be true.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed at Oakland, California this 15th day of September 2023.



MARK QUINLAN
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
WILDFIRE & EMERGENCY OPERATIONS