



JOINT IOU PRESENTATION: Promoting Trust & Understanding the Purpose of Non-Punitive Information Sharing

Utility Safety Culture Working Group

September 18, 2025

Meeting Agenda

Topic	Presenter	Time
“IDOART,” Introductions & Log-in	Lauren (SoCalGas)	9:00 – 9:20 am
CPUC guidance and directives per D.25-01-031	Carolina (SPD)	9:20 – 9:25 am
Why are non-punitive information sharing protections necessary?	Melvin (SCE)	9:25 – 9:35 am
Review of Industry Frameworks: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Institute of Nuclear Operations (INPO)• Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)	Bill (PG&E)	9:35 – 10:00 am
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)	Lauren (SoCalGas)	10:00 – 10:10 am
10 min Break		
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Canada Energy Regulator (CER) Key Takeaways & Comparison Table	Elizabeth (SDG&E)	10:20 – 10:40 am
Roundtable Discussion	All	10:40 – 11:20 am
Next Steps Discussion	All	11:20 – 11:50 am
Log-out (time permitting)	Lauren (SoCalGas)	11:50 – 12:00 pm

I DO ART

Intention

Review of industry frameworks and processes for establishing trust and non-punitive information sharing

Desired Outcome

Shared understanding of what's needed to build a healthy safety culture and engagement from stakeholders

Agenda

- I DO ART
- Introductions & Log-in
- IOU Presentation
- Roundtable feedback and discussion
- Log-out

Roles/Rules

- SPD as facilitator
- Safety culture expert input
- All: Engage, ask questions & contribute
- Listen to each other

Time

~3 hours


CPUC Guidance & Directives

- » D.25-01-031: “Safety Policy Division, in collaboration with the Utility Safety Culture Working Group, discussed later in this decision, should explore mechanisms supportive of open-information flow within the IOUs, across the industry, and between the IOUs and the Commission, including, but not limited to, those applied by INPO for confidentiality and non-punitive information sharing, which the Commission may consider at a future time.”
- » Goals adopted in D.25-01-031 include: “Develop means for collaborative information-sharing and coordination among all interested entities to recognize risk.”
- » Guiding Principles adopted in D.25-01-031 include: “Non-punitive engagement and collaboration supports developing and maintaining healthy safety cultures that improve outcomes.”

Why is non-punitive information sharing necessary?

- » To promote continuous learning and improvement, we want to encourage open dialog and information sharing consistent with guidance from safety culture experts. Sharing of information will be less likely if information can be used punitively
 - e.g., openly discuss failures and challenges for collaboration on safety improvement solutions
- » Establish trust and confidence that shared information won't be used punitively
 - IOUs will continue to report issues where such reporting is required
 - Regulator – IOU: e.g., Notice of Violation, fines, penalties
 - Intervenor – IOU: e.g., proposed funding disallowance, reference in other proceedings

Shared Focus on Safety & Learning



Within the AER model, the regulatory body’s approach seeks to foster accountability for safety, enabling continuous improvement and safety culture growth towards higher maturity levels.¹

¹ Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) / OECD The Mutual Impact of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies and License Holders from a Safety Culture Perspective

Incorporating HOP principles to support continuous learning

The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), an agency within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, has produced documents on safety culture, emphasizing a **top-down leadership role** combined with **individual accountability**, not a hierarchical structure based on maturity.

According to the NEA, organizations must foster an environment where issues can be raised **without fear of reprisal**.

A "parent-child" dynamic would inhibit the open communication and questioning attitude that are critical for identifying safety issues and fostering continuous improvement.



Industry Process & Framework Examples

Sharing Operating Experience

Institute of Nuclear Operations (INPO) Process

Background:

Sharing Operating Experience (OE): A Critical Industry Practice

- The 1979 Kemeny Commission Report on the Three Mile Island accident emphasized the need for systematic collection and sharing of OE across the nuclear industry. It called for an international network to ensure timely communication of Lessons Learned.
- To support this, Nuclear plants contribute Operating Experience (OE) and Construction Experience (CE) to the Industry Reporting and Information System (IRIS), promoting long-term learning and performance improvement. Leaders and employees must openly share lessons learned with peers and, in so doing, reinforce high standards. If there is uncertainty whether an event meets the reporting criteria, the event is expected to be reported.
- Sharing OE and CE enhances safety and reliability by enabling efficient exchange of OE and CE, identifying trends early, and supporting risk-informed decisions.

Sharing Operating Experience

Institute of Nuclear Operations (INPO) Process

INPO 19-002-Industry Reporting and Information System (IRIS)

- INPO 19-002 is the governing document for IRIS reporting requirements and standards for World Association of Nuclear Operator (WANO) members excluding China.
- During this process, the reports may be classified at any given time as one of the following:
 - Shared with the industry or not shared with the industry by the originating station and
 - Level of Significance. Significant and Consequential OE may drive additional push of information to the industry (Rapid OE).
- Reporting timeliness status include
 - Prompt- less than or equal to 10 calendar days
 - Early- within the earlier of 30 days from discovery of the event or 10 days after the end of the month.
 - Normal- complete, final and shared record shall be created and sent “To Screening” within 90 days of the event or condition discovery.
 - Timeliness requirement is based on Significance of the event.
- IRIS also outlines Exemptions to reporting.

Sharing Operating Experience

Institute of Nuclear Operations (INPO) Process

INPO 19-002-Industry Reporting and Information System (IRIS)

Confidential Conditions of Use

- **Ownership:** The data contained in IRIS and the software program used to operate IRIS are the exclusive properties of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) and participating WANO-AC members.
- **Permitted Use:** The Industry Reporting and Information System may be used only to promote safety and reliability in the operation and construction of commercial nuclear power plants. .
- **Confidentiality:** Data obtained through IRIS is confidential. Disclosure is prohibited without the advance, expressed written consent of INPO.
- **Contractor Access:** Any individual or organization that obtains access to IRIS by means of a contract with a member station shall return to the member all IRIS data, user identification codes, passwords, documentation and similar items at the conclusion of the contract.
- **Credential Security:** IRIS user identification codes and passwords are confidential. Disclosure of user identification codes and passwords is prohibited without the advance, expressed written consent of INPO

Sharing Operating Experience

Institute of Nuclear Operations (INPO) Process

INPO 19-002-Industry Reporting and Information System (IRIS)

2018 INPO Confidentiality Conditions of Use Changes

- The initial driver to the changes was anti-nuclear groups attempting to litigate INPO under Georgia freedom of information laws to obtain reports about plants operating outside of GA. Similarly, because the industry shared plant information from plant-to-plant, those same groups could litigate a Florida company and try to get information about a plant in California (and vice versa).
- In 2017, INPO's President and CEO, Robert F. Willard updated additional minimum requirements and responsibilities for the protection of INPO sensitive information and information systems along with the development and management of new ShareVault software (OE sharing platform).
- The new ShareVault Governance & Guide procedure and software outlines guidance on handling INPO created confidential documents with tiered credential access.
- Currently all plant reports are now shared via ShareVault with no download capability.

Sharing Operating Experience

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

NRC Operating Experience Smart Sample ([OpESS](#)) Program

Purpose: The OpESS Program provides NRC inspection staff with detailed synopses of selected operating experience that have generic safety implications. It supports Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) baseline inspections and helps identify issues requiring further agency action.

Intended Users:

- NRC Inspection Staff: Primary users for baseline inspections.
- NRC Regional Offices: Use OpESS with cross-regional review panels.
- NRC Internal Stakeholders: Offices such as Nuclear Reactor Regulation and Research.
- Applicable to All Licensed Operating Commercial Nuclear Reactors and Industry Owner's Group.
- **Public** – Regulatory transparency and accountability

Sharing Operating Experience

NRC Operating Experience Smart Sample ([OpESS](#)) Program

Industry Inputs to OpESS:

- Event Notification Reports for radioactive material - ([10CFR50.72](#))*
- Licensee Event Reports for Physical Protection of Plant ([10CFR50.73](#))*
- Plant Status Report.*
- Defect or Non-Compliance Reports ([10CFR21](#))*
- There are many more other inputs which is not accessible to the Public

*Publicly Available on the NRC Web Page.

Sharing Operating Experience

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

NRC Operating Experience Smart Sample ([OpESS](#)) Program

Public Access Restrictions and changes since Sept 11, 2001:

- Following Sept 11, 2001, event, NRC changed its practices to ensure it does not unnecessarily release information that could be used to plan or execute an attack against facilities or citizens in the US.
- Previous public domain are no longer routinely released and is treated as [sensitive unclassified](#) information.
- OpESS is publicly accessible for **non-sensitive** information only.

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)


- » Administered by NASA, ASRS is a cornerstone of the FAA's voluntary reporting system.
- » Confidentiality:
 - NASA de-identifies all reports by removing personal and organizational names before forwarding the information to the FAA. Reporter identity has never been breached.
- » Non-punitive protections:
 - Reporters who file a timely report for an unintentional violation may receive a waiver of fines or penalties, providing a constructive attitude is shown

Air Traffic Safety Action Program (ATSAP)

- » This program is a partnership between the FAA and the air traffic controllers' unions (NATCA and NAGE).
- » Confidentiality:
 - Reports are reviewed by an Event Review Team, and employee names and other identifying information are redacted.
- » Non-punitive protections:
 - It fosters a non-punitive environment for FAA air traffic employees to report safety concerns.

FAA CAST Program*

- » Issue: Fatal aviation accident rate stopped declining in the early 1990's and research predicted accidents may double in 15-20 years. Industry concerned that twice as many fatal accidents would scare the flying public.
- » Solution: Implemented Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) - a voluntary industry-wide collaborative program
- » CAST is a government and industry partnership
 - CAST uses non-punitive information sharing as a foundational principle to improve aviation safety
 - This collaborative, data-driven approach encourages industry participants to report safety incidents without fear of punishment, allowing the FAA and industry to identify and fix systemic problems proactively



CAST Non-punitive Information Sharing Objectives

- » **Encourages reporting:** By removing the threat of enforcement*, the FAA encourages airlines, pilots, mechanics, and air traffic controllers to voluntarily disclose safety incidents, errors, and concerns.
- » **Identifies root causes:** Voluntary reporting gives the FAA and industry access to a wider range of data points, which helps them identify underlying safety issues that might otherwise remain hidden.
- » **Prevents future incidents:** Rather than reacting to major accidents, this data-informed approach allows for the development of preventative strategies, training improvements, and procedural changes before a serious event occurs.
- » **Fosters collaboration:** The non-punitive environment builds trust and promotes cooperation between the FAA and industry stakeholders, including manufacturers, operators, and labor groups.

** This non-punitive philosophy does not apply in all cases. The FAA maintains a zero-tolerance policy for specific types of behavior that can lead to enforcement actions, such as intentional misconduct, reckless behavior, or falsification of documents.*

FAA CAST Solution: Non-punitive framework allowed for “System Think”

System Think: Understanding how an improvement in one subsystem of a complex system may affect other subsystems within that system

- » CAST brings all parts of a complex system together to collaborate
- » Collaboration includes airlines, manufacturers, airports, pilots, air traffic controllers, and the regulator (FAA)
- » Recognizes system interdependencies
- » CAST engages all participants in identifying problems and developing and evaluating remedies

Outcome: 83% decrease in fatal accident rate in less than ten years largely because of System Think fueled by proactive safety information programs¹

¹FAA Article: "Out Front on Airline Safety: Two Decades of Continuous Evolution"

CER



Canada Energy
Regulator

Régie de l'énergie
du Canada

- The **Canada Energy Regulator (CER)** has developed a comprehensive, **non-punitive safety culture framework** that emphasizes trust, learning, and information sharing to enhance safety and environmental protection across the energy sector.
- The Statement on Safety Culture (2014, reaffirmed in 2021) expresses the regulators' expectations of companies they regulate to build and sustain a positive safety culture while continually scrutinizing their respective organizations for potential cultural threats.

CER Safety Culture Statement

- In 2013, a special meeting of North American oil and gas regulators was convened to discuss improving safety and environmental protection outcomes by leveraging safety culture.
- Major incidents in both Canada and the U.S. had exposed weaknesses in safety management systems and organizational culture.
- During that meeting, several opportunities were identified by the regulators to move a concerted safety culture effort forward, including:
 - Building a shared understanding of the term safety culture among regulators and regulated companies;
 - Articulating clear regulatory expectations as they relate to safety culture; and
 - Collaborating on the development of reference and resource material for industry in order to provide clarity and consistency in terminology, and safety culture dimensions and attributes, where possible.

CER Non-Punitive Approach to Safety

A cornerstone of the CER's framework is the **promotion of a “Just Culture”**, which balances accountability with fairness and learning.

This means:

- Employees are **encouraged to report hazards and errors** without fear of reprisal.
- Mistakes are treated as **learning opportunities**, not grounds for punishment.
- The focus is on **systemic improvement**, not individual blame.
- This approach fosters **psychological safety**, enabling open communication and proactive risk management.

CER Graduated Enforcement Model

While CER has enforcement tools (e.g., inspections, orders, penalties), it applies them using a **graduated response model**:

- Initial focus is on **corrective actions and guidance**.
- Enforcement escalates only when necessary, based on risk and repeated non-compliance.
- This model supports a **learning-oriented environment**, where companies are given the opportunity to improve before punitive measures are considered

CER: Transparency, Collaboration & Commitment

CER promotes trust through:

- **Open communication** with regulated companies.
- **Workshops and outreach** to share best practices and lessons learned.
- **Public reporting** of incidents and compliance activities to foster accountability without blame

CER remains committed to promoting and advancing safety culture through engagement with industry members, Indigenous peoples, subject matter experts, and other interested parties. The Working Group on Safety Culture is directed to prioritize work related to:

- **regulatory staff competency** development related to safety culture;
- **improved understanding** of regulatory safety oversight culture and its impact on industry performance outcomes; and
- **outreach, sharing and learning** across industry.

Key Takeaways

INPO:

- » Established protections to promote information sharing amongst members
- » Third-party framework provides layered protection between member and regulator

NRC:

- » Compliance based reporting
- » Public access to non-sensitive information

FAA/CAST:

- » Voluntary reporting systems based on non-punitive information sharing principles
- » Collaborative working group model

CER:

- » CER journey similar to current efforts led by CPUC
- » Established trust over time
- » Focused on learning and safety improvements vs. punitive measures


Framework Comparison Table

	INPO	NRC	FAA/CAST	CER
Confidentiality Protections	X	X	X	
Public information sharing		X	X	X
Non-punitive Reporting Mechanism	X		X	X
Collaborative Information Sharing	X	X	X	X

Roundtable discussion

Roundtable Discussion Prompt

All Stakeholders/Participants are encouraged to provide their insight, perspective and feedback.

- » Of the industry examples presented here today (or others), what mechanisms or principles resonated with you and why?
 - » What opportunities and/or challenges do you foresee with implementing element(s) of these frameworks?
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Roundtable discussion: Next Steps

Roundtable Discussion Prompt

All Stakeholders/Participants are encouraged to provide their insight, perspective and feedback.

- » What are your thoughts on collaborative development of a Concept Paper on the topic of confidentiality and non-punitive information sharing?
 - » Other ideas on next steps (e.g., participant feedback survey)?
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Resources

- » Slide 6: https://www.oecd-nea.org/upload/docs/application/pdf/2024-03/7672_wglsc_regulatory_bodies_report.pdf
- » Slide 7: https://www.oecd-nea.org/jcms/pl_26323/human-and-organisational-factors
- » Slides 9-15: <https://www.inpo.info/>
- » Slides 16-19: https://www.faa.gov/uas/getting_started/asrp;
https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/divisions/safety-policy-division/meeting-documents/safety-culture-oir-workshop-presentation_03112022.pdf
- » Slides 20-24: <https://www.cer-rec.gc.ca/en/safety-environment/safety-culture/statement-safety-culture/>