PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT

APRIL 1, 2024

PG&E®

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APRIL 1, 2024

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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
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INTRODUCTION

For this report, Pacific Gas and Electric Company is identifying material changes report in blue font. The material updates to this chapter can be found in Section D concerning performance against target.

A. Introduction

Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E or the Company) respectfully submits this fifth semi-annual Safety and Operational Metrics (SOM) Report. This report is submitted in compliance with California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC or Commission) Decision (D.) 21-11-009 concerning the Risk-Based Decision-Making Framework proceeding (Risk OIR).

At PG&E, nothing is more important than the safety of our customers, employees, contractors and communities. We strive to be the safest, most-reliable gas and electric Company in the United States. This SOM report demonstrates PG&E's commitment to overseeing safe operations and, where needed, driving progress to reduce risk and improve performance. SOMs are embedded in our internal processes to give Company leaders visibility into performance to identify negative trends and take swift corrective actions to prevent harm. These metrics are central to safety performance across the Company.

PG&E has approached each SOM on a metric-by-metric basis. More specifically, PG&E evaluated our historical and current year performance and available benchmarking data, and established objectives that align with our commitment to safety. For example, a metric where PG&E already performs in the first quartile may not demand dramatic improvement but could require consistent monitoring to ensure that performance remains at acceptable levels. For metrics that include Major Event Days (MED), PG&E will use the information to help ensure that our infrastructure is adaptable to an environment rapidly changing due to climate change. For some metrics, the Company has found opportunity to continue to drive safety performance through ongoing or future programs that are described in each chapter of this report.

B. Background and Requirements

As part of the decision for PG&E's Plan of Reorganization (D.20-05-053), the Commission envisioned a set of metrics that provides a "holistic quantitative and qualitative 'indicator light' method to evaluate key metrics directly associated with PG&E safe and operational performance."

On November 9, 2021, through the Commission's Risk OIR that began on November 17, 2020, the Commission issued D.21-11-009 (the Risk OIR decision) establishing 32 SOMs. Ordering Paragraph 5 of that decision requires that:

> PG&E shall report its Safety and Operational Metrics as follows. PG&E shall, on a semi-annual basis, serve and file its SOMs report in Rulemaking 20-07-013, any successor Safety Model Assessment Proceeding, and its most recent or current General Rate Case and Risk Assessment and Mitigation Phase proceedings starting March 31, 2022, and continuing annually at the end of September and March thereafter, with the March reports covering the 12 months of the previous calendar year (i.e., January through December) and the September reports providing data for January through June of the current year. PG&E shall concurrently send a copy of its semi-annual SOMs reports to the Director of the Commission's Safety Policy Division and to RASA_Email@cpuc.ca.gov. PG&E shall:
>
> a) Report on each SOM, using data for the preceding 12 months and providing all available historical data;[1]
> b) For each SOM, provide a proposed target for the year following the reporting period for each metric and a 5-year target, with the proposed target represented as specific values, ranges of values, a rolling average, or another specified target value, except for our final adopted SOM #s 1.3, 2.3, 3.1, 3.3, 3.5, and 3.6 for which PG&E may provide directional targets;
> c) For each SOM, provide a narrative description of the rationale for selecting the target proposed and why a specific value, a range of values, a rolling average or another type of target is selected;
> d) For each SOM, provide a narrative description of progress towards the proposed annual and 5-year targets;
> e) For each SOM, provide a narrative description of any substantial deviation from prior trends based on quantitative and qualitative analysis, as applicable;
> f) For each SOM, provide a brief description of current and future activities to meet the proposed targets; and

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1 These historic data files are provided through a Notice of Availability (NOA) being filed concurrently with this report. An index of these files is provided as an attachment to the NOA.

1   g)   Provide the Commission's Safety and Policy Division with a copy of any

2   report filed more frequently than semi-annually with the Commission that

3   contains SOMs, at the same time the report is filed.[2]

4   This report outlines PG&E's 2023 performance and is organized into

5 32 individual metric chapters as defined in Attachment A of D.21-11-009. Each

6 chapter provides discussion on performance and progress against 1- and 5-year

7 targets.

8 **C. PG&E's Approach to Safety and Operational Metrics Target Setting**

9   PG&E's approach to SOMs was developed around four pillars for

10 developing targets that align with Commission's objective for this report:

11 1)   Targets should be set at levels indicating "insufficient progress" or "poor

12   performance" within the context of the Enhanced Oversight and

13   Enforcement Process;

14 2)   Targets should be set at a reasonable and attainable level, including but not

15   limited to the following considerations:

16   a)   Historical data and trends;

17   b)   Benchmarking;

18   c)   Applicable federal, state, or regulatory requirements;

19   d)   Resources;

20 3)   Targets should be set at levels where performance can be sustained over

21   time; and

22 4)   Targets should be set and evaluated in consideration of a holistic qualitative

23   and quantitative view including additional contextual information and factors.

24   With these criteria, PG&E sought to develop targets for each metric that

25 generally maintain performance for well-performing metrics or drive performance

26 improvement to satisfactory levels of safe and reliable service. As required by

27 the decision, within each metric chapter PG&E provides the rationale behind the

28 selection of the 1- and 5-year targets. On their own, metrics can fail to tell a

29 complete story and may not provide crucial detail or context that is necessary for

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2   PG&E understands this requirement to not include one-time event triggered reports
(e.g., Electric Incident Reports). PG&E can provide such reports upon request. Note
that PG&E provided quarterly reports as part of the Wildfire Mitigation Plan to the
Commission through June 2021 but are now submitted to the Office of Energy
Infrastructure Safety. These reports can be found online at PG&E's Wildfire Mitigation
Plan webpage.

1   a proper evaluation of performance or progress. Recognizing that, the

2   Commission's Risk OIR decision requires PG&E to provide a narrative-driven

3   report that gives the Commission further insight on how PG&E's safety and

4   operational programs are progressing towards targets or if performance is

5   deviating from target and trend, and to state current and future activities that will

6   drive performance towards target or trend.

7   5) PG&E and the Commission's Safety Policy Division (SPD) participate in

8   monthly meetings to discuss questions arising from prior reports, or, in some

9   instances to preview expected performance or target-setting for upcoming

10   reports. These meetings have proven successful in providing PG&E

11   ongoing guidance for target-setting and as an effective way to resolve

12   questions through metric owner presentations. Additionally, PG&E uses

13   feedback from these meetings to engage leadership and to address SPD

14   recommendations where possible. PG&E will continue to drive performance

15   improvement where appropriate, and prioritize the safety of our customers,

16   contractors, and employees.

D. Summary of Metric Performance Against Targets

18   This report shows that PG&E is exceeding or maintaining performance

19   expectations against its 2023 targets for 31 of 32 metrics. Only SOM 1.3

20   (Serious Injury and Fatality (SIF) Actual (Public)) did not meet the 2023 target of

21   zero incidents. For 2023, there were four confirmed Public SIF incidents.

22   In Chapter 1.3 of this report, we summarize the four incidents and provide an

23   overview of current and planned activities we are implementing to eliminate

24   public safety incidents. These include incident investigation processes and

25   corrective action measures; activities for reducing the risk of gas, electric and

26   energy supply system failure or malfunction; public awareness and education

27   programs; transportation safety programs to control risks that can lead to motor

28   vehicle accidents; and contractor safety programs.

29   PG&E has updated the one-year targets for 20 of the 32 metrics evaluated

30   in this report. 12 metrics carry the same one-year targets from the prior report

31   and PG&E includes a justification, on a case-by-case basis, on why maintaining

32   metric performance is the appropriate approach. These reasons include

33   historical data availability, metrics susceptible to high variability (e.g., metrics

1   significantly impacted by weather), MED threshold changes, or where PG&E's

2   performance is within already desired performance ranges.

3   Below is a summary of each metric 2023 performance and targets. The

4   details for each metric can be found in each of the metric report chapters that

5   follow.

TABLE 1-1
SUMMARY OF 2023 METRIC PERFORMANCE AND TARGETS

#	Metric	2023 Performance	2023 Target	2024 Target
Safety				
1.1	Rate of Serious Injury or Fatality (SIF) Actual (Employee)	Rate: 0.063	Rate: 0.070	Rate: 0.060
1.2	Rate of SIF Actual (Contractor)	Rate: 0.063	Rate: 0.100	Rate: 0.100
1.3	SIF Actual (Public)	Confirmed: 4	Demonstrate progress towards 0	Demonstrate progress towards 0
Reliability				
2.1	System Average Interruption Duration (Unplanned)	3.56 hrs.	3.45 – 5.34 hrs.	3.71 – 5.73 hrs.
2.2	System Average Interruption Frequency (Unplanned)	1.402 outages per customer	1.426 – 2.205 outages per customer	1.435 – 2.219 outages per customer
2.3	System Average Outages due to Vegetation and Equipment Damage in High Fire Threat District (HFTD) Areas	610 outages due to 20 MEDs	Maintain	Maintain
2.4	System Average Outages due to Vegetation and Equipment Damage in HFTD Areas (Non-MEDs)	1,655 outages	Range: 1,523 – 1,980	Range: 1,523 – 1,980

TABLE 1-1
SUMMARY OF 2023 METRIC PERFORMANCE AND TARGETS
(CONTINUED)

#	Metric	2023 Performance	2023 Target	2024 Target
Electric				
3.1	Wires Down MED in HFTD Areas (Distribution)	10.26 wires down (WD) events/1,000 mi. due to 20 MEDs	Maintain/66.02	Maintain/65.94
3.2	Wires Down Non-MED in HFTD Areas (Distribution)	19.07 WD events/1,000 mi.	Maintain/41.36	Maintain/41.30
3.3	Wires Down MED in HFTD Areas (Transmission)	8.092 WD events/1,000 mi, due to 20 MEDs	Maintain/8.433	Maintain/8.433
3.4	Wires Down Non-MED in HFTD Areas (Transmission)	1.471 WD events/1,000 mi.	Maintain/≤4.440	Maintain/≤4.440
3.5	Wires Down Red Flag Warning Days in HFTD Areas (Distribution)	0.00003 WD due to 1 WD event	Maintain/0.00058	Maintain/0.00057
3.6	Wires Down Red Flag Warning Days in HFTD Areas (Transmission)	0 WD due to 0 WD events	Maintain	Maintain
Patrols and Inspections				
3.7	Missed Overhead Distribution Patrols in HFTD Areas	3.94%	0% – 4%	0% – 4%
3.8	Missed Overhead Distribution Detailed Inspections in HFTD Areas	0%	0% – 4%	0% – 2%
3.9	Missed Overhead Transmission Patrols in HFTD Areas	0.00%	0.0% – 0.04%	0.0% – 0.03%
3.10	Missed Overhead Transmission Detailed Inspections in HFTD Areas	0.00%	0.0% – 0.04%	0.0% – 0.03%
3.11	GO-95 Corrective Actions in HFTDs	71%	69%	69%
3.12	Electric Emergency Response Time	Average: 32 min Median: 29 min	Average: 44 min Median: 43 min	Average: 44 min Median: 43 min

TABLE 1-1
SUMMARY OF 2023 METRIC PERFORMANCE AND TARGETS
(CONTINUED)

#	Metric	2023 Performance	2023 Target	2024 Target
Ignitions and Wildfire				
3.13	Number of CPUC-Reportable Ignitions in HFTD Areas (Distribution)	55 ignitions	Range: 82 – 94	Range: 72 – 84
3.14	Percentage of CPUC-Reportable Ignitions in HFTD Areas (Distribution)	2.26/1,000 circuit miles	Range: 3.24 – 3.72	Range: 3.93 – 3.32
3.15	Number of CPUC-Reportable Ignitions in HFTD Areas (Transmission)	6 ignitions	Range: 0 – 10	Range: 0 – 10
3.16	Percentage of CPUC-Reportable Ignitions in HFTD Areas (Transmission)	1.09/1,000 circuit miles	0 – 1.75	0 – 1.75
Gas				
4.1	Number of Gas Dig-Ins per 1,000 USA tickets on Transmission and Distribution pipelines	1.42	≤2.21	≤1.93
4.2	Number of Overpressure Events	5	≤11	≤10
4.3	Time to Respond On-Site to Emergency Notification	Average (mins): 19.8 Median (mins): 18.2	Average (mins): ≤21.5 Median (mins): ≤19.8	Average (mins): ≤21.4 Median (mins): ≤19.7
4.4	Gas Shut-In Times, Mains	80 mins	≤84.9 mins	≤84.9 mins
4.5	Gas Shut-In Times, Services	35.3 mins	≤40.2 mins	≤40.2 mins
4.6	Uncontrolled Release of Gas on Transmission Pipelines	1,276	≤3,510	≤3,474
4.7	Time to Resolve Hazardous Conditions	141 mins	≤183 mins	≤182.5 mins
Clean Energy				
5.1	Clean Energy Goals Compliance Metric	1330.1MW	≥1165 MW	≥2366.1 MW
Quality of Service				
6.1	Quality of Service Metric	8 sec	15 sec	15 sec

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CHAPTER 1.1

RATE OF SIF ACTUAL

(EMPLOYEE)

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SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
CHAPTER 1.1
RATE OF SIF ACTUAL
(EMPLOYEE)

The material updates to this chapter since the October 2, 2023, report can be found in Section B concerning metric performance; Section D concerning performance against target, and Section E concerning current and planned work. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

A. (1.1) Overview

1. Metric Definition

Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 1.1 – Rate of Serious Injury and Fatality (SIF) Actual (Employee) is defined as:

Rate of SIF Actual (Employee) is calculated using the formula: Number of SIF-Actual cases among employees x 200,000/employee hours worked, where SIF Actual is counted using the methodology developed by the Edison Electric Institute's (EEI) Occupational Safety and Health Committee (OS&HC).

2. Introduction of Metric

Pacific Gas and Electric Company's (PG&E or the Company) safety stand is, "Everyone and Everything Is Always Safe." This includes our employee and contractor workforce, as well as the public. We remain committed to building an organization where every work activity is designed to facilitate safe working conditions and every member of our workforce is encouraged to speak up if they see an unsafe or risky condition with the confidence that their concerns and ideas will be heard and addressed. As part of this stand, PG&E is committed to employee safety.

As defined by Decision (D.) 21-11-009, the SIF Actual (Employee) SOM calculation is relatively new in application to PG&E's existing injury and SIF dataset. The data were analyzed and reported under this definition beginning with the first report which was submitted in March of 2022.

The EEI OS&HC serious injury criteria are updated annually based on additional learnings from injury classification to provide further clarification or criteria for the following year. PG&E is using the 2023 OS&HC serious

injury criteria found in Appendix 7 of the EEI Safety Classification and Learning Model guidance.[1] The criteria include:

1) Fatalities;

2) Amputations (involving bone);

3) Concussions and/or cerebral hemorrhages;

4) Injury or trauma to internal organs;

5) Bone fractures (certain types);

6) Complete tendon, ligament, and cartilage tears of the major joints (e.g., shoulder, elbow, wrist, hip, knee, and ankle).

7) Herniated disks (neck or back);

8) Lacerations resulting in severed tendons and/or a deep wound requiring internal stitches;

9) Second (10 percent body surface) or third-degree burns;

10) Eye injuries resulting in eye damage or loss of vision;

11) Injections of foreign materials (e.g., hydraulic fluid);

12) Severe heat exhaustion and all heat stroke cases;

13) Dislocation of a major joint (shoulder, elbow, wrist, hip, knee, and ankle);

   a) Count only cases that required the manipulation or repositioning of the joint back into place under the direction of a treating doctor.

14) "Other Injuries" category should only be selected for reporting injuries not identified in the existing categories.

PG&E's SIF Program was deployed at the end of 2016 to establish a cause evaluation process for coworker serious safety incidents. This program was established to create consistency and guidance in classifying and evaluating serious safety incidents for all employees and contractors. The goal of PG&E's SIF Program is to reduce the number and severity of safety incidents that result in a SIF. The program objective is to learn from prior safety incidents by performing cause evaluations on each SIF Actual (SIF-A) and SIF Potential (SIF-P) incident, implementing corrective actions, and sharing key findings across the enterprise.

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[1] EEI Safety Classification and Learning (SCL) model guidance. Serious Injury criteria are located in Appendix 7. SCL model guidance.

1   From 2017 to 2020, PG&E classified SIF-A incidents based on the job

2   task and whether a life altering or life-threatening injury, or fatality occurred.

3   In August of 2020, PG&E adopted Edison Electric International's Safety

4   Classification Learning (SCL)[2] model to classify its SIF incidents. The EEI

5   SCL model classifies incidents into categories: High-Energy SIF (HSIF),[3]

6   Low-Energy SIF (LSIF),[4] Potential SIF (PSIF),[5] Capacity,[6] Exposure,[7]

7   Success,[8] and Low Severity.[9] In 2020, the HSIF terminology was new to

8   the industry; however, it is equivalent to a SIF-A with regard to how serious

9   life threatening or life-altering injuries, or fatalities are determined, per PG&E

10   definition. Adopting the EEI SCL model has improved the SIF Program by

11   bringing a consistent and objective approach to reviewing and classifying

12   SIF incidents across the Company and industry. The SCL model allows the

13   Company to focus its safety and risk mitigation efforts on the most serious

14   outcomes and highest risk work where a high energy incident occurred. The

15   EEI SCL model is also used for the Employee SIF-A Safety Performance

16   Metric (SPM) and is aligned with other California utilities.

17   The rate of SIF-A (Employee) SOM definition is based on the EEI

18   OS&HC serious injury criteria,[10] which is different than the EEI SCL Model.

19   It is suggested by EEI to use the OS&HC criteria in conjunction with the EEI

20   SCL model. Therefore, using only the OS&HC serious injury criteria creates

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2 EEI, SCL Model available here: https://www.safetyfunction.com/scl-model.

3 *Id.* at p. 17, HSIF is defined as: "Incident with a release of high energy in the absence of a direct control where a serious injury is sustained."

4 *Id.* at p. 17, LSIF is defined as: "Incident with a release of low energy in the absence of a direct control where a serious injury is sustained."

5 *Id.* at p. 17, PSIF is defined as: "Incident with a release of high energy in the absence of a direct control where a serious injury is not sustained."

6 *Id.* at p. 17, Capacity is defined as: "Incident with a release of high energy in the presence of a direct control where a serious injury is not sustained."

7 *Id.* at p. 17, Exposure is defined as: "Condition where high energy is present in the absence of a direct control."

8 *Id.* at p. 17, Success is defined as: "Condition where a high energy incident does not occur because of the presence of a direct control."

9 *Id.* at p. 17, Low Severity is defined as: "Incident with a release of low energy where no serious injury is sustained."

10 EEI Safety Classification and Learning (SCL) model guidance. Serious Injury criteria are located in Appendix 7. SCL model guidance.

1   a different result in SIF-A classification from the expectation of using the EEI

2   SCL model that includes high energy incidents.

3 **B. (1.1) Metric Performance**

4   **1. Historical Data (2017 – 2023)**

5   PG&E is including historical data for the years 2017 through 2023[11] in

6 this report. This timeframe is consistent with the implementation of PG&E's

7 SIF Program. The dataset includes injury type, incident date, location, and

8 EEI OS&HC injury classification. See corresponding Employee SIF SOM

9 data file (21-11-009.PGE_SOM_1-1_Employee_SIF_A__2024_03-31-24

10 r1.xlsx) for a list of incidents.

11   Figure 1.1-1 illustrates the rate of employee serious injuries and

12 fatalities by year from 2017 through 2023. From 2017 through 2023 there

13 are a total of 68 employee SIF Actuals that met the EEI OS&HC serious

14 injury criteria as described in Section A.2. above. Fifty-six percent of the

15 serious injury incidents (35 of 62) met the criteria of bone fracture, including

16 of the hands and feet. Six were fatalities, of those one involved a violent act

17 of a third party, three involved operations of motor vehicles, one involved a

18 pipeline drying (pigging) line of fire incident, and one involved a tire

19 changing incident.

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[11] Historical data through 2021 was provided in PG&E's first Safety and Operational
Metrics report provided on April 1, 2022.

FIGURE 1.1-1
RATE OF SIF ACTUAL (EMPLOYEE)
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE

1   **2.   Data Collection Methodology**

2   Injury data are collected by the Nurse Care Line (NCL). The NCL is an

3   enhanced injury reporting process for improving the employee experience

4   when reporting major and minor work-related injuries. The NCL allows

5   employees to speak up, without fear, when faced with a work-related health

6   challenge, strengthening the message that employee health is essential.

7   Employees receive medical advice, self-care information, and clinic

8   referrals. For this review, injury data was pulled from PG&E's Safety and

9   Environmental Management System (SEMS) database, which houses all

10   employee injury data.

11   As mentioned above, the SIF-A (Employee) SOM as defined in

12   D.21-11-009 is relatively new in application to PG&E's existing injury and

13   SIF dataset, and 2022 was the first year in which the data were analyzed

14   and reported under this definition. To evaluate and establish historical

15   performance for the SOM SIF-A (Employee) metric, PG&E reviewed all

16   employee injury data from 2017 through 2023 to determine if any met one of

17   the 14 EEI OS&HC serious injury criteria as summarized in Section A.2.

1 above. To establish historical performance for the first SOMs report

2 submittal, PG&E reviewed approximately 18,000-line items of injury data.

3 A substantial portion of those were not Occupational Safety and Health

4 Administration (OSHA)-recordable (i.e., first aid, non-OSHA recordable) and

5 were removed from the population. The remaining population that met the

6 OSHA definition (i.e., work-related injury) was reviewed against the EEI

7 OS&HC serious injury criteria for this report.

8 **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

9   For 2023, there were 16 employee serious injuries and one employee

10 fatality. 56 percent of the employee serious injuries were due to bone

11 fractures (9 of 16). These included bone fractures of the ankle, leg, fingers,

12 and chest.

13   On January 31, 2023, a Vegetation Management inspector was fatally

14 injured while changing a tire when the fender connection where the jack was

15 placed failed.

16   The 2023 SIF rate of 0.063 is a significant increase over 2022 and prior

17 years. The increase in the number of serious injuries is primarily due to

18 increases in the number of falls, slips, and trips, and the number of contacts

19 with or exposure to harmful substances. PG&E' current and planned work

20 activities for the improvement and maintenance the long term performance

21 of this metric are discussed in Section E below.

22 **C. (1.1) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

23 **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

24   There have been no changes to the 1-year and 5-year targets since the

25 last SOMs report filing. The 2023 target for rate of SIF-A (Employee) was to

26 remain below the second to third quartile threshold rate of 0.070 (see

27 Figure 1.1-2 below). The 2024 and 2028 target thresholds of 0.060

28 considered EEI benchmarking data with a 0.010 target decrease beginning

29 this year comparable with PG&E internal benchmarking practices.

30   It should be known that although the 2024 EEI second to third quartile

31 value has shifted slightly upward from 0.070 to 0.090, PG&E's 2024 target

32 threshold for the employee SIF Actual remains as 0.060.

As previously discussed, this metric calculation is relatively new to PG&E and we are continuing to monitor the metric's trend and the appropriateness of the targets.

2. **Target Methodology**

To establish the 1-year and 5-year target thresholds, PG&E considered the following factors:

- Historical Data and Trends: PG&E pulled OSHA recorded injuries from 2017 to 2021 to review each injury against the EEI OS&HC serious injury criteria. This injury dataset was used because it aligns with the beginning of the PG&E SIF Program (est. in 2017). Over that historical data period, performance showed a consistent trend at or around 0.040 injury rate, with a dip in 2019 and trend back up in 2020 and 2021; A similar pattern occurred for the years 2022 and 2023 with a dip in rate and then an increase however still below the 2023 threshold target rate of 0.070.

- Benchmarking: In July 2022, PG&E met with EEI leadership and confirmed that OS&HC serious injury criteria benchmarking is available for the metric going back to 2017. PG&E used the prior years' benchmarking data from EEI and compared it to PG&E's performance going back to 2017. Between 2017 and 2020, PG&E hovered between the top of first quartile and low second quartile. In 2021, PG&E ended the year in second quartile, 1/100th of a point above the first quartile performance. PG&E's performance for 2023 was between the first quartile and second quartile.

- Regulatory Requirements: None;

- Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Yes. The main focus for driving down injuries is noted below in planned/future work related to Days Away, Restricted and Transferred (DART) reduction;

- Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators: While the performance at or below the target threshold is sustainable, the more appropriate metric is to focus on injuries resulting from a high energy incident, which is consistent with both industry SIF-A monitoring and the SPM; and

- <u>Other Qualitative Considerations</u>: This target threshold approach was established to account for all job-related tasks with the potential to cause injury as defined by the EEI OS&HC criteria.

3. **2024 and 2028 Target**

The initial 2022 and 2026 target thresholds were to maintain at a rate of less 0.080 which allowed for no more than an increase of 0.038, as compared to highest employee SIF Actual rate from 2017 to 2021. The target threshold for 2023 incorporated available EEI employee SIF benchmarking data and the use of the second to third quartile threshold value of 0.070. The 2024 and 2028 target thresholds considered EEI benchmarking data with a 0.010 target decrease beginning this year comparable with PG&E internal benchmarking practices.

Although the 2024 EEI second to third quartile value has shifted slightly upward from 0.070 to 0.090, PG&E's 2024 target threshold for the employee SIF Actual remains as 0.060.

As discussed in C.1. above, PG&E's 2024 and 2028 target thresholds are in line with available EEI benchmarking data and PG&E target setting practices.

D. **(1.1) Performance Against Target**

1. **Progress Towards the 1-Year Target**

As demonstrated in Figure 1.1-2 below, PG&E saw an increase in the Employee SIF Actual rate from 0.027 in 2022 to 0.063 by the end of 2023. The increase is primarily due to increases in the number of falls, slips, and trips, and the number of contact with or exposure to harmful substances.

SIF investigations have been completed or are underway for the incidents including any needed corrective actions and we are continuing to monitor this trend. In addition, PG&E is implementing the SIF Capacity & Learning model as described in Section E below.

2. **Progress Towards the 5-Year Target**

As discussed in Section E below, and in consideration of the metric's trend, PG&E is continuing to deploy a number of programs to maintain or improve the long-term performance of this metric and to meet the Company's 5-year performance target.

Rate of SIF Actual (Employee)

E. (1.1) Current and Planned Work Activities

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
- SIF Capacity & Learning Model: PG&E is implementing the SIF Capacity & Learning model which redefines safety as measured by the presence of essential controls and the capacity to experience failures safely. Worksite essential controls directly target the stuff that can kill or seriously injure a co-worker or contract partner. When the controls are installed, verified, and used properly, they are not vulnerable to human error. Looking at safety differently with the SIF Capacity and Learning Model advances how we understand, manage, and prevent serious injuries and fatalities. Instead of measuring our success by the number of incidents, we are defining safety by the presence of controls that give coworkers the ability to fail safely.

  Implementation of the SIF Capacity and Learning model includes the use of the 10 Human Performance (HU) Tools which include: Questioning Attitude, Tailboards and Pre-Job Brief, Situational Awareness, Self-Checking (STAR), Two-Minute Rule, Three-Way Communication, Stop When Unsure, Procedure Use and Adherence, Phonetic Alphabet, and Placekeeping (i.e., physically marking steps in a procedure or other guiding

document that have been completed). The HU Tools are deeply connected to the SIF Prevention Program and allow coworkers to slow things down and reduce the chances of human errors caused by internal and external factors. When used effectively, these tools can also help ensure essential controls effectively remain in place and do not break down.

- <u>PG&E Safety Excellence Management System (PSEMS)</u>: PSEMS is the systematic management of our processes, assets, and occupational health and safety programs to prevent injury and illness, effectively and safely control and govern our assets, and manage the integrity of operating systems and processes. PSEMS is grounded in Organizational Culture and Safety Mindset and drives performance in Asset Management, Occupational Health & Safety and Process Safety. PSEMS is also part of the Performance Playbook along with Breakthrough Thinking and the Lean Operating Model.

- PG&E's Enterprise Health and Safety organization additionally supports this metric through focusing on:
  - Safety Leadership Development and Safety Culture;
  - Preventing workforce illness and injuries;
  - Governance, oversight, analytics, and reporting functions, including field safety support to drive strategy, programs, and continuous improvement;
  - SIF prevention and life safety
  - Safe operation of motor vehicles including regulatory compliance and governance;
  - Workforce health programs;
  - Field observations and inspection;
  - Assessing safety program impact; and
  - Incident investigations and human factor analyses.

    A Lloyd's Register Quality Assurance pre-assessment was conducted on the PSEMS implementation in 2023, Non-conformities were found in Management of Change, Operational Control, Performance Evaluation & Improvement and Assurance. Gap Closure Plans completion on task for EOY 2023 development.

1 • <u>Regional Safety Directors</u>: PG&E's team includes a field safety organization
2 led by five Regional Safety Directors who partner with the functional areas
3 (FA) to advise on and facilitate health and safety program implementation
4 and sustainability through the application of best safety practices in each
5 region, and ensure consistency across PG&E.

6 Safety organization responsibilities for each region include delivering
7 safety programs for safety culture improvements, field observations and
8 hazards identification, and the evaluation of essential control systems for
9 providing co-workers with the ability or "capacity" to safely recover from a
10 high-energy incident without life-threatening or life altering injury if an error
11 or mistake is made. Additional efforts include supporting incident
12 investigations, training, safety tailboards, and emergency response.

13 • The 100-day Keys to Life refresher campaign across PG&E including safety
14 talk tools about one of the Keys to Life listed below was completed last year
15 for the 10 Keys listed below:

16 1) Conduct pre-job safety briefings prior to performing work activities;
17 2) Follow safe driving principles and equipment operating procedures;
18 3) Use personal protective equipment (PPE) for the task being performed;
19 4) Follow electrical safety testing and grounding rules;
20 5) Follow clearance and energy lockout/tagout rules;
21 6) Follow confined space rules;
22 7) Follow suspended load rules;
23 8) Follow safety at heights rules; and
24 9) Follow excavation procedures.
25 10) Follow hazardous work environment procedures.

26 • <u>PG&E's Serious Injury or Fatality (SIF) Prevention Program</u>: All injuries and
27 reported near hits are evaluated to determine the hazards classification and
28 if the situation is a SIF-actual (work-related high-energy incident from work
29 at or for PG&E that results in a fatality, life-threatening, or life-altering injury)
30 or a SIF-potential (high-energy incident where a fatality or life threatening or
31 altering injury is not sustained) event. The SIF Prevention team conducts or
32 coordinates in-depth cause evaluations for all incidents classified as
33 SIF-potential or SIF-actual. The results of these investigations and the
34 identified corrective actions are monitored through the corrective action

1 program to ensure timely completion and effectiveness including the
2 elimination of recurrence. The SIF Prevention program is continuously
3 improved through the annual review of existing program processes for
4 enhancement and optimization. This ensures alignment with all FA[12] for
5 enterprise-wide consistency and continuity.

6 • Injury Management: The SIF-A (Employee) SOM definition includes injuries
7   that can occur during any work activity (including low or no energy tasks
8   such as lifting, walking, managing tools like knives), which is broader than
9   the high energy incidents that a mature SIF Program focuses on. Therefore,
10   a significant driver for improvement is within our occupational health
11   organization where our OSHA and DART cases are managed. DART cases
12   are employee OSHA-recordable injuries that involve Days Away from work
13   and/or days on Restricted duty or a job Transfer because the employee is
14   no longer able to perform his or her regular job. Since 2019, there has been
15   a 66 percent decrease in the employee DART rate (number of DART cases
16   per 100 fulltime employees divided by number of hours worked). The efforts
17   supporting this reduction include the expansion of PG&E's ergonomic
18   programs and increased Industrial Athlete Specialists for job site
19   evaluations. A primary goal of the efforts is reduced injury severity through
20   injury prevention and early intervention care for employees. In alignment
21   with this, we have strengthened the identification of the highest risk work
22   groups and tasks for field and vehicle ergonomic injuries. We identify
23   high-risk computer users through predictive modeling and provide targeted
24   interventions. Additional efforts also include enhanced injury management
25   containment for injuries at risk for escalation to DART and providing our
26   people leaders with additional injury management training.

27 • Safety Leadership Development: PG&E is continuing to improve Safety
28   Leadership Development and supervisor coaching by continuing to update
29   an impactful, practical training course for front line leaders. The Safety
30   Leadership development program provides training for crew leaders
31   (i.e., those individuals who lead teams of front-line employees doing field
32   operations and maintenance work) so they have the necessary safety skills

---

12 PG&E changed its title for lines of business to FAs in 2022.

1   to create trust, set expectations, remove barriers to safety and identify and

2   mitigate at risk behaviors.

3   • Safety Observations Program: Safety Observations Program plays a critical

4   role in helping to reduce employee and contractor injuries and fatalities by

5   increasing awareness of hazards and exposures in the field, reinforcing

6   positive work practices, and driving PG&E's Speak-Up culture. The

7   Program includes the use of the SafetyNet observation analysis and

8   reporting tool, and the Safety Observations dashboard to communicate

9   safety successes and improvement opportunities to leadership. In 2023,

10   approximately 143,000 safety observations were conducted across PG&E

11   with at-risk findings communicated to the respective FAs.

12   In 2023, PG&E initiated the pilot phase of High Energy Control

13   Assessments (HECA) and has integrated the assessments into the Safety

14   Observations program as of January 1, 2024. HECA is a new method of

15   measuring and monitoring safety by assessing whether front-line employees

16   are adequately protected against life-threatening hazards. HECA is

17   computed as the percentage of high-energy hazards that have

18   corresponding direct controls.

19   • Transportation Safety: PG&E Transportation Safety programs are designed

20   to protect our employees and the public by establishing requirements and

21   processes to help mitigate risks that can lead to motor vehicle incidents,

22   improve safety performance, and increase awareness of all PG&E

23   employees related to the operation of our motor vehicles. This

24   comprehensive program was established to reduce the number of motor

25   vehicle incidents that have the potential for serious injury, including fatal

26   injury, to PG&E's employees, staff augmentation employees operating

27   vehicles on Company business, and the public. Driver performance data is

28   used to identify specific risk drivers for targeted intervention, including driver

29   training, driver action plans and implementing vehicle safety technology. In

30   addition, PG&E's Transportation Safety Department also ensures

31   compliance with both the Federal Department of Transportation and

32   California state regulations. Additional Motor Vehicle Safety Incident risk

33   reduction programs including cell phone blocking and in-cab camera

34   technologies were discussed in the PG&E 2020 Risk Assessment and

1   Mitigation Phase (RAMP) Report.[13] The cellular phone blocking program is

2   currently in use with approximately 2,000 active users. The program has

3   effectively suppressed over 335,000 texts and over 83,000 calls. The

4   distraction and fatigue in-cab camera technology was piloted through March

5   of 2023. At this time, vendor request for proposal is in progress to take

6   advantage of technology bundling and reduce costs. In additional measures

7   to improve transportation safety include:

8   A Safe Driving policy and Driver Scorecard enhancement launched in

9   August of 2023. Since then, 161 Action Plans have been initiated. Of

10   those, 93 Action Plans have been completed.

11   The initiation of Smith Driving courses for apprentice and new hires

12   including behind the wheel and close quarter maneuvering courses.

13   The retrofit of 568 trouble trucks with Brigade Birdseye External

14   360 Cameras technology. The cameras are designed to eliminate blind

15   spots, where areas around the vehicle that are obscured to the driver by

16   bodywork or machinery and provide the driver with the ability to see

17   everything in the vehicle's path.

18   Additionally, PG&E significantly improved our vehicle roll-over

19   performance through targeted campaigns and by enabling "harsh cornering"

20   monitoring using vehicle telematics.

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[13] PG&E 2020 RAMP Report, Chapter 18, Risk Mitigation Plan: Motor Vehicle Safety
      Incident.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:

CHAPTER 1.2

RATE OF SIF ACTUAL

(CONTRACTOR)

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
CHAPTER 1.2
RATE OF SIF ACTUAL
(CONTRACTOR)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
CHAPTER 1.2
RATE OF SIF ACTUAL
(CONTRACTOR)

The material updates to this chapter since the October 2, 2023, report can be found in Section B concerning historical data; Section D concerning performance against target, and Section E for current and planned work. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

A. (1.2) Overview

1. Metric Definition

Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 1.2 – Rate of Serious Injury and/or Fatality (SIF) Actual (Contractor) is defined as:

Rate of SIF Actual (Contractor) is calculated using the formula: Number of SIF-Actual cases among contractors x 200,000/contractor hours worked, where SIF-Actual is counted using the methodology developed by the Edison Electrical Institute's (EEI) Occupational Safety and Health Committee (OS&HC).

2. Introduction of Metric

Pacific Gas and Electric Company's (PG&E or the Company) safety stand is "Everyone and Everything is Always Safe." Nothing is more important than our goal of continued risk reduction to keep our customers, and the communities we serve as well as our workforce (employees and contractors) safe. PG&E employees and contractors must understand that their actions reflect this priority. Our safety culture begins with each of us individually and extends to our coworkers and our communities. As part of this stand, PG&E is committed to contractor safety.

As defined in Decision (D.) 21-11-009, the SIF Actual (Contractor) SOM calculation is relatively new in application to PG&E's existing injury and SIF dataset. The data were analyzed and reported under this definition beginning with the first report which was submitted in March of 2022.

The EEI OS&HC serious injury criteria are updated annually based on additional learnings from injury classification to provide further clarification or criteria for the following year. PG&E is using the 2023 OS&HC serious

injury criteria found in Appendix 7 in EEI Safety Classification and Learning Model guidance.[1] The criteria include:

1) Fatalities;

2) Amputations (involving bone);

3) Concussions and/or cerebral hemorrhages;

4) Injury or trauma to internal organs;

5) Bone fractures (certain types);

6) Complete tendon, ligament and cartilage tears of the major joints (e.g., shoulder, elbow, wrist, hip, knee, and ankle);

7) Herniated disks (neck or back);

8) Lacerations resulting in severed tendons and/or a deep wound requiring internal stitches;

9) Second (10 percent body surface) or third degree burns;

10) Eye injuries resulting in eye damage or loss of vision;

11) Injections of foreign materials (e.g., hydraulic fluid);

12) Severe heat exhaustion and all heat stroke cases;

13) Dislocation of a major joint (shoulder, elbow, wrist, hip, knee, and ankle):

   a) Count only cases that required the manipulation or repositioning of the joint back into place under the direction of a treating doctor; and

14) "Other Injuries" category should only be selected for reporting injuries not identified in the existing categories.

PG&E's SIF Program was deployed at the end of 2016 to establish a cause evaluation process for coworker serious safety incidents. When it was deployed only contractor incidents that resulted in a SIF Actual (fatality or serious injury that was defined as life threatening or life altering) were investigated by PG&E and entered into the Corrective Action Program (CAP). The contractor was responsible for investigating all other incidents and reporting back to PG&E, but those incidents were not entered into CAP.

From 2017 to 2020, PG&E classified SIF Actual (SIF-A) incidents based on the job task and whether a life altering or life-threatening injury, or fatality occurred. In August of 2020, PG&E adopted EEI Safety Classification

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[1] EEI Safety Classification and Learning (SCL) model guidance. Serious Injury criteria are in Appendix 7. SCL model guidance.

1 Learning (SCL)[2] model to classify its SIF incidents. The EEI SCL model

2 classifies incidents into categories: High-Energy SIF (HSIF),[3] Low-Energy

3 SIF (LSIF),[4] Potential SIF (PSIF),[5] Capacity,[6] Exposure,[7] Success[8] and

4 Low Severity.[9] In 2020, the HSIF terminology was new to the industry;

5 however, it is equivalent to a SIF-A with regard to how serious life

6 threatening or life-altering injuries, or fatalities are determined, per PG&E

7 definition. Adopting the EEI SCL model has improved the SIF Program by

8 bringing a consistent and objective approach to reviewing and classifying

9 SIF incidents across the Company and industry. The SCL model allows the

10 Company to focus its safety and risk mitigation efforts on the most serious

11 outcomes and highest risk work where a high energy incident occurred. In

12 addition, in June of 2020 PG&E modified the SIF Program to include internal

13 classification and investigation of contractor SIF Potential (SIF-P)

14 incidents.[10] This expanded requirement led to an increase in contractor

15 injury data.

16 The rate of SIF-A (Contractor) SOM definition is based on the EEI

17 OS&HC serious injury criteria[11] which is different than the EEI SCL Model.

18 It is suggested by EEI to use the OS&HC criteria in conjunction with the EEI

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2 EEI, SCL Model available here: https://www.safetyfunction.com/scl-model.

3 *Id.* at p. 17, HSIF is defined as: "Incident with a release of high energy in the absence of a direct control where a serious injury is sustained."

4 *Id.* at p. 17, LSIF is defined as: "Incident with a release of low energy in the absence of a direct control where a serious injury is sustained."

5 *Id.* at p. 17, PSIF is defined as: "Incident with a release of high energy in the absence of a direct control where a serious injury is not sustained."

6 *Id*. at p. 17, Capacity is defined as: "Incident with a release of high energy in the presence of a direct control where a serious injury is not sustained."

7 *Id.* at p. 17, Exposure is defined as: "Condition where high energy is present in the absence of a direct control."

8 *Id.* at p. 17, Success is defined as: "Condition where a high energy incident does not occur because of the presence of a direct control."

9 *Id.* at p. 17, Low Severity is defined as: "Incident with a release of low energy where no serious injury is sustained."

10 SAFE-1100S-B001: Contractor SIF-P Incidents: Requiring SIF-P Incidents and Cause Evaluations Published 6/2020.

11 EEI Safety Classification and Learning (SCL) model guidance. Serious Injury criteria are in Appendix 7. SCL model guidance.

1   SCL model. Therefore, using only the OS&HC serious injury criteria creates

2   a different result in SIF-A classification from the expectation of using the EEI

3   SCL model that includes high energy incidents.

B.   (1.2) Metric Performance

1.   Historical Data (2017 – 2023)

6   PG&E is including the years 2017 through 2023 in this report. The

7   dataset includes injury type, incident date, location, and EEI OS&HC injury

8   classification. See the corresponding Contractor SIF-A SOM data file

9   (21-11-009.PGE_SOM_1-2_Contractor_SIF_A_2024_Q1r1) for a list of

10   incidents. Following the Kern Order Instituting Investigation (OII) Settlement

11   Agreement,[12] PG&E deployed the SIF Program to investigate employee

12   and contractor incidents resulting in life altering, life threatening, or fatal

13   injuries. Beginning in 2017, PG&E only tracked contractor incidents that

14   were classified through the SIF Program[13] meeting those criteria. Prior to

15   the implementation of the Kern OII requirements, contractors were not

16   required to report SIF incidents. In June 2020, PG&E expanded the SIF

17   Program to include investigating contractor incidents rising to SIF-P

18   classification (focusing on incidents that meet the EEI SCL methodology as

19   described above). This increased the number and types of injuries and

20   incidents that contractors are required to report[14] compared to prior

21   years.[15]

22   Figure 1.2-1 illustrates the rate of contractor serious injuries and

23   fatalities by year from 2017 through 2023 based on historical data

24   availability as discussed above. For 2020 through 2023, the dataset reflects

25   the expanded SIF-P incident reporting requirements for contractors

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[12]   Investigation (I.) 14-08-022, Kern OII (Aug. 28, 2014) Settlement Agreement with California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) see D.15-07-014.

[13]   SAFE-1100S Rev. 00 (2017): SIF Program.

[14]   SAFE-1100S-B001.

[15]   Note, the expanded incident reporting requirement implemented in 2020 does not include the broader SOM SIF-A (Contractor) EEI OS&HC serious injury criteria metric definition.

1	implemented in June of 2020.[16] The 2017 through 2023 dataset includes a
2	total of 72 contractor SIF Actuals that met the EEI OS&HC serious injury
3	criteria as described in Section A.2. above. Sixty-five percent of the serious
4	injury incidents (38 of 58) met the criteria of bone fracture, including of the
5	hands and feet. Fourteen were fatalities, where one helicopter crash in
6	2020 claimed the lives of three individuals; the other fatalities involved an
7	act of a third party, falls from trees, electrical pole gas pipe placement, and
8	operations of motor and powered vehicles.

FIGURE 1.2-1
RATE OF SIF ACTUAL (CONTRACTOR)
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE

9	**2. Data Collection Methodology**
10	Contractor related Serious Safety Incidents[17] or any SIF-A or SIF-P
11	incidents are reported to the Safety Helpline at Company number
12	1-415-973-8700, Option 1 and then entered into the Enterprise CAP

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[16] SAFE-1100S-B001: Contractor SIF-P Incidents: Requiring SIF-P Incidents and Cause Evaluations Published 6/2020.

[17] As defined by SAFE-1004S: Safety Incident Notification and Response Management.

1	program for SIF review and classification.[18] PG&E's SIF Program[19] is
2	managed through the CAP.
3	As mentioned above, the SIF-A (Contractor) SOM as defined in
4	D.21-11-009 SOM calculation is relatively new in application to PG&E's
5	existing injury and SIF dataset, and 2022 was the first year in which the data
6	were analyzed and reported under this definition. To evaluate and establish
7	historical performance for the SOM SIF-A (Contractor) metric, PG&E pulled
8	data from the CAP system and reviewed 472 issues with the Issue Type of
9	Contractor Safety. The list included both incidents or injuries reported to
10	PG&E or entered in CAP from 2017 through 2021. Twenty-seven percent,
11	or 128 incidents were related to gas dig-in by a third-party where no injuries
12	occurred. The remaining issues were reviewed to determine if any met the
13	14 EEI OS&HC serious injury criteria as summarized in Section A.2. above.
14	For the years 2022 and 2023, the same process was used to review
15	Contractor Safety related CAPs entered on a monthly basis. A total of
16	368 contractor related CAPs were reviewed in 2022, and 224 were reviewed
17	for 2023

3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period

19	For 2023, there were 17 contractor serious injuries and one contractor
20	fatality. 65 percent of the contractor serious injuries were due to bone
21	fractures (11 of 17). These included bone fractures of the fingers, wrist,
22	arms, ribs, and legs.
23	The contractor fatality occurred while supporting the historic storms
24	response effort in the first quarter of 2023. Two contractors travelling on a
25	local road in Mendocino County, towards PG&E's base camp at Point Arena
26	lost control of their bucket truck, and it subsequently rolled over off the
27	roadway. One passenger was fatally injured. The second passenger was
28	seriously injured and was transferred to a local hospital where they received
29	ongoing care.

---

[18] Per SAFE-1100S-B001, PG&E contractors are required to submit any Serious Safety Incidents or PSIF incidents to PG&E within 5-business days of becoming aware of the incident.

[19] SAFE-1100S: SIF Standard determined SIF classification and management.

1   All the incidents involved a high-energy event and were classified as
2   either SIF-A (HSIF) or SIF-P per the EEI SCL model and PG&E's SIF
3   Standard.

4   2023 performance against target is further discussed in Section D.1
5   below.

C. (1.2) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target

1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report

There have been no changes to the 1- and 5-year targets since the last SOMs report filing. As mentioned above, the rate of Contractor SIF-A dataset includes the expanded SIF-P incident reporting requirements for contractors implemented in June of 2020. We will continue to monitor Contractor SIF-A trends and adjust the targets once the dataset has matured.

2. Target Methodology

To establish the 1-year and 5-year target thresholds, PG&E considered the following factors:

- Historical Data and Trends: The target threshold takes into consideration the historical increase (from 0.013 to 0.063) between 2019, 2020 and 2021, after expanding the contractor reporting requirements in 2020. This increased the amount and rate of contractor serious injuries (as defined by the EEI OS&HC serious injury criteria) by over 466-percent. It also takes into consideration that in 2022 PG&E expanded contractor injury reporting requirements to meet the SOM SIF-A OS&HC criteria;

- Benchmarking: Not available. This metric uses new methodology not used in the industry; therefore, benchmarking is not available. PG&E confirmed with EEI that it is starting to collect these data among its utility members and hopes to increase benchmarking capability as more utilities begin to track contractor incident data. For establishing the SOM 1.2: SIF-A (Contractor) target threshold PG&E used the industry data that were available as a proxy to establish approximate calculations. PG&E will continue to refine its targets as benchmark data comes available;

- Regulatory Requirements: None;
- Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Yes. The main focus for driving down injuries is noted below in planned/future work related to Contractor Safety initiatives;
- Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators: While the performance at or below the target may be sustainable, the more appropriate metric is to focus on injuries resulting from a high energy incident, which is consistent with both industry SIF-A monitoring and the SPM; and
- Other Qualitative Considerations: This target approach was established to account for all job-related tasks with the potential to cause injury as defined by the EEI OS&HC criteria.

3. **2024 and 2028 Target**

Consistent with the 2023 (1-year) and 2027 (5-year) targets, the 2024 (1-year) and 2028 (5-year) target thresholds are to maintain a rate of less than 0.100. This target rate takes into consideration the historical increase (from 0.013 to 0.063) from 2019 through 2021 after expanding the contractor reporting requirements in 2020. It also considers that in 2022 PG&E expanded contractor injury reporting requirements to meet the SOM SIF-A (Contractor) defined EEI OS&HC criteria and that the rates are subject to change depending on number of contractors hours worked.

The target thresholds are set at the highest serious injury occurrence in one year that would be concerning if the rate was surpassed. Since this metric calculation is relatively new to PG&E and 2022 was the first year it was reported, the threshold takes into consideration historical data from 2020 and 2021 with an allowance for understanding this calculation and its consequences. The threshold allows for a 50-percent rate increase over 2021, which allows PG&E to refine expectations as this new metric is refined further.

D. **(1.2) Performance Against Target**

1. **Progress on Sustaining the 1-Year Target**

As demonstrated in Figure 1.1-2 below, PG&E experienced an increase in the Contractor SIF Actual rate during the first half of 2023, with a downward trend during the second half of 2023.

1   SIF investigations have been completed or are underway for the

2   incidents including corrective actions and we are continuing to monitor this

3   trend. In addition, PG&E is implementing the SIF Capacity & Learning

4   model as described in section E below.

5   **2. Progress on Sustaining the 5-Year Target**

6   As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is continuing to deploy a

7   number of programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this

8   metric to meet the Company's 5-year performance target and will continue

9   to monitor Contractor SIF-A trends and adjust the targets as appropriate.

FIGURE 1.2-2
RATE OF SIF-A (CONTRACTOR)
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE AND TARGETS

10   **E. (1.2) Current and Planned Work Activities**

11   • <u>SIF Capacity & Learning Model</u>: PG&E is implementing the SIF Capacity &

12   Learning model which redefines safety as measured by the presence of

13   essential controls and the capacity to experience failures safely. Worksite

14   essential controls directly target the stuff that can kill or seriously injure a

15   co-worker or contract partner. When the controls are installed, verified, and

1	used properly, they are not vulnerable to human error. Looking at safety
2	differently with the SIF Capacity and Learning Model advances how we
3	understand, manage, and prevent serious injuries and fatalities. Instead of
4	measuring our success by the number of incidents, we are defining safety
5	by the presence of controls that give coworkers and contractors the ability to
6	fail safely.
7	• Implementation of the SIF Capacity and Learning model includes the use of
8	the ten Human Performance (HU) Tools which include: Questioning Attitude,
9	Tailboards and Pre-Job Brief, Situational Awareness, Self-Checking (STAR),
10	Two-Minute Rule, Three-Way Communication, Stop When Unsure,
11	Procedure Use and Adherence, Phonetic Alphabet, and Placekeeping
12	(i.e., physically marking steps in a procedure or other guiding document that
13	have been completed). The HU Tools are deeply connected to the SIF
14	Prevention Program and allow coworkers to slow things down and reduce
15	the chances of human errors caused by internal and external factors. When
16	used effectively, these tools can also help ensure essential controls
17	effectively remain in place and do not break down.
18	• Contractor Safety Quality Assurance Reviews (CSQAR): CSQARS are
19	conducted with selected Contractors with adverse trends in safety
20	performance and who are at risk of experiencing a Serious Injury or Fatality.
21	The purpose is to partner directly with our contract partners, perform a
22	comprehensive review of their safety programs and culture, and implement
23	controls to eliminate serious injuries and fatalities. The contractors are
24	invited to participate in a six-week examination of their safety culture within
25	their company. Opportunities are identified, they undergo a barrier analysis,
26	and corrective actions are designed and implemented. Following the
27	successful completion of the initial six weeks, PG&E checks in with
28	contractors every 30 days for a minimum of three months to conduct an
29	effectiveness review to ensure the corrective actions were implemented as
30	designed, were effective and self-sustaining, and do not expose employees
31	to unforeseen hazards. As of the end of 2023, 19 PG&E Contractors
32	completed a CSQAR and not one of them has experienced a serious injury
33	or fatality, and only three have experienced SIF Potential incidents. Each

1 post CSQAR SIF Potential event is properly evaluated, and controls are

2 implemented and validated in the field.

3 • Contractor Motor Vehicle Programs: PG&E implemented the Slow Your Roll

4 campaign focused on preventing motor vehicle rollovers and reaching

5 100 consecutive days rollover free. As of the end of 2023, PG&E

6 contractors have gone 155 consecutive days without a motor vehicle rollover

7 event. This is a 154 percent improvement in the most consecutive days

8 rollover free compared to last year, and a 214 percent improvement over the

9 previous year (the average number of days of 52.1 between rollover events

10 compared to last years' 16.6 days between rollover events). PG&E

11 attributes this progress to the partnership with high-risk contract companies

12 in the improvement of their driving safety programs and the development

13 and implementation of company specific rollover prevention plans.

14 • PG&E's Contractor Safety Program: Programs that support this metric

15 include PG&E's Enterprise Health and Safety organization and the

16 Contractor Safety Program. Beginning in 2016, PG&E implemented a

17 formal Contractor Safety Program to help our contractor partners reduce

18 illness and injuries when working with PG&E. The program was

19 implemented as required by the CPUC, Kern OII Settlement Agreement.

20 PG&E's Contractor Safety Program includes all contractors and

21 subcontractors (currently over 2,100) performing high and medium-risk work

22 on behalf of PG&E, on either PG&E owned, or customer owned, sites and

23 assets. The Contractor Safety Program consists of the following primary

24 elements:

25 − Contractor Company Pre-Qualification: PG&E leverages the capabilities

26 of ISNetworld (ISN) to collect performance and safety compliance

27 program information from all prime and subcontractors that conduct

28 work classified as high or medium risk. PG&E is responsible for the

29 performance of its contractors. As part of this effort, ISNetworld a

30 third-party administrator, independently assesses contractors' historical

31 safety data, and safety, drug/alcohol, and written safety programs to

32 evaluate whether contractors meet PG&E's minimum performance

33 standards and have the necessary risk management programs in place

34 to proactively mitigate risk. A variance to work for PG&E is required for

contractors who do not meet the prequalification requirements. The variance process includes a review of the contractor's safety performance, an improvement plan and the business need in relation to the proposed scope of work. The decision to award a variance requires Vice President and Chief Safety Officer approval, or Chief Executive Officer designee approval. PG&E has implemented a Driving Safety Program. This program is intended to ensure our prime contractors and subcontractors are meeting the PG&E driving program expectations, as well as the Department of Transportation's regulatory agencies, and best in class procedures adapted from the ANSI Z15.1-2017 standard. PG&E continues to strengthen the requirements in the areas of fatalities and safety performance evaluation, including requiring a mitigation plan, and adding the requirement of a safety observation program.

- Enhanced Safety Contract Terms: PG&E Contract terms require that, following a serious public or worker safety incident, the contractor will conduct a cause evaluation, share the analysis with PG&E, and cooperate and assist with PG&E's cause evaluation analysis and corrective actions for the incident, and regulatory investigations and inquiries, including but not limited to Safety Enforcement Division's investigations and inquiries. Under the enhanced Safety Contract Terms, PG&E has the right to:

  1) Designate safety precautions in addition to those in use or proposed by the contractor;

  2) Stop work to ensure compliance with safe work practices and applicable federal, state and local laws, rules and regulations;

  3) Require the contractor to provide additional safeguards beyond what the contractor plans to utilize;

  4) Terminate the contractor for cause in the event of a serious incident or failure to comply with PG&E's safety precautions;

  5) Review and approve criteria for work plans, which include safety plans; and

  6) Require the contractor to promptly, thoroughly, and transparently investigate all safety incidents that occur during Contractor's PG&E related work in compliance with PG&E's Enterprise Cause

Standard, including all SIF-A and SIF-P incidents, which shall be investigated jointly with PG&E, taking into account the priority and needs of Occupational Safety and Health Administration and other regulator investigations.

- <u>Contractor Job Safety Planning</u>: Safety must be factored into every job plan from start to finish. Safety considerations include formal training, job site work controls, specialized equipment to reduce hazards, and personal protective equipment. Each of PG&E's functional areas have safety plan requirements unique to its operations. Prior to commencement of work, PG&E is required to review the adequacy of the safety plans, including contractor safety personnel qualifications where applicable, and perform a safety assessment to evaluate whether additional safety mitigations are required, including whether to assign PG&E onsite safety personnel. These reviews must be conducted by PG&E employees that are qualified to perform such work or PG&E engages third-party experts as appropriate to perform this safety analysis.

- <u>Contractor Oversight</u>: Work activities are governed by qualified PG&E oversight personnel to ensure work follows a PG&E reviewed and approved safety plan designed for the job. PG&E conducts field safety observations of the contractor. For 2023, approximately 86,000 contractor observations were conducted. High-risk findings are reviewed daily, and corrective actions are discussed. Observation data collected by all observers (e.g., PG&E and contractors) are analyzed to support continuous improvement.

- <u>Contractor Safety Performance Evaluation</u>: To maximize and capture lessons learned, the results of which are shared across the enterprise, as well as providing a means of determining future contract award, Functional Area Representatives evaluate contractor safety performance. Prime Contractors must also evaluate all Subcontractors performing any active work during the year. Evaluations must be completed at the conclusion of the contracted work or at least once every calendar year. Safety performance evaluations must include the following minimum performance evaluation criteria:

1   a.   Worksite hazard mitigation;

2   b.   Training and qualifications compliance;

3   c.   Work site safety performance (observations);

4   d.   Safety incident and injury prevention and reporting;

5   e.   Development and implementation of a PG&E-approved safety plan;

6   f.   Speak Up and Stop Work Authority; and

7   g.   Wildfire Prevention and Mitigation.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:

CHAPTER 1.3

SIF ACTUAL

(PUBLIC)

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
CHAPTER 1.3
SIF ACTUAL
(PUBLIC)

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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
CHAPTER 1.3
SIF ACTUAL
(PUBLIC)

The material updates to this chapter since the October 2,2023, report can be found in Section B concerning historical data and metric performance; Section D concerning performance; and Section E Current and Planned Work Activities. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

A. (1.3) Overview

1. Metric Definition

Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 1.3 – Serious Injury and Fatality (SIF) Actual (Public) is defined as:

A fatality or personal injury requiring inpatient hospitalization for other than medical observations that an authority having jurisdiction has determined resulted directly from incorrect operation of equipment, failure or malfunction of utility-owned equipment, or failure to comply with any California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC or Commission) rule or standard. Equipment includes utility or contractor vehicles and aircraft used during the course of business.

2. Introduction of Metric

Pacific Gas and Electric Company's (PG&E or the Company) safety stand is "Everyone and Everything is Always Safe." Our goal is zero public safety incidents that result from the failure or malfunction of a PG&E asset or the failure of PG&E to follow rules and/or standards. In support of this, PG&E is continuing to invest in programs to protect the public including electric transmission and distribution system reliability and the reduction of wildfire risk. PG&E remains committed to building an organization where every work activity is designed to facilitate safe performance, every member of our workforce knows and practices safe behaviors, and every individual is encouraged to speak up if they see an unsafe or risky behavior with the confidence that their concerns and ideas will be heard and followed up on. As part of this stand, the Public SIF Actual metric is integral in ensuring the safety of our communities.

1   The Public SIF Actual metric definition established in Decision
2   (D.) 21-11-009 is a new way for PG&E to categorize and report public safety
3   incidents resulting in a SIF. There are two primary differences between the
4   SOMs Public SIF Actual metric and the Safety Performance Metric (SPM)
5   Public SIF metric (SPM Metric 20).

6   • First, the SOM requires a finding by "an authority having jurisdiction";
7   and

8   • Second, that finding must determine that the Public SIF Actual "resulted
9   directly from incorrect operation of equipment, failure or malfunction of
10   utility owned equipment, or failure to comply with any California Public
11   Utilities Commission (CPUC or Commission) rule or standard."[1]

12   As a result, the data in this report are a subset of the data included with
13   the SPM Report for the Public SIFs metric, which is defined as a fatality or
14   personal injury requiring in-patient hospitalization involving utility facilities or
15   equipment. Equipment, in the case of the SPM, includes utility vehicles
16   used during the course of business.

17   In 2012, PG&E improved its data collection processes and reporting for
18   public serious incidents. These data were used to inform PG&E's Risk
19   Assessment and Mitigation Phase Report, which informs and helps prioritize
20   our investments to address top safety risks. The report outlines our top
21   safety risks and includes descriptions of the controls currently in place, as
22   well as mitigations—both underway and proposed—to reduce each risk.

23   **B. (1.3) Metric Performance**

24   **1. Historical Data (2010 – 2023)**

25   In this report, PG&E is providing fourteen years of historical data from
26   2010 through 2023.[2] The data include a description of the incident, type of
27   injury, and identification of the authority with jurisdiction that has determined
28   or may determine that incorrect operations, malfunction, or failure to meet a
29   standard was the cause of the SIF. As mentioned above, the data collection
30   and internal reporting processes for public safety serious incidents were

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1 D.21-11-009 – (Rulemaking 20-07-013) Appendix A, p. 2.

2 See 21-11-009.PGE_SOM_1-3_Public_SIF_A_Q1 2024 for a detailed list of incidents.

1	improved in 2012. Historical data for the Public SIF Actual metric are based
2	on this timeframe and also include available data for the years of 2010 and
3	2011.
4	Since the metric definition requires a finding from an authority having
5	jurisdiction, Public SIF Actual incidents in prior years may not appear in the
6	historical data. For the purposes of this report, PG&E is including incidents
7	where PG&E may have disputed the assertion of an authority with
8	jurisdiction that the Public SIF Actual was caused by incorrect operation of
9	utility equipment, a malfunction of utility equipment, or failure to comply a
10	Commission rule or standard, and/or where the incidents are subject to
11	pending investigation or litigation. These incidents are shown as "unknown"
12	in the corresponding metric data file
13	(21-11-009.PGE_SOM_1-3_Public_SIF_A_Q1 2024). PG&E will continue
14	to update the historical data in future SOMs reports as appropriate and
15	identify changes based on new information.
16	**2. Data Collection Methodology**
17	PG&E's Public SIF Actual incident data largely come from the Enterprise
18	Health and Safety Serious Incidents Reports, which includes a compilation
19	of Law Department claims from PG&E's Riskmaster database, Electric
20	Incident Reports, and other reportable incidents such as PG&E Federal
21	Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) license compliance reports. For the
22	SOMs report, the incidents included in the Public SIF Actual metric must be
23	determined by an authority having jurisdiction to have resulted directly from:
24	(1) incorrect operation of equipment, (2) failure or malfunction of
25	utility-owned equipment, or (3) the failure to comply with any Commission
26	rule or standard. PG&E interprets authorities having jurisdiction to include
27	agencies such as the CPUC, California Department of Forestry and Fire
28	Protection, or the National Transportation Safety Board. The term authority
29	having jurisdiction can also include PG&E itself if PG&E concludes that the
30	definition of the SOM is met.
31	**3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**
32	The graphs included in Figure 1.3-1 and Figure 1.3-2 below show the
33	total number of incidents and the total number of serious injuries or fatalities

for each identified incident. Between 2010 through 2023, there were a total of 27 confirmed incidents where Public SIF Actuals occurred (Figure 1.3-1), which resulted in a total of 173 public SIFs (Figure 1.3-2). There are two incidents related to wildfire where a serious injury or fatality to a member of the public occurred that are shown as "unknown" due to ongoing investigation and/or litigation. There is one incident that occurred on September 30, 2023, involving a motorcyclist who made contact with a low hanging de-energized power line that is shown as "pending." This incident was reported to PG&E on February 10, 2024.

For 2023, there are four confirmed Public SIF incidents as described below:

- On May 8, 2023, a waste management truck contacted an energized guy wire that had been previously damaged. As the waste management employee was emptying a metal trash bin it contacted the truck and the employee received an electric shock for approximately one or two seconds which resulted in a serious injury.
- On July 10, 2023, a PG&E coworker was making a left turn when a motorcycle collided with the driver's side rear fender of the truck. The motorcyclist was transported to the hospital and treated for a broken leg.
- On July 13, 2023, a contract partner truck was traveling northeast and encountered a sudden stop in traffic. The driver was unable to come to a complete stop and collided with a third-party passenger vehicle causing serious injury to the occupant of the third-party vehicle.
- On August 16, 2023, a member of the public contacted a downed primary line which resulted in a fatality in Mendota, Fresno County.[3]

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[3] The downed primary line was due to the failure of a pole damaged in a fire not caused by PG&E, and about which PG&E was not notified. PG&E is reporting this incident under SOM 1.3 in the spirit of transparency despite the existence of non-PG&E related causes because we determined that our troubleshooter did not follow our line reenergization procedures that may have allowed us to prevent the incident.

FIGURE 1.3-1
NUMBER OF PUBLIC SIF ACTUAL INCIDENTS 2010 – 2023
CONFIRMED AND PENDING INVESTIGATION

Number of Public SIF Actual Incidents

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Unknown or Pending										1	1			1
Confirmed	1		5	2	2	4		1	2	1	0	3	2	4

FIGURE 1.3-2
NUMBER OF PUBLIC SIF ACTUALS 2010 – 2023
CONFIRMED AND PENDING INVESTIGATION

Number of Public SIF Actuals

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Unknown or Pending										4	5			1
Confirmed	59		5	4	2	6	0	1	86	1	0	3	2	4

1.3-5

1   PG&E is continuing to evaluate its current and planned Public Safety
2   work activities as described in Section E below and through further maturing
3   its public incident investigation process, including the advancement of Public
4   SIF Actual metric definition requirements and learnings.

5   **C. (1.3) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

6   **1. Updates to 1- and 5- Year Targets Since Last Report**

7   There have been no changes to the 1-year and 5-year targets since the
8   last SOMs report filing, for the Public SIF Actual metric, which is to
9   demonstrate progress towards the elimination of serious injuries and
10   fatalities (zero Public SIF Actual incidents).

11   **2. Target Methodology**

12   With our stand of Everyone and Everything is Always Safe, our goal is
13   the elimination of Public SIF Actual incidents resulting directly from incorrect
14   operation of PG&E equipment, failure, or malfunction of PG&E-owned
15   equipment, or from PG&E's failure to comply with any Commission rule or
16   standard.

17   In consideration of the above, PG&E also reviewed the following factors:

18   • Historical Data and Trends: From 2010 through 2023, there were a total
19   of 27 confirmed incidents where Public SIF Actuals occurred
20   (Figure 1.3-1), which resulted in a total of 173 public SIFs (Figure 1.3-2).
21   Four incidents where a serious injury or fatality occurred are pending
22   due to ongoing investigation and/or litigation. Historical data will
23   continue to inform PG&E's plans and actions to achieve its goal of zero
24   public safety incidents.

25   • Benchmarking: Not available. This is a new metric definition;

26   • Regulatory Requirements: CPUC, FERC, and Department of
27   Transportation (DOT), public safety reporting requirements;

28   • Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Yes. PG&E's work and
29   resource plan prioritizes public safety risk reduction. This includes
30   minimizing the risk of catastrophic wildfires in alignment with the
31   continued execution of the Wildfire Mitigation Plan (WMP) and
32   maturation of key wildfire mitigation strategies. It also includes

1	mitigation of other public safety risks related to the elimination of serious
2	injuries and fatalities (zero Public SIF Actual incidents);
3	• Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight
4	Enforcement: A 1-year goal of zero Public SIF Actuals was established
5	in 2022 and has not changed for 2024 through 2028 (5-year). The goal
6	reflects PG&E's intent to immediately and continuously operate without
7	creating risk to the public; and
8	• Other Qualitative Considerations: PG&E's approach is aligned to and
9	anchored on PG&E's goal and commitment to "always" safe operations.

3. 2024 Target

As discussed above, PG&E's 1-year target for the Public SIF Actual metric is to demonstrate progress towards the elimination of serious injuries and fatalities (zero Public SIF Actual incidents) resulting directly from incorrect operation of PG&E equipment, failure, or malfunction of PG&E-owned equipment, or PG&E's failure to comply with any Commission rule or standard.

4. 2028 Target

PG&E's 5-year target for the Public SIF Actual metric is to demonstrate progress towards the elimination of serious injuries and fatalities (zero Public SIF Actual incidents) resulting directly from incorrect operation of PG&E equipment, failure, or malfunction of PG&E-owned equipment, or PG&E's failure to comply with any Commission rule or standard.

D. (1.3) Performance Against Target

1. Progress Towards the 1-Year Directional Target

For 2023 there are four confirmed Public SIF Actual incidents that meet the SOMs criteria as described in section B.3. above.

2. Progress Towards the 5-Year Directional Target

As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is continuing to deploy several programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this metric to meet the Company's 5-year performance target.

E. (1.3) Current and Planned Work Activities

Many of the current and planned activities to eliminate public safety incidents are addressed by meeting key operations risks, which are discussed in other SOMs Chapters.

The current and planned work activities for reducing the risk of gas transmission and distribution system equipment failure or malfunction, are discussed in Chapters 4.1 through 4.7 of this report. The list below touches upon some of these:

- Gas System Damage Prevention team (Chapter 4.1): PG&E's Damage Prevention team is responsible for the overall management of PG&E's Damage Prevention Program, by managing the risks associated with excavations around PG&E's facilities and conducting investigations. As an additional control to manage the Damage Prevention Program, the Dig-in Reduction team works closely with various local PG&E operations personnel and respond to referrals from those employees when they observe excavations potentially not in compliance with regulatory requirements.

- Gas Public Awareness and Education Programs (Chapter 4.1): Gas public awareness programs reduce the threat of third-party damage to pipelines through educational outreach regarding safe excavation near pipelines. PG&E's Damage Prevention activities include educational outreach activities for professional excavators, local public officials, emergency responders, and the public who lives and works within PG&E's service territory. The program communicates safe excavation practices, required actions prior to excavating near underground pipelines, availability of pipeline location information, and other gas safety information through a variety of methods throughout the year. These efforts are aimed at increasing public awareness about the importance of utilizing the 811 Program before an excavation project is started, understanding the markings that have been placed, and following safe excavation practices after subsurface installations have been marked.

- Gas Field Service and Gas Dispatch (Chapter 4.3): PG&E's Field Service and Gas Dispatch partner together to respond to customer Gas Emergency (odor calls). There is a shared responsibility in the overall performance of

1   this work. Gas Service Representatives are deployed systemwide, 24 hours

2   a day—utilizing an on-call as needed.

3 • Gas Leak Management (Chapter 4.6): The Leak Management Program

4   addresses the risk of Loss of Containment by finding and fixing leaks.

5   PG&E performs leak survey of the gas transmission and storage system

6   twice per year, by either ground or aerial methods in accordance with

7   General Order (GO) 112-F. Leak surveys of pipeline and equipment are

8   commonly accomplished on foot or vehicle, by operator-qualified personnel,

9   using a portable methane gas leak detector. Aerial leak surveys, in remote

10   locations and areas difficult to access on the ground, are performed by

11   helicopter using Light Detection and Ranging Infrared technology.

12   Additional activities that complement the Leak Management Program

13   include risk-based leak surveys, mobile leak quantification, and

14   replacing/removing high bleed pneumatic devices at its compressor stations

15   and storage facilities.

16 • Gas Transmission Integrity Management (Chapter 4.6): The Integrity

17   Management Program provides the tools and processes for risk ranking and

18   prioritization of remediation efforts. This program enables PG&E to focus on

19   identifying and remediating threats to its system. The Transmission Integrity

20   Management Program assesses the threats on every segment of

21   transmission pipe, evaluates the associated risks, and acts to prevent or

22   mitigate these threats.

23   The current and planned work activities for reducing the risk of electric

24 transmission and distribution system equipment failure or malfunction are

25 discussed in Chapters 2.1 through 2.4, and Chapters 3.1 through 3.16 of this

26 report. The list below touches upon some of these:

27 • Vegetation Management (Chapter 2.1): Vegetation Management for

28   Operational Mitigations is a new transitional program which began 2023.

29   This program is intended to help reduce outages and potential ignitions

30   using a risk-informed, targeted plan to mitigate potential vegetation contacts

31   based on historic vegetation outages on Enhanced Powerline Safety

32   Setting-enabled circuits. The focus is on mitigating potential vegetation

33   contacts in Circuit Protection Zones that have experienced vegetation

34   caused outages.

1   Focused Tree Inspections is another new transitional program that began in
2   2023 stemming from the conclusion of the Enhanced Vegetation
3   Management Program. PG&E is developed Areas of Concern to better
4   focus Vegetation Management efforts to address high risk areas that have
5   experienced higher volumes of vegetation damage during Public Safety
6   Power Shutoff (PSPS) events, outages, and/or ignitions. These areas are
7   inspected by Vegetation Management Inspectors with a Tree Risk
8   Assessment Qualification which provides a higher level of rigor to the
9   inspection.

10   • <u>Downed Conductor Detection (DCD) (Chapter 2.1)</u>: To further mitigate high
11   impedance faults that can lead to ignitions, PG&E is piloting specific
12   distribution line reclosers utilizing advanced methods to detect and isolate
13   previously undetectable faults. This innovative solution is called DCD and
14   has been implemented on over 1,100 reclosing devices as of January 31,
15   2024. This technology uses sophisticated algorithms to determine when a
16   line-to-ground arc is present (i.e., electrical current flowing from one
17   conductive point to another) and the recloser will immediately de-energize
18   the line once detected. Although this technology is new, it has already
19   proven successful in detecting faults that would have otherwise been
20   undetectable. PG&E will continue to learn from these installations through
21   the 2024 wildfire season and expects to optimize and adjust this technology
22   to address system risks as needed.

23   • <u>Overhead (OH) Patrols and Inspections (Chapter 3.1)</u>: PG&E monitors the
24   condition of OH conductor through patrols and inspections consistent with
25   GO 165. Tags are created for abnormal conditions, including those that can
26   lead to a wire down. Work is prioritized in a risk-informed manner to
27   address the issues identified in the tags. In addition, PG&E has
28   implemented risk based aerial inspections using drones in targeted areas.
29   Drone inspections significantly improves our ability to assess deteriorated
30   conditions on the conductor.

31   • <u>Asset Inspection</u> (Chapter 3.3): Detailed inspections of overhead
32   transmission assets seek to proactively identify potential failure modes of
33   asset components which could create future wire down, outage, and/or
34   safety events if left unresolved or allowed to "run to failure." Detailed

inspections for transmission assets involve at least two detailed inspection methods per structure (ground and aerial), though not necessarily in the same calendar year which allows for staggered inspection methods across multiple years. Aerial inspections may be completed either by drone, helicopter, or aerial lift.

- Public Safety Power Shut Off (PSPS) (Chapter 3.13): PSPS is a wildfire mitigation strategy, first implemented in 2019, to reduce powerline ignitions during severe weather by proactively de-energizing powerlines (remove the risk of those powerlines causing an ignition) prior to forecasted wind events when humidity levels and fuel conditions are conducive to wildfires. PG&E's focus with the PSPS Program is to mitigate the risks associated with a catastrophic wildfire and to prioritize customer safety. In 2021, PG&E continued to make progress to its PSPS Program to mitigate wildfire risk, including updating meteorology models and scoping processes. In 2023, PG&E continued a multi-rear effort to install additional distribution sectionalizing devices, Fixed Power Solutions, and other mitigations targeted at reducing the risk of wildfire.

- Public Awareness Programs: Electric public awareness programs educate non-PG&E contractors and the public about power line safety and the hazards associated with wire down events and are intended to reduce the number of third-party electrical contacts. Outreach efforts include social media campaigns focused on increasing customer awareness of overhead lines, representation at local fire safe councils and community events and the automated customer notification system. Security improvements can include proactive equipment replacement, security measures and intrusion detection devices.

In addition, PG&E's 2023 WMP[4] also includes information regarding grid system hardening and enhancements to reduce the risk of wildfire.

The current and planned work activities for reducing the risk of the power generation hydroelectric system equipment failure or malfunction are below:

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[4] PG&E's 2023 Wildfire Mitigation Plan.

1 • <u>Power Generations Hydroelectric Programs</u>: Hydroelectric programs
2   include procedures for planning for unusual water releases, along with their
3   associated safety warnings.
4 • <u>Power Generation Compliance Programs</u>: Public Safety Plans are
5   published and routinely updated as required by PG&E hydroelectric facility
6   FERC licenses. FERC required Emergency Action Plans exist for all
7   significant and high hazards dams. The Plans are exercised annually with a
8   seminar and phone drill.
9 • <u>Hydro Facility Unusual Water Releases and Water Safety Warning Standard</u>
10   <u>and accompanying procedure</u>: Hydroelectric facility Unusual Water
11   Releases and Water Safety Warning documentation establishes Hydro
12   facility requirements for planning and making unusual water releases or high
13   flow events and their associated safety warnings. In addition, public safety
14   has distributed hydroelectric safety brochures that included dam safety,
15   water safety, and recreational safety information. The brochures notify the
16   recipient that they live near a hydroelectric facility in order to minimize
17   potential reaction time and encourage them to be aware of dangerous spring
18   flows. PG&E mailed brochures to 6,556 recipients for annual FERC
19   compliance in the spring of 2023.
20 • <u>PG&E Dam Safety Surveillance and Monitoring Program</u>: This program
21   establishes and defines PG&E's Dam Safety Surveillance and Monitoring
22   Program for the continued long-term safe and reliable operation of PG&E's
23   dams. Dam surveillance involves the collection of data by various means,
24   including inspections and instrumentation, whereas monitoring involves the
25   review of the collected data as obtained and over time for any adverse
26   trends.
27 • <u>Canals and Waterways Safety</u>: In 2022, PG&E Power Generation and
28   external public safety representatives successfully tested a new rope system
29   designed to enable members of the public who might accidentally fall into a
30   hydro canal to pull themselves out of danger. Since 2019, an additional
31   8.3 miles of barrier fencing has been installed along with
32   139 newly-designed escape ladders. In addition, 327 warning signs have
33   been posted, identifying the canal and specific GPS location.

Power Generation has also distributed safety information to property owners with canals that bisect their property. A canal entry emergency response plan has been published to guide efficient and timely communications between PG&E personnel and local first responders when responding to emergencies resulting from public entry into PG&E-owned water conveyance systems. PG&E mailed brochures to 1,062 recipients in late spring of 2023. Brochures included information to help people understand the dangers around canals and to help people prepare and plan for what to do in case of a safety emergency.

- Recreation safety posters are posted for recreation sites identified below time sensitive EAP dams. These recreation areas include campgrounds, river access, trails, and boat ramps. Recreation safety posters illustrate what to do in the event of a high flow event or dam safety emergency. Posters provide the public with information on inundation areas, warning signs of a dam safety emergency, safety precautions, and local agency emergency contacts in order to prevent, moderate, or alleviate the effects of an incident.

- Drowning hazard safety signs: In response to public safety concerns associated with specific locations, public safety personnel prepared unique drowning hazard safety signs that informed the public of potentially dangerous river currents and changing water levels. PG&E produced multiple signs that were posted at sites for public information. These signs included potential hazards and safety precautions.

    The current and planned work activities for reducing the risk enterprise-wide include:

- K- through 8th grade safety awareness education. In 2023, we continued our long-standing utility public safety awareness education initiative that offers various interactive and educational materials and programs for K-8 educators, their students, and students' families. These resources help educators increase student awareness of utility safety issues, including safety around hydroelectric facilities and waterways. The content of the materials provided to teachers are aligned with STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math) standards. These classroom materials are offered to districts and educators in all zip codes within PG&E's service territory. Educators are made aware of these resources using a blend of

direct mailing, and one-on-one conversations between company representatives and stakeholders. PG&E representatives make direct telephone calls to local school officials and educators to alert them to the availability of materials. PG&E has made additional phone calls to K- through 8th grade schools located within zip codes where PG&E hydroelectric facilities are located. Each of these schools is contacted up to six times to confirm that the schools have received PG&E's offer of educational classroom booklets and encourage stakeholders to use online educational resources that PG&E makes available on its dedicated Safe Kids website. In 2023, PG&E reached approximately 67,000 teachers and delivered educational materials for nearly 300,000 K-8 students and their families.

- Transportation Safety: PG&E Transportation Safety programs protect our employees and the public by establishing requirements and processes to control risks that can lead to motor vehicle accidents, improve safety performance, and increase awareness of all PG&E employees related to the operation of motor vehicles. This comprehensive program was established to reduce the number of motor vehicle incidents that have the potential for serious injury, including fatal injury, to PG&E's employees, staff augmentation employees operating vehicles on Company business, and the public. Driver performance data is used to identify specific risk drivers for targeted intervention, including driver training and implementing vehicle safety technology including the cellular phone blocking program currently in use with approximately 2,000 active users. The program has effectively suppressed over 335,000 texts and over 83,000 calls. Other programs include:

    - A Safe Driving policy and Driver Scorecard enhancement launched in August of 2023. Since then, 161 Action Plans have been initiated. Of those, 93 Action Plans have been completed.

    - The initiation of Smith Driving courses for apprentice and new hires including behind the wheel and close quarter maneuvering courses.

    - The retrofit of 568 trouble trucks with Brigade Birdseye External 360 Cameras technology. The cameras are designed to eliminate blind spots, where areas around the vehicle that are obscured to the driver by

bodywork or machinery, and provide the driver with the ability to see everything in the vehicle's path.

- Improvements to vehicle roll-over performance through targeted campaigns and by enabling "harsh cornering" monitoring using vehicle telematics.

PG&E's Transportation Safety Department also ensures compliance with federal DOT and California state regulations and requirements which emphasize public and employee safety.

- <u>Contractor Safety Programs</u>: Pre-qualification requirements for the PG&E Contractor Safety Program include a review of the 3-year history of Serious Safety Incidents (Life Altering/Life Threatening) affecting the public. This information must be updated annually. Additional information on the Contractor Safety program can be found in Chapter 1.2 of this report.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:

CHAPTER 2.1

SYSTEM AVERAGE INTERRUPTION

DURATION INDEX (SAIDI)

(UNPLANNED)

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
CHAPTER 2.1
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SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
CHAPTER 2.1
SYSTEM AVERAGE INTERRUPTION
DURATION INDEX (SAIDI)
(UNPLANNED)

The material updates to this chapter since the October 2, 2023, report can be found in Section B metric performance and Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

A. (2.1) Overview

1. Metric Definition

Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 2.1 – System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) (Unplanned) is defined as:

*SAIDI (Unplanned) = average duration of sustained interruptions per metered customer due to all unplanned outages, excluding on Major Event Days (MED), in a calendar year. "Average duration" is defined as: Sum of (duration of interruption * # of customer interruptions)/Total number of customers served. "Duration" is defined as: Customer hours of outages. Includes all transmission and distribution outages.*

2. Introduction of Metric

The measurement of SAIDI unplanned represents the amount of time the average Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) customer experiences a sustained outage or outages, defined as being without power for more than five minutes, each year. The SAIDI measurement does not include planned outages, which occur when PG&E deactivates power to safely perform system work. This metric is associated with risk of Asset Failure, which is associated with both utility reliability and safety. The metric measures outages due to all causes including impacts of various external factors, but excludes MED. It is an important industry-standard measure of reliability performance as it is a direct measure of a customer's electric reliability experience.

B. (2.1) Metric Performance

1. Historical Data (2013 – 2023)

PG&E has measured unplanned SAIDI for over 20 years; however, this report uses 2013-2023 unplanned SAIDI values for target analysis to align with the same timeframe used for the wire down SOMs metrics. 2013 was the first full year PG&E uniformly began measuring wire down events.

The Cornerstone program investments in 2013 involved both capacity and reliability projects, and PG&E experienced its best reliability performance in 2015. In 2015, SAIDI (unplanned and planned) was in second quartile when benchmarking with peer utilities.

Most of the 2017-2020 reliability investment was on Fault Location Isolation and Restoration (FLISR), which automatically isolates faulted line sections and then restores all other non-faulted sections in less than five minutes typically in urban/suburban areas. Of note, FLISR does not prevent customer interruptions but rather reduces the number of customers that experience a sustained (greater than five minutes) outage.

The targeted circuit program, distribution line fuse replacement, and installing reclosers in the worst performing areas are the initiatives that have had the biggest impact in improving system reliability at the lowest cost.

Other factors that contribute to reliability improvement include (but are not limited to) reliability project investments and project execution, favorable weather conditions, outage response and repair times, asset lifecycle and health, vegetation management (VM), and switching device locations and function (including disablement of reclosers to mitigate fire risk).

Reliability performance has consistently degraded since 2017 as PG&E's focus pivoted to wildfire risk prevention and mitigation, with a 45 percent unplanned SAIDI increase occurring in 2021 from 2020.

In 2021, Hot Line Tag, which was soon named Enhanced Powerline Safety Settings (EPSS) became an additional mitigation for wildfires. This was used in conjunction with PSPS. The EPSS on all protective devices feeding into HFRA areas were set very sensitively so they could quickly and automatically turn off power if a problem was detected on the line. This significant reduction in time for clearing a fault had come into conflict with normal utility practices of maintaining coordination between devices. Where

1   there was one device operating for an issue on the line, we now had multiple

2   devices leading to more customers out and worser reliability.

3   In 2022, PG&E added additional 800+ circuits and 2000+ devices to the

4   EPSS work. Additionally, PG&E has focused on optimizing the EPSS

5   settings and installing additional devices to make reliability better where

6   possible. In 2023, PG&E had over 1,000 circuits and 5,100 protective

7   devices that are EPSS enabled.

FIGURE 2.1-1
TRANSMISSION & DISTRIBUTION HISTORICAL UNPLANNED SAIDI PERFORMANCE
(2013-2023 NON-MED ONLY)

8   **2. Data Collection Methodology**

9   PG&E uses its outage database, typically referred to as its Integrated

10   Logging Information System (ILIS) – Operations Database and its Customer

11   Care and Billing database to obtain the customer count information to

12   calculate these metric results. It should also be noted that PG&E's outage

13   database includes distribution transformer level and above outages that

14   impact both metered customers and a smaller number of unmetered

15   customers. Outage information is entered into ILIS by distribution operators

16   based on information from field personnel and devices such as Supervisory

17   Control and Data Acquisition alarms and SmartMeter™ devices. PG&E last

1	upgraded its outage reporting tools in 2015 and integrated SmartMeter
2	information to identify potential outage reporting errors and to initiate a
3	subsequent review and correction.
4	PG&E uses the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
5	(IEEE) 1366 Standard titled IEEE Guide for Electric Power Distribution
6	Reliability Indices to define and apply excludable MED to measure the
7	performance of its electric system under normally expected operating
8	conditions. Its purpose is to allow major events to be analyzed apart from
9	daily operation and avoid allowing daily trends to be hidden by the large
10	statistical effect of major events. Per the Standard, the MED classification is
11	calculated from the natural log of the daily SAIDI values over the past
12	five years. The SAIDI index is used as the basis since it leads to consistent
13	results and is a good indicator of operational and design stress.

3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period

The unplanned SAIDI metric performance was 3.56 hours and finished the year the same as 2022. This is largely due to the following factors:

- Weather between January and March saw 53 significant storm days causing outages across PG&E territory and exhausted restoration resources to bring customers back online.

- To reduce ignition risk, PG&E implemented the Enhanced Powerline Safety Shutoff (EPSS) program in July 2021. This program enabled higher sensitivity settings on targeted circuits in High Fire Threat Districts (HFTD) to deenergize when tripped. .As Figure 2-1.3 shows below, the implementation of EPSS has significantly reduced ignitions in highest-risk wildfire months. One consequence of EPSS however, is that it contributes additional customer outage hours that are included in SOM 2.1.

Count of Reportable Ignitions in HFTD
2018-2023 August-October

1 • In addition to EPSS, the unplanned SAIDI metric has been impacted as
2   PG&E shifted away from traditional system reliability improvement work
3   and toward other wildfire risk reduction efforts, with reclose disablement
4   beginning in 2018, thereby reducing reliability and contributing to
5   increased customer outages. As such, 2022 and 2023 performance is
6   not directly comparable to years prior to 2018 as the operating
7   conditions have changed significantly and resulted in large
8   year-over-year changes.

9 **C. (2.1) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

10   **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

11   With the conclusion of 2023, the 1 and 5-year targets have been

12   adjusted to reflect a year's worth of results from the EPSS program (and a

13   complete fire season), as well as to account for any efficiencies that may be

14   gained. As year-over-year weather variables shift, targets will continue to be

1	adjusted in each subsequent report filing as PG&E continues to be able to
2	quantify the impacts of EPSS on Reliability performance.
3	The target for 2024 will be a target range of 3.71-5.73 hours.

2. **Target Methodology**

For 1-year and 5-year targets, PG&E is proposing a range for the SAIDI unplanned metric, primarily due to the continued high MED threshold, and the continuing variability of weather from year-to-year such as the storm events experienced in January, February, and March 2023.

First, EPSS settings were added to an additional 848 circuits in 2022 (compared to 170 in 2021) for a total of approximately 1,018 circuits.

Second, the MED threshold will now have an increased daily SAIDI value of 6.519, which is still up from 3.50 in 2021, which means typically more severe weather is required. This higher threshold makes it difficult for days of, or after, the storm to meet the MED classification. With that threshold higher, it will allow more storms to be counted towards the SAIDI metric, therefore moving the reliability metric upwards.

Finally, unpredictable variability in weather from year to year is also a consideration in target setting. For example, as of March 1, 2023, PG&E has experienced 29 storm days. Although 14 of the storm days are excluded in MEDs, 15 of the storms are not, and the widespread outages that occur before or after such storms can delay the response time of our crews. PG&E has not had such severe weather occur since 2008.

The 2024 lower range target of 3.71 reflects a 3 percent improvement from the average of 2022-2023 with additional minutes adjusted due to the MED threshold change from 5.033 to 6.519; the upper range target of 5.73, which reflects a 50 percent increase from that adjusted 2-year average to account for weather volatility.

The following factors were also considered in establishing targets:

- Historical Data and Trends: As 2021 was the first year of EPSS deployment and given the expansion of the program in 2022 and 2023, there is very little historical data to help guide in target setting.
- Benchmarking: PG&E is currently in the fourth quartile. At this time, targets are set based on operational and risk factors as opposed to only an aspirational quartile goal, although current quartile performance is

acknowledged as an indicator of PG&E's opportunity to improve for our customers over the long-run as risk reduction allows;

- Regulatory Requirements: None;
- Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and Enforcement: The target range for this metric is suitable for EOE as it accounts for our current work plan and the unknowns of EPSS; and
- Attainable With Known Resources/Work Plan: Based on 2023 results and the 2024 work plan, PG&E expects performance to fall within proposed target range. The lower limit of PG&E's proposed SOMs target (3.71 hours) reflects a 3 percent improvement from the adjusted 2-year average.
  - PG&E's top financial and resource priority of minimizing the risk of catastrophic wildfires has led to declining reliability performance and does not support an improvement of the unplanned SAIFI metric. This risk prioritized work plan does not support an improvement of the unplanned SAIDI metric. However, some of the wildfire hardening projects have reliability benefits for those customers in high risk areas. Those projects should reduce the frequency of outages experienced, in both the short and the long term. PG&E also has an allocated budget of an additional $7 million to support areas affected by EPSS by reducing customer impacted areas and resolving some of the asset health issues in those areas. As PG&E moves forward into 2024, our asset spending is to maintain reliability but looking further into 2025, PG&E is exploring an additional $19 million in spending on new gang-operated equipment that will coordinate more effectively with our currently available protective devices. This program will reduce customer impact during EPSS but could have future reliability benefits for non-HFTD areas.

FIGURE 2.1-4
HISTORICAL RELIABILITY SPEND (2010-2024)

Reliability Spend (Millions)
2010-2024

		The most significant driver of reliability performance is Equipment
1	–	The most significant driver of reliability performance is Equipment
2		Failure, specifically Overhead (OH) Conductor;
3	–	Current replacement rates from 2017-2023 have been on average
4		30 miles/year. This is significantly below the OH Conductor Asset
5		Management Plan, which cites third-party recommendations for
6		replacement rates at approximately 1200 miles per year to sustain
7		2016 levels of reliability performance;
8	–	Current investment profile in the GRC for OH Conductor is
9		approximately 70 miles/year. Alternative funding scenarios or
10		internal prioritization would be needed to increase replacement
11		miles per year;
12	–	Conductor replacement under the System Hardening program for
13		wildfire risk reduction is forecasted through the GRC period, but
14		provides limited additional benefit, at approximately 1 percent
15		(due to rural HFTD geography in which this work takes place);
16	–	Current allocated 2024 spending amount for targeted Reliability
17		improvements (MAT code 49X) is $10 million, which equates to an
18		approximate unplanned SAIDI reduction of 0.80 minutes;
19	–	Prior to the implementation of EPSS in July 2021, current levels of
20		investment and assuming the GRC forecast through 2026,
21		SAIDI/System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI)

performance was expected to remain in the third quartile and sustained improvement are not expected. With the EPSS implementation, performance fell and is expected to remain in the fourth quartile; and

- Other Considerations: PG&E expanded the 2022 EPSS program (as described earlier in this chapter) and began enablement on high-risk circuits in January 2022 representing and expanded fire season duration—all of which significantly impact expected SAIDI and SAIFI performance and targets.

3. **2024 Target**

Range: 3.71-5.73 hours.

The 2024 target reflects a range of a 3 percent improvement from PG&E's adjusted 2 year average of unplanned SAIDI target of (3.82) to a 50 percent increased unplanned SAIDI performance (5.73 hours) to account for the factors listed above.

In 2023 PG&E had 53 storm days that severely impacted the SAIDI and SAIFI unplanned metrics. The weather experienced between January to March 2023 has shown that metric can have some significant volatility depending the weather. Therefore, PG&E has maintained the upper range to a 50 percent increase target due to weather.

4. **2028 Target**

Range: 3.60-5.62 hours.

The end of 2023 marked the second set of yearly data with full EPSS in place which will provide PG&E more data to better inform future targets; the 2028 target range considers an improvement from a $19 million fuse saver program to be deployed mainly throughout the 2026 year where most benefits will potentially be seen in 2027.

Some of the other major consideration to this 2028 target is that weather similar to 2023 may occur again. PG&E will generally be striving to make year-over-year improvements and PG&E has set their 5-year target slightly lower than the 1-year target. This is mainly because atmospheric storms will be unpredictable and will have overwhelming impacts to the results. PG&E is predicting the MED threshold to be slightly greater in 2028 and SAIDI

1   between 4-6 minutes for each storm day will contribute significantly to

2   PG&E's overall unplanned SAIDI.

3 **D. (2.1) Performance Against Target**

4   **1. Progress Towards 1-Year Target**

5   As demonstrated in Figured 2.1-5 below, PG&E saw an unplanned

6   SAIDI result of 3.56 hours for 2023 results which was within the Company's

7   1-year target range of 3.45-5.34. This happens to be the same performance

8   as 2022.

9   **2. Progress Towards 5-Year Target**

10   As discussed in Section E below, PG&E has deployed or is deploying a

11   number of programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this

12   metric to meet the Company's 5-year performance target.

FIGURE 2.1-5
TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION
SAIDI UNPLANNED HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE AND TARGETS

13 **E. (2.1) Current and Planned Work Activities**

14   Existing Programs that could improve Reliability Metric Performance and

15   historical trend data for SAIDI are listed below.

16   • Vegetation Management: The EVM Program targeted OH distribution lines

17   in Tier 2 and 3 HFTD areas and supplemented PG&E's annual routine VM

2.1-10

1	work with California Public Utilities Commission mandated clearances. Our
2	EVM Program went above and beyond regulatory requirements for
3	distribution lines by expanding minimum clearances and removing
4	overhangs in HFTD areas. Due to the emergence of other wildfire mitigation
5	programs (namely EPSS and Undergrounding), the program was
6	discontinued in 2023. The trees that were identified as part of the program
7	and previous iterations and scopes will be worked down over the next
8	nine years under a program called Tree Removal Inventory (TRI), prioritized
9	by risk rank using our latest wildfire distribution risk model. The WMP has
10	commitments for this program of the removal of 15 thousand trees in 2023,
11	20 thousand trees in 2024, and 25 thousand trees in 2025.
12	VM for Operational Mitigations is a new transitional program which
13	began 2023 stemming from the conclusion of the EVM program. This
14	program is intended to help reduce outages and potential ignitions using a
15	risk-informed, targeted plan to mitigate potential vegetation contacts based
16	on historic vegetation outages on EPSS-enabled circuits. The focus is on
17	mitigating potential vegetation contacts in CPZs that have experienced
18	vegetation caused outages. Scope of Work is developed by using EPSS
19	and historical outage data and vegetation failure from the current WDRM
20	risk model. Vegetation outage extent of condition inspections conducted on
21	EPSS-enabled devices may generate additional tree work.
22	Focused Tree Inspections (FTI) is another new transitional program that
23	began in 2023 stemming from the conclusion of the EVM program. PG&E is
24	developed Areas of Concern (AOC) to better focus VM efforts to address
25	high risk areas that have experienced higher volumes of vegetation damage
26	during PSPS events, outages, and/or ignitions. These areas are inspected
27	by Vegetation Management Inspectors with a Tree Risk Assessment
28	Qualification (TRAQ) which provides a higher level of rigor to the inspection.
29	Please see Section 8.2, Vegetation Management and Inspections in
30	PG&E's WMP for additional details.
31	• Asset Replacement (Overhead/Underground): Overhead asset replacement
32	addresses deteriorated overhead conductor and switches, while
33	underground asset replacement primarily focuses on replacing underground
34	cable and switches.

1   Please see Chapter 4.11 Overhead and Underground Distribution

2   Maintenance in the 2023 GRC for additional details.

3   • <u>Grid Design and System Hardening</u>: PG&E's broader grid design program

4   covers a number of significant programs, called out in detail in PG&E's 2023

5   WMP. The largest of these programs is the System Hardening Program

6   which focuses on the mitigation of potential catastrophic wildfire risk caused

7   by distribution overhead assets. In 2023, we continued our system

8   hardening efforts by: completing 447 circuit miles of system hardening work

9   which includes overhead system hardening, undergrounding and removal of

10   overhead lines in HFTD or buffer zone areas; completing approximately

11   364 circuit miles of undergrounding work, including Butte County Rebuild

12   efforts and other distribution system hardening work. As we look beyond

13   2024, PG&E is targeting 250 miles of Underground and 70 miles of

14   OH/removal/remote grid to be completed in 2024 as part of the 10,000-Mile

15   Undergrounding Program. This system hardening work done at scale is

16   expected to have limited reliability benefit due rural HFTD geography, and is

17   prioritized to mitigate wildfire risk rather than reliability risk at this time.

18   Please see Section 7.3.3, Grid Design and System Hardening

19   Mitigations in PG&E's WMP for additional details.

20   • <u>Downed Conductor Detection</u>: To further mitigate high impedance faults

21   that can lead to ignitions, PG&E is piloting specific distribution line reclosers

22   utilizing advanced methods to detect and isolate previously undetectable

23   faults. This innovative solution is called Down Conductor Detection (DCD)

24   and has been implemented on over 1100 reclosing devices as of

25   January 31, 2024. This technology uses sophisticated algorithms to

26   determine when a line-to-ground arc is present (i.e., electrical current

27   flowing from one conductive point to another) and the recloser will

28   immediately de-energize the line once detected. Although this technology is

29   new, it has already proven successful in detecting faults that would have

30   otherwise been undetectable. PG&E will continue to learn from these

31   installations through the 2024 wildfire season and expects to optimize and

32   adjust this technology to address system risks as needed.

33   • <u>Animal Abatement</u>: The installation of new equipment or retrofitting of

34   existing equipment with protection measures intended to reduce animal

1   contacts. This includes avian protection on distribution and transmission

2   poles such as jumper covers, perch guards, or perching platforms.

3   Please see Chapter 4.11 Overhead and Underground Distribution

4   Maintenance in the 2023 GRC for additional details.

5   • <u>Overhead/Underground Critical Operating Equipment (COE) Replacement</u>

6   <u>Work</u>: The Overhead COE Program is comprised of corrective maintenance

7   of certain defined equipment—including Protective Devices (Reclosers,

8   Cutouts, Sectionalizers), Voltage Devices (Regulators, Boosters), Switches

9   (Switches, Disconnects), Capacitors, and Conductors—that plays an

10   important role in preventing customer interruptions.

11   Since COE Program is expected to address equipment as quickly as

12   possible, numbers for each device may change quickly upon reporting.[1]

13   Please see Chapter 4.11 Overhead and Underground Distribution

14   Maintenance in the 2023 GRC for additional details.

TABLE 2.1-2
TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION SAIDI PERFORMANCE DRIVER SUMMARY

SAIDI SUMMARY	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	5-Yr Ave	%
SYSTEM	126.5	148.8	153.2	218.2	255.8	255.9	180.5	-42%
3rd Party	20.6	22.8	26.4	28.8	31.0	29.1	25.9	-12%
Animal	6.4	6.2	6.9	10.5	16.3	10.4	9.3	-12%
Company Initiated	27.9	26.6	27.2	32.6	41.8	42.4	31.2	-36%
Environmental	3.7	2.8	4.1	8.9	6.7	6.8	5.2	-30%
Equipment Failure	43.3	48.0	54.8	73.7	82.4	83.5	60.4	-38%
Unknown Cause	9.9	12.9	14.3	34.2	41.7	36.8	22.6	-63%
Vegetation	14.7	22.4	15.4	22.4	28.0	39.5	20.6	-92%
Wildfire Mitigation	0.0	7.1	4.1	7.0	7.9	7.4	5.2	-41%

Note: The data in this table is subject to change based on continuing review of prior period outages. Any changes are reflected in PG&E's March 2024 report. Table includes planned outages.

_____

[1]   Information on COE equipment can be provided upon request.

TABLE 2.1-3
ANNUAL EPSS CIRCUIT SAIDI SUMMARY (2018-Q2 2023)

Line No.	SAIDI	Non-EPSS Circuit	EPSS Circuit
1	2018	48.7	51.1
2	2019	56.8	60.9
3	2020	65.0	60.9
4	2021	78.5	104.3
5	2022	93.6	119.9
6	2023	81.8	132.0

_____

Note: PG&E provides a monthly EPSS report to the CPUC that includes Customer Minutes (CMIN) and customers experiencing sustained outage (CESO) that can calculate SAIDI/CAIDI/SAIFI.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:

CHAPTER 2.2

SYSTEM AVERAGE INTERRUPTION FREQUENCY (SAIFI)

(UNPLANNED)

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
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SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
CHAPTER 2.2
SYSTEM AVERAGE INTERRUPTION FREQUENCY (SAIFI)
(UNPLANNED)

The material updates to this chapter since the October 2, 2023, report can be found in Section B concerning metric performance and Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

A. (2.2) Overview

1. Metric Definition

Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 2.2 – System Average Interruption Frequency (SAIFI)(Unplanned) is defined as:

SAIFI (Unplanned) = average frequency of sustained interruptions due to all unplanned outages per metered customer, except on Major Event Days (MED), in a calendar year. "Average frequency" is defined as: Total # of customer interruptions/Total # of customers served. Includes all transmission and distribution outages.

2. Introduction of Metric

The measurement of SAIFI unplanned represents the number of instances the average Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) customer experiences a sustained outage or outages, defined as being without power for more than five minutes, each year. The System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI) measurement does not include planned outages, which occur when PG&E deactivates power to safely perform system work. This metric is associated with the risk of Asset Failure, which is associated with both utility reliability and safety. The metric measures outages due to all causes but excludes MED. It is an important industry-standard measure of reliability performance as it is a direct measure of the frequency of outages a customer experiences.

B. (2.2) Metric Performance

1. Historical Data (2013 – 2023)

PG&E has measured unplanned SAIFI for over 20 years; however, this report uses 2013 to 2023 unplanned SAIFI values for target analysis to align with the same timeframe used for the wire down SOMs metrics. 2013 was the first full year PG&E uniformly began measuring wire down events.

The Cornerstone program investments in 2013 involved both capacity and reliability projects, and PG&E experienced its best reliability performance in 2015. In 2015, SAIFI (unplanned and planned) was in second quartile when benchmarking with peer utilities.

Most of the 2017-20 reliability investment was on Fault Location Isolation and Service Restoration (FLISR), which automatically isolates faulted line sections and then restores all other non-faulted sections in less than 5 minutes typically in urban/suburban areas. Of note, FLISR does not prevent customer interruptions but rather reduces the number of customers that experience a sustained (greater than five minutes) outage.

The targeted circuit program, distribution line fuse replacements and installing reclosers in the worst performing areas are initiatives that have had the biggest impact in improving system reliability at the lowest cost.

Other factors that contribute to reliability improvement include (but are not limited to) reliability project investments and project execution, favorable weather conditions, outage response and repair time, vegetation management (VM), and switching device locations and function (including disablement of reclosers to mitigate fire risk).

Reliability performance has consistently degraded since 2017 as PG&E's focus pivoted to wildfire risk prevention and mitigation, with a 25 percent unplanned SAIFI increase occurring in 2022 from 2021.

In 2021, Hot Line Tag, which was soon named Enhanced Powerline Safety Settings (EPSS) became an additional mitigation for wildfires. This was used in conjunction with Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS). The EPSS on all protective devices feeding into HFRA areas were set very sensitively so they could quickly and automatically turn off power if a problem was detected on the line. This significant reduction in time for

1   clearing a fault had come into conflict with normal utility practices of

2   maintaining coordination between devices. Where there was one device

3   operating for an issue on the line, we now had multiple devices leading to

4   more customers out and worser reliability.

5   In 2022, PG&E added additional 800+ circuits and 2000+ devices to the

6   EPSS work. Additionally, PG&E has focused on optimizing the EPSS

7   settings and installing additional devices to make reliability better where

8   possible. In 2023, PG&E had over 1000 circuits and 5100 protective

9   devices that are EPSS enabled.

FIGURE 2.2-1
TRANSMISSION & DISTRIBUTION HISTORICAL UNPLANNED SAIFI PERFORMANCE
(2013-2023 NON-MEDS ONLY)

10   **2. Data Collection Methodology**

11   PG&E uses its outage database, typically referred to as its Integrated

12   Logging Information System (ILIS) – Operations Database and its Customer

13   Care & Billing database to obtain the customer count information to

14   calculate these metric results. It should also be noted that PG&E's outage

database includes distribution transformer level and above outages that impact both metered customers and a smaller number of unmetered customers. Outage information is entered into ILIS by distribution operators based on information from field personnel and devices such as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition alarms and SmartMeters™.   PG&E last upgraded its outage reporting tools in 2015 and integrated SmartMeter information to identify potential outage reporting errors and to initiate a subsequent review and correction.

PG&E uses the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 1366 Standard titled IEEE Guide for Electric Power Distribution Reliability Indices to define and apply excludable MEDs to measure the performance of its electric system under normally expected operating conditions. Its purpose is to allow major events to be analyzed apart from daily operation and avoid allowing daily trends to be hidden by the large statistical effect of major events. Per the Standard, the MED classification is calculated from the natural log of the daily System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) values over the past five years by reliability specialists. The SAIDI index is used as the basis since it leads to consistent results and is a good indicator of operational and design stress.

3. **Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

The unplanned SAIFI metric performance was 1.402 and was slightly better than the 2023 one-year target of 1.426 – 2.205. Even though 2023 performance was slightly lower than the 2022 performance, the 2023 performance result is still higher than previous years due to the following factors:

- To reduce ignition risk, PG&E implemented the Enhanced Powerline Safety Shutoff (EPSS) program in July 2021. This program enabled higher sensitivity settings on targeted circuits in High Fire Threat Districts (HFTD) to deenergize when tripped.   As Figure 2-2.2 shows below, the implementation of EPSS has significantly reduced ignitions in highest-risk wildfire months.

1   • In addition to EPSS, the unplanned SAIFI metric has been impacted as
2   PG&E shifted away from traditional system reliability improvement work
3   and more toward other wildfire risk reduction efforts, starting with
4   recloser disablement in 2018. As such 2022 and 2023 performance is
5   not directly comparable to years prior to 2018 as the operating
6   conditions have changed significantly and resulted in large
7   year-over-year changes.

8 **C. (2.2) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

9 **1.   Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

10   With the conclusion of 2023, the 1- and 5-Year targets have been
11   adjusted to reflect a year's worth of results from the EPSS program (and a
12   complete fire season), as well as to account for any efficiencies that may be
13   gained. As year-over-year weather variables shift, we expect that targets

1 will be adjusted in subsequent reports as PG&E continues to be able to

2 quantify the impacts of EPSS on Reliability performance.

3   The target for 2024 will be a target range of 1.435-2.219.

4 **2. Target Methodology**

5   For 1-year and 5-year targets, PG&E is proposing a range for the SAIFI

6 unplanned metric, primarily due to the vast expansion of the EPSS program

7 in 2022 to reduce wildfire risk, the continued high MED threshold, and the

8 continuing variability of weather from year-to-year such as the storm events

9 experienced in January, February, and March 2023. The target calculation

10 is described in Section C.3 below.

11   First, EPSS settings were added to an additional 848 circuits in 2022

12 (compared to 170 in 2021) for a total of approximately 1,018 circuits.

13 Additionally, PG&E has focused on optimizing the EPSS settings and

14 installing additional devices to make reliability better where possible. In

15 2023, PG&E had over 1000 circuits and 5100 protective devices that are

16 EPSS enabled.

17   Second, the MED threshold will now have an increased daily SAIDI

18 value of 6.519, which is still up from 3.50 in 2021, which means typically

19 more severe weather is required. This higher threshold makes it difficult for

20 days of, or after, the storm to meet the MED classification. With that

21 threshold higher, it will allow more storms to be counted towards the SAIFI

22 metric, therefore moving the reliability metric upwards.

23   Finally, unpredictable variability in weather from year to year is also a

24 consideration in target setting. For example, as of March 1, 2023, PG&E

25 has experienced 29 storm days. Although 14 of the storm days are

26 excluded in MEDs, 15 of the storms are not, and the widespread outages

27 that occur before or after such storms can delay the response time of our

28 crews. PG&E has not had such severe weather occur since 2008.

29 The following factors were also considered in establishing targets:

30 • <u>Historical Data and Trends</u>: As 2021 was the first year of EPSS deployment

31 and given the expansion of the program in 2022 and 2023, there is very little

32 historical data to help guide in target setting.

1 • <u>Benchmarking</u>: PG&E is currently in the fourth quartile. At this time, targets
2 are set based on operational and risk factors as opposed to only an
3 aspirational quartile goal, although current quartile performance is
4 acknowledged as an indicator of PG&E's opportunity to improve for our
5 customers over the long-run as risk reduction allows;

6 • <u>Regulatory Requirements</u>: None;

7 • <u>Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and</u>
8 <u>Enforcement</u>: The target range for this metric is suitable for EOE as it
9 accounts for our current work plan and the unknowns of EPSS;

10 • <u>Attainable With Known Resources/Work Plan</u>: Based on 2023 results and
11 2024 work plan, PG&E expects performance to fall within the proposed
12 target range. The lower limit of PG&E's proposed SOMs target (1.435)
13 reflects a 3 percent improvement from the average of 2022-2023
14 performance with an adjustment due to the MED threshold change. Factors
15 driving this expectation are as follows:

16 − PG&E's top financial and resource priority of minimizing the risk of
17 catastrophic wildfires has led to declining reliability performance and
18 does not support an improvement of the unplanned SAIFI metric.
19 However, some of the wildfire hardening projects have reliability
20 benefits for those customers in high risk areas. Those projects should
21 reduce the frequency of outages experienced, in both the short and the
22 long term. PG&E also has an allocated budget of an additional
23 $7 million to support areas affected by EPSS by reducing customer
24 impacted areas and resolving some of the asset health issues in those
25 areas. As PG&E moves forward into 2024, our asset spending is to
26 maintain reliability but looking further into 2025, PG&E is exploring an
27 additional $19 million in spending on new gang-operated equipment
28 that will coordinate more effectively with our currently available
29 protective devices. This program will reduce customer impact during
30 EPSS but could have future reliability benefits for non-HFTD areas.

FIGURE 2.2-3
RELIABILITY SPEND 2010 – 2024

Reliability Spend (Millions)
2010-2024

1   –   The most significant driver of reliability performance is Equipment

2   Failure, specifically Overhead Conductor;

3   –   Current replacement rates from 2017-2023 have been on average

4   30 miles/year. This is significantly below the Overhead Conductor

5   Asset Management Plan, which cites third-party recommendations for

6   replacement rates at approximately 1,200 miles per year to sustain

7   2016 levels of reliability performance;

8   –   Current investment profile in the GRC for OH Conductor is

9   approximately 70 miles/year. Alternative funding scenarios or internal

10   prioritization would be needed to increase replacement miles per year;

11   –   Conductor replacement under the System Hardening program for

12   wildfire risk reduction is forecasted through the GRC period but

13   provides limited additional benefit, at approximately 1 percent (due to

14   the rural HFTD geography in which this work takes place);

15   –   Current assigned 2024 GRC spending amount for targeted Reliability

16   improvements (MAT Code 49X) is $10 million, which equates to an

17   approximate unplanned SAIFI reduction of 0.004 minutes;

18   –   Prior to the implementation of EPSS in July 2021, current levels of

19   investment and assuming the GRC forecast through 2026, SAIDI/SAIFI

20   performance was expected to remain in the third quartile and sustained

21   improvement trending are not expected. With the EPSS

1	implementation, performance fell and is expected to remain in the fourth
2	quartile; and
3	• Other Considerations: PG&E expanded the EPSS program in 2022 (as
4	described earlier in this chapter) and began enablement on high-risk circuits
5	in January-representing and expanded fire season—all of which significantly
6	impact SAIDI and SAIFI performance.
7	**3. 2024 Target**
8	Range: 1.435-2.219
9	The 2024 target reflects a range of a 3 percent improvement from the
10	average of 2022-2023 with an adjustment due to the MED threshold change
11	from 5.033 to 6.519 (1.479) to a 50 percent increased unplanned SAIFI
12	performance (2.219) to account for the factors listed above.
13	**4. 2028 Target**
14	Range: 1.406-2.174
15	The end of 2023 marked the second set of yearly data with full EPSS in
16	place which will provide PG&E more data to better inform future targets; the
17	2028 target range considers an improvement from a $19M fuse saver
18	program to be deployed mainly throughout the 2026 year where most
19	benefits will potentially be seen in 2027.
20	Some of the other major consideration to this 2028 target is that weather
21	similar to 2023 may occur again. PG&E will generally be striving to make
22	year-over-year improvements and PG&E has set their 5 year target slightly
23	lower than the 1 year target. This is mainly because atmospheric storms will
24	be unpredictable and will have overwhelming impacts to the results. PG&E
25	is predicting the MED threshold to be slightly greater in 2028 and SAIFI on
26	each storm day will contribute significantly to PG&E's overall unplanned
27	SAIFI.
28	**D. (2.2) Performance Against Target**
29	**1. Progress Towards the 1-Year Target**
30	As demonstrated in Figured 2.2-4 below, PG&E saw an unplanned
31	SAIFI result of 1.402 for 2023 which was below the Company's 2023 target
32	range of 1.426 – 2.205. This performance is slightly better than 2022.

1　　**2. Progress Towards the 5-Year Target**

2　　　　As discussed in Section E below, PG&E has deployed or is deploying a

3　　number of programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this

4　　metric to meet the Company's 5-year performance target.

FIGURE 2.2-4
TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION SAIFI
UNPLANNED HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE AND TARGETS

T&D SAIFI Unplanned
Historical Performance and Targets

5　　**E. (2.2) Current and Planned Work Activities**

6　　　　Existing Programs that could improve Reliability Metric Performance and

7　　historical trend data for SAIFI are listed below.

8　　• Vegetation Management: The EVM Program targeted OH distribution lines

9　　　in Tier 2 and 3 HFTD areas and supplemented PG&E's annual routine VM

10　　　work with California Public Utilities Commission mandated clearances. Our

11　　　EVM Program went above and beyond regulatory requirements for

12　　　distribution lines by expanding minimum clearances and removing

13　　　overhangs in HFTD areas. Due to the emergence of other wildfire mitigation

14　　　programs (namely EPSS and Undergrounding), the program was

15　　　discontinued in 2023. The trees that were identified as part of the program

16　　　and previous iterations and scopes will be worked down over the next nine

17　　　years under a program called Tree Removal Inventory, prioritized by risk

2.2-10

rank using our latest Wildfire Distribution Risk Model (WDRM). The WMP has commitments for this program of the removal of 15K trees in 2023, 20K trees in 2024, and 25K trees in 2025.

VM for Operational Mitigations is a new transitional program which began 2023 stemming from the conclusion of the EVM program. This program is intended to help reduce outages and potential ignitions using a risk-informed, targeted plan to mitigate potential vegetation contacts based on historic vegetation outages on EPSS-enabled circuits. The focus is on mitigating potential vegetation contacts in Circuit Protection Zones that have experienced vegetation caused outages. Scope of Work is developed by using EPSS and historical outage data and vegetation failure from the current WDRM risk model. Vegetation outage extent of condition inspections conducted on EPSS-enabled devices may generate additional tree work.

 Focused Tree Inspections (FTI) is another new transitional program that began in 2023 stemming from the conclusion of the EVM program. PG&E is developed Areas of Concern (AOC) to better focus VM efforts to address high risk areas that have experienced higher volumes of vegetation damage during PSPS events, outages, and/or ignitions. These areas are inspected by Vegetation Management Inspectors with a Tree Risk Assessment Qualification (TRAQ) which provides a higher level of rigor to the inspection.

Please see Section 8.2, Vegetation Management, and Inspections in PG&E's WMP for additional details.

- Asset Replacement (Overhead, Underground): Overhead asset replacement addresses deteriorated overhead conductor and switches, while underground asset replacement primarily focuses on replacing underground cable and switches.

Please see Chapter 4.11 Overhead and Underground Distribution Maintenance in the 2023 GRC for additional details.

- Grid Design and System Hardening: PG&E's broader grid design program covers a number of significant programs, called out in detail in PG&E's 2023 WMP. The largest of these programs is the System Hardening Program which focuses on the mitigation of potential catastrophic wildfire risk caused

1   by distribution overhead assets. In 2023, we continued our system
2   hardening efforts by: completing 447 circuit miles of system hardening work
3   which includes overhead system hardening, undergrounding and removal of
4   overhead lines in HFTD or buffer zone areas; completing approximately 364
5   circuit miles of undergrounding work, including Butte County Rebuild efforts
6   and other distribution system hardening work. As we look beyond 2024,
7   PG&E is targeting 250 miles of Underground and 70 miles of
8   OH/removal/remote grid to be completed in 2024 as part of the 10,000 Mile
9   Undergrounding program. This system hardening work done at scale is
10 expected to have limited reliability benefit due rural HFTD geography, and is
11 prioritized to mitigate wildfire risk rather than reliability risk at this time.

12   Please see Section 7.3.3, Grid Design and System Hardening
13 Mitigations in PG&E's WMP for additional details.

14 • Downed Conductor Detection: To further mitigate high impedance faults
15   that can lead to ignitions, PG&E is piloting specific distribution line reclosers
16   utilizing advanced methods to detect and isolate previously undetectable
17   faults. This innovative solution is called Down Conductor Detection (DCD)
18   and has been implemented on over 1100 reclosing devices as of January
19   31, 2024. This technology uses sophisticated algorithms to determine when
20   a line-to-ground arc is present (i.e., electrical current flowing from one
21   conductive point to another) and the recloser will immediately de-energize
22   the line once detected. Although this technology is new, it has already
23   proven successful in detecting faults that would have otherwise been
24   undetectable. PG&E will continue to learn from these installations through
25   the 2024 wildfire season and expects to optimize and adjust this technology
26   to address system risks as needed.

27 • Animal Abatement: The installation of new equipment or retrofitting of
28   existing equipment with protection measures intended to reduce animal
29   contacts. This includes avian protection on distribution and transmission
30   poles such as jumper covers, perch guards, or perching platforms.

31   Please see Chapter 4.11 Overhead and Underground Distribution
32 Maintenance in the 2023 GRC for additional details.

1   •   <u>Overhead/Underground Critical Operating Equipment (COE) Replacement</u>
2   <u>Work</u>: The Overhead COE Program is comprised of corrective maintenance
3   of certain defined equipment—including Protective Devices (Reclosers,
4   Cutouts, Sectionalizers), Voltage Devices (Regulators, Boosters), Switches
5   (Switches, Disconnects), Capacitors, and Conductors—that plays an
6   important role in preventing customer interruptions. Since COE Program is
7   expected to address equipment as quickly as possible, numbers for each
8   device may change quickly upon reporting.[1] Please see Chapter 4.11
9   Overhead and Underground Distribution Maintenance in the 2023 GRC for
10   additional details.

FIGURE 2.2-6
SAIFI PERFORMANCE DRIVERS HISTORICAL DATA

| SAIFI SUMMARY	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	5-Yr Ave	%
SYSTEM	1.080	1.128	1.178	1.318	1.630	1.558	1.267	-23%
3rd Party	0.216	0.201	0.220	0.233	0.250	0.240	0.224	-7%
Animal	0.070	0.068	0.076	0.079	0.125	0.103	0.084	-23%
Company Initiated	0.154	0.146	0.153	0.175	0.227	0.214	0.171	-25%
Environmental	0.027	0.021	0.020	0.026	0.026	0.025	0.024	-5%
Equipment Failure	0.399	0.405	0.435	0.487	0.556	0.525	0.456	-15%
Unknown Cause	0.115	0.134	0.174	0.196	0.273	0.262	0.179	-47%
Vegetation	0.100	0.131	0.086	0.095	0.142	0.160	0.111	-44%
Wildfire Mitigation	0.000	0.022	0.014	0.025	0.032	0.030	0.019	-58%

Note: The data in this table is subject to change based on continuing review of prior period outages.
Any changes are reflected in PG&E's March 2024 report. Table includes planned outages.

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[1]   Information on COE equipment can be provided upon request.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:

CHAPTER 2.3

SYSTEM AVERAGE OUTAGES DUE TO VEGETATION AND

EQUIPMENT DAMAGE IN HFTD AREAS

(MAJOR EVENT DAYS)

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
CHAPTER 2.3
SYSTEM AVERAGE OUTAGES DUE TO VEGETATION AND EQUIPMENT
DAMAGE IN HFTD AREAS
(MAJOR EVENT DAYS)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
CHAPTER 2.3
SYSTEM AVERAGE OUTAGES DUE TO VEGETATION AND
EQUIPMENT DAMAGE IN HFTD AREAS
(MAJOR EVENT DAYS)

The material updates to this chapter since the October 2, 2023, report can be found in Section B concerning metric performance and D concerning performance against targets. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

A. (2.3) Overview

1. Metric Definition

Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 2.3 – System Average Outages Due to Vegetation and Equipment Damage in HFTD Areas (Major Event Days) is defined as:

Average number of sustained outages on Major Event Days (MED) per 100 circuit miles in High Fire Threat District (HFTD) per metered customer, in a calendar year, where each sustained outage is defined as. total number of customers interrupted / total number of customers served.

2. Introduction of Metric

The measurement of System Average Outages due to Vegetation and Equipment Damage in HFTD areas on MEDs is tied to the public safety risk of Asset Failure. While Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E or the Company) traditionally does not measure Customers Experiencing Sustained Outages (CESO) on MEDs only, CESO is an important industry-standard measure of reliability performance as it a direct measure of outage frequency.

B. (2.3) Metric Performance

1. Historical Data (2013 – 2023)

PG&E has measured CESO for over 20 years, however this report uses 2013 to 2023 CESO values for target analysis to align with the same timeframe used for the wire down SOMs metrics (2013 was the first full year PG&E uniformly began measuring wire down events).

1   The Cornerstone program investments in 2013 involved both capacity

2   and reliability projects, and PG&E experienced its best reliability

3   performance in 2015. While this metric is not benchmarkable, in 2015

4   System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI) (unplanned and

5   planned) was in second quartile when benchmarking with peer utilities.

6   The majority of the 2017-2020 investment was on Fault Location

7   Isolation and Restoration (FLISR), which automatically isolates faulted line

8   sections and then restores all other non-faulted sections in less than

9   five minutes typically in urban/suburban areas. Of note, FLISR does not

10   prevent customer interruptions but rather reduces the number of customers

11   that experience a sustained (> 5 minutes) outage.

12   The targeted circuit program, distribution line fuse replacement, and

13   installing reclosers in the worst performing areas are initiatives that have

14   had the biggest impact in improving system reliability at the lowest cost.

15   Other factors that contribute to reliability improvement include (but not

16   limited to) project investments and project execution, favorable weather

17   conditions, response to outages, asset lifecycle and health, Vegetation

18   Management (VM), switching device locations and function (including

19   disablement of reclosers to mitigate fire risk).

20   The current investment/work plan is heavily weighted towards wildfire

21   mitigation and is not weighted towards improving reliability performance.

22   PG&E's top financial and resource priority of minimizing the risk of

23   catastrophic wildfires has led to declining reliability performance and does

24   not support an improvement of this metric.

FIGURE 2.3-1
RELIABILITY SPEND HISTORICAL DATA 2010 – 2024

Reliability Spend (Millions)
2010-2024

(Line chart showing reliability spend in millions from 2010 to 2024 forecast. Values start near $87M in 2010, peak around $135M in 2011, $120.5M in 2012, $130M in 2013, then decline sharply to about $47M in 2014, $38M in 2015, rise to $52M in 2016, then decline through $30M in 2017, $20M in 2018, $10M in 2019, $2M in 2020, $5M in 2021, $8M in 2022, $24M in 2023, and $25M in 2024 forecast. Y-axis ranges from $0.5 to $140.5.)

1   Reliability performance has consistently degraded since 2017 as

2   PG&E's focus pivoted to wildfire risk prevention and mitigation, with a

3   50 percent CESO increase occurring in 2022 from 2021.

FIGURE 2.3-2
TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION
VEGETATION AND EQUIPMENT FAILURE CESO HISTORICAL DATA
(MED ONLY, 2013 – 2023)

Veg and EQ Failure CESO/100 T&D Miles
MED Only 2013-2023

(Line chart showing Actual values: 2013: 281, 2014: 381, 2015: 501, 2016: 321, 2017: 1806, 2018: 158, 2019: 1545, 2020: 192, 2021: 643, 2022: 133, 2023: 610. Y-axis ranges from 0 to 2000.)

Actual

_____

Note: The data in this figure is subject to change based on continuing review of prior period
        information. Any changes are reflected in PG&E's March 2024 report.

FIGURE 2.3-3
TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION VEGETATION CESO HISTORICAL DATA
(MED ONLY 2013-2023)

T&D Vegetation CESO/100 T&D Miles (HFTD only)
MED 2013-2023

Note: The data in this figure is subject to change based on continuing review of prior period information. Any changes are reflected in PG&E's March 2024 report.

FIGURE 2.3-4
TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION
OVERHEAD/UNDERGROUND EQUIPMENT FAILURE CESO HISTORICAL DATA
(MED ONLY 2013-2023)

Transmission & Distribution Overhead/Underground EQ Failure
CESO/100 T&D Miles (HFTD only) MED 2013-2023

Note: The data in this table is subject to change based on continuing review of prior period information. Any changes are reflected in PG&E's March 2024 report.

TABLE 2.3-1
ANNUAL MAJOR EVENT DAYS (2013-2023)

2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
4	5	10	3	30	7	31	14	25	5	20

_____

Note: The data in this table is subject to change based on continuing review of prior period outages. Any changes are reflected in PG&E's March 2024 report.

1   **2.   Data Collection Methodology**

2   PG&E uses its outage database, typically referred to as its Integrated

3   Logging Information System (ILIS) – Operations Database and its Customer

4   Care & Billing database to obtain the customer count information to

5   calculate these metric results. It should also be noted that PG&E's outage

6   database includes distribution transformer level and above outages that

7   impact both metered customers and a smaller number of unmetered

8   customers. Outage information is entered into ILIS by distribution operators

9   based on information from field personnel and devices such as Supervisory

10   Control and Data Acquisition alarms and SmartMeter™ devices. PG&E last

11   upgraded its outage reporting tools in 2015 and integrated SmartMeter™

12   information to identify potential outage reporting errors and to initiate a

13   subsequent review and correction.

14   PG&E traditionally excludes MEDs from Reliability measures per the

15   Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 1366 Standard titled

16   IEEE Guide for Electric Power Distribution Reliability Indices to define and

17   apply excludable MED to measure the performance of its electric system

18   under normally expected operating conditions. Its purpose is to allow major

19   events to be analyzed apart from daily operation and avoid allowing daily

20   trends to be hidden by the large statistical effect of major events. Per the

21   Standard, the MED classification is calculated from the natural log of the

22   daily System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) values over the

23   past five years by reliability specialists. The SAIDI index is used as the

24   basis since it leads to consistent results and is a good indicator of

25   operational and design stress.

26   There is a total of approximately 33,474 transmission and distribution

27   (overhead and underground) circuit miles located in the Tier 2 and Tier 3

1   HFTD areas. PG&E's databases reflect the circuit miles that currently exist

2   and do not maintain the historical values specifically in the Tier 2/3 HFTD

3   areas. As such, we assumed the circuit miles have remained the same for

4   all years from 2013 through 2022. Beginning 2023 PG&E will report the

5   nominally updated circuit mileage total annually.

6   Due to data limitations, PG&E uses the Lat/Long of the operating device

7   as a proxy for determining the distribution outage events that occurred in the

8   Tier 2/3 HFTD areas.

9   **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

10   The number of vegetation and equipment failure related customer

11 outages per 100 transmission and distribution line miles during MEDs has

12 varied each year and has been heavily driven by not just the number, but by

13 the severity of the MED experienced in that specific year (refer to table

14 above). 2021 performance increased by 235 percent from 2020 and

15 experienced nine more MEDs, largely due to historic snowstorms that

16 occurred in December. Due to the increase in the MED threshold, 2022

17 experienced 20 fewer MEDs than 2021. Other performance spikes were

18 experienced in 2017 and 2019, with both years also experiencing a high

19 number of MEDs. Lastly, the number of MED in 2023 has risen from 2022

20 and 2023 weather was more similar to 2019 and 2021. Given the

21 randomness of weather patterns, no discernable trends can be learned from

22 historical performance results.

23   The performance for the metric is 610 for 2023. This is higher than

24 2022 performance because 2022 did not have as many MEDs but the 2023

25 performance was very similar to 2021 results.

26 **C. (2.3) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

27 **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

28   There have been no changes to the directional 1 and 5-Year Targets

29 since the SOMs report filing.

30 **2. Target Methodology**

31 • Directional Only: Maintain (stay within historical range, and assumes

32   response stays the same in events).

When normalized based on the number of MEDs per year, this metric shows improved performance. However, this metric measures the average number of customers impacted per 100 miles and will increase due the additional Enhanced Powerline Safety Settings (EPSS) settings that were deployed in 2022 as EPSS contributes to more MEDs. Performance is expected to remain within historical range.

In addition, the MED threshold increased from a daily SAIDI value of 3.50 in 2021 to 5.04 in 2022. In 2024, the MED threshold increases to 6.519. This new threshold will equate to fewer MEDs in 2024 compared to previous years.

The following factors were also considered in establishing targets:

- Historical Data and Trends: No discernable trends can be learned from historical performance results given the randomness of weather patterns;

- Benchmarking: While this metric is not benchmarkable, PG&E is currently in the fourth quartile in SAIFI performance;

- Regulatory Requirements: None;

- Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and Enforcement (EOE): The directional target for this metric is suitable for EOE as it states we are to remain within historical performance range while accounting for the randomness of weather patterns and impacts of climate change;

- Attainable With Known Resources/Work Plan: Based on 2023 results and variability in weather patterns, performance expected to be within historical range; and

- Other Considerations: Given the difficulty in predicting when PG&E areas will experience fire risk conditions, EPSS settings may be activated for a significantly longer period than the currently estimated fire season of June through November—leading to a greater than anticipated impact on reliability performance.

D. (2.3) Performance Against Target

1. Deviation From the 1-Year Target

As demonstrated in Figure 2.3-2 above, PG&E experienced 20 MEDs in 2023 and 2023 performance remains in historical bounds. The performance result for was 610, which is higher than 2022 results only because the 2022 year did not have many MEDs. 2023 results are however within the bounds of what PG&E historically had seen before.

2. Progress Towards the 5-Year Target

As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is deploying a number of programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this metric to align with the Company's 5-year directional performance target.

E. (2.3) Current and Planned Work Activities

Existing Programs that could improve Reliability Metric Performance are listed below.

- Vegetation Management: The Enhanced Vegetation Management (EVM) Program targeted OH distribution lines in Tier 2 and 3 HFTD areas and supplemented PG&E's annual routine VM work with California Public Utilities Commission mandated clearances. Our EVM Program went above and beyond regulatory requirements for distribution lines by expanding minimum clearances and removing overhangs in HFTD areas. Due to the emergence of other wildfire mitigation programs (namely EPSS and Undergrounding), the program was discontinued in 2023. The trees that were identified as part of the program and previous iterations and scopes will be worked down over the next nine years under a program called Tree Removal Inventory, prioritized by risk rank using our latest Wildfire Distribution Risk Model (WDRM). The WMP has commitments for this program of the removal of 15 thousand trees in 2023, 20 thousand trees in 2024, and 25 thousand trees in 2025.

    VM for Operational Mitigations is a new transitional program which began 2023 stemming from the conclusion of the EVM program. This program is intended to help reduce outages and potential ignitions using a risk-informed, targeted plan to mitigate potential vegetation contacts based on historic vegetation outages on EPSS-enabled circuits. The focus is on

1	mitigating potential vegetation contacts in Circuit Protection Zones that have
2	experienced vegetation caused outages. Scope of Work is developed by
3	using EPSS and historical outage data and vegetation failure from the
4	current WDRM. Vegetation outage extent of condition inspections
5	conducted on EPSS-enabled devices may generate additional tree work.
6	Focused Tree Inspections is another new transitional program that
7	began in 2023 stemming from the conclusion of the EVM program. PG&E is
8	developed Areas of Concern to better focus VM efforts to address high risk
9	areas that have experienced higher volumes of vegetation damage during
10	PSPS events, outages, and/or ignitions. These areas are inspected by VM
11	Inspectors with a Tree Risk Assessment Qualification which provides a
12	higher level of rigor to the inspection.
13	Please see Section 8.2, Vegetation Management, and Inspections in
14	PG&E's WMP for additional details.
15	• Asset Replacement (Overhead, Underground): Overhead asset
16	replacement addresses deteriorated overhead conductor and switches,
17	while underground asset replacement primarily focuses on replacing
18	underground cable and switches.
19	Please see Chapter 4.11, Overhead and Underground Distribution
20	Maintenance in the 2023 General Rate Case (GRC) for additional details.
21	• Grid Design and System Hardening: PG&E's broader grid design program
22	covers a number of significant programs, called out in detail in PG&E's 2023
23	WMP. The largest of these programs is the System Hardening Program
24	which focuses on the mitigation of potential catastrophic wildfire risk caused
25	by distribution overhead assets. In 2023, we continued our system
26	hardening efforts by: completing 447 circuit miles of system hardening work
27	which includes overhead system hardening, undergrounding and removal of
28	overhead lines in HFTD or buffer zone areas; completing approximately
29	364 circuit miles of undergrounding work, including Butte County Rebuild
30	efforts and other distribution system hardening work. As we look beyond
31	2024, PG&E is targeting 250 miles of Underground and 70 miles of
32	OH/removal/remote grid to be completed in 2024 as part of the 10,000-Mile
33	Undergrounding program. This system hardening work done at scale is

expected to have limited reliability benefit due rural HFTD geography and is prioritized to mitigate wildfire risk rather than reliability risk at this time.

Please see Section 7.3.3, Grid Design and System Hardening Mitigations in PG&E's WMP for additional details.

- Downed Conductor Detection (DCD): To further mitigate high impedance faults that can lead to ignitions, PG&E is piloting specific distribution line reclosers utilizing advanced methods to detect and isolate previously undetectable faults. This innovative solution is called DCD and has been implemented on over 1100 reclosing devices as of January 31, 2024. This technology uses sophisticated algorithms to determine when a line-to-ground arc is present (i.e., electrical current flowing from one conductive point to another) and the recloser will immediately de-energize the line once detected. Although this technology is new, it has already proven successful in detecting faults that would have otherwise been undetectable. PG&E will continue to learn from these installations through the 2024 wildfire season and expects to optimize and adjust this technology to address system risks as needed.

- Animal Abatement: The installation of new equipment or retrofitting of existing equipment with protection measures intended to reduce animal contacts. This includes avian protection on distribution and transmission poles such as jumper covers, perch guards, or perching platforms.

Please see Chapter 4.11 Overhead and Underground Distribution Maintenance in the 2023 GRC for additional details.

- Overhead/Underground Critical Operating Equipment (COE) Replacement Work: The Overhead COE Program is comprised of corrective maintenance of certain defined equipment—including Protective Devices (Reclosers, Cutouts, Sectionalizers), Voltage Devices (Regulators, Boosters), Switches (Switches, Disconnects), Capacitors, and Conductors–that plays an important role in preventing customer interruptions. Since COE Program is expected to address equipment as quickly as possible, numbers for each device may change quickly upon reporting.[1]

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1   Information on COE equipment can be provided upon request.

1   Please see Chapter 4.11, Overhead and Underground Distribution

2   Maintenance in the 2023 GRC for additional details.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:

CHAPTER 2.4

SYSTEM AVERAGE OUTAGES DUE TO VEGETATION AND

EQUIPMENT DAMAGE IN HFTD AREAS

(NON-MAJOR EVENT DAYS)

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
CHAPTER 2.4
SYSTEM AVERAGE OUTAGES DUE TO VEGETATION AND
EQUIPMENT DAMAGE IN HFTD AREAS
(NON-MAJOR EVENT DAYS)

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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
CHAPTER 2.4
SYSTEM AVERAGE OUTAGES DUE TO VEGETATION AND
EQUIPMENT DAMAGE IN HFTD AREAS
(NON-MAJOR EVENT DAYS)

The material updates to this chapter since the October 2, 2023, report can be found in Section B concerning metric performance and Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

A. (2.4) Overview

1. Metric Definition

Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 2.4 – System Average Outages due to Vegetation and Equipment Damage in HFTD Areas (Non-Major Event Days) is defined as:

Average number of sustained outages on Non-Major Event Days (MED) per 100 circuit miles in High Fire Threat District (HFTD) per metered customer, in a calendar year, where each sustained outage is defined as: total number of customers interrupted/total number of customers served.

2. Introduction of Metric

The measurement of System Average Outages due to Vegetation and Equipment Damage in HFTD areas is tied to the public safety risk of Asset Failure. Customers Experiencing Sustained Outages (CESO) is an important industry-standard measure of reliability performance as it a direct measure of outage frequency.

B. (2.4) Metric Performance

1. Historical Data (2013 – 2023)

Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) has measured CESO for over 20 years, however this report used 2013 to 2023 CESO values for target analysis to align with the same timeframe used for the wire down SOMs (2013 was the first full year PG&E uniformly began measuring wire down events).

1	The Cornerstone program investments in 2013 involved both capacity
2	and reliability projects, and PG&E experienced its best reliability
3	performance in 2015. While this metric is not benchmarkable, in
4	2015 System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI) (unplanned and
5	planned) was in second quartile when benchmarking with peer utilities.
6	The majority of the 2017-2020 investment was on Fault Location
7	Isolation and Restoration (FLISR), which automatically isolates faulted line
8	sections and then restores all other non-faulted sections in less than
9	five minutes typically in urban/suburban areas. Of note, FLISR does not
10	prevent customer interruptions but rather reduces the number of customers
11	that experience a sustained (> 5 minutes) outage.
12	The targeted circuit program, distribution line fuses, and recloser
13	installation in the worst performing areas have the biggest impact in
14	improving system reliability at the lowest cost.
15	Many factors influence reliability performance, including (but not limited
16	to) reliability project investments and project execution, favorable weather
17	conditions, outage response time, asset lifecycle and health, switching
18	device locations and function (including disablement of reclosers to mitigate
19	fire risk).
20	The current investment/work plan is heavily weighted towards wildfire
21	mitigation and is not targeted towards improving reliability performance.
22	PG&E's top financial and resource priority of minimizing the risk of
23	catastrophic wildfires has led to declining reliability performance and does
24	not support an improvement of this metric.

FIGURE 2.4-1
HISTORICAL RELIABILITY SPEND: 2010 – 2024

Reliability Spend (Millions)
2010-2024

1   Reliability performance has consistently degraded since 2017 as

2   PG&E's focus pivoted to wildfire risk prevention and mitigation, with a

3   50 percent CESO increase occurring in 2022 from 2021.

Veg and EQ Failure CESO/100 T&D Miles
Non-MED 2013-2023

Note: The data in this figure is subject to change based on continuing review of prior period information. Any changes are reflected in PG&E's March 2024 report.

Note: The data in this figure is subject to change based on continuing review of prior period information. Any changes are reflected in PG&E's March 2024 report.

T&D Vegetation CESO/100 T&D Miles (HFTD only)
Non MED 2013-2023

Note: The data in this figure is subject to change based on continuing review of prior period information. Any changes are reflected in PG&E's March 2024 report.

2. Data Collection Methodology

PG&E uses its outage database, typically referred to as its Integrated Logging Information System (ILIS) – Operations Database and its Customer Care and Billing database to obtain the customer count information to calculate these metric results. It should also be noted that PG&E's outage database includes distribution transformer level and above outages that impact both metered customers and a smaller number of unmetered customers. Outage information is entered into ILIS by distribution operators based on information from field personnel and devices, such as SCADA alarms and SmartMeter™ devices. PG&E last upgraded its outage reporting tools in 2015 and integrated SmartMeter™ devices information to identify potential outage reporting errors and to initiate a subsequent review and correction.

PG&E excludes MEDs from Reliability measures per the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 1366 Standard titled IEEE Guide for Electric Power Distribution Reliability Indices to define and apply excludable MED to measure the performance of its electric system under normally expected operating conditions. Its purpose is to allow major events to be analyzed apart from daily operation and avoid allowing daily trends to be hidden by the large statistical effect of major events. Per the Standard, the MED classification is calculated from the natural log of the daily System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) values over the past five years by reliability specialists. The SAIDI index is used as the basis since it leads to consistent results and is a good indicator of operational and design stress.

There is a total of approximately 33,474 transmission and distribution (overhead and underground) circuit miles located in the Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTD areas. PG&E's databases reflect the circuit miles that currently exist and do not maintain the historical values specifically in the Tier 2/3 HFTD areas. As such, we assumed the circuit miles have remained the same for all years from 2013 through 2022. Beginning 2023 PG&E will report the nominally updated circuit mileage total annually.

Due to data limitations, PG&E uses the Lat/Long of the operating device as a proxy for determining the distribution outage events that occurred in the Tier 2/3 HFTD areas.

3. **Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

The number of vegetation and equipment failure related customer outages occurring per 100 T&D line miles on Non-MEDs has varied each year but was generally declining since 2016. More recently, the CESO increased 27 percent from 2020 to 2021, and 50 percent from 2021 to 2022. 2023 year end performance of 1655 is seemingly very similar to 2022 performance of 1674. In general, the increased CESO is due to the following reasons:

- To reduce ignition risk, PG&E implemented the Enhanced Powerline Safety Settings (EPSS) program in July 2021. This program enabled higher sensitivity settings on targeted circuits in HFTD to deenergize

1   when tripped. The implementation of EPSS has significantly reduced

2   ignitions in the highest-risk wildfire months.; and

3   • In addition to the impact of EPSS, the metrics tied to CESO have been

4   impacted as PG&E shifted away from traditional system reliability

5   improvement work and more toward wildfire risk reduction, from reclose

6   disablement in 2018 forward. As such, 2022 and 2023 performance is

7   not directly comparable to prior years as the operating conditions have

8   changed significantly and resulted in large year-over-year changes.

9   **C. (2.4) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

10 **1.   Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

11 PG&E proposes to maintain the current 1- and 5-year metric targets

12 without change.

13 • PG&E proposes a 1- and 5-Year target range for this metric, similar to

14 the SAIDI (2.1) and SAIFI (2.2) metrics as it is experiencing the same

15 unknowns within the EPSS environment. Customer outages of all

16 causes are increasing in the HFTD areas due to EPSS, and the full

17 annual impact is currently unknown. Due to the increase in threshold,

18 there are also less excludable MEDs thus resulting in more vegetation

19 and equipment failure related outages that occur during large

20 (non-MED) storm events, such as in January 2022. 20 MEDs occurred

21 in 2023 compared to the 5 MEDs that occurred in 2022.

22 In addition, PG&E's outage reporting systems were not designed to

23 accurately measure this metric.

24 • Distribution outages are recorded by the operating device and the

25 Lat/Long of the operating device is used to identify the Tier 2/3 HFTD

26 location (not the actual Lat/Long of where the fault occurred since this is

27 unavailable within the data base). As such, this metric may include a

28 device outage located in a Tier 2/3 HFTD area that may operate due to

29 a fault in a non-Tier 2/3 HFTD area and this may also distort over time

30 the benefits associated with the Tier 2/3 HFTD mitigation efforts.

31 Longer term technology enhancements and processes are needed

32 to automate the determination of accurate fault locations on the T&D

1	systems relative to the Tier 2/3 HFTD areas and to better integrate with
2	the outage data base to improve the reporting accuracy of this metric.
3	Until the metric data can be more accurately measured, a target
4	range for this metric will be established to account for the variances
5	mentioned above.

6 **2. Target Methodology**

7 • For 1-Year and 5-Year targets, PG&E is proposing a range of CESO

8 due to Vegetation and Equipment Failure in HFTD of 1,523-1,980. This

9 range mirrors last year range and performance due to the increase in

10 significant expansion of the EPSS program in 2022:

11 – EPSS settings were added to an additional 848 circuits in 2022

12 (compared to 170 in 2021) for a total of approximately 1,018

13 circuits. Additionally, PG&E has focused on optimizing the EPSS

14 settings and installing additional devices to make reliability better

15 where possible. In 2023, PG&E had over 1000 circuits and

16 5100 protective devices that are EPSS enabled;

17 – The upper range of the target range represents an 18 percent

18 buffer, as 2022 performance may not have seen the full range of

19 weather events; and

20 – The MED threshold will increase to a daily SAIDI value of 6.519

21 which is up from 3.50 in 2021. This threshold only allowed for 5

22 MED exclusions in 2022 whereas in the previous year, there were

23 25. The increased threshold will cause more days that would

24 previously have been MEDs to be accounted for in this metric

25 instead.

26 The following factors were also considered in establishing targets:

27 • Historical Data and Trends: As 2021 was the first year of EPSS

28 deployment and given the expansion of the program in 2022 and 2023,

29 there had been very little historical data to help guide in target setting.

30 • Benchmarking: While this metric is not benchmarkable, PG&E is

31 currently in the fourth quartile in SAIFI performance;

32 • Regulatory Requirements: None;

33 • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and

34 Enforcement: The target for this metric is suitable for EOE as it aligns

with unplanned SAIFI target range and accounts for our current work
plan and the unknowns of EPSS;

- Attainable With Known Resources/Work Plan: Based on 2023 results
  and 2024 work plan, PG&E does not expect degradation that would
  prevent us from meeting proposed target;

- PG&E's top financial and resource priority of minimizing the risk of
  catastrophic wildfires has led to declining reliability performance and
  does not support an improvement of outage performance:

  – The General Rate Case (GRC) in 2023-2026 allocated budget for
    reliability, but the work was re-prioritized to focus on wildfire
    mitigation, compliance, pole replacement and tags;

  – The most significant driver of reliability performance is Equipment
    Failure, specifically Overhead Conductor;

  – Conductor replacement under the System Hardening program for
    wildfire risk reduction is forecasted through the GRC period, but
    provides limited additional benefit, at approximately 1 percent
    (due to the rural HFTD geography in which this work takes place);

  – Current allocated 2024 GRC spending amount for targeted
    reliability improvements (MAT Code 49x) is $10 million;

  – Prior to the implementation of EPSS in July 2021, current levels of
    investment and assuming the GRC forecast through 2026,
    SAIDI/SAIFI performance was expected to remain in the
    third quartile and sustained improvement are not expected . With
    the EPSS implementation, performance fell and is expected to
    remain in the fourth quartile; and

- Other Considerations: PG&E expanded the EPSS program (as
  described earlier in this chapter) and began enablement on high-risk
  circuits in January-representing and expanded fire season—all of which
  significantly impact SAIDI, SAIFI and CESO performance.

3. 2024 Target

Range: 1,523 – 1,980

The 2024 target reflects a range of 1,523 – 1,980 which is the same as
the 2023 target. The goal is to maintain similar performance within this
range. See Section C above for reason of EPSS and reporting system.

1   **4.   2028 Target**

2   Range: 1,523 – 1,980

3   Given the uncertainty of the EPSS environments and limitations within

4   our reporting capabilities, 2028 target range mirrors 2024.

5   **D.   (2.4) Performance Against Target**

6   **1.   Performance Against the 1-Year Target**

7   The 2023 year performance was 1655 which is within the target range of

8   1523 – 1980 for end of year. This result is similar to 2022 year

9   performance.

10   **2.   Performance Against the 5-Year Target**

11   As discussed in Section E below, PG&E has deployed or is deploying a

12   number of programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this

13   metric to meet the Company's 5-year performance target.

FIGURE 2.4-6
TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION
VEGETATION AND EQUIPMENT FAILURE CESO HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE AND TARGETS
(2013 – 2023)

14   **E.   (2.4) Current and Planned Work Activities**

15   Existing Programs that could improve Reliability Outage Metric Performance

16   are listed below.

2.4-11

- <u>Vegetation Management:</u> The Enhanced Vegetation Management (EVM) Program targeted OH distribution lines in Tier 2 and 3 HFTD areas and supplemented PG&E's annual routine Vegetation Management (VM) work with California Public Utilities Commission mandated clearances. Our EVM Program went above and beyond regulatory requirements for distribution lines by expanding minimum clearances and removing overhangs in HFTD areas. Due to the emergence of other wildfire mitigation programs (namely EPSS and Undergrounding), the program was discontinued in 2023. The trees that were identified as part of the program and previous iterations and scopes will be worked down over the next nine years under a program called Tree Removal Inventory, prioritized by risk rank using our latest wildfire distribution risk model. The Wildfire Mitigation Plan (WMP) has commitments for this program of the removal of 15 thousand trees in 2023, 20 thousand trees in 2024, and 25 thousand trees in 2025.

  VM for Operational Mitigations is a new transitional program which began 2023 stemming from the conclusion of the EVM program. This program is intended to help reduce outages and potential ignitions using a risk-informed, targeted plan to mitigate potential vegetation contacts based on historic vegetation outages on EPSS-enabled circuits. The focus is on mitigating potential vegetation contacts in Circuit Protection Zones that have experienced vegetation caused outages. Scope of Work is developed by using EPSS and historical outage data and vegetation failure from the current Wildfire Distribution Risk Model risk model. Vegetation outage extent of condition inspections conducted on EPSS-enabled devices may generate additional tree work.

  Focused Tree Inspections is another new transitional program that began in 2023 stemming from the conclusion of the EVM program. PG&E is developed Areas of Concern to better focus VM efforts to address high risk areas that have experienced higher volumes of vegetation damage during PSPS events, outages, and/or ignitions. These areas are inspected by VM Inspectors with a Tree Risk Assessment Qualification which provides a higher level of rigor to the inspection.

  Please see Section 8.2, Vegetation Management, and Inspections in PG&E's WMP for additional details.

- <u>Asset Replacement (Overhead, Underground)</u>: Overhead asset replacement addresses deteriorated overhead conductor and switches, while underground asset replacement primarily focuses on replacing underground cable and switches.

  Please see Chapter 4.11, Overhead and Underground Distribution Maintenance in the 2023 GRC for additional details.

- <u>Grid Design and System Hardening</u>: PG&E's broader grid design program covers a number of significant programs, called out in detail in PG&E's 2023 WMP. The largest of these programs is the System Hardening Program which focuses on the mitigation of potential catastrophic wildfire risk caused by distribution overhead assets. In 2023, we continued our system hardening efforts by: completing 447 circuit miles of system hardening work which includes overhead system hardening, undergrounding and removal of overhead lines in HFTD or buffer zone areas; completing approximately 364 circuit miles of undergrounding work, including Butte County Rebuild efforts and other distribution system hardening work. As we look beyond 2024, PG&E is targeting 250 miles of Underground and 70 miles of OH/removal/remote grid to be completed in 2024 as part of the 10,000 Mile Undergrounding program. This system hardening work done at scale is expected to have limited reliability benefit due rural HFTD geography and is prioritized to mitigate wildfire risk rather than reliability risk at this time.

  Please see Section 7.3.3, Grid Design and System Hardening Mitigations in PG&E's WMP for additional details.

- <u>Downed Conductor Detection:</u> To further mitigate high impedance faults that can lead to ignitions, PG&E is piloting specific distribution line reclosers utilizing advanced methods to detect and isolate previously undetectable faults. This innovative solution is called Down Conductor Detection and has been implemented on over 1100 reclosing devices as of January 31, 2024. This technology uses sophisticated algorithms to determine when a line-to-ground arc is present (i.e., electrical current flowing from one conductive point to another) and the recloser will immediately de-energize the line once detected. Although this technology is new, it has already proven successful in detecting faults that would have otherwise been undetectable. PG&E will continue to learn from these installations through

1   the 2024 wildfire season and expects to optimize and adjust this technology

2   to address system risks as needed.

3   • Animal Abatement: The installation of new equipment or retrofitting of

4   existing equipment with protection measures intended to reduce animal

5   contacts. This includes avian protection on distribution and transmission

6   poles such as jumper covers, perch guards, or perching platforms.

7   Please see Chapter 4.11 Overhead and Underground Distribution

8   Maintenance in the 2023 GRC for additional details.

9   • Overhead/Underground Critical Operating Equipment (COE) Replacement

10   Work: The Overhead COE Program is comprised of corrective maintenance

11   of certain defined equipment—including Protective Devices (Reclosers,

12   Cutouts, Sectionalizers), Voltage Devices (Regulators, Boosters), Switches

13   (Switches, Disconnects), Capacitors, and Conductors—that plays an

14   important role in preventing customer interruptions. Since COE Program is

15   expected to address equipment as quickly as possible, numbers for each

16   device may change quickly upon reporting.[1]

17   Please see Exhibit (PG&E-4), Chapter 4.11 Overhead and Underground

18   Distribution Maintenance in the 2023 GRC for additional details.

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[1] Information on COE equipment can be provided upon request.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:

CHAPTER 3.1

WIRES DOWN MAJOR EVENT DAYS IN HFTD AREAS

(DISTRIBUTION)

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
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WIRES DOWN MAJOR EVENT DAYS IN HFTD AREAS
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SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
CHAPTER 3.1
WIRES DOWN MAJOR EVENT DAYS IN HFTD AREAS
(DISTRIBUTION)**

The material updates to this chapter since the October 2, 2023, report can be found in Section B concerning metric performance and Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

A. (3.1) Overview

1. Metric Definition

Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 3.1 – Wires Down Major Event Days (MED) in High Fire Threat District (HFTD) Areas (Distribution) is defined as:

Number of Wires Down events on MED involving overhead (OH) primary or secondary distribution circuits divided by total circuit miles of OH primary distribution lines x 1,000, in HFTD Areas in a calendar year.

2. Introduction of Metric

In 2012, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E or the Company) initiated the Electric Wires Down Program, including introduction of the electric wires down metric, to advance the Company's focus on public safety by reducing the number of electric wire conductors that fail and result in contact with the ground, a vehicle, or other object.

This metric is associated with our Failure of Electric Distribution OH Asset Risk and our Wildfire Risk, which are part of our 2020 Risk Assessment and Mitigation Phase Report filing.

B. (3.1) Metric Performance

1. Historical Data (2013–2023)

We have 11 years of historical data available from the years 2013-2023. Although we started measuring distribution wire down incidents in 2012, 2013 was the first full year we uniformly measured the number of distribution wire down incidents.

Over this historical reporting period, performance is largely influenced by external factors such as weather and third-party contact with our OH electric facilities. These historical results are plotted in Figure 3.1-1 below.

Our OH electric primary distribution system consists of approximately 80,200 circuit miles of OH conductor and associated assets that could contribute to a wires down incident. Approximately 25,060[1] miles of our OH electric primary distribution lines traverse in the HFTD areas.

Over the last several years, we have completed significant work and launched various initiatives targeted at reducing wires down incidents, including:

- Performing infrared inspections of OH electric power lines to identify and repair hot spots;
- Clearing of vegetation hazards posing risks to our OH electric facilities
- Hardening of OH electric power systems with more resilient equipment.

In addition, our vegetation management (VM) teams conduct site visits of vegetation caused wires down incidents as part of its standard tree-caused service interruption investigation process. The data obtained from site visits supports efforts to reduce future vegetation-caused wires down incidents. The data collected from these investigations also helps identify failure patterns by tree species that are associated with wires down incidents. Additionally, beginning in March of 2024, an extent of condition patrol five spans in all directions from the wire down. The purpose of an extent of condition patrol is to determine subject tree failure mode and identify any additional trees of concern within the extent of condition patrol area. This may include but is not limited to:

- Conditions similar to the failed subject tree;
- Trees damaged from the fire or the failed subject tree;
- Other tree conditions of concern which may lead to another outage or ignition; and
- Non-compliant trees.

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[1] For purposes of computing 2022 performance, PG&E used the end of year 2021, which was 25,270 miles. For 2023 performance, PG&E is using the end of year 2022, which is 25,060 miles.

1	Distribution Wire Down Events on MEDs have varied each year and
2	have been heavily driven by not just the number of events, but by the
3	severity of the MED experienced in that specific year (refer to table below).
4	Given the randomness of weather patterns, no discernable trends can be
5	learned from historical performance results.

FIGURE 3.1-1
DISTRIBUTION PRIMARY WIRES DOWN INCIDENTS PER 1,000 CIRCUIT MILES TIER 2/3, OCCURRING ON MEDS (2013-2023)

Note: The data in this figure is subject to change based on continuing review of prior period outages. Any changes are reflected in PG&E's March 2024 report.

TABLE 3.1-1
ANNUAL MAJOR EVENT DAYS (2013–2023)

2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
4	5	10	3	30	7	31	14	25	5	20

Note: The data in this table is subject to change based on continuing review of prior period outages. Any changes are reflected in PG&E's March 2024 report.

1   **2. Data Collection Methodology**

2   PG&E uses the Integrated Logging Information System (ILIS) –

3   Operations Database, to track and count the number of wires down

4   incidents as well as our electric distribution geographical information

5   systems (EDGIS) to determine if the wire down incident was in an HFTD

6   locations. Although our outage database does not specifically identify

7   precise location of the downed wire, we use the Latitude and Longitude

8   (e.g., Lat/Long) of the device used to isolate the involved electric power line

9   Section as a proxy. We also use our EDGIS application to determine if that

10 device (via: Lat/Long information) is in the HFTD (e.g., Tier 2 or Tier 3

11 location). Outage information is entered into ILIS by our electric distribution

12 operators based on information from field personnel and devices such as

13 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition alarms and SmartMeter™[2]

14 devices. We last upgraded our outage reporting tools in 2015 and

15 integrated SmartMeter information to identify potential outage reporting

16 errors and to initiate a subsequent review and correction.

17   PG&E uses the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

18 (IEEE) 1366 Standard titled IEEE Guide for Electric Power Distribution

19 Reliability Indices to define MED to measure the performance of its electric

20 system under normally expected operating conditions. PG&E normally

21 excludes MEDs to allow major events to be analyzed apart from daily

22 operation and avoid allowing daily trends to be hidden by the large statistical

23 effect of major events. Per the Standard, the MED classification is

24 calculated from the natural log of the daily System Average Interruption

25 Duration Index (SAIDI) values over the past five years by reliability

26 specialists. The SAIDI index is used as the basis since it leads to consistent

27 results and is a good indicator of operational and design stress.

28 **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

29   The number of Distribution Wire Down events during MEDs in 2023 was

30 10.26. The number of Distribution Wire Down events during MEDs has

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2   SmartMeter is a PG&E registered trademark. All further references to SmartMeters in
PG&E's testimony in this proceeding should be assumed to refer to the trademarked
name, without continually using the ™ symbol, consistent with legally-acceptable
practice.

varied each year and has been heavily driven by both the number and severity of the MEDs experienced in that specific year.

As can be seen from the 2013 to 2023 distribution wire down event and number of MEDs per year data, the number of Tier 2 and Tier 3 wire down events were significantly impacted by the number of MEDs experienced in 2017 and 2019. The total number of Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTD distribution wire down events per 1,000 miles per MED was 0.513 in 2023, compared to 2.294 in 2017 and 1.794 in 2019.

C. (3.1) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target

1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report

There have been no changes to the directional 1- and 5- year targets since the last report.

2. Target Methodology

- Directional Only: Maintain (stay within historical range, and assumes response stays the same in events)

    Based on the historical performance of this metric, PG&E interprets "Maintain" as staying within 2 standard deviations from the 10-year average. This equates to an upper limit of 65.94 (as shown in Figure 3.1-1);

- Historical Data and Trends: This metric is expected to remain within the historical performance levels, but will vary based on the number of MEDs experienced in a year and the weather conditions;

- Benchmarking: Not available to the best of our knowledge;

- Regulatory Requirements: None;

- Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and Enforcement: The directional target for this metric is suitable for EOE as it states performance will remain within historical range which accounts for unknown factors which may vary such as the frequency and severity of weather;

- Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Yes, this metric is attainable within known resources, however this metric is impacted by variability in conditions outside of PG&E's control, such as the severity of weather on MED; and

- Other Considerations: None.

3. 2024 Target

Based on the methodology explained above, the 2024 target is to remain within 2 standard deviations from the 10-year average. This equates to an upper limit of 65.94.

4. 2028 Target

The 2028 target is the same as the 1-year target, to maintain within historical performance levels, i.e., within the upper limit of 65.94.

D. (3.1) Performance Against Target

1. Progress Towards the 1-Year Target

As demonstrated in Figure 3.1-1 and Table 3.1-1 above, PG&E experienced 20 MEDs in 2023, resulting in a performance of 10.26. This increase in events was driven by extreme weather that occurred January through March, including the numerous atmospheric river events. The weather that occurred April through December was much more moderate, only resulting in one MED. As a result, the overall performance in 2023 remained below the 2023 target of 66.02.

2. Progress Towards the 5-Year Target

As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is deploying a number of programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this metric to align with the Company's 5-year directional performance target.

E. (3.1) Current and Planned Work Activities

PG&E will continue to execute many ongoing activities to reduce wires down, including the following programs:

- OH Conductor Replacement: PG&E's electric distribution system includes approximately 80,200 circuit miles of OH conductor on its distribution system that operates between 4 and 21 kilovolt, including bare and covered conductors. Approximately 54,500 circuit miles of this distribution conductor, including approximately 36,300 circuit miles of small conductor is in non-HFTD areas. PG&E's OH Conductor Replacement Program, recorded in MAT 08J, proactively replaces OH conductor in non-HFTD

1   areas to address elevated rates of wires down and deteriorated/damaged

2   conductors and to improve system safety, reliability, and integrity.

3   Please see Exhibit (PG&E-4), Chapter 13, "Overhead and Underground

4   Asset Management" in the 2023 General Rate Case for additional details.

5   • <u>Patrols and Inspections</u>: PG&E monitors the condition of OH conductor

6   through patrols and inspections consistent with General Order 165. Tags

7   are created for abnormal conditions, including those that can lead to a wire

8   down. Work is prioritized in a risk-informed manner to address the issues

9   identified in the tags. In addition, PG&E has implemented risk based aerial

10   inspections using drones in targeted areas. Drone inspections significantly

11   improves our ability to assess deteriorated conditions on the conductor.

12   • <u>Grid Design and System Hardening</u>: PG&E's broader grid design program

13   covers a number of significant programs, called out in detail in PG&E's 2023

14   Wildfire Mitigation Plan (WMP). The largest of these programs is the

15   System Hardening Program which focuses on the mitigation of potential

16   catastrophic wildfire risk caused by distribution OH assets. In 2023, we

17   continued our system hardening efforts by: (i) completing 447 circuit miles

18   of system hardening work which includes OH system hardening,

19   undergrounding and removal of OH lines in HFTD or buffer zone areas;

20   (ii) completing approximately 364 circuit miles of undergrounding work,

21   including Butte County Rebuild efforts and other distribution system

22   hardening work; and (iii) replacing equipment in HFTD areas that creates

23   ignition risks, such as non-exempt fuses and surge arresters. As we look

24   beyond 2024, PG&E is targeting 250 miles of Undergrounding and 70 miles

25   of OH/removal/remote grid to be completed in 2024 as part of the

26   10,000 Mile Undergrounding Program. Even though this program will

27   provide wire down mitigation benefit, note that PG&E's approach to wildfire

28   mitigations in the HFTD locations is based on a risk informed prioritization of

29   work in the areas where wildfire risk is evaluated as highest, as opposed to

30   where wires down incidents have a high likelihood of occurrence if they are

31   in areas where wildfire risk is relatively lower within the HFTD.

32   Please see Section 7.3.3, Grid Design and System Hardening

33   Mitigations in PG&E's WMP for additional details.

1   •   <u>VM:</u> The Enhanced Vegetation Management (EVM) Program targeted OH

2   distribution lines in Tier 2 and 3 HFTD areas and supplemented PG&E's

3   annual routine VM work with California Public Utilities Commission

4   mandated clearances. Our EVM Program went above and beyond

5   regulatory requirements for distribution lines by expanding minimum

6   clearances and removing overhangs in HFTD areas. Due to the emergence

7   of other wildfire mitigation programs (namely Enhanced Powerline Safety

8   Settings (EPSS) and Undergrounding), the program was discontinued in

9   2023. The trees that were identified as part of the program and previous

10   iterations and scopes will be worked down over the next nine years under a

11   program called Tree Removal Inventory, prioritized by risk rank using our

12   latest wildfire distribution risk model (WDRM). The WMP has commitments

13   for this program of the removal of 15K trees in 2023, 20K trees in 2024, and

14   25K trees in 2025.

15   VM for Operational Mitigations is a new transitional program which began

16   2023 stemming from the conclusion of the EVM program. This program is

17   intended to help reduce outages and potential ignitions using a

18   risk-informed, targeted plan to mitigate potential vegetation contacts based

19   on historic vegetation outages on EPSS-enabled circuits. The focus is on

20   mitigating potential vegetation contacts in Circuit Protection Zones that have

21   experienced vegetation caused outages. Scope of Work is developed by

22   using EPSS and historical outage data and vegetation failure from the

23   current WDRM risk model. Vegetation outage extent of condition

24   inspections conducted on EPSS-enabled devices may generate additional

25   tree work.

26   Focused Tree Inspections is another new transitional program that began in

27   2023 stemming from the conclusion of the EVM program. PG&E is

28   developed Areas of Concern to better focus VM efforts to address high risk

29   areas that have experienced higher volumes of vegetation damage during

30   Public Safety Power Shutoff events, outages, and/or ignitions. These areas

31   are inspected by VM Inspectors with a Tree Risk Assessment Qualification

32   which provides a higher level of rigor to the inspection.

33   Please see Section 8.2, VM and Inspections in PG&E's WMP for

34   additional details.

1 • <u>Other Advancements</u>: In addition, there are several technologies that PG&E
2 is piloting to better identify and/or prevent conductor to ground faults. This
3 includes:
4 – SmartMeter-based methods;
5 – Distribution Falling Wire Detection Method;
6 – Distribution Fault Anticipation;
7 – Early Fault Detection; and
8 – Rapid Earth Fault Current Limiter.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:

CHAPTER 3.2

WIRES DOWN NON-MAJOR EVENT DAYS IN HFTD AREAS

(DISTRIBUTION)

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
CHAPTER 3.2
WIRES DOWN NON-MAJOR EVENT DAYS IN HFTD AREAS
(DISTRIBUTION)

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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
CHAPTER 3.2
WIRES DOWN NON-MAJOR EVENT DAYS IN HFTD AREAS
(DISTRIBUTION)

The material updates to this chapter since the October 2, 2023, report can be found in Section B concerning metric performance and Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

A. (3.2) Overview

1. Metric Definition

Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 3.2 – Wires Down Non-Major Event Days (Non-MED) in High Fire Threat District (HFTD) Areas (Distribution) is defined as:

Number of Wires Down events on Non-MED involving overhead (OH) primary distribution circuits divided by the total circuit miles of OH primary distribution lines x 1,000, in HFTD areas, in a calendar year.

2. Introduction to the Metric

In 2012, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E or the Company) initiated the Electric Wires Down Program, including introduction of the electric wires down metric, to advance the Company's focus on public safety by reducing the number of electric wire conductors that fail and result in contact with the ground, a vehicle, or other object.

This metric is associated with our Failure of Electric Distribution Overhead (OH) Asset Risk and our Wildfire risk, which are part of our 2020 Risk Assessment and Mitigation Phase Report (RAMP) filing.

B. (3.2) Metric Performance

1. Historical Data (2013 – 2023)

We have 11 years of historical data available from the years 2013-2023. Although we started measuring distribution wire down incidents in 2012, 2013 was the first full year uniformly measuring the number of distribution wire down incidents.

1   Over this historical reporting period, performance is largely influenced by

2   external factors such as weather and third-party contact with OH electric

3   facilities. These historical results are plotted in Figure 3.2-1 below.

4   Our OH electric primary distribution system consists of approximately

5   80,200 circuit miles of OH conductor and associated assets that could

6   contribute to a wires down incident. Approximately 25,060 miles[1] of our OH

7   electric primary distribution lines traverse in the HFTD areas.

8   Over the last several years, we have completed significant work and

9   launched various initiatives targeted at reducing wires down incidents,

10   including:

11   •   Performing infrared inspections of OH electric power lines to identify and

12   repair hot spots;

13   •   Clearing of vegetation hazards posing risks to our OH electric facilities;

14   and

15   •   Hardening of OH electric power systems with more resilient equipment.

16   In addition, our vegetation management (VM) teams conduct site visits

17   of vegetation caused wires down incidents as part of its standard

18   tree-caused service interruption investigation process. The data obtained

19   from site visits supports efforts to reduce future vegetation-caused wires

20   down incidents. The data collected from these investigations also helps

21   identify failure patterns by tree species that are associated with wires down

22   incidents. Additionally, beginning in March of 2024, an extent of condition

23   patrol five spans in all directions from the downed wire. The purpose of an

24   extent of condition patrol is to determine subject tree failure mode and

25   identify any additional trees of concern within the extent of condition patrol

26   area. This may include but is not limited to:

27   •   Conditions similar to the failed subject tree;

28   •   Trees damaged from the fire or the failed subject tree; and

29   •   Other tree conditions of concern which may lead to another outage or

30   ignition.

31   •   Non-compliant trees.

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[1]   For purposes of computing 2022 performance, PG&E used end of year 2021, which was 25,270 miles. For 2023 performance, PG&E is using the end of year 2022, which is 25,060 miles.

FIGURE 3.2-1
**DISTRIBUTION PRIMARY WIRES DOWN INCIDENTS PER 1,000 CIRCUIT MILES TIERS 2/3,
OCCURRING ON NON-MEDS (2013-2023)**

Distribution Tier 2/3 WD Events/1,000 miles
(Non MED 2013-2023)

Note: The data in this figure is subject to change based on continuing review of prior period outages.
Any changes are reflected in PG&E's March 2024 report.

2. Data Collection Methodology

PG&E uses its Integrated Logging Information System (ILIS) –
Operations Database to track and count the number of wires down
incidents, as well as its electric distribution geographical information
systems (EDGIS) to determine if the wire down incident was in an HFTD
locations. Although the outage database does not specifically identify
precise location of the downed wire, the Latitude and Longitude
(e.g., Lat/Long) of the device is used to isolate the involved electric power
line Section as a proxy. PG&E also uses its EDGIS application to determine
if that device (Lat/Long information) is in the HFTD (e.g., Tier 2 or Tier 3
location). Outage information is entered into ILIS by our electric distribution
operators based on information from field personnel and devices such as
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition alarms and SmartMeter™

1   devices.[2] We last upgraded our outage reporting tools in year 2015 and

2   integrated SmartMeter™ information to identify potential outage reporting

3   errors and to initiate a subsequent review and correction.

4   PG&E uses the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)

5   1366 Standard titled IEEE Guide for Electric Power Distribution Reliability

6   Indices to define and apply excludable MEDs to measure the performance

7   of its electric system under normally expected operating conditions. Its

8   purpose is to allow major events to be analyzed apart from daily operation

9   and avoid allowing daily trends to be hidden by the large statistical effect of

10   major events. Per the Standard, the MED classification is calculated from

11   the natural log of the daily System Average Interruption Duration Index

12   (SAIDI) values over the past five years by reliability specialists. The SAIDI

13   index is used as the basis since it leads to consistent results and is a good

14   indicator of operational and design stress.

15   **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

16   In 2023, there were 478 distribution wires down events, compared

17   to 466 in 2022 and 475 in 2021. The number of distribution wires down

18   events occurring on non-MED typically varies each year. Within the past

19   4 years, 2020-2023, there has been a decrease in the number of events

20   when comparing to years prior to 2020. The variance in this metric is driven

21   by several factors including weather conditions, third party influence and the

22   number of MED days per year. Furthermore, PG&E's approach to wildfire

23   mitigations in the HFTD locations is based on a risk informed prioritization of

24   work in the areas where wildfire risk is evaluated as highest, as opposed to

25   where wires down incidents have a high likelihood of occurrence if they are

26   in areas where wildfire risk is relatively lower within the HFTD.

27   In 2021, PG&E had a metric of 18.80. In 2022, PG&E had a metric of

28   18.44. In 2023, PG&E had a current metric of 19.07.

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2   SmartMeter™ is a PG&E registered trademark. All further references to SmartMeters in PG&E's testimony in this proceeding should be assumed to refer to the trademarked name, without continually using the ™ symbol, consistent with legally-acceptable practice.

C. (3.2) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target

1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report

There have been no changes to the methodology for calculating the directional 1- and 5- year targets since the last report (i.e., maintaining performance within 1 standard deviation from the 10-year average). Appling this methodology, the 1-year and 5-year targets for 2024 and 2028 are to maintain performance within an upper limit of 41.30, as compared to the 2023 and 2027 target of 41.36.

2. Target Methodology

- <u>Directional Only</u>: Maintain (stay within historical range, and assumes response stays the same in events)

    Based on the historical performance of this metric, PG&E interprets "Maintain" designation as staying within 1 standard deviation from the 10-year average. This equates to an upper limit of 41.30 (as shown in Figure 3.2-1);

- <u>Historical Data and Trends</u>: This metric is expected to remain within the historical performance levels, but will vary based on the number of MEDs experienced in a year and the weather conditions;

- <u>Benchmarking</u>: Not available to the best of our knowledge;

- <u>Regulatory Requirements</u>: None;

- <u>Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and Enforcement</u>: The directional target for this metric is suitable for EOE as it states performance will remain within historical range which accounts for unknown factors which may vary such as the frequency and severity of weather;

- <u>Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan</u>: Yes, targets are attainable within known resources, however this metric is impacted by the variability in conditions outside of PG&E's control, such as weather conditions that may not be excluded as an MED; and

- <u>Other Considerations</u>: None.

3. 2024 Target

The 2024 target is to maintain within historical performance levels, i.e., below the upper limit of 41.3.

1   **4. 2028 Target**

2   The 2028 target is to maintain within historical performance levels,

3   i.e., below the upper limit of 41.3.

4   **D. (3.2) Performance Against Target**

5   **1. Progress Towards the 1-Year Target**

6   As demonstrated in Figure 3.2-1, PG&E saw a performance of 19.07

7   Distribution Wires Down Events per 1,000 circuit miles for 2023, which is

8   consistent with the Company's 1-year target of 41.36. Although there were

9   a historically high number of wire down events in 2023, most occurred on

10   MEDs. There was a significant increase in MEDs in 2023, as compared to

11   2022, driven by extreme weather that occurred January through March of

12   2023, including the atmospheric river events.

13   **2. Progress Towards the 5-Year Target**

14   As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is deploying a number of

15   programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this metric to

16   meet the Company's 5-year performance target.

17   **E. (3.2) Current and Planned Work Activities**

18   PG&E will continue to execute many ongoing activities to reduce wires

19   down, including the following programs:

20   • OH Conductor Replacement: PG&E's electric distribution system includes

21   approximately 80,200 circuit miles of OH conductor on its distribution system

22   that operates between 4 and 21 kilovolt, including bare and covered

23   conductors. Approximately 54,500 circuit miles of this distribution

24   conductor, including approximately 36,300 circuit miles of small conductor is

25   in non-HFTD areas. PG&E's OH Conductor Replacement Program,

26   recorded in MAT 08J, proactively replaces OH conductor in non-HFTD

27   areas to address elevated rates of wires down and deteriorated/damaged

28   conductors and to improve system safety, reliability, and integrity.

29   Please see Exhibit (PG&E-4), Chapter 13, Overhead and Underground

30   Asset Management in the 2023 GRC for additional details.

31   • Patrols and Inspections: PG&E monitors the condition of OH conductor

32   through patrols and inspections consistent with GO 165. Tags are created

33   for abnormal conditions, including those that can lead to a wire down. Work

3.2-6

1   is prioritized in a risk-informed manner to address the issues identified in the

2   tags. In addition, PG&E has implemented risk based aerial inspections

3   using drones in targeted areas. Drone inspections significantly improves our

4   ability to assess deteriorated conditions on the conductor.

5   • Grid Design and System Hardening: PG&E's broader grid design program

6   covers a number of significant programs, called out in detail in PG&E's 2023

7   WMP. The largest of these programs is the System Hardening Program

8   which focuses on the mitigation of potential catastrophic wildfire risk caused

9   by distribution OH assets. In 2023, we continued our system hardening

10 efforts by: (1) completing 447 circuit miles of system hardening work which

11 includes OH system hardening, undergrounding and removal of OH lines in

12 HFTD or buffer zone areas; (2) completing approximately 364 circuit miles of

13 undergrounding work, including Butte County Rebuild efforts and other

14 distribution system hardening work; and (3) replacing equipment in HFTD

15 areas that creates ignition risks, such as non-exempt fuses and surge

16 arresters. As we look beyond 2024, PG&E is targeting 250 miles of

17 Undergrounding and 70 miles of OH/removal/remote grid to be completed in

18 2024 as part of the 10,000 Mile Undergrounding Program. Even though this

19 program will provide wire down mitigation benefit, note that PG&E's

20 approach to wildfire mitigations in the HFTD locations is based on a risk

21 informed prioritization of work in the areas where wildfire risk is evaluated as

22 highest, as opposed to where wires down incidents have a high likelihood of

23 occurrence if they are in areas where wildfire risk is relatively lower within

24 the HFTD.

25   Please see Section 7.3.3, Grid Design and System Hardening

26 Mitigations in PG&E's WMP for additional details.

27 • Vegetation Management: The EVM Program targeted OH distribution lines

28 in Tier 2 and 3 HFTD areas and supplemented PG&E's annual routine VM

29 work with California Public Utilities Commission mandated clearances. Our

30 EVM Program went above and beyond regulatory requirements for

31 distribution lines by expanding minimum clearances and removing

32 overhangs in HFTD areas. Due to the emergence of other wildfire mitigation

33 programs (namely EPSS and Undergrounding), the program was

34 discontinued in 2023. The trees that were identified as part of the program

and previous iterations and scopes will be worked down over the next nine years under a program called Tree Removal Inventory (TRI), prioritized by risk rank using our latest wildfire distribution risk model. The WMP has commitments for this program of the removal of 15 thousand trees in 2023, 20 thousand trees in 2024, and 25 thousand trees in 2025.

VM for Operational Mitigations is a new transitional program which began 2023 stemming from the conclusion of the EVM program. This program is intended to help reduce outages and potential ignitions using a risk-informed, targeted plan to mitigate potential vegetation contacts based on historic vegetation outages on EPSS-enabled circuits. The focus is on mitigating potential vegetation contacts in CPZs that have experienced vegetation caused outages. Scope of Work is developed by using EPSS and historical outage data and vegetation failure from the current WDRM risk model. Vegetation outage extent of condition inspections conducted on EPSS-enabled devices may generate additional tree work.

Focused Tree Inspections (FTI) is another new transitional program that began in 2023 stemming from the conclusion of the EVM program. PG&E is developed Areas of Concern (AOC) to better focus VM efforts to address high risk areas that have experienced higher volumes of vegetation damage during PSPS events, outages, and/or ignitions. These areas are inspected by Vegetation Management Inspectors with a Tree Risk Assessment Qualification (TRAQ) which provides a higher level of rigor to the inspection.

Please see Section 8.2, Vegetation Management and Inspections in PG&E's WMP for additional details.

- Other Advancements: In addition, there are several technologies that PG&E is piloting to better identify and/or prevent conductor to ground faults. This includes:
  - SmartMeter-based methods;
  - Distribution Falling Wire Detection Method;
  - Distribution Fault Anticipation;
  - Early Fault Detection; and
  - Rapid Earth Fault Current Limiter.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:

CHAPTER 3.3

WIRES DOWN MAJOR EVENT DAYS IN HFTD AREAS

(TRANSMISSION)

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
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WIRES DOWN MAJOR EVENT DAYS IN HFTD AREAS
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WIRES DOWN MAJOR EVENT DAYS IN HFTD AREAS
(TRANSMISSION)

</div>

The material updates to this chapter since the October 2, 2023, report can be found in Section B concerning metric performance; and Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

A. (3.3) Overview

1. Metric Definition

Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 3.3 – Wires Down Major Event Days in High Fire Threat District (HFTD) Areas (Transmission) is defined as:

Number of Wires Down events on Major Event Days (MED) involving overhead transmission circuits divided by total circuit miles of overhead transmission lines x 1,000, in HFTD Areas in a calendar year.

2. Introduction of Metric

This metric is a measure of how Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E or the Company) provides safe and reliable electric services to its customers. It is also a measure of how available PG&E's electric transmission (ET) grid is to the market for the buying and selling of electricity as managed by the California Independent System Operator.

This metric is associated with PG&E's Failure of ET Overhead Asset Risk and Wildfire Risk, which are part of the Company's 2020 Risk Assessment and Mitigation Phase Report filing.

B. (3.3) Metric Performance

1. Historical Data

There are 11 years of historical data available from the years 2013-2023. Although PG&E started measuring wire down incidents in 2012, 2013 was the first full year uniformly measuring the number of transmission wire down events. This metric is normalized by the transmission circuit miles within Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTDs. The HFTD boundaries are a recent development and were not defined for several years within the historical

1		data timeframe. Hence, for all years prior to and including 2022, PG&E
2		uses 5,525.9 overhead transmission circuit miles in Tier 2/3 HFTD areas
3		and assumes any variances in prior years are negligible. Moving forward,
4		HFTD mileage will be refreshed at the beginning of each year. Table 1
5		provides the HFTD miles used for each year.

TABLE 3.3-1
HFTD MILES

Line No.	Year	HFTD Miles
1	Prior to 2023	5525.9
2	2023	5437.7
3	2024	5402.3

6	**2.**	**Data Collection**
7		Unplanned ET outages are documented by PG&E's Transmission
8		Operations Department using its Transmission Operations Tracking and
9		Logging (TOTL) application. If distribution-served customers are affected by
10		a particular transmission wire down event, the data captured in TOTL are
11		merged in a separate data set with respective data from PG&E's distribution
12		outage reporting application Integrated Logging Information System. Follow
13		up is usually required to validate cause of the wire down event, including
14		daily outage review calls with various stakeholder departments to clarify the
15		details of the wire down event. Results are consolidated and regularly
16		communicated internally to keep stakeholders informed of progress.
17	**3.**	**Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**
18		All systems and processes and their outputs exhibit variability. Control
19		charts help monitor variability and can be used to differentiate common
20		causes of variability from special causes. Common, or chance, causes are
21		numerous small causes of variability that are inherent to a system and
22		operate randomly. Special, or assignable, causes can have relatively large
23		effects on the process and may lead to a state that is out of statistical
24		control—i.e., outside control chart limits.

PG&E's control charts are set up using a static time window of 2013-2022. Using the actual data from those years allows us to calculate the following values that are used in the control charts:

- Mean: Average value of the metric.
- Standard Deviation: Amount of variation of the metric calculated by taking the square root of the variance of the dataset.
- Upper Control Limit (UCL): The maximum value that can be attributed to natural fluctuations calculated by mean plus 3 standard deviations.
- Lower Control Limit (LCL): The minimum value that can be attributed to natural fluctuations calculated by mean minus 3 standard deviations.
- Upper Warning Limit (UWL): The warning value that should raise a flag to take a proactive response to prevent the metric from approaching the UCL calculated by mean plus 2 standard deviations.
- Lower Warning Limit (LWL): The warning value that should raise a flag to take a proactive response to prevent the metric from approaching the LCL calculated by mean minus 2 standard deviations.

The probability that a point falls above the UCL which for most control chart designs is an indicator of significant process degradation or below the LCL, an indicator of significant process improvement) if only common causes are operating is approximately 0.00135. It is therefore unlikely to have measures fall beyond the control limits when no special cause is operating. False alarms are possible, but the placement of the control limits at 3 standard deviations (+/-) from the process average is thought to control the number of false alarms adequately in most situations. The simplest rule for detecting presence of a special cause is one or more points that fall beyond upper or lower limits of the chart.

Control charts can further illustrate an expected range of performance based on historical data. They can assist with discrete observations of recent performance improvement or decline or stability.

Figure 3.3-1 below is a control chart showing historical annual performances since 2013 for ET wire down events excluding those that occurred on a declared MED. Similarly, Figure 3.3-2 is a control chart showing all wire down events including MEDs.

Electric Transmission Wire Down Events
Excluding MEDs, All Cause Categories

FIGURE 3.3-2
ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION WIRES DOWN EVENTS, INCLUDING MEDS
(2013-2023)

Electric Transmission Wire Down Events
Including MEDs, All Cause Categories

1   Comparing the two figures above, one can conclude that on average we

2   can expect more transmission wire down events when MEDs are included.

3   More importantly, there are no instances in either chart where the upper

4   chart limit set at three standard deviations was exceeded. It appears we

5   have a stable performing process in the count of transmission wire down

6   events, whether MEDs are included in the count or not.

7   Figure 3.3-3 below is analogous to Figure 3.3-2 above but restricts the

8   count of transmission wire down events to those occurring within Tier 2 or

9   Tier 3 HFTDs. All categories related to cause are included. The bars in the

10   chart show congruence between the number of MEDs in a performance year

11   vs. the count of transmission wire down. It is also apparent that we

12   historically have had a stable system as all annual performance results fall

13   within the two standard deviation lines for UWL and LWL. The extreme

1 weather in Q1 of 2023 drove us above the UWL for the first time since we
2 began tracking this data.

3 Figure 3.3-4 below is analogous to Figure 3.3-3 above but further
4 restricts the count of transmission wire down events to those that occurred
5 only during a declared MED. These counts are normalized by dividing by
6 the circuit mileage associated circuits located in Tier 2 and Tier 3
7 boundaries x 1,000. Again, there is congruence between the normalized
8 counts of transmission wire down events and the number of MEDs.

Electric Transmission Wire Down Events/1000 miles
Occurring on MEDs, HFTD, All Cause Categories

C. (3.3) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target

1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report

There are no updates to the directional 1- and 5-Year Targets since last report, to maintain performance within the historical range, i.e., the target is to stay below the UCL as defined above. The UCL for 2024 and 2028 is 8.433. The winter storms in Q1 caused more wire down events, however, there were 0 wire down events in HFTDs on MEDs after March which allowed us to stay below the UCL for 2023.

2. Target Methodology

- Unplanned Directional Only: Maintain, i.e., stay within historical range as determined by the UCL and the LCL as defined above, and assumes response stays the same in events.

As discussed above in the interpretations of control charts related to this metric—and absent any "special" cause(s) that would result in deviation

above the current three standard deviations—it is reasonable to expect that future transmission wire down results would remain within the historical performance levels. Such results will vary based on the number and severity of MEDs experienced in a year; however, end-of-year actuals should remain centered around the mean and below the UCL shown in Figure 3.3-4. It is noted that changes in MED thresholds from year to year can skew the UCL.

- <u>Benchmarking</u>: Not available to best of our knowledge;
- <u>Regulatory Requirements</u>: None;
- <u>Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and Enforcement</u>: The directional target for this metric is suitable for EOE as it states metric performance will remain in historical range;
- <u>Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan</u>: Yes, this metric is attainable within known resources, however this metric is impacted by the variability in conditions outside of PG&E's control, such as the severity of inclement weather on MED; and
- Other Considerations: None.

D. (3.3) Performance Against Target

1. Progress Towards the 1-Year Target

PG&E experienced 44 wire down events in HFTDs on 19 MEDs from January through June of 2023 resulting in a performance of 8.092. This was below the UCL of 8.433. This increase in events from 2022 was driven by extreme weather that occurred January through April 2023, including the numerous atmospheric river events. However, once the weather improved PG&E experienced 0 wire down events in HFTDs on MEDs for the remainder of 2023 resulting in a 2023 performance of 8.092.

2. Progress Towards the 5-Year Target

As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is deploying a number of programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this metric to meet the Company's 5-year directional performance target.

E. (3.3) Current and Planned Work Activities

Wire down events can be caused by a variety of factors, including, but not limited to asset failure, third-party contact, or vegetation contact. The following

1	work activities may provide future resiliency for certain wire down event causes,
2	though the effectiveness of the work is dependent upon the circumstances of the
3	wire down event (e.g., new assets may still be prone to a wire down event that
4	occur due to extreme weather events outside of standard design guidance).
5	• Asset Inspection: Detailed inspections of overhead transmission assets
6	seek to proactively identify potential failure modes of asset components
7	which could create future wire down, outage, and/or safety events if left
8	unresolved or allowed to "run to failure." Detailed inspections for
9	transmission assets involve at least two detailed inspection methods per
10	structure (ground and aerial), though not necessarily in the same calendar
11	year which allows for staggered inspection methods across multiple years.
12	Aerial inspections may be completed either by drone, helicopter, or aerial lift.
13	In addition to the ground and aerial inspections, climbing inspections are
14	also required for 500 kilovolt structures or as triggered. All these inspection
15	methods involve detailed, visual examinations of the assets with use of
16	inspection checklists that are in accordance with the ET Preventive
17	Maintenance standards, as well as the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis.
18	• Asset Repair and Replacement: Completing repair, replacement, removal
19	or life extension to transmission assets provides the benefit of reduced
20	probability of failure for components that could potentially result in a wire
21	down event. Idle asset de-energization and removal eliminates wires down
22	event risk by removing the energized electrical components.
23	Many improvements are identified through corrective maintenance
24	notifications. These notifications are typically identified as a result of
25	transmission asset inspections and patrols. Prioritization of maintenance tags
26	are based on severity of the issues found and fire ignition potential
27	(i.e., asset-conditions impacting issues associated with HFTD areas and High
28	Fire Risk Area). Execution of the prioritized work plan would also have to
29	address other factors such as clearance availability, access, work efficiency, etc.
30	• Vegetation Management (VM): Trees or other vegetation that make contact
31	or cross within flash-over distance of high voltage transmission lines can
32	cause phase to phase or phase to ground electrical arcing, fire ignition or
33	local, regional or cascading, grid-level service interruption. Dense
34	vegetation growing within the right-of-way (ROW) can act as a fuel bed for

1	wildfire ignition. Vegetation growing close to any pole or structure can
2	impede inspection of the structure base and in some cases can damage the
3	structure or conductors and result in wire down events.
4	PG&E operates our lines in ET corridors that are home to vast amounts of
5	vegetation. This vegetation ranges from sparse to extremely dense. Our
6	transmission lines also pass through urban, agricultural, and forested settings.
7	The corridor environment is dynamic and requires focused attention to ensure
8	vegetation stays clear of energized conductors and other equipment. Vegetation
9	inspection is a required operational step in an overall VM Program. Accordingly,
10	PG&E has developed an annual inspection cycle program as part of our overall
11	Transmission VM Program to respond to the diverse and dynamic environment
12	of our service territory. The Routine North American Electric Reliability
13	Corporation (NERC) and Routine Non-NERC Programs are annually recurring.
14	The Integrated Vegetation Management (IVM) Program maintains cleared
15	ROWs and recurs on a two-to-five-year cycle. The frequency and prioritization
16	for each of these programs is described in more detail below.
17	• Routine NERC: The Routine NERC Program includes Light Detection and
18	Ranging (LiDAR) inspection, visual verification of findings, and mitigation of
19	vegetation encroachments, as well as other vegetation conditions on
20	approximately 6,800 miles of NERC Critical lines. 100 percent inspection
21	and work plan completion are required by NERC Standard FAC-003-4.
22	Work is prioritized based on aerial LiDAR detection. This program recurs
23	annually.
24	• Non-Routine NERC: The Non-Routine NERC Program includes LiDAR
25	inspection, visual verification of findings, and mitigation of vegetation
26	encroachments, as well as other vegetation conditions on approximately
27	11,400 miles of transmission lines not designated as critical by NERC.
28	Work is prioritized based on aerial LiDAR detection. This program recurs
29	annually.
30	• Integrated Vegetation Management: The IVM Program is an ongoing
31	maintenance program designed to maintain cleared rights-of-way in a
32	sustainable and compatible condition by eliminating tall-growing and
33	fire-prone vegetation and promoting low-growing, compatible vegetation.
34	Prioritization is based on aging of work cycles and evaluation of vegetation

1   re-growth. After initial work is performed, the rights-of-ways are reassessed

2   every two to five years

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
CHAPTER 3.4
WIRES DOWN NON-MAJOR EVENT DAYS IN HFTD AREAS
(TRANSMISSION)

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SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
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WIRES DOWN NON-MAJOR EVENT DAYS IN HFTD AREAS
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CHAPTER 3.4
WIRES DOWN NON-MAJOR EVENT DAYS IN HFTD AREAS
(TRANSMISSION)

The material updates to this chapter since the October 2, 2023, report can be found in Section B concerning metric performance and Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

A. (3.4) Introduction

1. Metric Definition

Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 3.4 – Wires Down Non-Major Even Days in HFTD Areas (Transmission) is defined as:

Number of Wires Down events on Non-Major Event Days (MED) involving overhead transmission circuits divided by total circuit miles of overhead transmission lines x 1,000, in High Fire Threat District (HFTD) Areas, in a calendar year.

2. Introduction of Metric

This metric is a measure of how Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E or the Company) provides safe and reliable electric services to its customers. It is also a measure of how available PG&E's Electric Transmission (ET) grid is to the market for the buying and selling of electricity as managed by the California Independent System Operator (CAISO).

This metric is associated with PG&E's Failure of ET Overhead Asset Risk and Wildfire Risk, which are part of the Company's 2020 Risk Assessment and Mitigation Phase Report filing.

B. (3.4) Metric Performance

1. Historical Data (2013 – 2023)

There are 11 years of historical data available from the years 2013- 2023. Although PG&E started measuring wire down events in 2012, 2013 was the first full year uniformly measuring the number of transmission

1	wire down incidents. This metric is normalized by the transmission circuit
2	miles within Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTDs. The HFTD boundaries are a recent
3	development and were not defined for several years within the historical
4	data timeframe. Hence, for all years prior to and including 2022, PG&E
5	uses 5,525.9 overhead transmission circuit miles in Tier 2/3 HFTD areas
6	and assumes any variances in prior years are negligible. Moving forward,
7	HFTD mileage will be refreshed at the beginning of each year. Table 3.4-1
8	provides the HFTD miles used for each year.

TABLE 3.4-1
HFTD MILES

Line No.	Year	HFTD Miles
1	Prior to 2023	5525.9
2	2023	5437.7
3	2024	5402.3

FIGURE 3.4-1
ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION WIRES DOWN EVENTS
OCCURRING ON NON-MEDS PER 1,000 CIRCUIT MILES (2013-2023)

2. Data Collection Methodology

Unplanned ET outages are documented by PG&E's Transmission Operations Department using its Transmission Operations Tracking & Logging (TOTL) application. If distribution-served customers are affected by a particular transmission wire down event, the data captured in TOTL are merged in a separate data set with respective data from PG&E's distribution outage reporting application (integrated logging information system). Follow up is usually required to validate cause of the wire down event, including daily outage review calls with various stakeholder departments to clarify the details of the wire down event. Results are consolidated and regularly communicated internally to keep stakeholders informed of progress Metric performance.

3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period

All systems and processes and their outputs exhibit variability. Control charts help monitor variability and can be used to differentiate common causes of variability from special causes. Common, or chance, causes are numerous small causes of variability that are inherent to a system and operate randomly. Special, or assignable, causes can have relatively large effects on the process and may lead to a state that is out of statistical control—i.e., outside control chart limits.

PG&E's control charts are set up using a static time window of 2013-2022. Using the actual data from those years allows us to calculate the following values that are used in the control charts:

- Mean: Average value of the metric.
- Standard Deviation: Amount of variation of the metric calculated by taking the square root of the variance of the dataset.
- Upper Control Limit (UCL): The maximum value that can be attributed to natural fluctuations calculated by mean plus three standard deviations.
- Lower Control Limit (LCL): The minimum value that can be attributed to natural fluctuations calculated by mean minus three standard deviations.
- Upper Warning Limit: The warning value that should raise a flag to take a proactive response to prevent the metric from approaching the UCL calculated by mean plus two standard deviations.

- Lower Warning Limit: The warning value that should raise a flag to take a proactive response to prevent the metric from approaching the LCL calculated by mean minus two standard deviations.

The probability that a point falls above the UCL (for most control chart designs, usually an indicator of significant process degradation) or below the LCL (an indicator, usually, of significant process improvement) if only common causes are operating is approximately 0.00135. It is therefore unlikely to have measures fall beyond the control limits when no special cause is operating. False alarms are possible, but the placement of the control limits at three standard deviations (+/-) from the process average is thought to control the number of false alarms adequately in most situations. The simplest rule for detecting presence of a special cause is one or more points that fall beyond upper or lower limits of the chart.

Control charts can further illustrate an expected range of performance based on historical data. They can assist with discrete observations of recent performance improvement or decline or stability.

Each year since 1998 PG&E and the CAISO or ISO have monitored ET availability using control charts.

Appendix C of the Transmission Control Agreement between PG&E and CAISO states that each participating transmission owner:

> …shall submit an annual report…describing its Availability Measures performance. This annual report shall be based on Forced Outage records…and shall include the date, start time, end time affected Transmission Facility, and the probable cause(s) if known.

Appendix C goes on to address targets which are defined as "The Availability performance goals established by the ISO," which are based on the control chart limits calculated and shown in the annual report.

As mentioned, ET wire down events have been tracked historically in part as a measure of how available PG&E's ET grid is to the market managed by CAISO. With this proven and statistically robust method of calculating ET availability targets using control charts already established, it is reasonable—and preferable—to adopt this control chart methodology to not only monitor past and present performance but also better predict future performance and facilitate recommendations at a higher confidence level for annual targets related to ET wire down events.

1   There is precedent internally for using control charts to set targets.

2   Figure 3.4-1 above is a control chart showing historical annual

3 performances through 2022 for ET wire down events excluding those that

4 occurred on a declared MED. The 2023 performance was 1.471 compared

5 to the UCL of 4.44.

C. (3.4) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target

1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report

    There have been no changes to the 1-year and 5-year targets since the
last SOMs report filing. The targets remain at 4.44 which represents the
UCL based on three standard deviations as defined above.

2. Target Methodology

    To establish the 1-Year and 5-Year targets, the following:

- Historical Data and Trends: 1-Year and 5-Year Targets are set to
maintain performance within a 3-standard deviation range using the
available historical data. As discussed above in the interpretations of
control charts related to this metric—and absent any "special" cause(s)
that would result in deviation above the current three standard
deviations—it is reasonable to expect that future transmission wire down
results would remain within the historical performance levels. Such
results will vary based on the number of MEDs experienced in a year;
however, end of year actuals should remain centered around the mean
and not to exceed the UCL shown in Figure 3.4-1. Changes in MED
thresholds from year to year can skew the UCL;

- Benchmarking: Not available to the best of our knowledge;

- Regulatory Requirements: None;

- Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and
Enforcement (EOE): The target for this metric is suitable for EOE as it
suggests that future results will remain within the historic performance
levels;

- Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Metric targets are
attainable within known resources, however this metric is impacted by
the variability in conditions outside of PG&E's control, such as the
severity of inclement weather on days that do not register as MEDs; and

1 • Other Considerations: None.

2 **3. 2024 Target**

3   Not to exceed 4.440, which represents maintaining a 3-standard

4 deviation range. A 3-standard deviation remains consistent with other ET

5 external report filings with the CAISO.

6 **4. 2028 Target**

7   Not to exceed 4.440, which represents maintaining a 3-standard

8 deviation range. A 3-standard deviation remains consistent with other ET

9 external report filings with the CAISO.

10 **D. (3.4) Performance Against Target**

11 **1. Progress Towards the 1-year Target**

12   As demonstrated in Figure 3.4-2 below, PG&E saw a performance of

13 1.448 Transmission Wires Down Events per 1,000 circuit miles in 2022

14 which is consistent with Company's 1-year target. Although there were a

15 historically high number of overall wire down events in 2023, most occurred

16 on MEDs. There was a significant increase in MEDs in 2023, as compared

17 to 2022, driven by extreme weather that occurred January through April of

18 2023, including the atmospheric river events. PG&E saw a performance of

19 1.471 Transmission Wires Down Events per 1,000 circuit miles on non-MED

20 days in 2023 which was well within the UCL target of 4.44.

21 **2. Progress Towards the 5-year Target**

22   As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is deploying a number of

23 programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this metric to

24 meet the Company's 5-year performance target.

Electric Transmission Wire Down Events/1000 Miles
Occurring on non-MEDs, HFTD, Historical Performance and Targets

E. (3.4) Current and Planned Work Activities

Wire down events can be caused by a variety of factors, including but not limited to asset failure, third party contact, or vegetation contact. The following work activities may provide future resiliency for certain wire down event causes, though the effectiveness of the work is dependent upon the circumstances of the wire down event (e.g., new assets may still be prone to a wire down event that occur due to extreme weather events outside of standard design guidance).

- Asset Inspection: Detailed inspections of overhead transmission assets seek to proactively identify potential failure modes of asset components which could create future wire down, outage, and/or safety events if left unresolved or allowed to "run to failure." Detailed inspections for transmission assets involve at least two detailed inspection methods per structure (ground and aerial), though not necessarily in the same calendar year which allows for staggered inspection methods across multiple years. Aerial inspections may be completed either by drone or, helicopter. In addition to the ground and aerial inspections, climbing inspections are also

1	required for 500 kilovolt structures or as triggered. All these inspection
2	methods involve detailed, visual examinations of the assets with use of
3	inspection checklists that are in accordance with the ET Preventive
4	Maintenance (TD-1001M), as well as the Failure Modes and Effects
5	Analysis.
6	• Asset Repair and Replacement: Completing repair, replacement, removal
7	or life extension to transmission assets provides the benefit of reduced
8	probability of failure for components that could potentially result in a wire
9	down event. Idle asset de-energization and removal eliminates wires-down
10	event risk by removing the energized electrical components. Many
11	improvements are identified through corrective maintenance notifications.
12	These notifications are typically identified as a result of transmission asset
13	inspections and patrols.
14	Prioritization of maintenance tags are based on severity of the issues found
15	and fire ignition potential (i.e., asset-conditions impacting issues associated with
16	HFTD areas and High Fire Risk Area). Probability of failure and consequence
17	(such as public safety consequence) may also be considered. Execution of the
18	prioritized work plan would also have to address other factors such as clearance
19	availability, access, work efficiency, etc.
20	• Vegetation Management (VM): Trees or other vegetation that make contact
21	or cross within flash-over distance of high voltage transmission lines can
22	cause phase to phase or phase to ground electrical arcing, fire ignition or
23	local, regional or cascading, grid-level service interruption. Dense
24	vegetation growing within the right-of-way (ROW) can act as a fuel bed for
25	wildfire ignition. Vegetation growing close to any pole or structure can
26	impede inspection of the structure base and in some cases can damage the
27	structure or conductors and result in wire down events.
28	PG&E operates our lines in ET corridors that are home to vast amounts of
29	vegetation. This vegetation ranges from sparse to extremely dense. Our
30	transmission lines also pass through urban, agricultural, and forested settings.
31	The corridor environment is dynamic and requires focused attention to ensure
32	vegetation stays clear of energized conductors and other equipment. Vegetation
33	inspection is a required operational step in an overall VM Program. Accordingly,
34	PG&E has developed an annual inspection cycle program as part of our overall

1	Transmission VM Program to respond to the diverse and dynamic environment
2	of our service territory. The Routine North American Electric Reliability
3	Corporation (NERC) and Routine Non-NERC Programs are annually recurring.
4	The Integrated Vegetation Management (IVM) Program maintains cleared
5	ROWs and recurs on a two to five-year cycle. The frequency and prioritization
6	for each of these programs is described in more detail below.

- Routine NERC: The Routine NERC Program includes Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) inspection, visual verification of findings, and mitigation of vegetation encroachments, as well as other vegetation conditions on approximately 6,800 miles of NERC Critical lines.100 percent inspection and work plan completion are required by NERC Standard FAC-003-4. Work is prioritized based on aerial LiDAR detection. This program recurs annually.

- Non-Routine NERC: The Non-Routine NERC Program includes LiDAR inspection, visual verification of findings, and mitigation of vegetation encroachments, as well as other vegetation conditions on approximately 11,400 miles of transmission lines not designated as critical by NERC. Work is prioritized based on aerial LiDAR detection. This program recurs annually.

- Integrated Vegetation Management: The IVM Program is an ongoing maintenance program designed to maintain cleared ROWs in a sustainable and compatible condition by eliminating tall-growing and fire-prone vegetation and promoting low-growing, compatible vegetation. Prioritization is based on aging of work cycles and evaluation of vegetation re-growth. After initial work is performed, the ROWs are reassessed every two to five years.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:

CHAPTER 3.5

WIRES DOWN RED FLAG WARNING DAYS IN HFTD AREAS

(DISTRIBUTION)

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(DISTRIBUTION)

The material updates to this chapter since the October 2, 2023, report can be found in Section B concerning metric performance and Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

A. (3.5) Overview

1. Metric Definition

Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 3.5 – Wires Down Red Flag Warning (RFW) Days in High Fire Threat District (HFTD) Areas (Distribution) is defined as:

Number of Wires Down events in HFTD Areas on RFW Days involving overhead (OH) primary distribution circuits divided by RFW Distribution Circuit-Mile Days in HFTD Areas, in a calendar year.

2. Introduction of Metric

This metric measures the number of distribution wire down events located in the Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTD areas that occurred on RFW Days and is divided by sum of days and line miles (of the Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTD OH distribution line miles involved on each RFW Day).

In 2012, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E or the Company) initiated the Wires Down Program, including introduction of the wires down metric, to advance the Company's focus on public safety by reducing the number of conductors that fail and result in a contact with the ground, a vehicle, or other object.

This metric is associated with our Failure of Electric Distribution OH Asset Risk and Wildfire risk, which are part of our 2020 Risk Assessment and Mitigation Phase Report (RAMP) filing.

B. (3.5) Metric Performance

1. Historical Data (2013 – 2023)

We have 11 years of historical data available from the years 2013-2023. Although we started measuring distribution wire down incidents in the 2012, 2013 was the first full year uniformly measuring the number of distribution wire down incidents.

Over this historical reporting period, performance is largely influenced by external factors such as weather and third-party contact with our OH electric facilities. These historical results are plotted in Figure 3.5-1 below.

Our OH electric primary distribution system consists of approximately 80,200 circuit miles of OH conductor and associated assets that could contribute to a wires down incident. As of the end of year 2022, approximately 25,060 miles of our OH electric primary distribution lines traverse in the HFTD areas.

Over the last several years, we have completed significant work and launched various initiatives targeted at reducing wires down incidents, including:

- Performing infrared inspections of OH electric power lines to identify and repair hot spots;
- Clearing of vegetation hazards posing risks to our OH electric facilities; and
- Hardening of OH electric power systems with more resilient equipment.

In addition, our vegetation management (VM) teams conduct site visits of vegetation caused wires down incidents as part of its standard tree caused service interruption investigation process. The data obtained from site visits supports efforts to reduce future vegetation caused wires down incidents. The data collected from these investigations also helps identify failure patterns by tree species that are associated with wires down incidents. Additionally, beginning in March of 2024, an Extent of Condition patrol five spans in all directions from the wire down location will look for any other trees that may be of concerning the area requiring timely mitigation.

As of the end of year 2022, there are a total of approximately 25,060 OH distribution circuit lines miles located in HFTD areas. PG&E's databases reflect the circuit miles that currently exist and do not maintain the historical

1	values specifically in the HFTD areas. We have assumed the circuit miles
2	have remained the same for all years from 2013-2022. Going forward,
3	PG&E will report the nominally updated circuit mileage total annually.
4	For the calculation of this metric, both the HFTD OH line miles and
5	number of wires down events are measured based on the area subjected by
6	each specific RFW Day event and summed for each specific year.

FIGURE 3.5-1
ELECTRIC DISTRIBUTION
PRIMARY WIRES DOWN INCIDENTS PER RFW/CIRCUIT MILE-DAYS (2013-2023)

7	**2. Data Collection Methodology**
8	PG&E uses its Integrated Logging Information System (ILIS) –
9	Operations Database to track and count the number of wires down
10	incidents, as well as its electric distribution geographical information
11	systems (EDGIS) to determine if the wire down incident was in an HFTD
12	locations. Although the outage database does not specifically identify
13	precise location of the downed wire, the Latitude and Longitude
14	(e.g., Lat/Long) of the device is used to isolate the involved electric power

line Section as a proxy. PG&E also uses its EDGIS application to determine if that device (Lat/Long information) is in the HFTD (e.g., Tier 2 or Tier 3 location). Outage information is entered into ILIS by our electric distribution operators based on information from field personnel and devices such as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition alarms and SmartMeter™[1] devices. We last upgraded our outage reporting tools in year 2015 and integrated SmartMeter information to identify potential outage reporting errors and to initiate a subsequent review and correction.

PG&E's meteorology group maintains a data base tracking RFW dates, time, and involved areas and determines RFW Circuit Miles Days as follows:

- The National Weather Service (NWS) will issue a RFW and their associated polygons under specific polygon/shapefiles called Fire Zones.
- PG&E's geographic information system team has calculated all OH Distribution and Transmission lines for all the Fire Zone shapefile boundaries that intersect PG&E territory. For each NWS Fire Zone PG&E has the number of OH line miles for Distribution and Transmission and the number of OH line miles for Transmission, which is then also split into the specific HFTD and non HFTD tiers and zones.
- Meteorology then compiles all the archived RFW shapefiles for California, and from all the RFW events, determines which zones there was a RFW under and the duration of time it lasted.
- RFW Circuit Mile Days= RFW days x Circuit line miles.

3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period

As shown in Figure 3.5-1 above, the distribution wire down events on RFW days per circuit mile day has varied each year but has generally declined since 2017. In 2022 PG&E experienced zero wires down events on RFWs. Similarly, in 2023, PG&E only experienced one wire down event on RFWs. 2021 experienced 13 wires down events on RFWs compared to 34 in 2020. Performance is attributed to ongoing efforts in reducing wires

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[1] SmartMeter is a PG&E registered trademark. All further references to SmartMeters in PG&E's testimony in this proceeding should be assumed to refer to the trademarked name, without continually using the ™ symbol, consistent with legally-acceptable practice.

1 down events, in particular vegetation management and hardening.

2 However, because the number of events is very minimal, and the metric is

3 highly weather dependent in areas that are more susceptible to wire down

4 events, it can be expected to see variance from a year-to-year basis.

5 **C. (3.5) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

6 **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

7 There have been no changes to the directional 1- and 5- year targets

8 since the last report.

9 **2. Target Methodology**

10 • Directional Only: Maintain (stay within historical range, and assumes

11 response stays the same in events)

12 Based on the historical performance of this metric, PG&E interprets

13 "Maintain" as staying within two standard deviations from the 10-year

14 average. This equates to an upper limit of 0.00057 (as shown in

15 Figure 3.5-1).

16 • Historical Data and Trends: This metric is expected to remain within the

17 historical performance levels, but will vary based on the number of

18 RFWs and severity of weather experienced in a year;

19 • Benchmarking: Not available to the best of our knowledge;

20 • Regulatory Requirements: None;

21 • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and

22 Enforcement: The directional target for this metric is suitable for EOE as

23 it suggests performance will remain within the historical range which

24 accounts for unknown factors which may vary such as the frequency

25 and severity of weather;

26 • Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: The directional target

27 to maintain performance is attainable within known resources, however

28 this metric is impacted by the variability in conditions outside of PG&E's

29 controls, such as the severity of weather on RFWs;

30 • Other Considerations: None.

31 **3. 2024 Target**

32 The 2024 target is to maintain within historical performance levels.

1   **4. 2028 Target**

2   The 2028 target is to maintain within historical performance levels.

3 **D. (3.5) Performance Against Target**

4   **1. Progress Towards the 1-year Target**

5   As demonstrated in Figure 3.5-1 above, PG&E experienced one

6   distribution wires down event on RFW Days in 2023. Thus, the metric was

7   0.00003 for 2023, which is within the 2023 upper limit of 0.00058.

8   **2. Progress Towards the 5-year Target**

9   As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is deploying a number of

10   programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this metric to

11   align with the Company's 5-year directional performance target.

12 **E. (3.5) Current and Planned Work Activities**

13   PG&E will continue to execute many ongoing activities to reduce wires

14   down, including the following programs:

15   • OH Conductor Replacement: PG&E's electric distribution system includes

16   approximately 80,200 circuit miles of OH conductor on its distribution system

17   that operates between 4 and 21 kilovolt, including bare and covered

18   conductors. Approximately 54,500 circuit miles of this distribution

19   conductor, including approximately 36,300 circuit miles of small conductor is

20   in non-HFTD areas. PG&E's OH Conductor Replacement Program,

21   recorded in MAT 08J, proactively replaces OH conductor in non-HFTD

22   areas to address elevated rates of wires down and deteriorated/damaged

23   conductors and to improve system safety, reliability, and integrity.

24   Please see Exhibit (PG&E-4), Chapter 13, Overhead and Underground

25   Asset Management in the 2023 GRC for additional details.

26   • Patrols and Inspections: PG&E monitors the condition of OH conductor

27   through patrols and inspections consistent with GO 165. Tags are created

28   for abnormal conditions, including those that can lead to a wire down. Work

29   is prioritized in a risk-informed manner to address the issues identified in the

30   tags. In addition, PG&E has implemented risk based aerial inspections

31   using drones in targeted areas. Drone inspections significantly improves our

32   ability to assess deteriorated conditions on the conductor.

1   • Grid Design and System Hardening: PG&E's broader grid design program
2   covers a number of significant programs, called out in detail in PG&E's 2023
3   WMP. The largest of these programs is the System Hardening Program
4   which focuses on the mitigation of potential catastrophic wildfire risk caused
5   by distribution OH assets. In 2023, we continued our system hardening
6   efforts by: (1) completing 447 circuit miles of system hardening work which
7   includes OH system hardening, undergrounding and removal of OH lines in
8   HFTD or buffer zone areas; (2) completing approximately 364 circuit miles of
9   undergrounding work, including Butte County Rebuild efforts and other
10   distribution system hardening work; and (3) replacing equipment in HFTD
11   areas that creates ignition risks, such as non-exempt fuses and surge
12   arresters. As we look beyond 2024, PG&E is targeting 250 miles of
13   Undergrounding and 70 miles of OH/removal/remote grid to be completed in
14   2024 as part of the 10,000 Mile Undergrounding Program. Even though this
15   program will provide wire down mitigation benefit, note that PG&E's
16   approach to wildfire mitigations in the HFTD locations is based on a risk
17   informed prioritization of work in the areas where wildfire risk is evaluated as
18   highest, as opposed to where wires down incidents have a high likelihood of
19   occurrence if they are in areas where wildfire risk is relatively lower within
20   the HFTD.
21   Please see Section 7.3.3, Grid Design and System Hardening
22   Mitigations in PG&E's WMP for additional details.
23   • Vegetation Management: The EVM Program targeted OH distribution lines
24   in Tier 2 and 3 HFTD areas and supplemented PG&E's annual routine VM
25   work with California Public Utilities Commission mandated clearances. Our
26   EVM Program went above and beyond regulatory requirements for
27   distribution lines by expanding minimum clearances and removing
28   overhangs in HFTD areas. Due to the emergence of other wildfire mitigation
29   programs (namely EPSS and Undergrounding), the program was
30   discontinued in 2023. The trees that were identified as part of the program
31   and previous iterations and scopes will be worked down over the next nine
32   years under a program called Tree Removal Inventory (TRI), prioritized by
33   risk rank using our latest wildfire distribution risk model. The WMP has

commitments for this program of the removal of 15 thousand trees in 2023, 20 thousand trees in 2024, and 25 thousand trees in 2025.

VM for Operational Mitigations is a new transitional program which began 2023 stemming from the conclusion of the EVM program. This program is intended to help reduce outages and potential ignitions using a risk-informed, targeted plan to mitigate potential vegetation contacts based on historic vegetation outages on EPSS-enabled circuits. The focus is on mitigating potential vegetation contacts in CPZs that have experienced vegetation caused outages. Scope of Work is developed by using EPSS and historical outage data and vegetation failure from the current WDRM risk model. Vegetation outage extent of condition inspections conducted on EPSS-enabled devices may generate additional tree work.

Focused Tree Inspections (FTI) is another new transitional program that began in 2023 stemming from the conclusion of the EVM program. PG&E is developed Areas of Concern (AOC) to better focus VM efforts to address high risk areas that have experienced higher volumes of vegetation damage during PSPS events, outages, and/or ignitions. These areas are inspected by Vegetation Management Inspectors with a Tree Risk Assessment Qualification (TRAQ) which provides a higher level of rigor to the inspection.

Please see Section 8.2, Vegetation Management and Inspections in PG&E's WMP for additional details.

- Other Advancements: In addition, there are several technologies that PG&E is piloting to better identify and/or prevent conductor to ground faults. This includes:
  - SmartMeter-based methods;
  - Distribution Falling Wire Detection Method;
  - Distribution Fault Anticipation;
  - Early Fault Detection; and
  - Rapid Earth Fault Current Limiter.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
CHAPTER 3.6
WIRES DOWN RED FLAG WARNING DAYS IN HFTD AREAS
(TRANSMISSION)

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
CHAPTER 3.6
WIRES DOWN RED FLAG WARNING DAYS IN HFTD AREAS
(TRANSMISSION)

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6 *The material updates to this chapter since the October 2, 2023, report can be*
7 *found in Section B concerning metric performance and Section D concerning*
8 *performance against target. Material changes from the prior report are identified in*
9 *blue font.*

10 **A. (3.6) Overview**

11 **1. Metric Definition**

12   Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 3.6 – Wires Down Red Flag

13 Warning Days in HFTD Areas (Transmission) is defined as:

14   *Number of Wires Down events in High Fire Threat District (HFTD) Areas*

15 *on Red Flag Warning (RFW) Days involving overhead transmission circuits*

16 *divided by RFW Transmission Circuit-Mile Days in HFTD Areas, in a*

17 *calendar year.*

18 **2. Introduction of Metric**

19   This metric measures the count of Transmission Wire Down events

20 occurring on RFW Days and provides a partial indicator for electric system

21 safety and overall electric service reliability for end-use customers.

22   This metric is associated with Pacific Gas and Electric Company's

23 (PG&E) Failure of Electric Transmission Overhead Asset Risk and Wildfire

24 Risk, which are part of the Company's 2020 Risk Assessment and Mitigation

25 Phase Report filing

26 **B. (3.6) Metric Performance**

27 **1. Historical Data (2013 – 2023)**

28   There are 11 years of historical data available from the years

29 2013-2023. Although PG&E started measuring wire down events in 2012,

30 2013 was the first full year uniformly measuring the number of transmission

31 wire down incidents. When calculating this metric, both the HFTD overhead

32 line miles and number of wires down events are measured based on the

1 area subjected by each specific RFW Day event and summed for each
2 specific year.
3   The HFTD boundaries are a recent development and were not defined
4 for several years. Hence, for all years prior to and including 2022, PG&E
5 uses 5,525.9 overhead transmission circuit miles in Tier 2/3 HFTD areas
6 and assumes any variances in prior years are negligible. Moving forward,
7 HFTD mileage will be refreshed at the beginning of each year. Table 3.6-1
8 provides the HFTD miles used for each year.

TABLE 3.6-1
HFTD MILES

Year	HFTD Miles
Prior to 2023	5525.9
2023	5437.7
2024	5402.3

FIGURE 3.6-1
ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION
WIRES DOWN INCIDENTS PER RFW/CIRCUIT MILE-DAYS (2013-2023)

2. Data Collection Methodology

PG&E used its transmission outage database, typically referred to as Transmission Operations Tracking & Logging to count the number of these events. Although PG&E's outage database does not specifically identify the precise location of the downed wire, PG&E uses the Lat/Long of the device used to operate/isolate the involved line Section as a proxy and then uses its Electric Transmission Geographic Information System application to determine if that point is in a Tier 2 or Tier 3 HFTD area.

The meteorology group maintains a data base with the RFW days/time and involved areas and determines RFW Circuit Miles Days as follows:

- The National Weather Service (NWS) will issue a RFW and their associated polygons under specific polygon/shapefiles called Fire Zones;

- PG&E's geographic information system team has calculated all overhead Distribution and Transmission lines for all of the Fire Zone shapefile boundaries that intersect PG&E territory. For each NWS Fire Zone PG&E has the number of OH line miles for Distribution and Transmission and the number of OH line miles for Transmission, which is then also split into the specific HFTD and non HFTD tiers and zones;

- Meteorology then compiles all the archived RFW shapefiles for California, and from all the RFW events, determines which zones there was a RFW under and the duration of time it lasted; and

- RFW Circuit Mile Days= RFW days x Circuit line miles.

3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period

As shown in Figure 3.6-1, the transmission wire down events on RFW days per circuit mile day is a very small subset of wire down events, making it difficult to identify any trending information. Zero events occurred in 2022. Similarly, there have been no transmission wire down events on Red Flag Warning days in 2023. 2020 experienced one such event. Since 2013, only two years have experienced any Transmission Wire Down events on RFWs; 2017 (3) and 2020 (1), respectively.

C. (3.6) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target

    1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report

        There are no updates to the directional 1- and 5-Year Targets since last report and are set to maintain performance within the historical range.

    2. Target Methodology

- <u>Directional Only</u>: Maintain (stay within historical range, and assumes response stays the same in events);
  Note that there has not been enough historic electric transmission wire down events on RFW days to establish a target based on prior performance.
- <u>Benchmarking</u>: Not available to best of our knowledge;
- <u>Regulatory Requirements</u>: None;
- <u>Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and Enforcement</u>: The directional target for this metric is suitable for EOE as it suggests performance will remain within the historical range;
- <u>Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan</u>: Unknown, however this metric is impacted by the variability in conditions outside of PG&E's control, such as the severity of weather on RFWs; and
- <u>Other Considerations</u>: None.

D. (3.6) Performance Against Target

    1. Progress Towards the 1-Year Target

        As demonstrated in Figure 3.6-1 above, PG&E experienced zero transmission wires down events on Red Flag Warning Days in which is consistent with Company's 1-year directional target. There were zero transmission wire down events on Red Flag Warning days in 2023.

    2. Progress Towards the 5-Year Target

        As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is deploying a number of programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this metric to align with the Company's 5-year directional performance target.

E. (3.6) Current and Planned Work Activities

        Wire down events can be caused by a variety of factors, including but not limited to asset failure, third-party contact, or vegetation contact. The following

1   work activities may provide future resiliency for certain wire down event causes,

2   though the effectiveness of the work is dependent upon the circumstances of the

3   wire down event (e.g., new assets may still be prone to a wire down event that

4   occur due to extreme weather events outside of standard design guidance).

5   • Asset Inspection: Detailed inspections of overhead transmission assets

6   seek to proactively identify potential failure modes of asset components

7   which could create future wire down, outage, and/or safety events if left

8   unresolved or allowed to "run to failure." Detailed inspections for

9   transmission assets involve at least two detailed inspection methods per

10   structure (ground and aerial), though not necessarily in the same calendar

11   year which allows for staggered inspection methods across multiple years.

12   Aerial inspections may be completed either by drone or, helicopter. In

13   addition to the ground and aerial inspections, climbing inspections are also

14   required for 500 kilovolt structures or as triggered. All these inspection

15   methods involve detailed, visual examinations of the assets with use of

16   inspection checklists that are in accordance with the ET Preventive

17   Maintenance (TD-1001M), as well as the Failure Modes and Effects

18   Analysis.

19   • Asset Repair and Replacement: Completing repair, replacement, removal

20   or life extension to transmission assets provides the benefit of reduced

21   probability of failure for components that could potentially result in a wire

22   down event. For example, by replacing or improving aged, degraded assets

23   and providing more robust, up-to-standard designs. Asset removal

24   eliminates wire-down event risk by removing the energized electrical

25   components. Many improvements are identified through corrective

26   maintenance notifications. These notifications are typically identified as a

27   result of transmission asset inspections and patrols.

28   Prioritization of maintenance tags are based on severity of the issues

29   found and fire ignition potential (i.e., asset-conditions impacting issues

30   associated with HFTD areas and High Fire Risk Area). Probability of failure

31   and consequence (such as public safety consequence) may also be

32   considered. Execution of the prioritized work plan would also have to

33   address other factors such as clearance availability, access, work efficiency,

34   etc.

- <u>Vegetation Management (VM)</u>: Trees or other vegetation that make contact or cross within flash-over distance of high voltage transmission lines can cause phase to phase or phase to ground electrical arcing, fire ignition or local, regional or cascading, grid-level service interruption. Dense vegetation growing within the right-of-way (ROW) can act as a fuel bed for wildfire ignition. Vegetation growing close to any pole or structure can impede inspection of the structure base and in some cases can damage the structure or conductors and result in wire down events.

    PG&E operates our lines in electric transmission (ET) corridors that are home to vast amounts of vegetation. This vegetation ranges from sparse to extremely dense. Our transmission lines also pass through urban, agricultural, and forested settings. The corridor environment is dynamic and requires focused attention to ensure vegetation stays clear of energized conductors and other equipment. Vegetation inspection is a required operational step in an overall VM Program. Accordingly, PG&E has developed an annual inspection cycle program as part of our overall Transmission VM Program to respond to the diverse and dynamic environment of our service territory. The Routine North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and Routine Non-NERC Programs are annually recurring. The Integrated Vegetation Management (IVM) Program maintains cleared ROWs and recurs on a two-to-5-year cycle. The frequency and prioritization for each of these programs is described in more detail below.

- <u>Routine NERC</u>: The Routine NERC Program includes Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) inspection, visual verification of findings, and mitigation of vegetation encroachments, as well as other vegetation conditions on approximately 6,800 miles of NERC Critical lines.100 percent inspection and work plan completion are required by NERC Standard FAC-003-4. Work is prioritized based on aerial LiDAR detection. This program recurs annually.

- <u>Routine Non-NERC</u>: The Non-Routine NERC Program includes LiDAR inspection, visual verification of findings, and mitigation of vegetation encroachments, as well as other vegetation conditions on approximately 11,400 miles of transmission lines not designated as critical by NERC.

1   Work is prioritized based on aerial LiDAR detection. This program recurs
2   annually.
3   •   <u>Integrated Vegetation Management</u>: The IVM Program is an ongoing
4   maintenance program designed to maintain cleared ROWs in a sustainable
5   and compatible condition by eliminating tall-growing and fire-prone
6   vegetation and promoting low-growing, compatible vegetation. Prioritization
7   is based on aging of work cycles and evaluation of vegetation re-growth.
8   After initial work is performed, the ROWs are reassessed every two to
9   five years.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:

CHAPTER 3.7

MISSED OVERHEAD DISTRIBUTION PATROLS IN HFTD AREAS

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MISSED OVERHEAD DISTRIBUTION PATROLS IN HFTD AREAS

The material updates to this chapter since the December 20, 2023, report can be found in Section B concerning metric performance and Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

A. (3.7) Overview

1. Metric Definition

Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 3.7 – Missed Overhead (OH) Distribution Patrols in High Fire Threat District (HFTD) is defined as:

Total number of overhead electric distribution structures that fell below the minimum patrol frequency requirements divided by the total number of overhead electric distribution structures that required patrols, in HFTD area in past calendar year. "Minimum patrol frequency" refers to the frequency of patrols as specified in General Order (GO) 165. "Structures" refer to electric assets such as transformers, switching protective devices, capacitors, lines, poles, etc.

2. Introduction of Metric

Patrols involve simple visual observations to identify obvious structural problems and hazards affecting safety or reliability. Within HFTD, nonconformances identified by patrols can involve conditions that represent a wildfire ignition risk. Performing required patrols on time ensures that nonconformances are identified in a timely manner so that they can be prioritized for repair in accordance with the risk of the condition.

Prior to year 2014, GO 165 required that patrols be completed any time between January 1 and December 31 each year.

Starting in 2015 and through 2019, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) implemented the new GO 165 requirement to complete patrols each year within a prescribed timeframe, based on the date of the last patrol or inspection. PG&E's interpretation and implementation of this new language calculated the due date for each patrol each year as follows:

1   The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) Patrol & Inspection

2   requirement defines:

3   • The due date for each map is based on the date the map was last

4   inspected or patrolled;

5   • Inspections or patrols may not exceed three additional months past the

6   previous inspection or patrol date (maximum 15 months);

7   • Inspections or patrols may be performed before the due date;

8   • Inspections or patrols are performed by the end of the calendar year

9   (12/31/YY); and

10   • The start of an inspection or a patrol starts a new inspection or patrol

11   interval that must be completed within the prescribed timeframe.

12   For the years 2020 and 2021, PG&E shifted away from the "12+3" due

13   date for completing patrols, with the intent of wildfire risk reduction by

14   focusing on the High Fire Threat District areas and using new risk models to

15   inform the prioritization of patrols. PG&E completed patrols by static due

16   dates, August 31 for HFTD areas, and December 31st for Non-HFTD areas.

17   In 2022, PG&E completed OH patrols and inspections in compliance

18   with GO 165.

19   In 2023 and beyond, PG&E will continue to complete patrols and

20   inspections in compliance with GO 165.

21   **B. (3.7) Metric Performance**

22   **1. Historical Data (2015–2023)**

23   To be consistent with the implementation of new GO 165 requirements,

24   historical data begins in 2015.[1] The 2015-2019 data includes systemwide

25   results. The 2020- 2023, data includes HFTD specific results.

26   Prior to 2020, PG&E completed patrols on paper by "plat map". Each

27   plat map had a calculated "12+3" due date based on the start date of the last

28   patrol or inspection for that plat map. For the years 2015-2019, PG&E

29   tracked and measured performance of patrols based on the "12+3"

30   calculated due date for each *plat map*. Performance was tracked using

---

[1] Historical patrol data is at plat map level vs. structure level. We are further validating plat-based results for HFTD vs. NHFTD units, we may see slight changes to volumes completed late vs. on time, or vice-versa.

1	detailed excel spreadsheets for each of the 19 Divisions across the system,
2	and SAP data recorded for each plat map, which recorded the actual start
3	and end dates for each plat map, as well as actual units and the PG&E LAN
4	ID (login ID) of the Inspector who completed the work. PG&E's annual
5	performance for completing patrols in these years was 0.00 percent
6	completed late.
7	For the years 2020 and 2021, PG&E's performance was impacted by
8	the shift away from completing OH patrols by the "12+3" calculated due
9	dates to the use of a risk--based prioritization approach and focus on HFTD
10	with the intention of wildfire risk reduction.

FIGURE 3.7-1
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE (2015 –2023)

Note: Actual performance as follows between 2015-2019: 2015: 0.0003 percent, 2016:
0.0003 percent, 2017: 0.0000 percent, 2018: 0.0002 percent, 2019: 0.0015 percent. 2020:
8.61 percent, 2021: 0.86 percent, 2022: 0.00 percent 2023: 3.94 percent.

11	**2. Data Collection Methodology**
12	The currently used data collection methodology was implemented in
13	2020. It uses a mobile platform for completing OH inspections, recorded at
14	structure (pole) level using a detailed inspection checklist. PG&E also

1	shifted its maintenance plan structure in SAP from purely plat -map based to
2	circuit/risk based, tracking performance at *structure -level*.
3	PG&E continues to perform OH patrols on paper, with a goal of shifting
4	to mobile technology over the next few years. OH Patrols are tracked at
5	"maintenance plan" level, using excel spreadsheets and SAP data.

3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period

Between 2015-2019, PG&E's annual performance for completing patrols by the CPUC "12+3" due date was 0 percent completed late. These results demonstrate our commitment to meet GO 165 CPUC "12+3" due dates.

For the years 2020 and 2021, with the shift to a wildfire risk reduction focused approach and away from completing OH patrols by the "12+3" calculated due date, PG&E's metric performance was 8.61 percent completed late in 2020, 0.86 percent completed late in 2021 and 0 percent were completed late in 2022. For 2023, 3.94 percent were completed late.

C. (3.7) 1-Year and 5-Year Target

1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report

For 2024, PG&E has not altered its 1-year target of 0-4 percent which has been consistent since the September 2022 report. However, PG&E has adjusted the 2028 5-year target to 0-1 percent from the previous 5-year target of 0-2 percent in 2027 to drive incremental improvement.

2. Target Methodology

To establish the 1-year and 5-year targets, PG&E considered the following factors:

- Historical Data and Trends: Based on historical performance of 0 percent completed late (2015-2019) and the results of the more recently used wildfire risk reduction approach (2020-2023). In 2024 PG&E intends to improve performance by completing OH patrols to (1) be in compliance with GO 165, with a target range of 0-4 percent completed late, and (2) incorporate Asset Strategy risk models.

- Benchmarking: Not available;

- Regulatory Requirements: GO 165;

- Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Targeted performance is attainable within PG&E's currently known resource plan;

- Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight Enforcement: The target range is a suitable indicator for EOE as it intends to return PG&E to historical levels of near-zero percent noncompliance while also incorporating reasonable impacts resulting from access and other field issues.
- Other Qualitative Considerations: None.

3. **2024 Target**

The 2024 target is 0-4 percent to maintain performance compared to 2023.

4. **2028 Target**

The 2028 target is 0-1 percent to improve performance compared to 2023, based on the factors described above, and the commitment to continuously improve performance.

D. **(3.7) Performance Against Target**

1. **Progress Towards the 1-Year Target**

As demonstrated in Figure 3.7-2 below, PG&E saw an increase in missed OH Distribution patrols in 2023 as compared to 2022. Over an approximate two-month period, PG&E incorrectly calculated due dates for Distribution OH Patrols due in April and May. This miscalculation led to late patrols in those two months as seen in the data set provided. However, since correcting the error, PG&E has seen a decrease in the number of late patrols and continues to perform the work on time leading to 3.94 percent late patrol late for 2023 which is within PG&E's. To alleviate this in the future, PG&E is validating its monthly 0-4 percent target range.

2. **Progress Towards the 5-Year Target**

As discussed in Section E below, PG&E has a number of programs to improve the long-term performance of this metric and to meet the company's 5-year performance target.

FIGURE 3.7-2
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE (2015-2023) AND TARGET

Historical Performance & Targets

E. (3.7) Current and Planned Work Activities

1.
2. • <u>Visibility and Compliance</u>: Since 2022, Supervisors and Inspectors could
3.   see the CPUC due dates for each patrol package to ensure understanding
4.   as to the due date of the OH patrol.
5. • <u>Tracking</u>:
6.   – System Inspections track progress and completion of OH patrols on a
7.   continuous basis, using detailed excel tracking spreadsheets + SAP
8.   data;
9.   – System Inspections track and report-out on any "late" OH patrols,
10.   including identifying mitigating factors and implementing process
11.   improvements or changes to the program; and
12.   – System Inspections track timeliness of patrols being completed on their
13.   weekly scorecard.
14. • <u>Training</u>: System Inspections conduct refresher training to ensure
15.   understanding of the importance of patrols in identifying obvious structural
16.   problems and hazards in years where an inspection is not required.

1 • <u>Maintenance Plan Management Tool</u>: System Inspections Maintenance
2   Planners complete timely review and completion of changes to structures
3   and maintenance plans using the maintenance plan management tool.

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CHAPTER 3.8

MISSED OVERHEAD DISTRIBUTION INSPECTIONS IN HFTD

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The material updates to this chapter since the December 20, 2023, report can be found in Section B concerning metric performance and Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

A. **(3.8) Overview**

1. **Metric Definition**

Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 3.8 – Missed Overhead Distribution Detailed Inspections in HFTD Areas is defined as:

Overhead Distribution Detailed Inspections in High Fire Threat District (HFTD): Total number of structures that fell below the minimum inspection frequency requirements divided by the total number of structures that required inspection, in HFTD area in past calendar year. "Minimum inspection frequency" refers to the frequency of scheduled inspections as specified in General Order (GO) 165. "Structures" refers to electric assets such as transformers, switching protective devices, capacitors, lines, poles, etc.

2. **Introduction of Metric**

Detailed inspections are performed to identify nonconformances affecting safety or reliability. Within HFTD, nonconformances identified by inspections can involve conditions that represent a wildfire ignition risk. Performing required inspections on time ensures that non-conformances are identified in a timely manner so that they can be prioritized for repair in accordance with the risk of the condition.

Prior to year 2014, GO 165 required that inspections be completed any time between January 1 and December 31 each year.

Starting in 2015 and through 2019, PG&E implemented the new GO 165 requirement to complete inspections each year within a prescribed timeframe, based on the date of the last patrol or inspection. PG&E's

interpretation and implementation of this new language calculated the due
date for each patrol or inspection each year as follows:

The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) Patrol & Inspection
requirement defines:

- The due date for each map is based on the date the map was last inspected or patrolled;
- Inspections or patrols may not exceed three additional months past the previous inspection or patrol date (maximum 15 months);
- Inspections or patrols may be performed before the due date;
- Inspections or patrols are performed by the end of the calendar year (12/31/XX); and
- The start of an inspection or a patrol starts a new inspection or patrol interval that must be completed within the prescribed timeframe.

For the years 2020 and 2021, PG&E shifted away from the "12+3" due
date for completing inspections with the intent of wildfire risk reduction by
focusing on the HFTD areas, and using new risk models to inform the
prioritization of inspections each year. PG&E completed inspections by the
static due dates of, August 31 for HFTD areas, December 31 for Non-HFTD
areas.

In 2022, PG&E intends to complete overhead patrols and inspections in
compliance with GO 165.

In 2023 and beyond, PG&E will continue to complete patrols and
inspections in compliance with GO 165.

B. (3.8) Metric Performance

1. Historical Data (2015-2023)

To be consistent with the implementation of new GO 165 requirements,
historical data begins in 2015. The 2015-2019 data includes systemwide
results. The 2020-2021 data[1] includes HFTD specific results.

Prior to 2020, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) completed
inspections on paper by plat map. Each plat map had a calculated "12+3"

---

[1] Historical inspection data <2020 is at plat map level vs. structure level. We are further validating plat map-based results for HFTD vs. NHFTD units, we may see slight changes to volumes completed late vs. on time, or vice-versa.

1 due date based on the start date of the last patrol or inspection for that plat

2 map. For the years 2015-2019, PG&E tracked and measured performance

3 of inspections based on the "12+3" calculated due date for each plat map.

4 Performance was tracked using detailed excel spreadsheets for each of the

5 19 Divisions across the system, and SAP data recorded for each plat map,

6 which recorded the actual start and end dates for each plat map, as well as

7 actual units and PG&E LAN ID (login ID) of the Inspector who completed the

8 work. PG&E's annual performance for completion and inspections in these

9 years was 0.01-0.04 percent completed late.

10   For the years 2020 and 2021, PG&E's performance was impacted by

11 the shift away from completing overhead inspection by the "12+3" calculated

12 due dates to the use of a risk-based prioritization approach and focus on

13 HFTD with the intention of wildfire risk reduction.

FIGURE 3.8-1
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE (2015- 2023)

14 **2. Data Collection Methodology**

15   The currently used data collection methodology was implemented in

16 2020. It uses a mobile platform for completing Overhead inspections,

17 recorded at structure (pole) level using a detailed inspection checklist.

1   PG&E also shifted its maintenance plan structure in SAP from purely

2   plat -map based to circuit/risk based, tracking performance at

3   *structure -level*.

4   PG&E now tracks the completion of inspections at structure (pole) level,

5   using the "attainment report," which records actual completion information

6   for each structure from actual inspection data recorded in SAP.

7   **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

8   Between 2015-2019, PG&E's annual performance for completing

9   inspections by the CPUC "12+3" due date was 0 - 4 percent completed late.

10 These results demonstrate our commitment to meet GO 165 CPUC "12+3"

11 due dates.

12   For the years 2020 and 2021, with the shift to a wildfire risk reduction

13 focused approach and away from completing overhead inspections by the

14 "12+3" calculated due date, PG&E performance worsened to 9.01 percent

15 completed late in 2020 and 4.10 percent completed late in 2021. In 2022,

16 PG&E's performance improved to 0.03 percent completed late. In 2023,

17 there were 10 late overhead inspections of the 230,491 inspections

18 performed which equates to a percentage of 0 percent.

19 **C. (3.8) 1-Year and 5-Year Target**

20   **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

21   PG&E adjusted the 2024 1-year target to 0-2 percent from the

22 0-4 percent 2023 1-year target, and the 2028 5-year target to 0-1 percent

23 from the 0-2 percent 2027 5-year target to drive incremental improvement.

24   **2. Target Methodology**

25   To establish the 1-year and 5-year targets, PG&E considered the

26 following factors:

27 •   Historical Data and Trends: Based on historical performance of

28   1-4 percent completed late (2015-2019) and the results of the more

29   recently used wildfire risk reduction approach (2020-2023), in 2024

30   PG&E intends to improve performance by completing overhead

31   inspections to: (1) be in compliance with GO 165, with a target range of

32   0-2 percent completed late, and (2) incorporate Asset Strategy risk

33   models;

- Benchmarking: Not available;
- Regulatory Requirements: GO 165;
- Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Targeted performance is attainable within PG&E's currently known resource plan;
- Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight Enforcement: The target range is a suitable indicator for EOE as it intends to return PG&E to historical levels of near-zero percent non-compliances while also incorporating reasonable impacts resulting from access and other field issues.
- Other Qualitative Considerations: None.

3. 2024 Target

The 2023 target is 0-2 percent to improve performance based on the factors described above.

4. 2028 Target

The 2027 target is 0-1 percent to improve performance based on the factors described above and the commitment to continuously improve performance.

D. (3.8) Performance Against Target

1. Progress Towards/Deviation From the 1-Year Target

As demonstrated in Figure 3.8-2 below, PG&E saw 0 percent missed overhead Distribution inspections in the 2023 which was within the company's 1-year target.

2. Progress Towards/Deviation From the 5-Year Target

As discussed in Section E below, PG&E has several programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this metric to meet the Company's 5-year performance target.

FIGURE 3.8--2
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE (2015- 2023) AND
TARGETS (2024 &2028)

E. (3.8) Current and Planned Work Activities

1

2 • <u>Visibility and Compliance</u>: Since 2022, Supervisors and Inspectors can see

3   the CPUC due dates for each inspection, so that they can plan work to be

4   completed on time.

5 • <u>Tracking</u>:

6   – System Inspections tracked progress and completion of overhead

7   inspections on a continuous basis, using detailed SAP data reports and

8   excel tracking spreadsheets.

9   – System Inspections tracked and reported-out on any overdue overhead

10   inspections, including identifying mitigating factors and implementing

11   process improvements or changes to address gaps.

12   – System Inspections tracked timeliness of inspections being completed

13   on their weekly scorecard.

14 • <u>Training</u>: System Inspections will conduct annual "Refresher" training on

15   overhead inspections, which includes focus on anything that has changed

16   since the previous year (guidance, standards, procedures), including updates

to the INSPECT application, inspection checklists, and associated Inspector job aids.

- Asset Strategy – Monthly Inspection Validations: Monthly inspection validations will continue to identify required additions to the original plan arising from additions or changes to the asset registry.

- Asset Strategy – Ad Hoc Inspections: Asset Strategy will continue to evaluate the asset registry and may identify additional "ad hoc" structures to be inspected each year, based on analysis related to ignition risk, etc.

- Maintenance Plan Management Tool: System Inspections Maintenance Planners will complete timely review and completion of changes to structures and maintenance plans by way of the "maintenance plan management tool."

- Desktop Quality Control: System Inspections conducts desktop work verification activities on a valid sample size of completed inspections to evaluate the completeness and quality of inspections.

- Quality Control Field Work Verification: System Inspections conducts "blind" field work verification activities on a valid sample size of completed inspections to evaluate the completeness and quality of inspections.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:

CHAPTER 3.9

MISSED OVERHEAD TRANSMISSION PATROLS IN

HFTD AREAS

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The material updates to this chapter since the October 2, 2023, report can be found in Section B concerning metric performance and Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

A. (3.9) Overview

1. Metric Definition

Safety and Operational Metrics (SOM) 3.9 – Missed Overhead Transmission Patrols in High Fire Threat District (HFTD) Areas is defined as:

Overhead (OH) Transmission Patrols in High Fire Threat District (HFTD): Total number of structures that fell below the minimum patrol frequency requirements divided by the total number of structures that required patrols, in HFTD area in past calendar year where, "Minimum patrol frequency" refers to the frequency of patrols requirements, as applicable. "Structures" refers to electric assets such as transformers, switching protective devices, capacitors, lines, poles, etc.

2. Introduction of Metric

Patrols involve simple visual observations to identify obvious non-conformances affecting safety or reliability. Within HFTD areas, nonconformances identified by patrols can involve conditions that represent a wildfire ignition risk. Performing patrols on time allows non-conformances to be identified in a timely manner so that they can be prioritized for repair in accordance with the risk of the condition.

All assets require either a detailed inspection or a patrol each year. While detailed inspections have shifted from circuit-based cycles to an inspection frequency that depends on HFTD and structure-level risk considerations, patrols are performed by circuit. Therefore, any line that does not receive a detailed inspection from end-to-end will require a patrol and it is possible for some structures to receive both an inspection and a patrol in the same year. Patrols may be performed either by air (helicopter)

1	or ground (walking or driving). Compared to transmission detailed
2	inspections, the transmission OH patrol program has not undergone
3	significant changes over the reporting period from 2015-present. Starting in
4	2021, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) imposed an in-year
5	deadline of July 31 for patrols on circuits containing HFTD or High Fire Risk
6	Area structures. Monthly validations of the inspection plan were started in
7	June 2021 to ensure that all assets were either inspected or patrolled each
8	year, including assets that were newly added to the asset registry. The
9	in-year deadline of July 31 introduced in 2021 for inspections and patrols in
10	HFTD will continue to be used in 2022. Beginning in 2022, assets added to
11	the registry after July 31 or whose HFTD changes after July 31 will not be
12	considered late as in 2021, provided that they are inspected or patrolled
13	within 90 days of the addition to the registry or the HFTD change.

B. (3.9) Metric Performance

1. Historical Data (2015 – 2023)

Historical data is provided from 2015 – 2023. Data provided for 2015-2019 reflects systemwide performance. HFTD-specific performance is not available prior to 2020. The percentage of missed patrols is calculated as the number of patrols not performed by the required deadline divided by the total number of patrols performed for that year. Through 2020, there was not a specific in-year deadline for patrols, so the deadline was considered December 31. The July 31 deadline for HFTD patrols in 2021 allowed exceptions due to access issues and weather that may have prevented a helicopter to fly, or where access issues may have prevented a ground patrol. In 2021, HFTD structures added to the asset registry after July 31 and inspected after the July 31 deadline were counted as missed inspections, as well as instances where the asset location was corrected from non-HFTD to HFTD after July 31.

FIGURE 3.9-1
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE (2015 – 2023)

Historical Performance

1   **2. Data Collection Methodology**

2   Overhead patrols are tracked at the "maintenance plan" level, using data

3   sheets to record completion and findings, if applicable, as well as the SAP

4   data.

5   **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

6   There are no missed patrols in 2023 with a total of 44,981 patrols

7   completed – 27,246 in Tier 2 HFTD areas,16,899 in Tier 3 HFTD areas,

8   451 in HFRA and 385 in Zone 1 areas.

9   **C. (3.9) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

10   **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

11   PG&E adjusted the 1-year 2024 target to 0.00-0.03 percent from the

12   0.00-0.04 percent 1-year 2023 target to demonstrate incremental

13   improvement. The 5-year 2028 target is set to be same as the 5-year 2027

14   target of 0.00-0.02 percent.

15   **2. Target Methodology**

16   To establish the 1-Year and 5-Year targets, PG&E considered the

17   following factors:

- Historical Data and Trends: The July 31 deadline for HFTD patrols was first applied in 2021 and is still in practice. Therefore, targets use 2021 performance as a baseline with incremental improvement for the reasons described below;
- Benchmarking: Not available;
- Regulatory Requirements: Relevant items include: (1) General Order 165 requirements to follow internal maintenance procedures, and (2) Wildfire Mitigation Plan targets to perform HFTD inspections and patrols by July 31;
- Attainable Within known Resources/Work Plan: Targets are attainable within currently known resources;
- Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and Enforcement: Targets are suitable indicators for EOE as historical driver of worsening performance (asset registry changes after July 31) will have an allowance to be counted as on time if inspected within 90 days of the addition to the registry or HFTD change at the beginning of 2022. This update ensures that the metric is an appropriate indicator of performance by focusing the measure on timely action to complete inspections as opposed to asset registry completeness; and
- Other Qualitative Considerations: None.

3. **2024 Target**

The 2024 target is to improve performance to 0.00-0.03 percent, based on the 90-day allowance for asset registry changes and consideration of double circuits described in the methodology above.

4. **2028 Target**

The 2028 target is to improve performance to 0.00-0.02 percent, based on the 90-day allowance for asset registry changes and consideration of double circuits described in the methodology above, as well as a reduction over time in the number of asset registry additions from assets being discovered in the field.

1   **D. (3.9) Performance Against Target**

2   **1. Maintaining Performance Against the 1-Year Target**

3   As demonstrated in Figure 3.9-2 below, PG&E saw 0.00 percent missed

4   overhead Transmission patrols in 2023 which is consistent with company's

5   1-year target.

6   **2. Maintaining Performance Against the 5-Year Target**

7   As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is deploying a number of

8   programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this metric to

9   meet the Company's 5-year performance target.

FIGURE 3.9-2
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE (2015 – 2023) AND TARGET (2024 AND 2028)

10   **E. (3.9) Current and Planned Work Activities**

11   Below is a summary description of the key activities that are tied to

12   performance and their description of that tie:

13   •   2024 Inspection and Patrol Plan: The 2024 Inspection and Patrol plan has

14   been created, which defines the initial scope of the HFTD patrols that fall

15   under this metric. The plan contains approximately 170 circuits running

16   through HFTD areas (containing approximately 31,000 HFTD structures)

17   that will be patrolled.

3.9-5

1   •   <u>Monthly Inspection Validations</u>: Monthly inspection validations, which also

2   consider required patrols, will continue to identify required additions to the

3   original plan arising from additions or changes to the asset registry.

4   Changes in HFTD affect the scope of patrols covered by this metric.

5   •   <u>In-Year Deadline Requirements</u>: The in-year deadline of July 31 introduced

6   in 2021 for patrols in HFTD will continue to be used in 2024, with the same

7   provisions for access issues as in 2021 and the addition of the 90-day

8   requirement described above for additions and changes to the asset

9   registry. The deadline is tracked with the patrol orders so that each HFTD

10   patrol is identified as having the July 31 compliance requirement.

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SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:

CHAPTER 3.10

MISSED OVERHEAD TRANSMISSION DETAILED INSPECTIONS

IN HFTD AREAS

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The material updates to this chapter since the October 2, 2023, report can be found in Section B concerning metric performance and Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

A. (3.10) Overview

1. Metric Definition

Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 3.10 – Missed Overhead Transmission Detailed Inspections in HFTD Areas is defined as:

Overhead (OH) Transmission Detailed Inspections in High Fire Threat District (HFTD): Total number of structures that fell below the minimum inspection frequency requirements divided by the total number of structures that required inspection, in HFTD area in past calendar year where, "Minimum inspection frequency" refers to the frequency of scheduled inspections requirements, as applicable. "Structures" refers to electric assets such as transformers, switching protective devices, capacitors, lines, poles, etc.

2. Introduction of Metric

Detailed inspections are performed using several methods (ground, aerial, and climbing) to identify non-conformances affecting safety or reliability. Within HFTD areas, non-conformances identified by inspections can involve conditions that represent a wildfire ignition risk. Performing inspections on time allows non-conformances to be identified in a timely manner so that they can be prioritized for repair in accordance with the risk of the condition.

Due to the importance of detailed inspections in identifying conditions that affect wildfire, other safety, and reliability risks, the OH transmission detailed inspection program has undergone significant evolution over the reporting period for the metric, 2015-present. Prior to 2019, detailed ground inspections were performed by circuit with a frequency depending on the

voltage and whether the majority of the structures on the circuit were wood (2-year cycle) or steel (5-year cycle).

The Wildfire Safety Inspection Program (WSIP), which began in late 2018 and extended into 2019, introduced several key improvements to OH transmission inspections including the use of an 'enhanced' inspection methodology with a questionnaire developed from a wildfire-ignition Failure Modes and Effects Analysis and the addition of aerial inspections using high-resolution drone photographs to provide a second vantage point from above to complement the ground inspections performed with the inspector standing at the base of the structure. These improvements from WSIP were incorporated into the regular OH inspection program beginning in 2020.

The 2020 inspections replaced the old wood- or steel-based inspection cycles with cycles that called for more frequent inspections in HFTD areas, annually for Tier 3 and on a 3-year cycle for Tier 2, compared to a 5-year cycle for non-HFTD areas. The 2020 inspections also included non-HFTD structures in High Fire Risk Areas (HFRA), which were treated like Tier 2.

The 2021 inspection program continued using the HFTD-based cycles introduced in 2020 and imposed an in-year deadline for HFTD and HFRA inspections of July 31, consistent with Pacific Gas and Electric Company's (PG&E or the Company) 2021 Wildfire Mitigation Plan (WMP). The intent of this deadline was to allow completion of the inspections and any emergency repairs found from the inspections prior to peak fire season. Monthly validations of the inspection plan were started in June 2021 to ensure that all assets requiring an inspection under their prescribed cycles were included in the plan, including assets that were newly added to the asset registry.

The 2022 inspection scope introduced the use of wildfire risk and consequence scores at the structure level to inform the selection of assets to be inspected. At the beginning of 2022, assets were added to the registry after July 31 or whose HFTD changes after July 31 will not be considered late, provided that they are inspected within 90 days of the addition to the registry or the HFTD change.

B. (3.10) Metric Performance

1. Historical Data (2015 – 2023)

Historical data is provided from 2015 –2023. Data provided for 2015-2019 reflects systemwide performance. HFTD-specific performance is not available prior to 2020. The percentage of missed inspections is calculated as the number of inspections not performed by the required deadline divided by the total number of inspections performed for that year. Through 2020, there was not a specific in-year deadline for inspections, so the deadline was considered December 31. The July 31 deadline for HFTD inspections in 2021 allowed exceptions due to access issues, landowner refusal, or site-specific worker safety situations (i.e., Cannot Get In (CGI)) where an unsuccessful inspection attempt was made prior to the deadline. In 2021, HFTD structures added to the asset registry after July 31 and inspected after the July 31 deadline were counted as missed inspections, as well as instances where the asset location was corrected from non-HFTD to HFTD after July 31.

FIGURE 3.10-1
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE PERCENT LATE (2015 – Q2 2023)

2. **Data Collection Methodology**

     The currently used data collection methodology was implemented in 2020. It uses a mobile platform for completing overhead inspections, recorded at structure (pole) level using a detailed inspection checklist.

3. **Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

     There were no missed inspections in 2023 with a total of 54,717 inspections completed – 40,480 in Tier 2 HFTD areas,11,720 in Tier 3 HFTD areas, 2445 in HFRA and 72 in Zone 1 areas.

C. **(3.10) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

1. **Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

     PG&E adjusted the 2024 1-year target to 0.00-0.03 percent from the 0.00-0.04 percent 2023 1-year target to demonstrate incremental improvement. The 2028 5-year target is set to be same as the 2027 5-year target of 0.00-0.02 percent.

2. **Target Methodology**

     To establish the 1-Year and 5-Year targets, PG&E considered the following factors:

- Historical Data and Trends: The July 31 deadline for HFTD patrols was first applied in 2021 and is still in practice. Therefore, targets use 2021 performance as a baseline with incremental improvement for the reasons described below;

- Benchmarking: Not available;

- Regulatory Requirements: Relevant items include: (1) General Order 165 requirements to follow internal maintenance procedures, and (2) Wildfire Mitigation Plan (WMP) targets to perform certain HFTD inspections and patrols by July 31;

- Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Targets are attainable within currently known resources;

- Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and Enforcement: Targets are suitable indicators for EOE as historical driver of worsening performance (asset registry changes after July 31) will have an allowance to be counted as on time for any assets discovered after January 1 of the given year and due for a baseline frequency

1   inspection based on installation date (via the created date in SAP), will

2   be inspected within 90 days of when added to the asset registry or by

3   July 31 or the given year, whichever is later. Structures in scope for the

4   given year with HFTD tier changes from Non-HFTD to HFTD after

5   January 1st are also given an allowance for inspection within 90 days of

6   the change or July 31st, whichever is later. This update beginning in

7   2022 ensures that the metric is an appropriate indicator of performance

8   by focusing the measure on timely action to complete inspections as

9   opposed to asset registry completeness.

10   • Other Qualitative Considerations: None.

11   **3. 2024 Target**

12   The 2024 target is to improve performance to 0.00-0.03 percent, based

13   on the 90-day allowance for asset registry changes described in the

14   methodology above.

15   **4. 2028 Target**

16   The 2028 target is to improve performance to 0.00-0.02 percent, based

17   on the 90-day allowance for asset registry changes described in the

18   methodology above, as well as a reduction over time in the number of asset

19   registry additions from assets being discovered in the field.

20   **D. (3.10) Performance Against Target**

21   **1. Progress Towards the 1-year Target**

22   As demonstrated in Figure 3.10-2 below, PG&E saw 0.00 percent

23   missed overhead Transmission detailed inspections in the first half of 2023

24   which is consistent with Company's 1-year target.

25   **2. Progress Towards the 5-year Target**

26   As discussed in Section E below, PG&E has deployed a number of

27   programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this metric to

28   meet the Company's 5-year performance target.

FIGURE 3.10-2
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE (2015-2023) AND TARGETS (2024 AND 2028)

Historical & Projected Performance

E. (3.10) Current and Planned Work Activities

Below is a summary description of the key activities that are tied to performance and their description of that tie.

- 2024 Inspection and Patrol Plan: The 2024 inspection plan has been created and contains Tier 3 and Tier 2 structures totaling approximately 26,000 receiving ground inspection, 24,000 aerial inspections, and approximately 1,700 structures that also will receive a climbing inspection.

- Monthly Inspection Validations: Monthly inspection validations will continue to identify required additions to the original plan arising from additions or changes to the asset registry. Changes in HFTD may affect the scope of inspections covered by this metric

- In-Year Deadline Requirements: The in-year deadline of July 31 introduced in 2021 for inspections in HFTD will continue to be used in 2024, with the same provisions for CGI access issues as in 2021 and the addition of the 90-day requirement described above for additions and changes to the asset registry. The deadline is tracked with the inspection and patrol orders so that each HFTD inspection is identified as having the July 31 compliance requirement.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:

CHAPTER 3.11

GO-95 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IN HFTDS

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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
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GO-95 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IN HFTDS

The material updates to this chapter since the October 2, 2023, report can be found in Section B concerning metric performance and Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

A. (3.11) Overview

1. Metric Definition

Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 3.11 – General Order (GO) 95 Corrective Actions in High Fire Threat Districts (HFTD) is defined as:

The number of Priority Level 2 notifications that were completed on time divided by the total number of Priority Level 2 notifications that were due in the calendar year in HFTDs. Consistent with General Order (GO) 95 Rule 18 provisions, the proposed metric should exclude notifications that qualify for extensions under reasonable circumstances.[1]

GO 95, Rule 18, Priority Level 2 has four relevant timeframes for corrective action of which 2 are relevant for HFTD criteria used in SOMs: (1) six months for potential violations that create a fire risk in Tier 3 of HFTD; (2) 12 months for potential violations that create a fire risk in Tier 2 of HFTD.[2]

This metric is also reported as Metric 29 in the annual Safety Performance Metrics Report.

2. Introduction to the Metric

The GO 95 Corrective Actions in HFTD metric measures the number of Priority Level 2 electric corrective notifications (tags) in HFTD that are completed in accordance with the GO 95 Rule 18 timelines. This metric is associated with our Failure of Electric Distribution Overhead Asset Risk and

---

[1] Correction times may be extended under reasonable circumstances, such as: third-party refusal, customer issue, no access, permits required, system emergencies (e.g., fires, severe weather conditions).

[2] GO 95 Rule 18, B1ai-aiii.

1 our Wildfire Risk, which are part of our 2020 Risk Assessment and

2 Mitigation Phase Report filing. Vegetation Management (VM) work

3 generally follows wildfire risk priorities. Priority notifications are tracked to

4 completion against procedural timelines that are consistent with the

5 underlying risk of the work.

6 **3. Background**

7   This metric consists of two major activities: corrective notification

8 repairs and VM. The Section below describes the work, including

9 risk-informed prioritization and associated activities. We also compare

10 Pacific Gas and Electric Company's (PG&E or the Company) priority

11 classifications against GO 95 Rule 18's classification and timelines for

12 completion.

13 • <u>Corrective Notifications Identified from Inspections</u>: PG&E routinely

14   inspects our electric assets using a variety of methods, including

15   observations when performing work in the area, periodic patrols, and

16   inspections, and targeted condition-based and/or diagnostic testing and

17   monitoring. These inspections of our overhead and underground

18   electric assets are designed to meet GO 95, 165, and 174 requirements.

19   Regarding our equipment inspections process, when an inspector

20   identifies a maintenance condition, the inspector may immediately

21   correct the condition (e.g., performs minor repair work) and records the

22   correction or records the uncorrected condition, which is also reviewed

23   by a centralized inspection review team (CIRT). This additional review

24   performed by the CIRT is to drive consistency in inspection results by

25   having a centralized team review all field findings prior to recording the

26   finding as a tag.

27   If the condition is not immediately corrected, the inspector fills out

28   the initial tag. The centralized review team approves and prioritizes the

29   corrective notification tag in our Work Management system. These tags

30   are prioritized based on the risk posed by the condition and urgency of

31   repairs. We also inspect vegetation in the vicinity of our facilities and

32   apply a similar process, described below.

33   Regarding Priority Level 2 electric notifications pertaining to our

34   equipment inspections, we have subdivided Priority Level 2 into two

categories: Priority "B" and Priority "E". Priority "B" notifications are scheduled to be addressed within 3 months for Tiers 2 and 3. Priority "E" are scheduled to be completed within 6 months for Tier 3 and 12 months for Tier 2.

- Vegetation Management: Regarding our VM Program, we routinely inspect clearances between our electric assets and adjacent vegetation through a variety of methods, including observations during annual patrols, targeted program inspections, and aerial light detection and ranging flights. These inspections are conducted by our VM personnel and are designed to meet or, in some cases, exceed GO 95 Rule 35 requirements and fire safety regulations that require a minimum clearance of 4 feet year-round for high-voltage power lines in the California Public Utilities Commission-designated HFTD areas. GO 95 Rule 35 also requires the removal of dead, diseased, defective, and dying trees that could fall into the lines.

  When an inspector identifies a clearance condition or a potential tree hazard, they record an abatement prescription (tree work) within VM's data systems. This tree work is assigned to tree crews unless there are constraints that require prior resolution (e.g., customer access, city or agency permits). Once the constraint has been resolved, the tree work is addressed within 30 days or within the initial timeline based on HFTD Tier from the date it was inspected, which is either 180 days for Tier 3 or 365 days for Tier 2. Tree crews confirm the completion of tree work within the VM data systems. VM tree work identified in this way does not follow the Electric Corrective notifications (EC for Distribution) and Line Corrective notifications (LC for Transmission) priority assignments. Our VM timeline to complete this tree work generally aligns with the risk presented by the vegetation and the risk reduction objectives of the VM Program. It is important to note that this data is classified into two categories: (1) Vegetation Dead and Dying and (2) Vegetation Priority 2, where each record reflects work completed on a tree.

- Priority Classifications and Timelines for Completion: We manage our corrective actions in HFTDs with a risk-informed prioritization of our

work plans. Our strategy focuses on reducing wildfire risk associated with open corrective notifications. To accomplish this, we address the highest risk Level 2 corrective notifications first. After that, we manage the inventory of Level 2 Priority "E" corrective notifications in a risk-informed manner, where the highest risk Level 2 Priority "E" corrective notifications are targeted first, while deploying safety controls to manage the lower risk Level 2 Priority "E" corrective notifications. This approach allows strategic and targeted wildfire risk reductions, informed by customer impact and risk spend efficiencies, to continue to be our primary focus.

We recognize that our electric Priority "B" notifications, which we consider having a higher likelihood of creating an equipment failure than other Level 2 Priority notifications, have a more aggressive timeline to address than GO 95 Rule 18 Priority Level 2. However, consistent with the safety and operational metric definitions provided in Decision 21-11-009, we are reporting our performance against the timelines set forth in GO 95 Rule 18 and can provide, upon request, additional information as to how we are performing against our more aggressive internal timelines for our electric Priority "B" notifications. Furthermore, we are including all EC and LC notifications, as well as all inspection-identified vegetation safety hazards that meet the definition of GO 95 Rule 18 Level 2.

At the end of 2022, Priority "B" was eliminated for newly created transmission (LC) notifications so that priority "E" LC notifications now directly align to Rule 18 Level 2. Priority "E" notifications may have timelines shorter than the maximum allowable Level 2 timelines, so 3-month notifications still can be created as priority "E." Although new "B" priority LC notifications will not be created, the existing population of "B" priority notifications will continue to be closed in 2023.

The following table summarizes the priority classifications we use to comply with GO 95 Rule 18. The changes to transmission's priority levels will be reflected in the next update.

TABLE 3.11-1
GO 95 RULE 18 RISK CATEGORIES AND TIMELINES

Line No.	GO 95 Rule 18	PG&E Priority	Description	GO 95 Rule 18 Timeline for Corrective Action	PG&E Internal Timeline for Corrective Action (Electric Notifications)	PG&E Internal Timeline for Corrective Action (Vegetation Tree Work)
1	Level 1	A (Electric) Priority 1 (Vegetation)	An immediate risk of high potential impact to safety or reliability	Take corrective action immediately, either by fully repairing or by temporarily repairing and reclassifying to a lower priority	Consistent with GO 95 Rule 18	Within 24 hrs. after identification
2	Level 2	B (Electric) Priority 2 or Dead & Dying (Vegetation)	Any other risk of at least moderate potential impact to safety or reliability: Take corrective action within specified time period (either by fully repair or by temporarily repairing and reclassifying to Level 3 priority).	Time period for corrective action to be determined at the time of identification by a qualified Company representative, but not to exceed: 1. Six months for potential violations that create a fire risk located in Tier 3 of the HFTD. 2. 12 months for potential violations that create a fire risk located in Tier 2 of the HFTD. 3. 12 months for potential violations that compromise worker safety; and 4. 36 months for all other Level 2 potential violations.	Corrective action within 3 months from date condition identified for electric equipment	1. Within 20 business days from identification Priority 2 Tag. 2. Dead & Dying tree: a. Six months within Tier 3 & Tier 2 of the HFTD; and b. 12 months outside Tier 3 & Tier 2 of the HFTD.
3		E (Electric)	Any other risk of at least moderate potential impact to safety or reliability: Take corrective action within specified time period (either by fully repair or by temporarily repairing and reclassifying to Level 3 priority).	Same as above	Corrective action within: 1. Six months for conditions that create a fire risk located in HFTD Tier 3 2. 12 months for conditions that create a fire risk located in HFTD Tier 2 Field Safety Re-assessment performed annually on time dependent tags to confirm Priority "E" Notification has not escalated to Priority A or B. If notification has escalated to Priority A or B, address according to timelines above.	N/A
4		H (Electric)	These are PG&E Priority "E" Notifications that are planned to be addressed by a planned System Hardening Project	Same as above	Field Safety Re-assessment performed annually on time dependent tags to confirm Priority "E" Notification has not escalated to a Priority A or B. If notification has escalated to Priority A or B, address according to timelines above.	N/A
5	Level 3	F (Electric)	Any risk of low potential impact to safety or reliability	Take corrective action within 60 months subject to the specific exceptions.[a]	1. Corrective actions for distribution assets to be addressed within five years from date condition identified. 2. Corrective actions for transmission assets to be addressed within two years from date condition identified.	N/A

(a) EXCEPTION – Potential violations specified in Appendix J or subsequently approved through Commission processes, including, but not limited to, a Tier 2 Advice Letter under GO 96B, that can be completed at a future time as opportunity-based maintenance. Where an exception has been granted, repair of a potential violation must be completed the next time the Company's crew is at the structure to perform tasks at the same or higher work level (i.e., the public, communications, or electric level). The condition's record in the auditable maintenance program must indicate the relevant exception and the date of the corrective action.

B. (3.11) Metric Performance

1. Historical Data (2020 – 2023)

We are reporting historical data from the years 2020 through 2023.

Our history of available data, which is recorded in our electric work management systems (e.g., SAP) goes back to 2010. However, we are focusing our historical reporting for this metric starting at 2020 due to various changes that occurred prior to 2020, which reshaped GO 95 and GO 165 to include boundaries for HFTD, as well as informed our current inspection methods to be more enhanced towards identifying ignition risks.

Reported timelines generally align with VM adoption of updated internal timeliness for Priority Tag mitigation and additional 'Dead & Dying' tree abatement identified through the implementation of PG&E Enhanced VM Program in 2019. The VM Program's work management system tracking these corrective actions is tracked in two separate databases; the Vegetation Management Database (VMD) and OneVM to track work identified through its annual inspection programs.

2. Data Collection Methodology

Data collected prior to year 2020 is excluded due to the various GO 165 and GO 95 Rule 18 changes mentioned above.

We are including all EC (Distribution) and LC (Transmission) notifications, as well as all inspection-identified vegetation safety hazards that meet the definition of GO 95 Rule 18 Level 2. Note that due dates must be manually adjusted in our data to align with the GO 95 Rule 18 timelines which vary from our internal timelines as previously mentioned.

3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period

Metric performance is comprised of an aggregated performance for electric distribution and electric transmission corrective notifications, as well as vegetation safety hazards.

As described in earlier sections, we are reporting and setting targets against the timeframes identified in GO 95 Rule 18 rather than the timelines articulated in our internal electric Priority "B" and "E" notifications, and internal VM Priority 2 and Dead and Dying Tree abatement corrective notifications.

1   To address the unprecedented wildfire risk in our service territory, in
2   2019 we launched our Wildfire Safety Inspection Program (WSIP) as part of
3   our Wildfire Safety Plan. The intent of that program was to expand our
4   focus during inspections to include fire ignition risk posed by failure modes
5   on our electric assets and accelerate the inspections to be complete by the
6   beginning of the 2019 wildfire season. The WSIP generated a volume much
7   greater than what we have typically experienced for our annual electric
8   corrective notification volume, with the majority of electric corrective
9   notifications being of lower risk (e.g., Level 2 Priority "E" & Level 3).

10   Given the high volume (e.g., approximately 4x the volume from prior
11   years) of identified electric distribution and transmission corrective
12   notifications in the 2019 WSIP, we pivoted from managing our electric
13   corrective notifications based on due date to focusing our priority through a
14   wildfire risk informed approach. This means we would complete Level 1 and
15   Level 2 Priority "B" corrective notifications first and manage the inventory of
16   Level 2 Priority "E" and Level 3 corrective notifications.

17   Our approach for managing the inventory of Level 2 Priority "E" is to:
18   (1) group high concentrations of individual capital intensive rebuild corrective
19   notifications into new, more comprehensive, System Hardening projects,
20   and (2) permanently remove electric lines out of service that have multiple
21   corrective notifications and serve small numbers of customers, where
22   service can be provided via alternate line interconnections or remote grid
23   solutions and (3) bundle and prioritize corrective work execution for those
24   Level 2 Priority "E" notifications that were of high wildfire risk informed
25   priority based on risk spend efficiency as indicated in WMP RN-04. PG&E
26   address its distribution maintenance tag log more quickly through the
27   isolation zone bundling approach described in PG&E's 2023-2025 Wildfire
28   Mitigation Plan (WMP), which was approved by the Office of Energy
29   Infrastructure Safety (Energy Safety) on December 29, 2023. EC
30   notifications are bundled by isolation zone to maximize the number of
31   notifications completed within a single outage and/or planned day of work.
32   Isolation zones are circuit segments located between sectionalizing devices.
33   A bundle consists of all open notifications within a given isolation zone.
34   Bundles are created across all EC types (pole, non-pole capital, non-pole

expense). While PG&E's maintenance tag plan described in its 2023-2025 WMP will result in some lower-risk maintenance tags exceeding the current GO 95, Rule 18 timelines, the plan is prudent because it will allow PG&E to reduce the maintenance tag log more quickly and execute more tags with the same amount of resources while reducing the amount of clearances needed per unit executed.

January through December 2023 saw a performance of 71 percent as shown in Figure 3.11-1 below. This performance exceeded the 2023 one-year target of 69 percent. 2023 Work Plan for Distribution focused to work down risk bundles based on highest risk spend efficiency per our commitment in the Wildfire Mitigation Plan rather than execute on individual tags with the highest risk which resulted in 4.8 percent lower 2023 on time performance as compared 2022 performance but with an increase in reduced wildfire risk of a forecasted 48 percent with an actual greater than 52 percent. Lastly, there is a net reduction of approximately 10,700 EVM tree work units on the cessation of that program from the end of 2022, reducing the amount of on time completed units.

For those electric corrective Level 2 Priority "E" notifications that were going to remain open past their original due date, and that had the potential to degrade over time, we performed Field Safety Reassessments (FSR) of those open Level 2 Priority "E" electric notifications to determine if the conditions of the electric asset had degraded. If they had, we would accelerate those corrective notifications for repair.

We are also currently completing available vegetation priority corrective notifications within our internal timelines, limiting inventory to corrective notifications where we have access issues, such as customer property access issues or related permitting concerns, which are worked as dependencies are resolved. This is consistent with our Dead and Dying Tree Abatements.

The following figure plots our historical performance for GO 95 Rule 18 Level 2 HFTD Corrective Notifications.

FIGURE 3.11-1
GO 95 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IN HFTDS – HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE (2020 – Q2 2023)

Historical Performance

TABLE 3.11-2
GO 95 RULE 18 PRIORITY LEVEL 2 ACTUAL 2023
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PERFORMANCE AND TARGET
(ELECTRIC DISTRIBUTION, ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION AND VEGETATION MANAGEMENT)

Line No.	Year 2022	Level 2 Results
1	On Time	185,065
2	Past Due	75,874
3	% On Time	71%

TABLE 3.11-3
GO 95 RULE 18 LEVEL 2 ACTUAL 2023
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PERFORMANCE AND TARGET
(ELECTRIC DISTRIBUTION ONLY)

Line No.	Year 2023	Level 2 Priority "E"	Level 2 Priority "B"	Level 2 Priority "B" From "E"	Level 2 Results
1	On Time	2,105	3,791	122	6,018
2	Past Due	63,305	1,546	37	64,888
3	% On Time	3%	71%	77%	8%

TABLE 3.11-4
GO 95 RULE 18 LEVEL 2 ACTUAL 2023
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PERFORMANCE AND TARGET
(ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION ONLY)

Line No.	Year 2023	Level 2 Results
1	On Time	7116
2	Past Due	8008
3	% On Time	47%

_____

Note: Per PG&E Utility Procedure TD-8123P-103, effective 1/03/2023, all Level 2 Transmission tags are considered priority "E" which aligns with GO 95, Rule 18 Levels 1, 2, and 3. Tag priority categorization will no longer be provided for Transmission tags.

TABLE 3.11-5
GO 95 RULE 18 LEVEL 2 ACTUAL 2023
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PERFORMANCE AND TARGET
(VEGETATION MANAGEMENT)

Line No.	Year 2023	EVM Dead and Dying	Vegetation Dead and Dying	Vegetation Priority 2	Level 2 Results
1	On Time	39,427	104,813	27,691	171,931
2	Past Due	800	2,163	15	2,978
3	% On Time	98%	98%	100%	98%

C. (3.11) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target

1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report

There is no change to the 1-year targets.

The 5-year target decreased from 80 percent to 79 percent.

2. Target Methodology

To establish the 1-Year and 5-Year targets, we considered the following factors:

- Historical Data and Trends: The targets are based on the projected volume of GO 95 Rule 18 Priority Level 2 notifications, which consider existing open tags and forecasted new tags that are due for each year;

- Benchmarking: Not available;

- Regulatory Requirements: GO 95 Rule 18 requirements;

- Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Attainability is subject to other emerging higher risk priorities that may influence our ability to

meet projected targets. If emerging higher risk priorities emerge

throughout the course of the year, we may need to prioritize our

available resources to address these higher risk priorities and adjust our

work plan accordingly;

- <u>Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and</u>
<u>Enforcement</u>: Yes, performance at projected levels is sustainable,
subject to other emerging higher risk priorities may influence ability to
meet projected targets. If emerging higher risk priorities emerge
throughout the course of the year, we may need to prioritize our
available resources to address these higher risk priorities and adjust our
work plan accordingly; and

- <u>Other Qualitative Considerations</u>: This target was established with the
consideration of our risk informed strategy, as opposed to a corrective
notification due date prioritization approach.

3. 2024 Target

Our target for Priority Level 2 corrective maintenance notifications on
time completion rates is 69 percent for the year 2024.This metric
performance is comprised of an aggregated score combining performance
of electric distribution, electric transmission and Vegetation Management.
In 2023, the on time corrective actions in these three areas were 6,018;
7,116; and 171,931, respectively.

For year 2024, electric distribution notifications completed on
time percentage is projected at approximately 11 percent and electric
transmission notifications completed on time percentage is projected at
approximately 80 percent. The projected forecast for Vegetation
Management is approximately 98 percent. As the volume of Vegetation
Management decreases in 2024 we expect the aggregated score of this
metric to correspondingly decline.

Our distribution corrective notifications strategy will continue to focus on
reducing wildfire risk associated with our open corrective notifications by
working the highest risk spend efficiency bundles for Level 2 corrective
notifications first versus managing corrective notification due dates. Using
this approach in 2023, we reduced the relative wildfire risk associated with

1		open electric distribution corrective maintenance notifications in HFTD Tiers	
2		2 and 3 by as much as 52 percent.	

3   Also, it is important to note that within this aggregated year 2023

4   performance, we are forecasting that our electric Level 2 Priority "B"

5   notifications performance to achieve completed on time percentages of

6   95 percent for electric distribution notifications. As described earlier, we

7   consider electric Level 2 Priority "B" notifications to have a higher likelihood

8   of creating an equipment failure than other electric Level 2 Priority

9   notifications.

10   The following tables summarize PG&E's Year 2023 Target for Priority

11   Level 2 notifications completed on time percentage, as well as a breakdown

12   between the electric distribution, electric transmission and VM Priority

13   Level 2 notifications performance. Since the "B" priority will no longer be

14   assigned to transmission notifications, as described above, transmission

15   projections are not separated by "B" and "E" priority levels. Table 3.11-6

16   has been updated only to reflect Level 2 results due to the priority level

17   changes in transmission.

18   Table 3.11-9 Vegetation Management 2023 forecast is lower than 2022,

19   based upon an anticipated reduction in the volume of D&D tree work.

20   Enhanced Vegetation Management (EVM) Program concluded at the end of

21   2022.

TABLE 3.11-6
GO 95 RULE 18 PRIORITY LEVEL 2 PROJECTED 2024
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PERFORMANCE AND TARGET
(ELECTRIC DISTRIBUTION, ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION AND VEGETATION MANAGEMENT)

Line No.	Year 2023	Level 2 Results
1	On Time	172,488
2	Past Due	76,808
3	% On Time	69%

TABLE 3.11-7
GO 95 RULE 18 LEVEL 2 PROJECTED 2024
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PERFORMANCE AND TARGET
(ELECTRIC DISTRIBUTION ONLY)

Line No.	Year 2023	Level 2 Priority "E"	Level 2 Priority "B"	Level 2 Priority "B" From "E"	Level 2 Results
1	On Time	634	7932	272	8838
2	Past Due	70,795	232	768	71795
3	% On Time	1%	97%	26%	11%

TABLE 3.11-8
GO 95 RULE 18 LEVEL 2 PROJECTED 2024
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PERFORMANCE AND TARGET
(ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION ONLY)

Line No.	Year 2023	Level 2 Results
1	On Time	8530
2	Past Due	2133
3	% On Time	80%

TABLE 3.11-9
GO 95 RULE 18 LEVEL 2 PROJECTED 2024
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PERFORMANCE AND TARGET
(VEGETATION MANAGEMENT)

Line No.	Year 2023	Vegetation Dead and Dying	Vegetation Priority 2	EVM Dead and Dying	Level 2 Results
1	On Time	119,560	27,720	7840	155,120
2	Past Due	2440	280	160	2880
3	% On Time	98%	99%	98%	98%

4. 2028 Target

Our 5-year target for Priority Level 2 corrective maintenance notifications on time is 79 percent. Target decreased by 1 percent, compared to 2027 target due to 1.36 percent projected decrease of Priority Level 2 notifications that were completed on time (185,197 in 2028 vs 187,760 in 2027) and 0.24 percent projected decrease of Priority Level 2 notifications completed late (47,971 in 2028 vs 47,908 in 2027).This metric performance is comprised of an aggregated performance where the projected year 2028 volume of on time corrective notifications for electric

3.11-13

1	distribution, electric transmission and vegetation are at 28,406; 8,541; and
2	148,250, respectively.
3	For year 2028, we are projecting an on-time percentage of
4	approximately 39 percent, 98 percent, 98 percent for electric distribution,
5	electric transmission, and vegetation notifications performance, respectively.
6	Our distribution corrective notifications strategy will continue to focus on
7	reducing the most wildfire risk associated with our open corrective
8	notifications per dollar spent by working the highest risk bundles by isolation
9	zone first versus managing corrective notification due dates. Furthermore,
10	we are also revisiting opportunities to further align our distribution electric
11	corrective action Priority levels (e.g., A, B, E, F, and H) with that of GO 95
12	Rule 18 (e.g., Levels 1, 2, and 3), which we expect will improve our
13	performance in the long-term.
14	The following tables summarize our Year 2028 Target for Priority
15	Level 2 notifications completed on time percentages, as well as a
16	breakdown between the electric distribution, electric transmission and
17	vegetation Priority Level 2 notifications completed on time percentages.

TABLE 3.11-10
GO 95 RULE 18 PRIORITY LEVEL 2 PROJECTED 2028
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PERFORMANCE AND TARGET
(ELECTRIC DISTRIBUTION, ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION AND VEGETATION MANAGEMENT)

Line No.	Year 2027	Level 2 Results
1	On Time	185,197
2	Past Due	47,791
3	% On Time	79%

TABLE 3.11-11
GO 95 RULE 18 LEVEL 2 PROJECTED 2028 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
PERFORMANCE AND TARGET
(ELECTRIC DISTRIBUTION ONLY)

Line No.	Year 2027	Level 2 Priority "E"	Level 2 Priority "B"	Level 2 Priority "B" From "E"	Level 2 Results
1	On Time	21016	3152	4238	28406
2	Past Due	44658	166	223	45047
3	% On Time	32%	95%	95%	39%

3.11-14

TABLE 3.11-12
GO 95 RULE 18 LEVEL 2 PROJECTED 2028 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
PERFORMANCE AND TARGET
(ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION ONLY)

Line No.	Year 2027	Level 2 Results
1	On Time	8541
2	Past Due	174
3	% On Time	98%

TABLE 3.11-13
GO 95 RULE 18 LEVEL 2 PROJECTED 2028 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
PERFORMANCE AND TARGET
(VEGETATION MANAGEMENT)

Line No.	Year 2027	Vegetation Dead and Dying	Vegetation Priority 2	Level 2 Results
1	On Time	121520	26730	148250
2	Past Due	2480	270	2750
3	% On Time	98%	99%	98%

1   The Figure 3.11-2 plots our aggregated historical and aggregated
2   projected performance for GO 95 Rule 18 Level 2 HFTD Corrective
3   Notifications.

4   **D. (3.11) Performance Against Target**

5   **1. Progress Towards 1-Year Target**

6   As demonstrated in Figure 3.11-2 below, PG&E saw a performance of
7   71 percent in 2023, which exceeds the Company's 1-year target of
8   69 percent.

9   **2. Progress Towards the 5-Year Target**

10   As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is deploying a number of
11   programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this metric to
12   meet the Company's 5-year performance target.

Historical & Projected Performance

E. (3.11) Current and Planned Work Activities

Below is a summary description of the key activities that are tied to performance and their description.

- System Hardening: System Hardening Program focuses on mitigating wildfire risk posed by distribution overhead assets in and near Tier 2 and 3 HFTDs in our service territory. This program targets high wildfire risk miles and applies various mitigation activities, including: (1) line removal, (2) conversion of distribution lines from overhead to underground, (3) application of Remote Grid alternatives, (4) mitigation of exposure through relocation of overhead facilities, and (5) in-place overhead system hardening.

- Overhead Preventative Maintenance and Equipment Repair: Focuses on repair of electric equipment identified with corrective notifications. Our corrective notifications strategy will continue to focus on reducing wildfire risk associated with our open corrective notifications by working the highest risk Level 2 corrective notifications in a risk spend efficiency approach (bundling all open notifications by isolation zone and prioritizing by the most risk reduced per dollar spent starting in 2024) versus managing corrective notification due dates. We plan to accomplish this by continuing to complete Level 1 and Level 2 Priority "B" corrective notifications first and manage the

1 inventory of Level 2 Priority "E" corrective notifications in a risk informed
2 manner, where the highest risk pend efficiency isolation zone of bundled
3 open notifications are targeted first, while deploying safety controls to
4 manage the lower risk Level 2 Priority "E" corrective notifications. The
5 approach allows strategic and targeted wildfire risk reductions, informed by
6 customer impact and risk spend efficiencies, to continue to be our primary
7 focus. Using this approach in 2024, we are forecasting to reduce the
8 relative wildfire risk associated with open electric distribution corrective
9 maintenance notifications in HFTD Tiers 2 and 3 by as much as 68 percent.

10 Furthermore, we are also revisiting opportunities to further align our
11 electric corrective action Priority levels (e.g., A, B, E, F, and H) with that of
12 GO 95 Rule 18 (e.g., Levels 1, 2, and 3).

13 See Exhibit (PG&E-4), Chapters 4.3, 9, and 11 in PG&E's 2023 General
14 Rate Case for more information.

15 In 2024, PG&E will introduce priority X tags for Level 2 extremely urgent
16 conditions that pose a high potential to safety or reliability but does not pose
17 an immediate risk. These conditions should not wait six months to be
18 addressed similar to other Level 2 conditions and will be addressed within
19 seven days. These conditions are planned to be reflected in the September
20 reporting period.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:

CHAPTER 3.12

PERCENTAGE OF CPUC-REPORTABLE IGNITIONS IN

HFTD AREAS

(DISTRIBUTION)

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
CHAPTER 3.12
PERCENTAGE OF CPUC-REPORTABLE IGNITIONS IN
HFTD AREAS
(DISTRIBUTION)

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SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
CHAPTER 3.12
PERCENTAGE OF CPUC-REPORTABLE IGNITIONS IN
HFTD AREAS
(DISTRIBUTION)

The material updates to this chapter since the October 2, 2023, report can be found in Section B concerning metric performance and Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

A. (3.12) Overview

1. Metric Definition

Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 3.12 – Electric Emergency Response Time is defined as:

Average time and median time in minutes to respond on-site to an electric-related emergency notification from the time of notification to the time a representative (or qualified first responder) arrived onsite. Emergency notification includes all notifications originating from 911 calls and calls made directly to the utilities' safety hotlines. The data used to determine the average time and median time shall be provided in increments as defined in General Order 112-F 123.2 (c) as supplemental information, not as a metric.

2. Introduction of Metric

This metric measures the average and median time for Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E or the Company) to respond on-site to an electric emergency once a notification is received. Measuring response to 911 calls within 60 minutes has been a long-standing top public safety measure for PG&E and within the industry, and this metric, although calculated differently, is similar in its intent for responding quickly to our customers and any potentially unsafe conditions reported.

B. (3.12) Metric Performance

1. Historical Data (2015 – 2023)

Historical data is provided from 2015 through 2023. Although emergency response data exists prior to 2015 (as mentioned below), current validation practices were not in place until 2015 and therefore only data from 2015 is reported here for consistency and comparability.

Over the timeframe of 2015-2023, there has been almost 9 percent reduction in total average response time from 35 minutes in 2015 to 32 minutes in 2023. The median response time also reduced by around 6 percent from 32 minutes in 2015 to 30 minutes in 2023.

Since 2015, PG&E's historical performance has been within the first quartile and has been in the first decile for several years when measuring percentage of response times within 60 minutes, which is the industry benchmarkable definition.

Metric performance has been driven by accurately predicting when large volumes of calls will occur (based on weather forecasts), proactive scheduling of resources for 911 response, cross-functional coordination across PG&E to train non-traditional stand-by staff, availability of resources for weather days and improved understanding of shifts in storm fronts and impacts on the system.

FIGURE 3.12-1
ELECTRIC EMERGENCY RESPONSE TIME HISTORICAL DATA (2015 –2023)

2. Data Collection Methodology

The metric performance data is captured and stored in the Outage Information System (OIS) database. Each 911 call has a time stamp. The start time of a 911 call involves receipt by utility personnel and entry into the OIS database (creation of a tag). The tag is created in the OIS database when the PG&E personnel is on the phone with the 911 dispatch agency (there is a direct 911 stand-by line into Gas Dispatch, where all 911 stand by calls are routed). This process removes the delay between the time the call is received and entered into the system, and the raw data is then reviewed for duplicate entries, which are cancelled (if found). The timestamp of when PG&E personnel responds on site is when they select the "onsite" button on their mobile data terminals, which marks the completion of the response. If there is a discrepancy or uncertainty, our Electric Dispatch team will validate the exact arrival time by leveraging GPS data from our employee's vehicles and/or mobile data terminals. The response time in minutes is calculated by the difference between the two timestamps. From each call's response time, the average and median time is calculated for all calls.

3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period

In 2023, average response time was 32 minutes and median response time was 30 minutes. In context of the historic volume of atmospheric river events experienced across PG&E's service territory, these results are considered a strong performance as: (1) weather severity and timing are known uncontrollable variables, and (2) the corresponding benchmarkable calculation, percent response time within 60 minutes, remains at the top of industry performance. Even with dramatically increased volumes of emergency calls during the first quarter, PG&E still performed very well in its average electric emergency response time. This average time performance improved month over month in 2023 and is below the 2023 SOM threshold.

C. (3.12) 1-Year and 5-Year Target

1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report

There have been no changes to 1- and 5-Year targets since the last report filing.

2. Target Methodology

To establish the 1-Year and 5-Year targets, PG&E considered the following factors:[1]

- <u>Historical Data and Trends</u>: Comparable data is available starting in 2015 although historical benchmarking trends (under alternative definition) are informative back to 2012. This historical data context confirms PG&E's current results are improved, sustained, and reasonably considered strong performance, which has informed the target setting direction to "maintain";

- <u>Benchmarking</u>: Industry benchmarking is available under the emergency response time measure calculated as percent time responding on site within 60 minutes. PG&E is first quartile within this benchmark, and has used this industry data as the key datapoint to inform target setting:

  - To do this, PG&E used available industry benchmark data for the percentage time within 60 minutes metric to apply assumptions and generally extract estimated performance quartiles under the measures of average time and median time would equate to as a measures of average time and median time. The extrapolated estimated performance ranges for first quartile were then used. Specifically, these estimated values represent the point at which, when exceeded, performance would move out of first quartile and into second quartile;

  - PG&E's intent is to stay in first quartile performance. Given the context that benchmarking provides, PG&E targets are meant to maintain current performance at levels better than the first quartile threshold, and would consider a performance change on the magnitude of exceeding these targets (i.e., moving into a worse estimated quartile, a signal of concern);

  - In other words, target values in this case represent performance levels that PG&E does not want to exceed or move performance

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[1] Targets represent values that serve as appropriate indicator lights to signal a review of potential performance issues. Targets should not be interpreted as intention to worsen performance, as further described below.

towards. Values should not be interpreted as a plan for or expectation of worsening performance;

- Regulatory Requirements: None;
- Attainable With Known Resources/Work Plan: Yes;
- Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and Enforcement: Historical data and trends confirm that maintaining estimated first quartile performance is a sustainable target in both the 1-year and 5-year timeframes. A change in performance on the magnitude of reaching the targets (i.e., performance moving into the estimated second quartile) is an appropriate indicator light to examine potential performance issues as PG&E's intent is to maintain current practices and past improvements and mitigate any future operational impacts that may arise; and
- Other Considerations: None.

3. 2024 Target

The 2024 Target is to remain better than 44 minutes for average emergency response time and better than 43 minutes for median emergency response time. Targets are based on maintaining first quartile performance.

4. 2028 Target

The 2028 Target is to remain better than 44 minutes for average emergency response time and better than 43 minutes for median emergency response time. Targets are based on maintaining first quartile performance.

D. (3.12) Performance Against Target

1. Progress Towards the 1-Year Target

As demonstrated in Figure 3.12-2 below, PG&E saw an average of 32 response minutes and a median of 30 response minutes in 2023 which is consistent with the Company's 1-year target.

2. Progress Towards the 5-Year Target

As discussed in Section E below, PG&E has deployed two programs to maintain or improve long-term performance of this metric to meet the Company's 5-year performance target.

Historical & Projected Performance

E. **(3.12) Current and Planned Work Activities**

PG&E continues to refine the following actions in 2024 to maintain its top-level performance:

- Meteorology, Operations, and Dispatch Support:
  - PG&E Meteorology validated and enhanced 911 forecasting by using historical data to train the forecasting model and to provide 911 resource requirement recommendations based on predicted weather. Improved modeling will allow for more effective staffing.
  - A 'concierge' Meteorology advisor is assigned pre-event and identified for in event support.
  - Meteorology proactively reaches out to Electric Dispatch if a specific geographic area is looking to worsen over the forecast period. Meteorology will also modify PG&E's general wind alert system to provide in event systematic support to Dispatchers.
- Mobile Solution Deployment: Transition non-electric standby personnel into Field Automation System tool allowing for quicker dispatching to 911 standby requests.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:

CHAPTER 3.13

NUMBER OF CPUC-REPORTABLE IGNITIONS IN HFTD AREAS

(DISTRIBUTION)

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
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NUMBER OF CPUC-REPORTABLE IGNITIONS IN HFTD AREAS
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SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
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NUMBER OF CPUC-REPORTABLE IGNITIONS IN HFTD AREAS
(DISTRIBUTION)

The material updates to this chapter since the October 2, 2023, report can be found in Section B concerning metric performance and Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

A. (3.13) Overview

1. Metric Definition

Safety and Operational Metrics (SOM) 3.13 – the Number of California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) Reportable Ignitions in High Fire Threat Districts (HFTD) Areas (Distribution) is defined as:

The number of CPUC-reportable ignitions involving overhead distribution circuits in HFTD Areas.

A CPUC-Reportable Ignition refers to a fire incident where the following three criteria are met: (1) ignition is associated with Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) electrical assets, (2) something other than PG&E facilities burned, and (3) the resulting fire travelled more than one linear meter from the ignition point.[1]

For this SOM, reporting is specific to Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTDs.

PG&E provides the CPUC with annual ignition data in the Fire Incident Data Collection Plan, to the Office of Energy Infrastructure and Safety quarterly via quarterly geographic information system, data reporting, in quarterly Wildfire Mitigation Plan updates, and the Safety Performance Metrics Report.

2. Introduction of Metric

The number of CPUC-reportable ignitions in HFTDs provides one way to gauge the level of wildfire risk that customers and communities are exposed

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[1] Please see CPUC Decision (D.) 14-02-015, issued February 5, 2014 for additional details.

1   to from overhead distribution assets. PG&E's objective is to reduce the

2   number of CPUC reportable ignitions that may trigger a catastrophic wildfire.

B. (3.13) Metric Performance

1.   Historical Data (2015–2023)

5   PG&E implemented the Fire Incident Data Collection Plan in response

6   to D.14-02-015 in June 2014. PG&E's Ignitions Tracker includes all

7   CPUC-reportable ignitions from June 2014 to present. The 2014 data does

8   not represent a complete year and is excluded in this analysis.

9   PG&E's overhead distribution circuits traverse approximately

10   25,000 miles of terrain in the HFTD areas where the overhead conductor is

11   primarily bare wire, supported by structures consisting of poles, cross arms,

12   associated insulators, and operating equipment such as transformers, fuses

13   and reclosers. The main causes of CPUC-reportable ignitions have been

14   collected and classified. These fall into six broad categories: vegetation

15   contact, equipment failure, third party contact, animal contact, wire to wire

16   contact, and other causes. The counts for 2018 to 2023, are shown in the

17   graph below, highlighting the degree of variability that occurs from year to

18   year relative to each category.

FIGURE 3.13-1
HISTORIC PERFORMANCE BY SUSPECTED CAUSE

	1	There is also a seasonal pattern to the ignition events as shown in the
	2	chart of ignitions by month below for each of the years from 2018 through
	3	2023.

FIGURE 3.13-2
HISTORIC PERFORMANCE BY YEAR/MONTH

Historic Performance by Year/Month						
Month	2018 Total	2019 Total	2020 Total	2021 Total	2022 Total	2023 Total
January	1	1		19	2	
February	4		7	2	5	8
March	6	2	3	5	4	2
April	5	4	3	6	9	6
May	4	8	9	17	11	4
June	19	14	25	22	14	2
July	30	23	23	24	12	8
August	25	15	27	17	10	14
September	6	16	17	7	9	8
October	15	13	17	6	7	2
November	14	12	2		1	2
December	0	1	3	1		1
Grand Total	129	109	136	126	84	57

4   **2.   Data Collection Methodology**

5   Data will be collected per PG&E's Fire Incident Data Collection Plan

6   (Utility Standard/Procedure RISK-6306S/P). Results will be inclusive of

7   unique HFTD CPUC-reportable ignitions attributable to the distribution asset

8   class with overhead construction types.

9   The following ignition events captured by PG&E's Fire Incident Data

10   Collection Plan will be excluded for this metric:

11   •   Duplicate events;

12   •   Ignitions that do not meet CPUC reporting criteria;

13   •   Ignition events outside of Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTD;

14   •   Transmission ignitions; and

15   •   Ignitions attributable to underground or pad-mounted assets as these

16   are not associated overhead assets. (Ignitions caused by non-overhead

17   assets in HFTD are rare and, as the fires are often contained to the

18   asset, pose less of a wildfire risk.)

3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period

PG&E finished 2023 with 57 CPUC reportable ignitions in HFTD attributable to overhead distribution assets. These results were lower than each previous year in PG&E's record (see Section 3.13) and PG&E completed the year better than target.

Most importantly, PG&E has observed 21 ignitions where the Fire Potential Index Rating was in R3 or greater conditions. This is compared to 34 in 2022, and a 3-year previous average of 70 ignitions in R3 or greater conditions. This is aligned with PG&E's strategy of reducing ignitions when and where they matter, to reach our goal of stopping catastrophic wildfires.

Please see the Target Methodology section for an overview of our Fire Potential Index (FPI) model and our strategy to focus operational mitigations, like Enhanced Powerline Safety Settings (EPSS), on reducing ignitions where consequences are more likely.

C. (3.13) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target

1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report

PG&E proposes to reduce our target range for this metric to account for favorable performance in 2022 and 2023, representing two complete years after the implementation of our maturing EPSS strategy. PG&E proposes a reduced, more-challenging, target range of 72 to 84 ignitions for 2024 and 2028, shifting the higher end of the range to match the 2022 end of year value.

This existing range will continue to challenge the organization to reduce ignitions of consequence. Ignition counts, occurring in consequential and non-consequential environmental conditions, are highly variable and subject to a variety of causes such as migratory bird patterns, red flag warning days, and contact from external parties.

PG&E remains focused on reducing those ignitions in R3+ conditions and, as future strategies with direct ignition impact emerge, these targets will be reevaluated.

2. Target Methodology

The two major programs that most directly impact ignition reduction in the near-term are PSPS and EPSS. Other important resiliency programs

1   like undergrounding, system hardening, and vegetation management (VM)
2   will have an impact as multiple years of work are completed.
3   PG&E has observed success with EPSS in terms of mitigating ignitions
4   in R3+ Fire Potential Index (FPI) conditions. These ignitions in R3+
5   conditions represent all historical reportable ignitions resulting in a fatality,
6   all ignitions over 100 acres in size, and 99 percent of reportable ignitions
7   where a structure was destroyed. See Figure 3.13-4 for fire statistics by FPI
8   rating.

FIGURE 3.13-4
2018-2020 HFTD OVERHEAD REPORTABLE IGNITION STATISTICS
BY FPI, ALL ASSET CLASSES

	R2+	R3+
% of Total Reportable Ignitions in HFTD	84%	60%
% of Wildfires >10 Acres	81%	71%
% of Wildfires >100 Acres	100%	100%
% of Total Structures Destroyed	100%	99%
% of Total Fatalities	100%	100%

9   In 2022, PG&E enabled EPSS technology on over 1,000 circuits,
10 protecting approximately 44,000 overhead distribution miles in our service
11 territory, including all distribution milage within HFTD. We also refined when
12 to enable this tool to mitigate fires of consequence by targeting the right
13 meteorological conditions. When a circuit is forecasted to be in FPI
14 conditions of R3+, EPSS is enabled on protective devices. However, PG&E
15 further refined enablement conditions prior to the R3 threshold based on a
16 combination of wind speed, relative humidity, and dead fuel moisture
17 triggers to further mitigate ignitions and reduce risk. See Figure 3.13-5 for
18 details on this enablement criteria.

FIGURE 3.13-5
EPSS ENABLEMENT CRITERIA BASED ON FIRE POTENTIAL INDEX

PG&E Utility Fire Potential Index

R1 | R2 | R3 | R4 | R5 | R5+

Moist fuels — Very Dry Fuels

Existing HFRA & HFTD Criteria

EPSS enabled if
- Wind speed 25+ mph
- Relative humidity <20%
- Dead Fuel Moisture <9%

EPSS enabled if
- Wind speed 22+ mph
- Relative humidity <25%
- Dead Fuel Moisture <9%

Transmission Enabled R3 and above

EPSS enabled on all circuits

LAST RESORT
PSPS considered if:
- Wind gusts 30-40+ mph
- Relative humidity <30%
- Dead Fuel Moisture <9-11%

1   In 2023, PG&E expanded on the capabilities of this program to reduce
2   ignitions where and when they matter by layering additional system
3   protection strategies to complement the capabilities of EPSS, including
4   installing a Downed Conductor Detection (DCD) algorithm on recloser
5   controllers.

6   PG&E expects continued success with the EPSS program to reduce
7   ignitions of consequence in 2024 and is actively exploring additional layers
8   of protection through technology deployment to further reduce risk (please
9   see Current and Planned Work Activities). However, ignition counts (in both
10 low and potentially high consequence environments) are dependent on
11 weather conditions and are highly variable. As a result, PG&E forecasts a
12 range of 72 to 84 reportable ignitions to account for variability.

13 To establish the 1-year and 5-year targets, PG&E considered the
14 following factors:

15 • Historical Data and Trends: As 2021 was the first year of EPSS
16   deployment and given the expansion of the program in 2022, there is no
17   comparable historical data, outside of PG&E's own ignition record, to
18   help guide in target setting. However, PG&E has two complete years of
19   ignitions data after the widespread implementation of the EPSS
20   program; this data was leveraged to propose 2024-2028 targets.

21 • Benchmarking: None;

22 • Regulatory Requirements: D.14-02-015;

23 • Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Yes;

- Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and Enforcement: The targets for this metric are suitable for EOE as they consider the potential for an increase in severe weather events due to climate change; and
- Other Qualitative Considerations: The target range takes consideration for some variability in weather.

3. **2024 Target**

The 2024 target is 72-84 ignitions. The upper end of this range represents a 32 percent reduction relative to the 3-year average (2018-2020). The lower end of this range represents a 40 percent reduction for the same period.

4. **2028 Target**

The 2028 target is 72-84 ignitions. The upper end of this range represents a 32 percent reduction relative to the 3-year average (2018-2020). The lower end of this range represents a 40 percent reduction for the same period. Additional time and maturity of the EPSS program will enable PG&E to reduce ignitions in R3+ conditions and forecast the effectiveness of the EPSS program to help inform long-term target ranges.

D. **(3.13) Performance Against Target**

1. **Progress Towards the 1-Year Target**

As demonstrated in Figure 3.13-6 below, PG&E ended 2023 with 57 ignitions. This is in-line with our projections of a 30 percent reduction from the count of ignitions from the previous year (84 ignitions.)

2. **Progress Towards the 5-Year Target**

As discussed in Section E below, PG&E continues to deploy several programs outside of the EPSS program designed to improve the long-term performance of this metric and meet the Company's 5-year performance target. PG&E expects no deviation from delivering the 2028 goal for this metric.

FIGURE 3.13-6
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE (2015–2023) AND TARGETS (2024 & 2028)

E. (3.13) Current and Planned Work Activities

PG&E can expect to see improved performance on this metric through continual execution of the Wildfire Mitigation Plan (WMP) and maturation of key wildfire mitigation strategies, including:

- Maturation of the EPSS Program: In July 2021, to address this dynamic climate challenge, we implemented the EPSS Program on approximately 11,500 miles of distribution circuits, or 45 percent of the circuits in HFTD areas. With EPSS, we engineered changes to our electrical equipment settings so that if an object such as vegetation contacts a distribution line, power is automatically shut off within 1/10th of a second, reducing the potential for an ignition. EPSS enabled settings provide a layer of protection on days when the wind speeds are low. EPSS is especially important during hot dry summer days, when there are low winds. Continued low relative humidity, low fuel moistures levels, and areas where the volume of dry vegetation is in close proximity to the distribution lines, increases the risk of an ignition becoming a large wildfire.

1	In 2022, we expanded the EPSS scope to all primary distribution
2	conductor in High Fire Risk Area (HFRA) areas in our service territory, as
3	well as select non HFRA areas. In concert with this expansion of the
4	program, PG&E modified enablement criteria (improving risk reduction and
5	reliability).
6	In 2023, PG&E implemented a DCD algorithm on recloser controllers to
7	mitigate risk of low current fault conditions, also referred to as
8	high-impedance faults We have plans to continue to mature our
9	high-impedance fault detection in 2024 and beyond.
10	Please see Section 8.1.8.1.1, Protective Equipment and Device Settings
11	in PG&E's 2023-2025 WMP for additional details.
12	• Public Safety Power Shut Off (PSPS): PSPS is a wildfire mitigation
13	strategy, first implemented in 2019, to reduce powerline ignitions during
14	severe weather by proactively de-energizing powerlines (remove the risk of
15	those powerlines causing an ignition) prior to forecasted wind events when
16	humidity levels and fuel conditions are conducive to wildfires. PG&E's focus
17	with the PSPS Program is to mitigate the risks associated with a
18	catastrophic wildfire and to prioritize customer safety. In 2021, PG&E
19	continued to make progress to its PSPS Program to mitigate wildfire risk,
20	including updating meteorology models and scoping processes. In 2023,
21	PG&E continued a multi-rear effort to install additional distribution
22	sectionalizing devices, Fixed Power Solutions, and other mitigations
23	targeted at reducing the risk of wildfire.
24	Please see Section 9, PSPS, Including Directional Vision For PSPS in
25	PG&E's 2023-2025 WMP for additional details.
26	• Grid Design and System Hardening: PG&E's broader grid design program
27	covers several significant programs to reduce ignition risk, called out in
28	detail in PG&E's 2023 WMP. The largest of these programs is the System
29	Hardening Program which focuses on the mitigation of potential catastrophic
30	wildfire risk caused by distribution overhead assets. In 2023, we rapidly
31	expanded our system hardening efforts by:
32	– Completing 420 circuit miles of system hardening work which includes
33	overhead system hardening, undergrounding and removal of overhead
34	lines in HFTD or buffer zone areas;

1   –   Completing at least 350 circuit miles of undergrounding work, including

2   Butte County Rebuild efforts and other distribution system hardening

3   work; and

4   –   Replacing equipment in HFTD areas that creates ignition risks, such as

5   non-exempt fuses (3,000) and removing the remainder of non-exempt

6   surge arresters from our system.

7   As we look to 2024 and beyond, PG&E is targeting 1,000 miles of

8   undergrounding to be completed between 2024 and 2025 as part of the

9   10,000 Mile Undergrounding Program. This system hardening work done at

10   scale is expected to have a material impact on ignition reduction.

11   Please see Section 8.1.2, Grid Design and System Hardening

12   Mitigations in PG&E's 2023-2025 WMP for additional details.

13   •   VM: We restructured our VM Program based on a risk-informed approach.

14   Recent data and analysis demonstrate that the Enhanced Vegetation

15   Management (EVM) Program risk reduction is less than EPSS and

16   additional Operational Mitigations. As a result, we transitioned the EVM

17   Program to three new risk-informed VM programs.

18   –   Focused Tree Inspections: We developed specific areas of focus

19   (referred to as Areas of Concern), primarily in the HFRA, where we will

20   concentrate our efforts to inspect and address high-risk locations, such

21   as those that have experienced higher volumes of vegetation damage

22   during PSPS events, outages, and/or ignitions.

23   –   VM for Operational Mitigations: This program is intended to help reduce

24   outages and potential ignitions using a risk informed, targeted plan to

25   mitigate potential vegetation contacts based on historic vegetation

26   caused outages on EPSS-enabled circuits. We will initially focus on

27   mitigating potential vegetation contacts in circuit protection zones that

28   have experienced vegetation caused outages. Scope of work will be

29   developed by using EPSS and historical outage data and vegetation

30   failure from the Wildfire Distribution Risk Model v3 risk model.

31   EPSS-enabled devices vegetation outages extent of condition

32   inspections may generate additional tree work.

33   –   Tree Removal Inventory: This is a long-term program intended to

34   systematically work down trees that were previously identified through

1   EVM inspections. We will develop annual risk-ranked work plans and

2   mitigate the highest risk-ranked areas first and will continue monitor the

3   condition of these trees through our established inspection programs.

4   Please see Section 8.2.2, Vegetation Management and Inspections in

5   PG&E's 2023–2025 WMP for additional details.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:

CHAPTER 3.14

PERCENTAGE OF CPUC-REPORTABLE IGNITIONS IN

HFTD AREAS

(DISTRIBUTION)

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
CHAPTER 3.14
PERCENTAGE OF CPUC-REPORTABLE IGNITIONS IN
HFTD AREAS
(DISTRIBUTION)

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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
CHAPTER 3.14
PERCENTAGE OF CPUC-REPORTABLE IGNITIONS IN
HFTD AREAS
(DISTRIBUTION)

The material updates to this chapter since the October 2, 2023, report can be found in Section B concerning metric performance and Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

A. (3.14) Overview

1. Metric Definition

Safety and Operational Metrics (SOM) 3.14 – The number of California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) Reportable Ignitions in High Fire Threat Districts (HFTD) areas (Distribution) is defined as:

The number of CPUC-reportable ignitions involving overhead (OH) distribution circuits in HFTD areas divided by circuit miles of OH distribution lines in HFTD multiplied by 1000 miles (ignitions per 1000 HFTD circuit miles).

A CPUC-Reportable Ignition refers to a fire incident where the following three criteria are met: (1) Ignition is associated with PG&E electrical assets, (2) something other than PG&E facilities burned, and (3) the resulting fire travelled more than one linear meter from the ignition point.[1]

For this SOM, reporting is specific to Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTDs.

PG&E provides the CPUC with annual ignition data in the Fire Incident Data Collection Plan, to the Office of Energy Infrastructure and Safety quarterly via quarterly geographic information system, data reporting, in quarterly Wildfire Mitigation Plan updates, and the Safety Performance Metrics Report.

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[1] Please CPUC Decision (D.) 14-02-015, issued February 5, 2014, for additional details.

1 ## 2. Introduction of Metric

2 The number of CPUC-reportable Ignitions in HFTDs, normalized by

3 circuit mileage, provides one way to gauge the level of wildfire risk that

4 customers and communities are exposed to from OH distribution assets.

5 PG&E's objective is to reduce the number of CPUC reportable ignitions that

6 may trigger a catastrophic wildfire.

7 ## B. (3.14) Metric Performance

8 ### 1. Historical Data (2015–2023)

9 PG&E implemented the Fire Incident Data Collection Plan, in response

10 to D.14-02-015, in June 2014 and our record, the Ignitions Tracker, includes

11 all CPUC-reportable ignitions from June 2014 to present. The 2014 data

12 does not represent a complete year and is excluded in this analysis.

13 PG&E's OH distribution circuits traverse approximately 25,000 miles of

14 terrain in the HFTD areas where the OH conductor is primarily bare wire,

15 supported by structures consisting of poles, cross arms, associated

16 insulators, and operating equipment such as transformer, fuses and

17 reclosers. Given the volume of equipment within the 25,000 miles of HFTD,

18 the annual number of CPUC-reportable ignitions is too low to detect any

19 statistical pattern.

FIGURE 3.14-1
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE (2015 – 2023)

3.14-2

2. Data Collection Methodology

Data will be collected per PG&E's Fire Incident Data Collection Plan (Utility Standard/Procedure RISK-6306S/P). Results will be inclusive of unique HFTD CPUC-reportable ignitions attributable to the distribution asset class with OH construction types.

The following ignition events captured by PG&E's Fire Incident Data Collection Plan) will be excluded for this metric:

- Duplicate events;
- Ignitions that do not meet CPUC reporting criteria;
- Ignition events outside of Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTD;
- Transmission Ignitions; and
- Ignitions attributable to underground or pad mounted assets as these are not associated OH assets. (Ignitions caused by non-OH assets in HFTD are rare and, as the fires are often contained to the asset, pose less of a wildfire risk.)

The circuit mileage utilized to calculate the 2015-2022 performance of this metric originates from PG&E's Electrical Asset Data Reports, refreshed December 2022. The 2023 performance and targets is based on an updated sum of overhead circuit mileage, refreshed in 2023.

3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period

PG&E finished 2023 with 57 CPUC reportable ignitions in HFTD attributable to overhead distribution assets (corresponding to a rate of 2.27 ignitions per 1,000 circuit miles). These results were lower than all previous years in PG&E's ignition record.

Most importantly, PG&E has observed 21 ignitions where the Fire Potential Index Rating was in R3 or greater conditions. This compared to 30 in 2022, and a 3-year previous average of 70 ignitions in R3 or greater conditions. This is aligned with PG&E's strategy of reducing ignition when and where they matter, to reach our goal of stopping catastrophic wildfires.

Please see the Target Methodology section for an overview of our Fire Potential Index (FPI) model and our strategy to focus operational mitigations, like Enhanced Powerline Safety Settings (EPSS), on reducing ignitions where consequences are more likely.

C. (3.14) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target

1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report

PG&E proposes to reduce our target range for this metric to account for improved performance in 2022 and 2023, representing two complete years after the implementation of our maturing EPSS strategy. PG&E proposes a reduced, more-challenging, target range of 72 to 84 ignitions (corresponding to a rate of 2.87 – 3.35 ignitions per 1,000 circuit miles), shifting the higher end of the range to match the 2022 end of year value.

This existing range will continue to challenge the organization to reduce ignitions of consequence. However, ignition counts, occurring in consequential and non-consequential environmental conditions, are highly variable and subject to a variety of causes such as migratory bird patterns, red flag warning days, and contact from external parties. This existing range will continue to challenge the organization to reduce ignitions of consequence.

PG&E remains focused on reducing those ignitions in R3+ conditions and, as future strategies with direct ignition impact emerge, these targets will be reevaluated.

2. Target Methodology

The two major programs that most directly impact ignition reduction in the near-term are PSPS and EPSS. Other important resiliency programs like undergrounding, system hardening, and vegetation management will have an impact as multiple years of work are completed.

PG&E has observed success with EPSS in terms of mitigating ignitions in R3+ FPI conditions. These ignitions in R3+ conditions represent all historical reportable ignitions resulting in a fatality, all ignitions over 100 acres in size, and 99 percent of reportable ignitions where a structure was destroyed. See Figure 3.14-4 for fire statistics by FPI rating.

FIGURE 3.14-4
2018-2020 HFTD OVERHEAD REPORTABLE IGNITION STATISTICS BY FPI,
ALL ASSET CLASSES

	R2+	R3+
% of Total Reportable Ignitions in HFTD	84%	60%
% of Wildfires >10 Acres	81%	71%
% of Wildfires >100 Acres	100%	100%
% of Total Structures Destroyed	100%	99%
% of Total Fatalities	100%	100%

1   In 2022, PG&E enabled EPSS technology on over 1,000 circuits,

2   protecting approximately 44,000 overhead distribution miles in our service

3   territory, including all distribution milage within HFTD. We also refined when

4   to enable this tool to mitigate fires of consequence by targeting the right

5   meteorological conditions. When a circuit is forecasted to be in FPI

6   conditions of R3+, EPSS is enabled on protective devices. However, PG&E

7   further refined enablement conditions prior to the R3 threshold based on a

8   combination of wind speed, relative humidity, and dead fuel moisture

9   triggers to further mitigate ignitions and reduce risk. See Figure 3.14-5 for

10   details on this enablement criteria.

FIGURE 3.14-5
EPSS ENABLEMENT CRITERIA BASED ON FIRE POTENTIAL INDEX

1   in 2023, PG&E expanded on the capabilities of this program to reduce

2   ignitions where and when they matter by layering additional system

3   protection strategies to complement the capabilities of EPSS, including

4   installing a Downed Conductor Detection (DCD) algorithm on recloser

5   controllers.

6   PG&E expects continual success with the EPSS program to reduce

7   ignitions of consequence in 2024 and is actively exploring additional layers

8   of protection through technology deployment to further reduce risk (please

9   see Current and Planned Work Activities). However, ignition counts (in both

10   low and potentially high consequence environments) are dependent on

11   weather conditions and are highly variable. As a result, PG&E forecasts a

12   range of 72 to 84 reportable ignitions to account for variability.

13   To establish the 1-year and 5-year targets, PG&E considered the

14   following factors:

15   • Historical Data and Trends: As 2021 was the first year of EPSS

16   deployment and given the expansion of the program in 2022, there is no

17   comparable historical data, outside of PG&E's own ignition record, to

18   help guide in target setting. However, PG&E has two complete years of

19   ignitions data after the widespread implementation of the EPSS

20   program; this data was leveraged to propose 2024-2028 targets;

21   • Benchmarking: None;

22   • Regulatory Requirements: D.14-02-015;

23   • Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Yes;

24   • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and

25   Enforcement: The targets for this metric are suitable for EOE as they

26   consider the potential for an increase in severe weather events due to

27   climate change; and

28   • Other Qualitative Considerations: The target range takes consideration

29   for some variability in weather.

1   **3. 2024 Target**

2   The 2024 target is 2.87 – 3.35 ignitions per 1000 HFTD circuit miles.

3   The upper end of this range represents a 32 percent reduction relative to the

4   3-year average (2018-2020); the lower end of this range represents a

5   40 percent reduction for the same period.

6   **4. 2028 Target**

7   The 2028 target is 2.87 – 3.35 ignitions per 1000 HFTD circuit miles.

8   The upper end of this range represents a 32 percent reduction relative to the

9   3-year average (2018 - 2020); the lower end of this range represents a

10   40 percent reduction for the same period. Additional time and maturity of

11   the EPSS Program will enable PG&E to reduce ignitions in R3+ conditions

12   and forecast the effectiveness of the EPSS Program to help inform

13   long-term target ranges.

14   **D. (3.14) Performance Against Target**

15   **1. Progress Towards the 1-Year Target**

16   PG&E proposes to reduce our target range for this metric to account for

17   favorable performance in 2022 and 2023, representing two complete years

18   after the implementation of our maturing EPSS strategy. PG&E proposes a

19   reduced, more-challenging, target range of 72 to 84 ignitions (corresponding

20   to a rate of 2.87 – 3.35 ignitions per 1,000 circuit miles), shifting the higher

21   end of the range to match the 2022 end of year value.

22   **2. Progress Towards the 5-Year Target**

23   As discussed in Section E below, PG&E continues to deploy a number

24   of programs designed to improve the long-term performance of this metric

25   and meet the Company's 5-year performance target. PG&E expects no

26   deviation from delivering the 2028 goal for this metric.

FIGURE 3.14-6
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE (2015-2023) AND
TARGETS (2024 AND 2028)

Historical & Projected Performance

E. (3.14) Current and Planned Work Activities

PG&E can expect to see improved performance on this metric through continual execution of the Wildfire Mitigation Plan (WMP) and maturation of key wildfire mitigation strategies, including:

- Maturation of the EPSS Program: In July 2021, to address this dynamic climate challenge, we implemented the EPSS Program on approximately 11,500 miles of distribution circuits, or 45 percent of the circuits in HFTD areas. With EPSS, we engineered changes to our electrical equipment settings so that if an object such as vegetation contacts a distribution line, power is automatically shut off within 1/10th of a second, reducing the potential for an ignition. EPSS enabled settings provide a layer of protection on days when the wind speeds are low. EPSS is especially important during hot dry summer days, when there are low winds, but continued low relative humidity, low fuel moistures levels, and where the volume of dry vegetation, in close proximity to the distribution lines, increases the risk of an ignition becoming a large wildfire.

1	In 2022, we expanded the EPSS scope to all primary distribution
2	conductor in High Fire Risk Area (HFRA) areas in our service territory, as
3	well as select non HFRA areas. In concert with this expansion of the
4	program, PG&E modified enablement criteria (improving risk reduction and
5	reliability).
6	In 2023, PG&E implemented a DCD algorithm on recloser controllers to
7	mitigate risk of low current fault conditions, also referred to as
8	high-impedance faults. We have plans to continue to mature our
9	high-impedance fault detection in 2024 and beyond.
10	Please see Section 8.1.8.1.1, Protective Equipment and Device Settings
11	in PG&E's 2023-2025 WMP for additional details.
12	• Public Safety Power Shut Off (PSPS): PSPS is a wildfire mitigation
13	strategy, first implemented in 2019, to reduce powerline ignitions during
14	severe weather by proactively de-energizing powerlines (remove the risk of
15	those powerlines causing an ignition) prior to forecasted wind events when
16	humidity levels and fuel conditions are conducive to wildfires. PG&E's focus
17	with the PSPS Program is to mitigate the risks associated with a
18	catastrophic wildfire and to prioritize customer safety. In 2021, PG&E
19	continued to make progress to its PSPS Program to mitigate wildfire risk,
20	including updating meteorology models and scoping processes. In 2023,
21	PG&E continued a multi-rear effort to install additional distribution
22	sectionalizing devices, Fixed Power Solutions, and other mitigations
23	targeted at reducing the risk of wildfire.
24	Please see Section 9, PSPS, Including Directional Vision For PSPS in
25	PG&E's 2023-2025 WMP for additional details.
26	• Grid Design and System Hardening: PG&E's broader grid design program
27	covers several significant programs to reduce ignition risk, called out in
28	detail in PG&E's 2023 WMP. The largest of these programs is the System
29	Hardening Program which focuses on the mitigation of potential catastrophic
30	wildfire risk caused by distribution overhead assets. In 2023, we rapidly
31	expanded our system hardening efforts by:
32	– Completing 420 circuit miles of system hardening work which includes
33	overhead system hardening, undergrounding and removal of overhead
34	lines in HFTD or buffer zone areas;

- Completing at least 350 circuit miles of undergrounding work, including Butte County Rebuild efforts and other distribution system hardening work; and

- Replacing equipment in HFTD areas that creates ignition risks, such as non-exempt fuses (3,000) and removing the remainder of non-exempt surge arresters from our system

  As we look beyond 2023, PG&E is targeting 1,000 miles of undergrounding to be completed between 2024 and 2025 as part of the 10,000 Mile Undergrounding Program. This system hardening work done at scale is expected to have a material impact on ignition reduction

  Please see Section 8.1.2, Grid Design and System Hardening Mitigations in PG&E's 2023-2025 WMP for additional details.

- <u>Vegetation Management</u>: We restructured our VM Program based on a risk-informed approach. Recent data and analysis demonstrate that the Enhanced Vegetation Management (EVM) Program risk reduction is less than EPSS and other Operational Mitigations. As a result, we transitioned the EVM Program to three new risk-informed VM programs.

  - <u>Focused Tree Inspections:</u> We developed specific areas of focus (referred to as Areas of Concern (AOC)), primarily in the HFRA, where we will concentrate our efforts to inspect and address high-risk locations, such as those that have experienced higher volumes of vegetation damage during PSPS events, outages, and/or ignitions.

  - <u>VM for Operational Mitigations:</u> This program is intended to help reduce outages and potential ignitions using a risk informed, targeted plan to mitigate potential vegetation contacts based on historic vegetation caused outages on EPSS-enabled circuits. We will initially focus on mitigating potential vegetation contacts in circuit protection zones that have experienced vegetation caused outages. Scope of work will be developed by using EPSS and historical outage data and vegetation failure from the WDRM v3 risk model. EPSS-enabled devices vegetation outages extent of condition inspections may generate additional tree work.

  - <u>Tree Removal Inventory:</u> This is a long-term program intended to systematically work down trees that were previously identified through

1   EVM inspections. We will develop annual risk-ranked work plans and
2   mitigate the highest risk-ranked areas first and will continue monitor the
3   condition of these trees through our established inspection programs.
4   Please see Section 8.2.2, Vegetation Management and Inspections in
5   PG&E's 2023 -2025 WMP for additional details.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:

CHAPTER 3.15

NUMBER OF CPUC-REPORTABLE IGNITIONS IN HFTD AREAS

(TRANSMISSION)

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
CHAPTER 3.15
NUMBER OF CPUC-REPORTABLE IGNITIONS IN HFTD AREAS
(TRANSMISSION)

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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
CHAPTER 3.15
NUMBER OF CPUC-REPORTABLE IGNITIONS IN HFTD AREAS
(TRANSMISSION)

The material updates to this chapter since the October 2, 2023, report can be found in Section B concerning metric performance and Section D concerning performance against targets. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

A. (3.15) Overview

1. Metric Definition

Safety and Operational Metrics (SOM) 3.15 – Number of California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)-Reportable Ignitions in High Fire Threat District (HFTD) areas (Transmission) is defined as:

Number of CPUC-reportable ignitions involving overhead transmission circuits in HFTD Areas.

A CPUC-Reportable Ignition refers to a fire incident where the following three criteria are met: (1) Ignition is associated with Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) electrical assets, (2) something other than PG&E facilities burned, and (3) the resulting fire travelled more than one linear meter from the ignition point.[1]

For this SOM, reporting is specific to Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTDs.

PG&E provides the CPUC with annual ignition data in the Fire Incident Data Collection Plan, to the Office of Energy Infrastructure and Safety quarterly via quarterly geographic information system, data reporting, in quarterly Wildfire Mitigation Plan updates, and the Safety Performance Metrics Report.

2. Introduction of Metric

The number of CPUC-Reportable Ignitions in HFTDs provides one way to gauge the level of wildfire risk that customers and communities are

---

[1] Please CPUC Decision (D.) 14-02-015, issued February 5, 2014 for additional details.

1   exposed to from overhead transmission assets. PG&E's objective is to

2   minimize the number of CPUC-Reportable ignitions in the right locations

3   during the right conditions that may trigger a catastrophic wildfire.

4 **B. (3.15) Metric Performance**

5   **1. Historical Data (2015 – 2023)**

6   PG&E implemented the Fire Incident Data Collection Plan, in response

7   to D.14-02-015, in June 2014 and our record, the Ignitions Tracker, includes

8   all CPUC-Reportable ignitions from June 2014 to present. The 2014 data

9   does not represent a complete year and is excluded in this analysis.

10   PG&E's overhead transmission circuits traverse approximately

11   5,400 miles of terrain in the HFTD areas where the overhead conductor is

12   primarily bare wire, supported by structures consisting of poles and towers.

13   The annual number of CPUC-Reportable ignitions is too low to detect any

14   statistical pattern.

FIGURE 3.15-1
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE (2015 – 2023)

15   The main causes of CPUC-Reportable ignitions have been collected

16   and classified. These fall into five broad categories: third-party contact,

1	animal contact, equipment failure, vegetation contact, and other causes.
2	The counts for 2015 through 2023 are shown in the graph below
3	(Figure 3.15-2).
4	Note that all of the 2023 ignitions resulted from causes external to
5	PG&E.

FIGURE 3.15-2
HISTORIC (2015 – 2023) PERFORMANCE BY SUSPECTED CAUSE

6	**2. Data Collection Methodology**
7	Data will be collected per PG&E's Fire Incident Data Collection Plan
8	(Utility Standard/Procedure RISK-6306S/P). Results will be inclusive of
9	unique HFTD CPUC-Reportable ignitions attributable to the transmission
10	asset class with overhead construction types.
11	The following ignition events captured by PG&E's Fire Incident Data
12	Collection Plan (Utility Standard/Procedure RISK-6306S/P) will be excluded
13	for this metric:
14	• Duplicate events;
15	• Ignitions that do not meet CPUC reporting criteria;
16	• Ignition events outside of Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTD;
17	• Distribution Ignitions; and
18	• Ignitions attributable to underground or pad mounted assets as these
19	are not overhead assets. Ignitions caused by non-overhead assets in

HFTD are rare and, as the fires are often contained to the asset, pose less of a wildfire risk.

3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period

Historically, reportable transmission ignitions in HFTD are low in volume with variability year-to-year, which complicates the detection of significant trends. PG&E observed six CPUC-reportable ignitions on overhead transmission assets in 2023; one caused by third-party vehicle contact, one caused by a gunshot by a third party, and four caused by avian strikes.

C. (3.15) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target

1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report

There have been no changes to the 1-year target since the last SOMs report filing. PG&E has proposed a reduction in the 5-year target below.

2. Target Methodology

To establish the 1-Year and 5-Year targets, PG&E considered the following factors:

- <u>Historical Data and Trends</u>: Target ranges are based on both PG&E's stand that catastrophic wildfires shall stop and historical performance. The bottom end of the range is 0 in both 2024 and 2028, which reflects our stand that catastrophic wildfires shall stop. The upper end of the range is 10 in 2024 , which is based on our past average performance. The upper end of the range will reduce to 8 ignitions for 2028 to account for continual wildfire mitigation work planned in the future;
- <u>Benchmarking</u>: None;
- <u>Regulatory Requirements</u>: CPUC D.14-02-015;
- <u>Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and Enforcement</u>: The targets for this metric are suitable for EOE as they consider the potential for an increase in severe weather events due to climate change; and
- <u>Other Qualitative Considerations</u>: The target range takes consideration for some variability in weather.

3. 2024 Target

PG&E's target for 2024 is 0-10. The bottom end of the range is 0 in 2024, which reflects our stand that catastrophic wildfires shall stop. The

1   upper end of the range is 10 in 2024, which is based on our past average

2   performance. The upper end of the range stays at 10 in 2024 and 2028

3   because the volume of transmission ignitions is low, while variability

4   year-to-year remains high.

5   **4.   2028 Target**

6   PG&E's target for 2028 is 0-8. The bottom end of the range is 0 in

7   2028, which reflects our stand that catastrophic wildfires shall stop. The

8   upper end of the range is 8 in 2028, which accounts for our continual focus

9   to reduce ignitions associated with transmission assets.

10 **D.   (3.15) Performance Against Target**

11 **1.   Progress Towards the 1-Year Target**

12   As demonstrated in Figure 3.15-3 below, PG&E observed six

13 CPUC-reportable ignitions on overhead transmission assets in 2023, within

14 our 2022 target range of 0 – 10 ignitions. One incident was caused by

15 third-party vehicle contact; one incident was caused by a third-party

16 gunshot; and four incidents were caused by avian strikes.

17 **2.   Progress Towards the 5-Year Target**

18   As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is continuing to deploy several

19 programs to keep metric performance within the Company's target range.

20 PG&E expects no deviation from delivering the 2028 goal for this metric.

FIGURE 3.15-3
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE (2015 – 2023) AND
TARGETS (2024 AND 2028)

3.15-5

E. (3.15) Current and Planned Work Activities

1
2 Through continual execution of its WMP, PG&E has taken action to reduce
3 ignition risk associated with its transmission system, including:

4 • Utility Defensible Space Program: In 2023, PG&E expanded on Defensible
5 Space Requirements in Public Resources Code Section 4292. Defensible
6 Space is defined by three primary zones of clearance whereas in 2022 there
7 were two zones. Starting in 2023 the first zone (0-5 feet (ft.)) from energized
8 equipment or building is referred to as Zone 0 or the "Ember – Resistant
9 Zone" and is intended to be void of any combustibles. The second zone
10 (5-30 ft.) surrounding energized equipment and building is called the "Clean
11 Zone" and in most cases (with minimal exceptions) is clear of trees and
12 most vegetation. The third and final zone of clearance (30-100 ft.) is the
13 "Reduced Fuel Zone" where vegetation is permitted if it is reduced or
14 thinned and maintained regularly and within the requirements listed within
15 PG&E's hardening procedures.

16 Please see Section 8.2.3.5, Substation Defensible Space (Mitigation) in
17 PG&E's 2023-2025 WMP for additional details.

18 • Conductor Replacement and Removal: In 2021, PG&E completed
19 93.8 miles of conductor replacements and 10 miles of conductor removals.
20 All this work took place on lines traversing HFTD areas. In 2022, PG&E
21 removed or replaced 32 circuit miles of conductor in HFTD or High Fire Risk
22 Area. In 2023, PG&E removed or replaced 43 circuit miles of conductor in
23 HFTD or High Fire Risk Area. An additional 5 miles are planned through
24 2025.

25 Please see Section 8.1.2.5.1, Traditional Overhead Hardening –
26 Transmission Conductor in PG&E's 2023-2025 WMP for additional details.

27 • Conductor Splice Shunts: A conductor splice is a potential point of failure
28 within a conductor span, due to factors such as corrosion, moisture
29 intrusion, vibration, and workmanship variability. To reduce the risk of
30 failure, PG&E had initiated a program to install a shunt splice on top of the
31 existing splices on This installation eliminates the splice as a single point of
32 failure, as a failure of the original splice would not result in down conductor.
33 Lines prioritized for this program are based on higher risk splice and wildfire

consequence. In 2023, 20 transmission lines had splice shunts installed. An additional 45 lines are planned through 2025.

Please see Section 8.1.2.5.1, Traditional Overhead Hardening – Transmission Conductor in PG&E's 2023-2025 WMP for additional details.

- <u>Conductor Segment Replacements</u>: Another program has been initiated to replace targeted conductor segments within a line. A transmission line may consist of multiple conductor types, including spans of higher-risk segments such as small-sized conductors. This program reduces risk for lines where the conductor segments are may be at higher risk, but the supporting structures are generally in good condition and there is no expected additional electrical capacity need to increase the conductor size. This program is prioritized based on risk and wildfire consequence.

  Please see Section 8.1.2.5.1, Traditional Overhead Hardening – Transmission Conductor in PG&E's 2023-2025 WMP for additional details.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:

CHAPTER 3.16

PERCENTAGE OF CPUC-REPORTABLE IGNITIONS IN

HFTD AREAS

(TRANSMISSION)

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
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SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
CHAPTER 3.16
PERCENTAGE OF CPUC-REPORTABLE IGNITIONS IN
HFTD AREAS
(TRANSMISSION)

The material updates to this chapter since the October 2, 2023, report can be found in Section B concerning metric performance and Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

A. (3.16) Overview

1. Metric Definition

Safety and Operational Metrics (SOM) 3.16 – percentage of California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)-Reportable Ignitions in High Fire Threat District (HFTD) Areas (Transmission) is defined as:

The number of CPUC-reportable ignitions involving overhead transmission circuits in HFTD divided by circuit miles of overhead transmission lines in HFTD multiplied by 1,000 miles (ignitions per 1,000 HFTD circuit mile).

A CPUC-reportable ignition refers to a fire incident where the following three criteria are met: (1) Ignition is associated with Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) electrical assets, (2) something other than PG&E facilities burned, and (3) the resulting fire travelled more than one linear meter from the ignition point.[1]

For this SOM, reporting is specific to Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTDs.

PG&E provides the CPUC with annual ignition data in the Fire Incident Data Collection Plan, to the Office of Energy Infrastructure and Safety quarterly via quarterly GIS data reporting, in quarterly Wildfire Mitigation Plan (WMP) updates, and the Safety Performance Metrics Report.

---

[1] Please see CPUC Decision (D.) 14-02-015, issued February 5, 2014 for additional details.

1   **2. Introduction of Metric**

2   The number of CPUC-reportable ignitions in HFTDs, normalized by

3   circuit mileage, provides one way to gauge the level of wildfire risk that

4   customers and communities are exposed to from overhead transmission

5   assets. PG&E's objective is to minimize the number of CPUC-reportable

6   ignitions in the right locations during the right conditions that may trigger a

7   catastrophic wildfire.

8   **B. (3.16) Metric Performance**

9   **1. Historical Data (2015 – 2023)**

10   PG&E implemented the Fire Incident Data Collection Plan, in response

11   to CPUC D.14-02-015, in June 2014 and our record, the Ignitions Tracker,

12   includes all CPUC-reportable ignitions from June 2014 to present. The 2014

13   data does not represent a complete year and is excluded in this analysis.

14   PG&E's overhead transmission circuits traverse approximately

15   5,400 miles of terrain in the HFTD areas where the overhead conductor is

16   primarily bare wire, supported by structures consisting of poles and towers.

17   The annual number of CPUC-reportable ignitions is too low and too variable

18   to detect any statistical pattern.

FIGURE 3.16-1
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE (2015 – Q2 2023)

3.16-2

2. **Data Collection Methodology**

Data will be collected per PG&E's Fire Incident Data Collection Plan (Utility Standard/Procedure RISK-6306S/P). Results will be inclusive of unique HFTD CPUC-reportable ignitions attributable to the transmission asset class with overhead construction types.

The following ignition events captured by PG&E's Fire Incident Data Collection Plan (Utility Standard/Procedure RISK-6306S/P) will be excluded for this metric:

- Duplicate events;
- Ignitions that do not meet CPUC reporting criteria;
- Ignition events outside of Tier 2 and Tier 3 HFTD;
- Distribution Ignitions; and
- Ignitions attributable to underground or pad mounted assets, as these are not overhead assets. Ignitions caused by non-overhead assets in HFTD are rare and, as the fires are often contained to the asset, pose less of a wildfire risk.

The circuit mileage utilized to calculate the 2015 – 2022 performance of this metric originates from PG&E's Electrical Asset Data Reports, refreshed December 2022. The 2023 performance and targets is based on an updated sum of overhead circuit mileage, refreshed in 2023.

3. **Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

Historically, reportable transmission ignitions in HFTD are low in volume with variability year-to-year, which complicates the detection of significant trends. PG&E observed six CPUC reportable ignitions on overhead transmission assets in 2023 (corresponding to a rate of 1.10 ignitions per 1,000 circuit miles).

C. **(3.16) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

1. **Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

There have been no changes to the 1-year target since the last SOMs report filing. PG&E has proposed a reduction in the 5-year target below.

2. **Target Methodology**

To establish the 1-Year and 5-Year targets, PG&E considered the following factors:

- Historical Data and Trends: Target ranges are based on both PG&E's stand that catastrophic wildfires shall stop and historical performance. The bottom end of the range is 0 ignitions per 1,000 HFTD circuit miles in both 2024 and 2028, which reflects our stand that catastrophic wildfires shall stop. The upper end of the range is 1.84 ignitions per 1,000 HFTD circuit miles in 2024 , which is based on past average performance. The upper end of the range will reduce to 1.47 for 2028 to account for continual wildfire mitigation work planned in the future;
- Benchmarking: None;
- Regulatory Requirements: CPUC D.14-02-015;
- Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and Enforcement: The targets for this metric are suitable for EOE as they consider the potential for an increase in severe weather events due to climate change; and
- Other Qualitative Considerations: The target range takes consideration for some variability in weather.

3. 2024 Target

PG&E's target for 2024 is 0-1.84 ignitions per 1,000 HFTD circuit miles. The bottom end of the range is 0 in 2024, which reflects our stand that catastrophic wildfires shall stop. The upper end of the range is 1.84 ignitions per 1,000 HFTD circuit miles in 2024, which is based on our past average performance.

4. 2028 Target

PG&E's target for 2028 is 0-1.47 ignitions per 1,000 HFTD circuit miles. The bottom end of the range is 0 in 2028, which reflects our stand that catastrophic wildfires shall stop. The upper end of the range is 1.47 ignitions per 1,000 HFTD circuit miles in 2028, which accounts for our continual focus to reduce ignitions associated with transmission assets

D. (3.16) Performance Against Target

1. Progress Towards the 1-Year Target

As demonstrated in Figure 3.16-2 below, PG&E has observed six CPUC-reportable transmission overhead ignitions in 2023 which is a rate of 1.10 per 1,000 circuit miles.

1   **2. Progress Towards the 5-Year Target**

2   As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is continuing to deploy several

3   programs to keep metric performance within the Company's target range.

4   PG&E expects no deviation from delivering the 2028 goal for this metric.

FIGURE 3.16-2
HISTORICAL PERFORMANCE (2015- Q2 2023) AND
TARGETS (2023 AND 2028)

5 **E. (3.16) Current and Planned Work Activities**

6   Through continual execution of its WMP, PG&E has taken action to reduce

7   ignition risk associated with its transmission system, including:

8   • <u>Utility Defensible Space Program</u>: In 2023, PG&E expanded on Defensible

9   Space Requirements in Public Resources Code (PRC) Section 4292.

10   Defensible Space is defined by three primary zones of clearance whereas in

11   2022 there were two zones. Starting in 2023 the first zone (0-5 ft.) from

12   energized equipment or building is referred to as Zone 0 or the "Ember –

13   Resistant Zone" and is intended to be void of any combustibles. The

14   second zone (5-30 ft.) surrounding energized equipment and building is

15   called the "Clean Zone" and in most cases (with minimal exceptions) is clear

16   of trees and most vegetation. The third and final zone of clearance

(30-100 ft.) is the "Reduced Fuel Zone" where vegetation is permitted if it is reduced or thinned and maintained regularly and within the requirements listed within PG&E's hardening procedures.

Please see Section 8.2.3.5, Substation Defensible Space (Mitigation) in PG&E's 2023-2025 WMP for additional details.

- <u>Conductor Replacement and Removal</u>: In 2021, PG&E completed 93.8 miles of conductor replacements and 10 miles of conductor removals. All this work took place on lines traversing HFTD areas. In 2022, PG&E removed or replaced 32 circuit miles of conductor in HFTD or High Fire Risk Area. In 2023, PG&E removed or replaced 43 circuit miles of conductor in HFTD or High Fire Risk Area. An additional 5 miles are planned through 2025.

Please see Section 8.1.2.5.1, Traditional Overhead Hardening – Transmission Conductor in PG&E's 2023-2025 WMP for additional details.

- <u>Conductor Splice Shunts</u>: A conductor splice is a potential point of failure within a conductor span, due to factors such as corrosion, moisture intrusion, vibration, and workmanship variability. To reduce the risk of failure, PG&E had initiated a program to install a shunt splice on top of the existing splices on This installation eliminates the splice as a single point of failure, as a failure of the original splice would not result in down conductor. Lines prioritized for this program are based on higher risk splice and wildfire consequence. In 2023, 20 transmission lines had splice shunts installed. An additional 45 lines are planned through 2025.

Please see Section 8.1.2.5.1, Traditional Overhead Hardening – Transmission Conductor in PG&E's 2023-2025 WMP for additional details

- <u>Conductor Segment Replacements</u>: Another program has been initiated to replace targeted conductor segments within a line. A transmission line may consist of multiple conductor types, including spans of higher-risk segments such as small-sized conductors. This program reduces risk for lines where the conductor segments are may be at higher risk, but the supporting structures are generally in good condition and there is no expected additional electrical capacity need to increase the conductor size. This program is prioritized based on risk and wildfire consequence.

1   Please see Section 8.1.2.5.1, Traditional Overhead Hardening –
2   Transmission Conductor in PG&E's 2023-2025 WMP for additional details.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
CHAPTER 4.1
NUMBER OF GAS DIG-INS PER 1,000 UNDERGROUND
SERVICE ALERT (USA) TICKETS ON
TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION PIPELINES

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
CHAPTER 4.1
NUMBER OF GAS DIG-INS PER 1,000 UNDERGROUND
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NUMBER OF GAS DIG-INS PER 1,000 UNDERGROUND
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TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION PIPELINES

The material updates to this chapter since the October 2, 2023, report can be found in Section B concerning metric performance and Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

A. (4.1) Overview

1. Metric Definition

Safety and Operational Metric 4.1 – Number of Gas Dig-Ins per 1,000 tickets on Transmission and Distribution Pipelines is defined as:

The number of gas dig-ins per 1,000 Underground Service Alert (USA) tickets received for gas. A gas dig-in refers to damage (impact or exposure) which occurs during excavation activities and results in a repair or replacement of an underground gas facility. Excludes fiber and electric tickets. Also excludes tickets originated by the utility itself or by utility contractors.

2. Introduction of Metric

Reducing gas dig-ins increases public safety and improves reliability. It is therefore important to take reasonable steps reduce this risk because gas dig-ins represent a potential risk to people, property, and the environment.

If ignited, gas from a dig-in could produce a fire or explosion, either of which, could result property damage, injury or even death. Release of gas from a dig-in also produces a possible health hazard from inhalation of natural gas. Finally, dig-ins typically produce a disruption or loss of service to one or more customers.

For all these reasons, fewer dig-ins reduces risk to public safety and minimizes interruption to the gas business and customers.

B. (4.1) Metric Performance

1. Historical Data (2018 – 2023)

For this metric, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E or the Company) has six years of historic data available, which includes 2018-2023. The past six years were used for analysis in target setting. Over the historical reporting period, performance improved as demonstrated by both an overall increase in USA tickets and a decrease in gas dig-ins.

FIGURE 4.1-1
THIRD-PARTY TICKETS AND TOTAL DIG-IN COUNTS 2018 – 2023

| | 3rd Party Ticket Counts | | | | | | | Dig-In Count | | | | | |
	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023		2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
January	66,605	66,900	74,736	69,544	83,536	60,314	January	100	89	93	118	118	79
February	62,387	58,586	70,016	74,323	80,127	61,733	February	131	78	119	116	106	79
March	66,538	74,563	69,991	95,177	93,432	68,744	March	103	103	98	126	143	66
April	71,514	85,215	67,071	93,335	83,657	73,186	April	147	140	117	147	120	111
May	75,794	86,339	71,786	87,432	87,005	83,866	May	209	140	128	139	150	123
June	69,824	81,989	80,614	93,008	88,319	80,983	June	176	176	170	183	149	121
July	68,927	92,787	80,926	84,316	81,346	75,831	July	190	196	201	170	145	110
August	74,158	89,869	76,521	87,507	94,628	85,879	August	186	200	182	175	156	135
September	64,678	84,840	79,684	84,126	86,949	79,082	September	173	167	178	163	124	139
October	77,779	91,022	81,680	82,106	87,461	84,875	October	179	191	155	135	131	117
November	64,861	72,476	72,089	82,859	79,547	76,765	November	139	149	131	101	96	119
December	56,219	64,452	73,995	71,744	62,951	63,816	December	110	87	126	64	45	73
Total	819,284	949,038	899,109	1,005,477	1,008,958	895,074	Total	1,843	1,716	1,698	1,637	1,483	1,272

2. Data Collection Methodology

The data used for this metric reporting is maintained in two files. Together, these databases identify the number of dig-ins and the 811 tickets, respectively. To ensure accuracy of the Master Dig-In File data, three data sources are reviewed:

1) The repair data file recorded in SAP- (Obtained using Business Objects GCM058 Quarterly GQI Extract Report);

2) The Event Management (EM) Tool obtained from Gas Dispatch, data file; and

3) The Dig-In Reduction Teams (DiRT) Pronto download file, obtained from the DiRT team data download report.

Events that meet the definition of dig-in are recorded as a ratio of total dig-ins (count) divided by the third-party USA tickets (count) multiplied by 1,000. This metric does not include tickets originated by the utility itself or by utility contractors.

This metric also does not include PG&E dig-ins to third parties (e.g., sewer, water, telecommunications). Dig-ins are reported in real-time, so they should be captured for the reporting period. However, in the event dig-ins are reported after the reporting cycle is closed, the dig-in would be captured in the next reporting cycle (i.e., the next quarter of the current year or the first quarter of the next year). Electric and Fiber dig-ins are also excluded from the dig-in count. Also excluded from the dig-in count are the following (since damages are not from excavation activity):

- Damages to above-ground infrastructure, such as meters and risers, or overbuilds.
- Pre-existing damages (e.g., due to corrosion or old wrap).
- Any intentional damage to a pipeline (e.g., drilling or cutting).
- Damage caused by driving over a covered facility (heavy vehicles damage gas pipe, non-excavation).
- Damage to abandoned facilities.
- Damage due to materials failure (e.g., Aldyl-A pipe);
- Damage caused to gas or electric lines by trench collapse or soldering work; and
- Facility has been fully exposed, and damage is not as a result of excavation activity (as defined by California Government Code 4216 (G)) (e.g., cutting tree roots, object/person contact to exposed gas line.

3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period

There has been an overall downward trend in the number of dig-ins per 1,000 third-party USA tickets. PG&E attributes the reduction to current and planned Damage Prevention activities. Overall, PG&E has worked to increase knowledge of the requirement to call 811 before digging through Public Awareness Campaigns and by providing training and education to contractors. PG&E continues to show an improvement in its dig-in ratio.

FIGURE 4.1-2
TOTAL DIG-INS PER 1,000 THIRD-PARTY TICKETS 2018 – 2023

Total Dig-Ins Per 1,000 Third Party Tickets 2018-2023

1 **C. (4.1) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

2 **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

3 Updated Targets are provided below.

4 **2. Target Methodology**

5 To establish the 1-year and 5-year targets, PG&E considered the

6 following factors:

7 • Historical Data and Trends: Comparable data is available starting in

8 2018. Performance has been consistent with a downward trend from

9 2018-2023.

10 • Benchmarking: Although this metric is not benchmarkable as defined

11 (benchmarkable metrics include total tickets rather than only a subset of

12 tickets), benchmark data was used and derived as proxy guideposts to

13 understand PG&E performance for third-party tickets to inform target

14 setting. The target is set at a level consistent with strong performance.

15 • Regulatory Requirements: None.

16 • Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Yes.

17 • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight

18 Enforcement: Yes, performance at or below the set target is a

1   sustainable assumption for maintaining metric performance, plus room

2   for non-significant variability; and

3   •   <u>Other Qualitative Considerations</u>: None.

4 **3. 2024 Target**

5   The 2024 target is to maintain improved metric performance at or better

6 than a rate of 1.93 based on the factors described above. This improvement

7 is based upon the Damage Prevention Organization's Dig-in Reduction

8 Program. This target represents an appropriate indicator light to signal a

9 review of potential performance issues. Target should not be interpreted as

10 intention to worsen performance.

11 **4. 2028 Target**

12   The 2027 target is to maintain performance better than a rate of 1.89

13 based on the factors described above. Annual targets should continue to be

14 informed by available benchmarking data.

15 **D. (4.1) Performance Against Target**

16 **1. Maintaining Performance Against the 1-year Target**

17   As demonstrated in Figure 4.1-3, PG&E saw a 1.42 Gas Dig-In rate in

18 2023, which is better than the Company's 1-year target of 2.21 and remains

19 consistent with the Company's objective of maintaining first quartile

20 performance. 2023 Performance of 1.42 Gas Dig-in rate also exceeded the

21 2022 Performance of 1.47.

22 **2. Maintaining Performance against the 5-year Target**

23   As discussed in Section E, PG&E continues to use the Damage

24 Prevention and DiRT programs to maintain performance in its efforts toward

25 the Company's 5-year target.

FIGURE 4.1-3
TOTAL DIG-INS PER 1,000 THIRD-PARTY TICKETS 2018 – 2023
AND TARGETS THROUGH 2028

Gas Dig-Ins per 1000 USA Tickets
Historical Performance & Targets

Targets represent values that serve as appropriate indicator lights to signal a review of potential performance issues. Targets should not be interpreted as intention to worsen performance.

E. (4.1) Current and Planned Work Activities

1.
2. PG&E's Damage Prevention team is responsible for the overall
3. management of PG&E's Damage Prevention Program, by managing the risks
4. associated with excavations around PG&E's facilities and conducting
5. investigations. As an additional control to manage the Damage Prevention
6. Program, PG&E has its DiRT). DiRT consists of 25 people (18 PG&E
7. Employees and 7 Contractors) deployed systemwide to investigate dig-ins.
8. Team members work closely with various local PG&E operations personnel and
9. respond to referrals from those employees when they observe excavations
10. potentially not in compliance with the requirements of California Government
11. Code Section 4216. DiRT personnel also assist the Ground Patrol team when
12. they respond to immediate threats identified in the air by the Aerial Patrol team
13. and other PG&E groups, in order to intervene in unsafe digging activities by third
14. parties and follow-up to educate excavators as necessary.
15. PG&E's Damage Prevention activities include educational outreach activities
16. for professional excavators, local public officials, emergency responders, and
17. the general public who lives and works within PG&E's service territory. The
18. program communicates safe excavation practices, required actions prior to
19. excavating near underground pipelines, availability of pipeline location

1   information, and other gas safety information through a variety of methods

2   throughout the year. These efforts are aimed at increasing public awareness

3   about the importance of utilizing the 811 Program before an excavation project is

4   started, understanding the markings that have been placed, and following safe

5   excavation practices after subsurface installations have been marked. Specific

6   activities aimed at preventing dig-ins include:

7   •   Updating the Locate and Mark Field Guide to provide clear instruction

8   around critical processes for locating underground assets, including

9   troubleshooting of difficult to locate facilities.

10   •   PG&E participates in the Common Ground Alliance (CGA) – Damage

11   Prevention Institute (DPI). The Common Ground Alliance acquired the Gold

12   Shovel Standard in 2023. PG&E began this program that is now run by a

13   third-party and available to utilities and excavators across the nation. The

14   program sets safety criteria that PG&E contractors are required to meet to

15   be eligible to do work on behalf of the Utility. The Common Ground Alliance

16   is an internationally-recognized program, with companies in Canada

17   adopting and implementing its certification requirements. The DPI is a way

18   that PG&E is making its own communities safer, and bringing best safety

19   practices to the industry; and

20   •   An 811 Ambassador program, which utilizes all PG&E employees to

21   properly identify unsafe excavation activities where employees learn how to

22   identify excavation-related delineations and utility operator markings.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:

CHAPTER 4.2

NUMBER OF OVERPRESSURE EVENTS

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SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
CHAPTER 4.2
NUMBER OF OVERPRESSURE EVENTS

The material updates to this chapter since the October 2, 2023 report can be found in Section B concerning metric performance; Section D concerning performance against target and Section E concerning current and planned work activities. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

A. (4.2) Overview

1. Metric Definition

Safety and Operational Metric 4.2 – Number of Overpressure (OP) events is defined as:

OP events as reportable under General Order (GO) 112-F 122.2(d)(5).

2. Introduction of Metric

An OP event occurs when the gas pressure exceeds the Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP) of the pipeline, plus the build ups, set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) – 49 CFR 192.201.

This metric tracks the occurrence of OP events, which includes:

1) High pressure Gas Distribution (GD):

    a) (MAOP 1 pound per square inch gauge (psig) to 12 psig) greater than 50 percent above MAOP.

    b) (MAOP 12 psig to 60 psig) greater than 6 psig above MAOP; and

2) Gas Transmission (GT) pipelines greater than 10 percent above MAOP (or the pressure produces a hoop stress of ≥75 percent Specified Minimum Yield Strength, whichever is lower).

OP events on low pressure systems are excluded from this metric because they are not defined in federal code 49 CFR 192.201.

OP events have the potential to overstress pipelines which pose significant safety and operational risks to Pacific Gas and Electric Company's (PG&E) gas system. PG&E has implemented multiple controls and mitigations to reduce OP events.

Following the San Bruno event in 2010, an Overpressure Elimination (OPE) task force was established to identify the root causes of OP events and develop corrective actions.

In 2011, several decisions were made in response to San Bruno incident. One of the most important corrective actions was to lower the normal operating pressure below the MAOP across the system, which resulted in a significant drop-off of OP events from 2011-2012.

Beginning in 2013, causal evaluations were conducted on all OP events. Corrective actions from these evaluations included: equipment and design review, training, fatigue management, improved Gas Event Reporting, and improved work procedures.

In 2015, several benchmarking studies and industry evaluations were conducted to learn OP elimination best practice. The benchmarking studies and analyses helped influence the development and strategies of the OPE Program.

In 2017, after the Folsom OP event,[1] the OPE Program was stood up under one sponsor with dedicated resources. The OPE Program formalized a two-pronged strategy to mitigate the risk of large OP events, while reducing operational risk: (1) Human (HU) Performance Strategy, and (2) Equipment (EQ)-Related Strategy.

In 2020, PG&E retooled an effort to reduce the number of HU Performance-related events. PG&E contracted with Exponent to perform an analysis on the OP and near hit events using the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System to drive focused actions to improve. This effort helped the team to develop the HU Performance tools to: identify and control risk, improve efficiency, avoid delays, reduce errors, prevent events, and promote excellent performance at every facility.

---

[1] On January 24, 2017, the Hydraulically Independent System that delivers gas to the Folsom area experienced a large OP event in excess of the system's 60 psig MAOP. The OP event caused damage to the regulator station equipment and resulted in a significant number of leaks on plastic distribution piping. Inspection of the station revealed that the station filter had been clogged with debris and the regulator boot had been eroded by contaminants. Further investigation revealed that an upstream pigging project scraped corrosion scales from internal pipe walls. The scale—along with other debris—traveled downstream, until eventually collecting at Folsom, causing the OP event.

B. (4.2) Metric Performance

1. Historical Data (2011 – 2023)

Historical data of OP events is available since year 2011. Various data points of each OP event including location, Corrective Action Program (CAP) number, date, cause, corrective action, etc. are documented in the OP master list file attachment.

Data source of the metric is commonly from the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system, and from direct accounts, including gauge pressure readings, chart recorders, electronic recorders, and metering data.

The availability of data has expanded throughout the years due to the increase in pressure monitoring devices allowing more OP events to be identified and recorded. In 2012, PG&E had 1,409 SCADA pressure points on its pipeline system, and by end of December 2023, that number has grown to 7,042.

2. Data Collection Methodology

PG&E has both an automated process and field process for logging Gas OP events. For the automated process, the SCADA system monitors EQ pressure and notifies potential issues to Gas Control through alarms. For the field process, field personnel are required to gauge pressure during maintenance and clearances and report to Gas Control if an abnormal operating condition arises. The Gas OP metric reporting process flow is as follows:

1) Control Room Alarm/Third-Party Notification of abnormal pressure reading or Gas Pipeline Operations and Maintenance (GPOM) finds abnormal pressure reading during maintenance.

2) GPOM performs on-site investigation (validates pressure reading and compares onsite pressure with SCADA pressure upon arrival). "As-found" and "as-left" pressures are recorded on maintenance form.

3) Gas Control Room creates Abnormal Incident Report and issues e-page. FIMP reviews the e-page, creates a CAP, and prepares a Quick Hit.

1   4) OP event is recorded on OP Master List, and Apparent Cause
2   Evaluation is conducted to determine root cause and any corrective
3   actions as applicable.
4   Several controls are in place for this metric:
5   1) Each OP event is entered into our system of record SAP system CAP to
6   ensure retention of record history.
7   2) Each OP event's datasets (location, CAP number, date, cause,
8   corrective action etc.) are reviewed by Facility Integrity Management
9   Program team to ensure accuracy and are logged in the OP Master List
10   which is viewable by all PG&E employees; and
11 3) Each OP event is distributed to stakeholders by an electronic page
12   (e-page) and an e-mail (Quick Hit), reviewed on the next Daily
13   Operations Briefing with leadership.

14 **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

15   In 2023, 5 overpressure events occurred in the PG&E gas system, an
16   improvement from 2022 that experienced 9 events.

FIGURE 4.2-1
OVERPRESSURE EVENTS 2011 – 2023

C. (4.2) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target

1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report

The 2024 target is set to be 10 (i.e., same or lower than 2023 target); the 2028 target is set to be 9 (i.e., no change from the 2027 target).

2. Target Methodology

To establish the 1-year and 5-year targets, PG&E considered the following factors:

- Historical Data and Trends: OP events have ranged from 5 to 11 events per year since 2012. We exclude data from 2011, because it was the first year OP data was collected and several anomalies were embedded in the data and is shown for reference purposes only. The target is based on the maximum number of events in the past twelve years.
- Benchmarking: This metric is not traditionally benchmarkable; however, PG&E has contracted with third parties to conduct international and North American industry evaluations. The benchmarking studies indicated that PG&E has demonstrated strong performance in this area.
- Regulatory Requirements: OP events as reportable under California Public Utilities Commission GO No.112-F, 122.2(d)(5).
- Attainable Within Known Resources/Workplan: Yes.
- Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and Enforcement: Yes, performance at or below the maximum of the past eight years is a sustainable assumption for maintaining metric performance, plus room for non-significant variability; and
- Other Qualitative Considerations: The approach of using the maximum of the past eight years includes the consideration of the expected impact of ongoing SCADA device installations—improved system visibility and monitoring points may result in a higher number of observed OP events. Additionally, as the OP Program has expanded, there has been an increase in pressure monitoring devices throughout the system, which allows more OP events to be identified and recorded.

3. 2024 Target

The 2024 target is based on the maximum of the past eight years historical performance. The target is based on the highest number annual

1   events, is within 95 percent confidence level (within two standard deviations)
2   of the average number of events, and reflects a trend of continuous
3   improvement. This target represents an appropriate indicator light to signal
4   a review of potential performance issues. Target should not be interpreted
5   as intention to worsen performance.

6   **4.   2028 Target**

7   The 2028 target reflects a 5-year outlook target demonstrating continued
8   focus on improvement year-over-year.   This target demonstrates continued
9   focus on improvement year-over-year. PG&E continues to review
10   operations and look for opportunities to perform work to further reduce OP
11   events and contribute to system safety. However, it should be noted that in
12   D.21-11-069 the Commission denied or reduced funding for a number of the
13   Overpressure Elimination mitigation programs in the 2023 General Rate
14   Case final decision, especially in the GD area.[2] It is unknown what impact
15   this will have on the future trend of OP events, but ending these programs is
16   expected to decrease the pace of our mitigation efforts to reduce OP events
17   in the future. Therefore, despite not receiving funding from the rate case,
18   PG&E continues to fund the OP elimination efforts although at a reduce
19   pace.

20   **D.   (4.2) Performance Against Target**

21   **1.   Progress Towards the 1-Year Target**

22   In 2023, 5 overpressure events occurred in PG&E's gas system which is
23   consistent with the Company's 1-year target of equal to or less than 11.

24   **2.   Progress Towards the 5-Year Target**

25   As discussed in Section E below, PG&E is deploying several programs
26   to maintain or improve the long-term performance of the Over Pressure
27   metric to meet the Company's 5-year performance target.

---

[2]   The GT and GD Station OPP Enhancement Programs were not adopted by the
commission. Similarly, GD SCADA RTU installations were not adopted. All three of
these programs are risk mitigations for large OP events.

FIGURE 4.2-2
OVERPRESSURE EVENTS 2011 – 2023 AND TARGETS THROUGH 2028

Targets represent values that serve as appropriate indicator lights to signal a review of potential performance issues. Targets should not be interpreted as intention to worsen performance.

E.   (4.2) Current and Planned Work Activities

1
2   PG&E's initial objective included plans to execute the secondary
3   Overpressure Protection Program (OPP) to mitigate common failure mode
4   failure OP events for both GT and GD over a 10-year period (2018-2027). As
5   noted, funding for the following mitigation programs was eliminated in the 2023
6   GRC decision:

7   • Gas Distribution: For 2019-2023, PG&E has retrofitted approximately
8   939 GD pilot-operated stations. By end of 2023, PG&E has exceeded the
9   goal of retrofitting 50 percent of GD pilot-operated stations. PG&E will
10   continue the retrofitting of GD pilot-operation stations to mitigate the
11   common failure mode OP events in the Gas Distribution System. These
12   retrofits will be executed at a considerably reduced pace in comparison to
13   what was proposed in the GRC (see footnote 2 on page 4.2-6).

14   • Gas Transmission: In 2019, PG&E started rebuilding and retrofitting Large
15   Volume Customer Regulators (LVCR) sets specifically to address OP risks
16   and started rebuilding and retrofitting Large Volume Customer Meter
17   (LVCM) sets in 2023. From 2019 – 2023, PG&E has rebuilt and retrofitted

1   approximately 77 LVCRs/LVCMs. PG&E will continue modifying GT

2   LVCRs/LVCMs to mitigate the common failure mode OP events in the Gas

3   Transmission System. The modification of this regulation equipment will be

4   executed at a considerably reduced pace in comparison to what was

5   proposed in the GRC (see footnote 2 on page 4.2-6).

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:

CHAPTER 4.3

TIME TO RESPOND ON-SITE TO EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION

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CHAPTER 4.3
TIME TO RESPOND ON-SITE TO EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION

The material updates to this chapter since the October 2,2023, report can be found in Section B concerning metric performance; and Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

A. **(4.3) Overview**

1. **Metric Definition**

Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 4.3 – Time to Respond On-Site to Emergency Notification is defined as:

Average time and median time to respond on-site to a gas-related emergency notification from the time of notification to the time a Gas Service Representative (GSR) (or qualified first responder) arrived onsite. Emergency notification includes all notifications originating from 911 calls and calls made directly to the utilities' safety hotlines.

The data used to determine the average time and median time shall be provided in increments as defined in General Order 112-F 123.2 (c) as supplemental information, not as a metric.

2. **Introduction of Metric**

Gas emergency response measures Pacific Gas and Electric Company's (PG&E) ability to respond with urgency to hazardous or unsafe situations that may be a threat to customer and public safety. In some situations, GSRs respond to emergency situations as first responders. Responding to emergency situations is PG&E's highest priority so that PG&E can prevent or ameliorate hazardous situations. PG&E's goal is to have a GSR on-site as quickly as possible for customer generated gas odor calls. Faster response time to Emergency Notifications reduces the length of emergent situations.

PG&E's GSRs respond to approximately 500,000 gas service customer requests annually. These requests include investigating reports of possible gas leaks; carbon monoxide monitoring; Pilot re-lights; appliance safety

checks; and maintenance work, including Atmospheric Corrosion remediation and regulator replacements.

Consistent with current practice, PG&E will continue to treat all customer-reported gas odor calls as Immediate Response (IR) and will attempt to respond to such calls within 60 minutes. To meet this goal, PG&E utilizes industry best practices, such as: mobile data terminals, real-time Global Positioning Systems, backup on-call technicians, and shift coverage of 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

B. (4.3) Metric Performance

1. Historical Data (2011-2023)

Historical data is presented as a value in minutes for response time, indicated as both an average and a median value for all Emergency Notifications for each calendar year.

Data sets prior to 2014 come from historically submitted documentation; data sets from 2014 forward come from the Customer Data Warehouse system (a database for Field Automated Systems (FAS) data) and go through a rigorous, multi-step audit process prior to submission to ensure accuracy and precision.

2. Data Collection Methodology

The response time by PG&E is measured from the time PG&E is notified—defined as the order creation time in Customer Care and Billing by the contact center—to the time a GSR or a PG&E-qualified first responder arrives on-site to the emergency location (including Business Hours and After Hours). PG&E notification time is defined as when a gas emergency order is created and timestamped.

Using PG&E's FAS, the average response time is measured for all IR gas emergency orders generated where a GSR or qualified first responder is required to respond.

The following IR gas emergency jobs are excluded in the total gas emergency orders volume count:

- Level 2 and above emergencies;[1]
- If the source is a non-planned release of PG&E gas, the original call is included—the gas emergency itself—and all subsequent related orders are excluded;
- If the source is either a planned release of PG&E gas or another non-leak-related event, all related orders from the metric are excluded, including the original call;
    - If technician finds Grade 1 or Class A leak not previously identified by Company personnel, the order will be included in the metric even if the leak was clearly not source of odor complaint.
- Duplicate orders for assistance;
- Cancelled orders;
- For multiple leak calls from the same Multi-Meter Manifold;[2]
- Unknown premise tag with no nearby gas facility; and
- If the FAS system is unavailable—such as during a tech down event— the jobs cannot be created in our system, and are therefore, an exception (not available to be included in the volume).

3. **Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

Since 2011, PG&E has improved and maintained strong performance in this metric. In 2023, we have achieved an average response time of 19.8 minutes and a recorded median response time of 18.2 minutes, compared to 19.9 minutes of average response time and 18.3 median response time for the same period in 2022. Our performance in 2023 outperformed target and was our best response time in 8 years as shown in Figure 4.3-1. This was made possible by continued focus by our Field Teams and Gas Dispatch deploying Lean practices, cross collaboration and continued accountability and focus to this metric.

---

[1] Defined in the Gas Emergency Response Plan as a region-wide emergency event that may require 1-2 days for service restoration.

[2] The first order is included, and all subsequent orders are excluded.

FIGURE 4.3-1
AVERAGE RESPONSE TIME 2016- 2023

FIGURE 4.3-2
MEDIAN RESPONSE TIME 2016- 2023

1   **C. (4.3) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

2   **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

3   Applying the same methodology as in the last SOMs report, there will

4   be a reduction to the 1-year and 5-year targets as described below,

5   reflecting a trend of improved performance.

6   **2. Target Methodology**

7   To establish the 1-year and 5-year targets, PG&E considered the

8   following factors:

9   •   Historical Data and Trends: Comparable data is available starting in

10   2015. Performance has been consistent from 2015-2023 and maintains

11   top quartile.

- Benchmarking: The targets for average response time and median response time are informed by available benchmarking data and targets are set at a level consistent with strong performance.
- Regulatory Requirements: None.
- Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Yes.
- Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and Enforcement: Yes, performance at or below the set targets is a sustainable assumption for maintaining average and median response time performance, plus room for non-significant variability; and
- Other Qualitative Considerations: None.

3. **2024 Target**

The 2024 target is to maintain performance better than or equal to 21.4 minutes for average response time and 19.7 minutes for median response time, based on the factors described above. These targets represent values that serve as appropriate indicator lights to signal a review of potential performance issues. Targets should not be interpreted as intention to worsen performance.

4. **2028 Target**

The 2028 target is to maintain performance better than or equal to 21.0 minutes for average response time and 19.3 minutes for median response time, based on the factors described above. Annual targets should continue to be informed by available benchmarking data.

D. **(4.3) Performance Against Target**

1. **Maintaining Performance Against the 1-Year Target**

As demonstrated in Figure 4.3-3 and 4.3-4, PG&E saw an average response time of 19.8 minutes and a median response time of 18.2 minutes in 2023 which exceeded the Company's 2023 target of 21.5 and 19.8 minutes respectively.

2. **Maintaining Performance Against the 5-Year Target**

As discussed in Section E below, PG&E continues to employ thorough review, auditing, and cross-functional programs to maintain performance in pursuit of the Company's 5-year target.

FIGURE 4.3-3
AVERAGE RESPONSE TIME 2013- 2023 AND TARGETS THROUGH 2028

FIGURE 4.3-4
MEDIAN RESPONSE TIME 2013-2023 AND TARGETS THROUGH 2028

E. (4.3) Current and Planned Work Activities

1
2   Below is a summary description of the key activities that are tied to
3   performance and their description of that tie.
4   •   Field Service and Gas Dispatch: PG&E's Field Service and Gas Dispatch
5   partner together to respond to customer Gas Emergency (odor calls). There
6   is a shared responsibility in the overall performance of this work. GSRs are
7   deployed systemwide, 24 hours a day—utilizing an on-call as needed.
8   •   Monitoring Controls: Activities which help us to maintain our Gas
9   Emergency Response include continued focus and visibility in our Daily
10   Operating Reviews, Weekly Operating Reviews, and Cross Functional

1   Reviews. These help to illustrate several key drivers, including Dispatch

2   Handle Time, Drive Time, and Wrap Time.

3   • <u>Audits</u>: PG&E performs audits on Emergency calls to identify opportunities.

4   • <u>Data Analysis</u>: Staffing and historical Gas Emergency Response volume

5   are reviewed to help drive decisions. We utilize Best Practice of Dispatching

6   to the closest resource. In addition, Dispatcher Ride Alongs with GSRs

7   have been implemented to drive cross-functional understanding.

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SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:

CHAPTER 4.4

GAS SHUT-IN TIME, MAINS

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GAS SHUT-IN TIME, MAINS

A. (4.4) Introduction

1. Metric Definition

Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 4.4 – Gas Shut-In Time, Mains is defined as:

Median time to shut-in gas when an uncontrolled or unplanned gas release occurs on a main. The data used to determine the median time shall be provided in increments as defined in General Order 112-F 123.2 (c) as supplemental information, not as a metric.

2. Introduction of Metric

The measurement of Gas Shut in Time captures the median duration of time required to respond to and mitigate potentially hazardous gas leak conditions. These leak conditions are associated with the public safety risk of loss of containment on Gas Distribution Main or Service. The term "shut in" refers to the act of stopping the gas flow. It is important for the flow of gas to be stopped to avoid consequences such as overpressure events or explosions and so that work can be safely performed to make repairs in a timely manner. Performance aims for faster response times as a measure of prevention resulting in lower risk of an incident impacting public safety and minimized interruption to the gas business and customers. It is imperative that we promptly and effectively resolve any hazardous conditions on our distribution network while balancing timeliness, customer outages, and employee safety.

The timing for the response starts when the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E, the Company, or the Utility) first receives the report of a potential gas leak and ends when the Utility's qualified representative determines, per the Utility's emergency standards, that the reported leak is

1   not hazardous, a leak does not exist, or the Utility's representative

2   completes actions to mitigate a hazardous leak and render it as being

3   non-hazardous (i.e., by shutting-off gas supply, eliminating subsurface leak

4   migration, repair, etc.) per the Utility's standards.

5   This metric measures the median number of minutes required for a

6   qualified PG&E responder to arrive onsite and stop the flow of gas as result

7   of damages impacting gas mains from PG&E distribution network. It does

8   not include instances where a qualified representative determines that the

9   reported leak is not hazardous, or a leak does not exist.

10   **B. (4.4) Metric Performance**

11   **1. Historical Data (2014 – 2023)**

12   Historical data for shut-in the gas (SITG) Main metric is available for the

13   period 2014 through 2023. The data captures the median time that a

14   qualified first responder requires to respond and stop gas flow during

15   incidents involving an unplanned and uncontrolled release of gas on

16   distribution mains. This data includes incidents related to distribution main

17   pipelines and regulator stations because of third-party dig-ins, vehicle

18   impacts, explosion, pipe rupture, and material failure.

19   Before 2014, PG&E used a decentralized emergency process to

20   manage emergencies (i.e., each division used its own resources like

21   mappers, planners, among others to track and manage emergencies).

22   Similarly, support organizations like Dispatch, Mapping and Planning used

23   their own management tools to help schedule and manage emergency

24   information. Dispatch used a management tool called Outage Management

25   that recorded times at various stages of the process (i.e., when the

26   emergency call came in, when the Gas Service Representative (GSR)

27   arrived at the site, when the leak was isolated, etc.). The Distribution

28   Control Room used a tool called Gas Logging System to record incoming

29   information.

30   In 2014, a centralized process was implemented to allow Distribution,

31   Transmission, Dispatch, Planning and Mapping personnel to be co-located

32   and work together as a team to manage emergencies. This centralized

1   process also allowed the development of the Event Management Tool
2   (EMT) system.

3 **2. Data Collection Methodology**

4   The EMT is currently used as the official system to track gas
5   emergencies from start to finish. It is used by Dispatch and Gas Distribution
6   Control Center (GDCC) teams to create emergency events and collect
7   incident information and allows PG&E to run reports and retrieve historical
8   information. The data captures the time that a qualified first responder
9   requires to respond and stop gas flow during incidents involving an
10   unplanned and uncontrolled release of gas on distribution mains. There are
11   distinct types of incidents recorded in the EMT: explosions, corrosion, cross
12   bore, pipe damage, dig-ins, evacuations, exposed pipe—no gas leak, fires,
13   gas leaks (including Grade 1), high concentration areas, Hi/Lo pressures,
14   material failure, pipe ruptures, vehicle impacts, among others. The EMT
15   provides access to the latest information on an incident. All emergency data
16   is consolidated and stored in one place.

17 **3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

18   The range of data available to calculate the historical shut-in the gas
19   median time for Mains is from 2014 through 2023. Over this reporting
20   period, performance improved, decreasing from 97 minutes in 2014 to
21   80.0 minutes median time in 2023. Mains median response time in 2023
22   improved by 2.6 percent compared to 2022 EOY performance of
23   82.1 minutes. This improvement is due to strategically prearranging
24   construction crews in locations with high frequency of damages after
25   business hours and weekends, understanding root causes for long shut-in
26   time incidents and sharing best practices system wide during weekly
27   performance review calls.

FIGURE 4.4-1
GAS SHUT-IN TIME, MAINS MEDIAN RESPONSE TIME 2014-2023

1 **C. (4.4) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

2 **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

3   PG&E proposes to keep the 1-year and 5-year targets flat, compared

4 to 2023 target of 84.9 minutes. This recommendation is to prioritize the

5 safety of our customers, employees, and to minimize service disruptions by

6 allowing PG&E personnel to make informed shut-in gas isolation decisions

7 according to field conditions rather than hastily take actions to shut-in the

8 gas to meet a more stringent target.

9 **2. Target Methodology**

10   To establish the 1-year and 5-year targets, PG&E considered the

11 following factors:

12 • Historical Data and Trends: The target is based on the average of the

13   2018 – 2021 median historical data, plus 10 percent. The 4-year period

14   was used because 2018 was when the FAS system was first utilized,

15   and this data period is consistent with current operational practices. The

16   use of 10 percent allows for non-significant variability, and accounts for

17   the consideration of risk during shut in events.

18 • Benchmarking: Not available.

1   • Regulatory Requirements: None.

2   • Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Yes.

3   • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and

4   Enforcement: Yes, performance at or below the average of the

5   2018-2021 annual median response time plus 10 percent is a

6   sustainable assumption for maintaining the improvement from

7   2018-2023 time frame plus room for non-significant variability; and

8   • Other Qualitative Considerations: Reducing shut in time to the lowest

9   possible result is not necessarily the best approach from a public safety

10   standpoint, and there is consideration of risk in various situations. In

11   some instances, the safest decision for our employees and the public is

12   to allow the gas to escape before crews shut it off.

13   **3. 2024 Target**

14   The 2024 target is to maintain performance at or lower than

15   84.9 minutes based on the factors described above. This target was

16   established to account for the consideration of risk in various situations and

17   aligns with our commitment to the safe operations of our assets. This target

18   represents an appropriate indicator light to signal a review of potential

19   performance issues. Target should not be interpreted as intention to worsen

20   performance.

21   **4. 2028 Target**

22   The 2028 target is to maintain performance at or lower than

23   84.9 minutes, based on the factors described above.

24   **D. (4.4) Performance Against Target**

25   **1. Maintaining Performance Against the 1-Year Target**

26   As demonstrated in Figure 4.4-2, PG&E saw a median response time of

27   80.0 minutes in 2023 which is better than the Company's 1-year target of

28   84.9 minutes.

29   **2. Maintaining Performance Against the 5-Year Target**

30   As discussed in Section E, PG&E will continue mitigating the risk of loss

31   of containment on Gas Distribution Mains and Services and employing its

32   various programs to maintain performance in its efforts toward its 5-year

33   target.

FIGURE 4.4-2
**GAS SHUT IN TIME, MAINS MEDIAN RESPONSE TIME 2014- 2023 AND
TARGETS THROUGH 2028**

E. (4.4) Current and Planned Work Activities

1

2   PG&E will continue to drive metric progress through performance

3 management and supervisor-out-in-the-field initiatives. This metric will continue

4 to mitigate the risk of loss of containment on Gas Distribution Main or Service by

5 reducing distribution pipeline rupture with ignition.

6 The metric is supported by the following programs which focus on improving

7 public safety: Field Services and Gas Maintenance and Construction (M&C).

8   • Gas Field Service: Field Service responds to gas service requests, which

9   include investigation reports of possible gas leaks, carbon monoxide

10   monitoring, customer requests for starts and stops of gas service, appliance

11   pilot re-lights, appliance safety checks, as well as emergency situations as

12   first responders.

13   • Gas Maintenance and Construction: Gas M&C performs routine

14   maintenance of PG&E's gas distribution facilities, which includes emergency

15   response due to dig-ins, as well as leak repairs.

16   The following process improvement initiatives have been implemented to

17 help achieve metric results:

- Enhanced plastic squeeze capability from approximately 50 percent to all GSRs for < 1.5" plastic pipe.
- Purchased and implemented emergency trailers in every division, allowing for emergency equipment to be accessed quickly and easily.
- Purchased additional steel squeezers for 2-8" steel pipe (housed on emergency trailers).
- Implemented Emergency Management tool (EM tool) to alert maintenance and construction (M&C) of SITG events when notified by third-party emergency organizations.
- Established concurrent response protocol (dispatch M&C and Field Service resources) when notified by emergency agencies. Utility Procedure TD-6100P-03 Major Gas Event Response: Fire, Explosion, and Gas Pipeline Rupture was updated in 2021 to align with PG&E's response and communication protocols.
- Implemented 30-60-90-120+ minute communication protocols between Gas Distribution Control Center and Incident Commander to ensure consistent communication and issue escalation during events; and

The following process improvement initiatives are on-going to help achieve metric results:

- Daily Operating Reviews to identify deviations from the targets for the previous 24 hours and identify countermeasures for continuous improvement.
- Weekly Operating Review meetings weekly to share best practices and review long duration events.
- Provide yearly plastic squeeze training for all Field Service employees as part of Operator Qualification refresher.
- Live action drills to simulate emergency scenarios, practicing isolation procedures and documenting lessons learned.

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CHAPTER 4.5

GAS SHUT-IN TIME, SERVICES

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The material updates to this chapter since the October 2, 2023, report can be found in Section B concerning metric performance and Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

A. (4.5) Overview

1. Metric Definition

Safety and Operational Metric 4.5 – Gas Shut-In Time, Services is defined as:

Median time to shut-in gas when an uncontrolled or unplanned gas release occurs on a service. The data used to determine the median time shall be provided in increments as defined in General Order 112-F 123.2 (c) as supplemental information, not as a metric.

2. Introduction of Metric

The measurement of Gas Shut-In Time captures the median duration of time required to respond to and mitigate potentially hazardous gas leak conditions. These leak conditions are associated with the public safety risk of loss of containment on Gas Distribution Main or Service. The term "shut-in" refers to the act of stopping the gas flow. It is important for the flow of gas to be stopped to avoid consequences such as overpressure events or explosions and so that work can be safely performed to make repairs in a timely manner. Performance aims for faster response times as a measure of prevention resulting in lower risk of an incident impacting public safety and minimized interruption to the gas business and customers. It is imperative that we promptly and effectively resolve any hazardous conditions on our distribution network while balancing timeliness, customer outages, and employee safety.

The timing for the response starts when Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E, the Company, or the Utility) first receives the report of a potential gas leak and ends when the Utility's qualified representative determines, per the Utility's emergency standards, that the reported leak is

1 not hazardous, a leak does not exist, or the Utility's representative

2 completes actions to mitigate a hazardous leak and render it as being

3 non-hazardous (e.g., by shutting-off gas supply, eliminating subsurface leak

4 migration, repair, etc.) per the Utility's standards.

5   This metric measures the median number of minutes required for a

6 qualified PG&E responder to arrive onsite and stop the flow of gas as result

7 of damages impacting gas mains from PG&E distribution network. It does

8 not include instances where a qualified representative determines that the

9 reported leak is not hazardous, or a leak does not exist.

10 **B. (4.5) Metric Performance**

11 **1. Historical Data (2014 – 2023)**

12   Historical data for Shut-In the gas (SITG) Services metric is available for

13 the period 2014 – 2023. The data captures the median time that a qualified

14 first responder is required to respond and stop gas flow during incidents

15 involving an unplanned and uncontrolled release of gas on services. This

16 data includes incidents related to distribution services and related

17 components such as service lines, valves, risers, and meters due to

18 third party dig-ins, vehicle impacts, explosion, pipe rupture, and material

19 failure.

20   Before 2014, PG&E used a decentralized emergency process to

21 manage emergencies, i.e., each division used its own resources like

22 mappers, planners, among others to track and manage emergencies.

23 Similarly, support organizations like Dispatch, Mapping and Planning used

24 their own management tools to help schedule and manage emergency

25 information. Dispatch used a management tool called Outage Management

26 that recorded times at various stages of the process (i.e., when the

27 emergency call came in, when the Gas Service Representative (GSR)

28 arrived at the site, when the leak was isolated, etc.). The Distribution

29 Control Room used a tool called Gas Logging System to record incoming

30 information.

31   In 2014, a centralized process was implemented to allow Distribution,

32 Transmission, Dispatch, Planning and Mapping personnel to be co-located

33 and work together as a team to manage emergencies. This centralized

1	process also allowed the development of the Event Management Tool
2	(EMT) system.

2. Data Collection Methodology

The EMT is currently used as the official system to track gas emergencies from start to finish. The EMT is used by Dispatch and Gas Distribution Control Center (GDCC) teams to create emergency events and collect incident information and allows PG&E to run reports and retrieve historical information. There are distinct types of incidents recorded in the EMT: explosions, corrosion, cross bore, pipe damage, dig-ins, evacuations, exposed pipe—no gas leak, fires, gas leaks (including Grade 1), high concentration areas, Hi/Lo pressures, material failure, pipe ruptures, vehicle impacts, among others. The EMT provides access to the latest information on an incident. All emergency data is consolidated and stored in one place.

3. Metric Performance for the Reporting Period

The range of data available to calculate the historical SITG median time for Services is from 2014 to 2023. Over this reporting period, performance improved, decreasing from 38.0 minutes in 2014 to 35.1 minutes in 2023. This response time represents an improvement of 4 percent compared to same period in 2022. This improvement is due to strategically prearranging construction crews in locations with high frequency of damages after business hours and weekends, understanding root causes for long shut-in time incidents, sharing best practices system wide during weekly performance review calls, and First Responders personnel squeezing services on arrival when possible.

FIGURE 4.5-1
GAS SHUT IN TIME, SERVICES MEDIAN RESPONSE TIME 2014-2023

1   **C. (4.5) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

2   **1. Updates to 1-Year and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

3   PG&E proposes to keep the 1-year and 5-year targets flat, compared

4   to 2023 target of 40.2 minutes. This recommendation is to prioritize the

5   safety of our customers, employees, and to minimize service disruptions by

6   allowing PG&E personnel to make informed shut-in gas isolation decisions

7   according to field conditions rather than hastily take actions to shut-in the

8   gas to meet a more stringent target.

9   **2. Target Methodology**

10   To establish the 1-year and 5-year targets, PG&E considered the

11 following factors:

12 •   Historical Data and Trends: The target is based on the average of the

13   2018 - 2021 median historical data, plus 10 percent. The four-year

14   period was used because 2018 was when the FAS system was first

15   utilized, and this data period is consistent with current operational

16   practices. The use of 10 percent allows for non-significant variability,

17   and accounts for the consideration of risk during shut in events;

18 •   Benchmarking: Not available;

19 •   Regulatory Requirements: None;

20 •   Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Yes;

- <u>Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and Enforcement</u>: Yes, performance at or below the average of the 2018-2021 annual median response time plus 10 percent is a sustainable assumption for maintaining the improvement from 2018-2023 time-frame plus room for non-significant variability; and
- <u>Other Qualitative Considerations</u>: Reducing shut in time to the lowest possible result is not necessarily the best approach from a public safety standpoint, and there is consideration of risk in various situations. In some instances, the safest decision for our employees and the public is to allow the gas to escape before crews shut it off.

3. 2024 Target

The 2024 target is to maintain performance at or lower than 40.2 minutes based on the factors described above. This target was established to account for the consideration of risk in various situations and aligns with our commitment to the safe operations of our assets. This target represents an appropriate indicator light to signal a review of potential performance issues. Target should not be interpreted as intention to worsen performance.

4. 2028 Target

The 2028 target is to maintain performance at or lower than 40.2 minutes based on the factors described above.

D. (4.5) Performance Against Target

1. Maintain Performance Against the 1-Year Target

As demonstrated in Figure 4.5-2, PG&E saw a median response time of 35.1 minutes in 2023, which is better than the Company's 1-year target of 40.2 minutes.

2. Maintain Performance Against the 5-Year Target

As discussed in Section E, PG&E will continue mitigating the risk of loss of containment on Gas Distribution Mains and Services and employing its various programs to maintain performance in its efforts toward its 5-year target.

1 **E. Current and Planned Work Activities**

2   PG&E will continue to drive metric progress through performance

3 management and supervisor-out-in-the-field initiatives. This metric will continue

4 to mitigate the risk of loss of containment on Gas Distribution Main or Service by

5 reducing distribution pipeline rupture with ignition.

6   The metric is supported by the following programs which focus on improving

7 public safety: Field Services and Gas Maintenance and Construction (M&C).

8 •   Gas Field Service: Field Service responds to gas service requests, which

9   include investigation reports of possible gas leaks, carbon monoxide

10   monitoring, customer requests for starts and stops of gas service, appliance

11   pilot re-lights, appliance safety checks, as well as emergency situations as

12   first responders.

13 •   Gas M&C: Gas M&C performs routine maintenance of PG&E's gas

14   distribution facilities, which includes emergency response due to dig-ins, as

15   well as leak repairs.

The following process improvement initiatives have been implemented to help achieve metric results:

- Enhanced plastic squeeze capability from approximately 50 percent to all GSRs for < 1.5" plastic pipe.
- Purchased and implemented emergency trailers in every division, allowing for emergency equipment to be accessed quickly and easily.
- Purchased additional steel squeezers for 2-8" steel pipe (housed on emergency trailers);
- Implemented Emergency Management tool (EM tool) to alert M&C of SITG events when notified by third-party emergency organizations.
- Established concurrent response protocol (dispatch M&C and Field Service resources) when notified by emergency agencies. Utility Procedure TD-6100P-03 Major Gas Event Response: Fire, Explosion, and Gas Pipeline Rupture was updated in 2021 to align with PG&E's response and communication protocols; and
- Implemented 30-60-90-120+ minute communication protocols between GDCC and Incident Commander to ensure consistent communication and issue escalation during events.

The following process improvement initiatives are on-going to help achieve metric results:

- Daily Operating Reviews to identify deviations from the targets for the previous 24 hours and identify countermeasures for continuous improvement.
- Weekly Operating Review meetings weekly to share best practices and review long duration events.
- Provide yearly plastic squeeze training for all Field Service employees as part of Operator Qualification refresher.
- Live action drills to simulate emergency scenarios, practicing isolation procedures and documenting lessons learned.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:

CHAPTER 4.6

UNCONTROLLED RELEASE OF GAS ON

TRANSMISSION PIPELINES

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The material updates to this chapter since the October 2, 2023, report can be found in Section B concerning metric performance; Section D concerning performance; Section E concerning current and planned work activities. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

A. (4.6) Overview

1. Metric Definition

Safety and Operational Metrics (SOM) 4.6 – Uncontrolled Release of Gas on Transmission Pipelines is defined as:

The number of leaks, ruptures, or other loss of containment on transmission lines for the reporting period, including gas releases reported under Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 191.3.

2. Introduction of Metric

This metric tracks the total number of Grade 1, 2, and 3 leaks, as well as ruptures and other losses of containment on gas transmission (GT) pipelines. Leaks are an important indicator because each leak's uncontrolled flow of gas into the surrounding area can increase the consequence of incidents and cause disruption to our customers' gas service. Leaks are also an important indicator in evaluating the likelihood for where other incidents could occur due to similar criteria or conditions.

B. (4.6) Metric Performance

1. Historical Data (2016 – 2023)

Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) started by reviewing six years of historical data, comprising the years 2016 through 2021. In evaluating the data, PG&E noted changes in detection capabilities and frequency of surveys for the years after 2018. For this reason, the data used to develop these metrics is focused on 2019-2021.

2. **Data Collection Methodology**

Leak data is managed and pulled by the PG&E Leak Survey Process team. This data is extracted from PG&E's GCM013 report using SAP data. This report aggregates all leaks found during the reporting period including the location, line type, and grade of leak. Original grade is used for the metric criteria because it is not subject to change even if the leak condition or status changes due to regrade, cancelation, or repair.

In addition, transmission incidents reported to Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) that meet the incident reporting definition in CFR 191.3 are considered for metric inclusion. These events may be leaks, ruptures, or other incidents. For each reporting period, PG&E will review any transmission incidents reported to PHMSA and compare against the GCM013 leaks using available information like incident location (Route/MP, latitude/longitude, or street address) and date/time of incident to remove any duplicates between the two datasets.

3. **Metric Performance for the Reporting Period**

The annual count of all leaks, ruptures, and loss of containment had been increasing steadily since 2016, with the largest increase seen from 2018 to 2019. This increase is primarily due to a California Air Resources Board (CARB) rule change which requires more frequent leak surveys. The increase has improved visibility and resulted in a larger leak dataset relative to prior years. In March 2017, CARB finalized and approved the Oil and Gas Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Rule codified under California Code of Regulations, Title 17, Division 3, Chapter 1, Subchapter 10, "Climate Change," Article 4. Effective January 1, 2018, the GHG Rule covers emission standards, including, but not limited to, stringent leak detection and repair requirements for facilities in certain Oil and Gas sectors. This rule applies to PG&E's underground natural gas storage facilities and GT compressor stations. As a result, PG&E performs a quarterly leak survey at the impacted facilities and performs leak repairs based on CARB's repair timelines. The 1,350 year-to-date (YTD) leaks for 2023 are trending down compared to 2,248 YTD leaks for the same period in 2022. The proactive maintenance performed, and replacement of components as required by

1   CARB Oil and Gas Rule have contributed to the overall decline in

2   transmission leaks recorded in 2023.

FIGURE 4.6-1
LEAKS BY GRADE TYPE 2016- 2023

Leaks by Grade Type

3 **C. Note: Data has been corrected from 2022.(4.6) 1-Year Target and 5-Year**

4 **Target**

5   **1. Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

6   There have been no changes to the 1-year and 5-year target

7   methodology since the last SOMs report filing. Applying this methodology,

8   the targets have been updated as described below.

9   **2. Target Methodology**

10   To establish the 1-Year and 5-Year targets, PG&E considered the

11   following factors:

12   • Historical Data and Trends: The targets are based on annual 1 percent

13   reduction starting with the average of the three years of historical data

14   between 2019-2021. Those three years were used as the timeframe

15   most representative of current leak survey practices.

16   • Benchmarking: Not available.

17   • Regulatory Requirements: None.

18   • Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Yes.

19   • Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and

20   Enforcement: Yes, performance at or below the average of the past

1	three years (2019 – 2021) is a sustainable assumption and allows for
2	non-significant variability; and
3	• <u>Other Qualitative Considerations</u>: The target also takes into
4	consideration that the results for this metric may fluctuate based on
5	miles of leak surveys performed. The number of leaks found has a
6	correlative relationship to the miles of leak surveys performed. While
7	this is a positive impact for risk visibility and mitigation, it can be a driver
8	of varying trends appearing in the results.
9	**3. 2024 Target**
10	The 2024 target is to maintain performance at or lower than 3,474 leaks,
11	ruptures, or other loss of containment on GT pipelines. This proposed target
12	is based on the average of total leaks found from 2019-2021 (3,545 leaks,
13	ruptures, or other loss of containment on GT pipelines). Then the 1%
14	annual reduction is applied to this baseline target which could be impacted
15	by the factors described above, see Figure 4.6.2. This target aligns with our
16	commitment to the safe operations of our assets. This target represents an
17	appropriate indicator light to signal a review of potential performance issues.
18	Even though the target is set at a performance level worse than 2023
19	performance, it should not be interpreted as intention to worsen
20	performance.
21	**4. 2028 Target**
22	The 2028 target is to maintain performance at or lower than
23	3,336 events, which reflects a continued focus on improvement year over
24	year and is based on the factors described above.
25	**D. (4.6) Performance Against Target**
26	**1. Maintaining Performance Against the 1-Year Target**
27	Figure 4.6-3 demonstrates that PG&E identified 1,350 leaks in 2023,
28	which is 62 percent less than the Company's 1-year target of 3,510 leaks.
29	**2. Progress Towards/Deviation From the 5-Year Target**
30	As discussed in Section E, PG&E continues using surveys and
31	assessments, risk mitigation, and its programs to achieve the Company's
32	5-year performance target.

FIGURE 4.6-2
LEAKS BY GRADE TYPE 2019- 2023 AND TARGETS THROUGH 2028

Note: Data corrected for 2022.

FIGURE 4.6-3
UNCONTROLLED RELEASE OF GAS INCIDENTS IN 2023

CUMULATIVE ACTUALS VS FORECAST

1 **E. (4.6) Current and Planned Work Activities**

2   The primary programs that support the risk reduction goals of this metric are

3 Transmission Integrity Management and Leak Management.

4   • Transmission Integrity Management: The Integrity Management Program

5   provides the tools and processes for risk ranking and prioritization of

6   remediation efforts. This program enables PG&E to focus on identifying and

7   remediating threats to its system. The Transmission Integrity Management

4.6-5

Program (TIMP) assesses the threats on every segment of transmission pipe, evaluates the associated risks, and acts to prevent or mitigate these threats. The TIMP approach for assessing risk is based on methodologies consistent with American Society of Mechanical Engineers B31.8S and is in compliance with 49 CFR Part 192 Subpart O. Many of PG&E's programs that mitigate, and control transmission pipe asset risks are developed and managed within the TIMP program. Examples of assessments or mitigative work that contribute to reducing or preventing significant incidents include strength testing, inline inspection, direct assessment, direct examination, and pipe replacement.

- Leak Management: The Leak Management Program addresses the risk of Loss of Containment (LOC) by finding and fixing leaks. PG&E performs leak survey of the GT and storage system twice per year, by either ground or aerial methods in accordance with General Order 112-F. Leak surveys of pipeline and equipment are commonly accomplished on foot or vehicle, by operator-qualified personnel, using a portable methane gas leak detector. Aerial leak surveys, in remote locations and areas difficult to access on the ground, are performed by helicopter using Light Detection and Ranging Infrared technology. Additional activities that complement the TIMP include risk-based leak surveys, mobile leak quantification, and replacing/removing high bleed pneumatic devices at its compressor stations and storage facilities.

- In-line Inspection (ILI): In-line inspection is the most effective integrity assessment tool for identifying and repairing pipe anomalies whose continued growth could result in loss of containment. To utilize ILI, a pipeline must be upgraded to allow the passage of the ILI tools. PG&E plans on performing ILI upgrades at a pace of 4 upgrades per year. At the end of 2023, PG&E has 50.5 percent of the system capable of ILI. Work during the 2023 rate case period will contribute to PG&E's overall goal of upgrading the system so that 65 percent of PG&E's GT pipeline miles, are capable of ILI by end of 2038.

- External Corrosion Direct Assessment (ECDA): PG&E has assessed the effectiveness of its ECDA Program by evaluating the leak rates on pipe where ECDA has previously been applied, and by tracking the number of

1   immediate indications found during the ECDA surveys. Both indicators are

2   trending down over time. Figure 5-4 shows the leaks found over time in

3   locations where ECDA was previously applied. The significant decline over

4   time, indicates that the ECDA Program is reducing leaks. PG&E expects to

5   conduct ECDA indirect inspections on approximately 268 miles of

6   transmission pipeline in HCAs during the rate case period.

FIGURE 4.6-4
LEAK REDUCTION OVER TIME BY ECDA

7   • Close Interval Survey: PG&E also has a Close Interval Survey (CIS)

8   Program targeted at monitoring the effectiveness of the transmission

9   pipelines' cathodic protection (CP) systems by reading the CP levels

10   between the annual monitoring locations. This program annually assesses

11   8-10 percent of PG&E's gas transmission pipelines. Assessing the levels of

12   CP between test points provides increased confidence that the readings

13   obtained at test stations reflect conditions along the entire system and

14   enable PG&E to make CP adjustments where CIS indicates additional CP is

15   warranted. CIS is recognized as a best practice to assess CP along the

16   entire pipeline, verify electrical isolation, and identify potential interference

17   gradients that may compromise the integrity of the system.

18   • Strength Testing: Strength tests reduce significant loss of containment

19   incidents like ruptures by confirming the integrity of a pipeline at its

1   Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP). They are conducted as a
2   qualifying test for MAOP reconfirmation and for integrity assessments when:
3   –   Class location changes.
4   –   A Section of pipe lacks a Traceable, Verifiable, and Complete (TVC)
5   record of a test that supports the MAOP; or
6   –   As an integrity assessment to verify pipeline integrity.
7   Currently, approximately 90 percent of PG&E's GT pipelines have a
8   valid strength test. PG&E's plan is to continue to perform strength tests on
9   all HCA pipe that lack a TVC test record, and where the pipeline requires
10   MAOP reconfirmation under the new federal regulations. Locations
11   operating over 30 percent specified minimum yield strength will be the
12   highest priority. This work will also enable PG&E to confirm the MAOP of all
13   gas transmission lines in HCAs, Class 3 and 4 locations and MCAs requiring
14   assessment by July 2035.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:

CHAPTER 4.7

TIME TO RESOLVE HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS

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TIME TO RESOLVE HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS

The material updates to this chapter since the October 2,, 2023, report can be found in Section B concerning metric performance and Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

A. (4.7) Overview

    1. Metric Definition

        Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 4.7 – Time to Resolve Hazardous Conditions (TRHC) is described as:

        Median response time to resolve Grade 1 leaks. Time starts when the utility first receives the report and ends when a utility's qualified representative determines, per the utility's emergency standards, that the reported leak is not hazardous or the utility's representative completes actions to mitigate a hazardous leak and render it as being non-hazardous (i.e., by shutting-off gas supply, eliminating subsurface leak migration, repair, etc.) per the utility's standards.

        The data used to determine the Median Time shall be provided in increments as defined in General Order 112-F 123.2 (c) as supplemental information, not as a metric.

    2. Introduction of Metric

        The measurement of TRHC captures the duration of time required to mitigate hazardous gas leak conditions. These leak conditions are associated with the public safety risk of loss of containment on Gas Distribution Main or Service. Performance aims for faster resolution times as a measure of prevention resulting in lower risk of an incident impacting public safety and minimized interruption to the gas business and customers. It is imperative that we promptly and effectively resolve any hazardous conditions on our distribution network while balancing timeliness, customer outages, and employee safety. Long duration blowing gas events have the potential to negatively impact public safety if an ignition source is present, as well as it poses a risk if migration into sub-surface structures occurs.

B. (4.7) Metric Performance

    1. Historical Data (2018 – 2023)

        Historical data for TRHC Grade 1 Leaks metric is available for 2018- 2023. The data captures the time that a qualified first responder requires to respond and stop gas flow due to Grade 1 leaks. This data includes leaks identified in our distribution system and includes all facility types, i.e., customer facilities, service and main pipelines, meters, regulator stations, service risers, valves. It includes leaks identified by Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) personnel only and with a final resolution of leak repaired.

        Before 2014, PG&E used a decentralized emergency process to manage emergencies (i.e., each division used its own resources like mappers, planners, among others to track and manage emergencies). Similarly, support organizations like Dispatch, Mapping and Planning used their own management tools to help schedule and manage emergency information. Dispatch used a management tool called Outage Management that recorded times at various stages of the process (i.e., when the emergency call came in, when the Gas Service Representative arrived at the site, when the leak was isolated, etc.). The Distribution Control Room used a tool called Gas Logging System to record incoming information.

        In 2014, a centralized process was implemented to allow Distribution, Transmission, Dispatch, Planning and Mapping personnel to be co located and work together as a team to manage emergencies. This centralized process also allowed the development of the Event Management Tool (EMT) system which was implemented in 2018.

        PG&E started tracking gas flow stop times for Grade 1 leaks in 2018 although this has not been a mandatory requirement, except when the incident is California Public Utilities Commission or Department of Transportation reportable.

    2. Data Collection Methodology

        The EMT is currently used as the official system to track gas emergencies from start to finish. The EMT provides access to latest

information on an incident. All emergency data is consolidated and stored in one place.

The EMT is used by Dispatch and Gas Distribution Control Center teams to create emergency events and collect incident information. It also allows us to run reports and retrieve historical information. There are distinct types of incidents recorded in the EMT: explosions, corrosion, cross bore, pipe damage, dig-ins, evacuations, exposed pipe—no gas leak, fires, gas leaks (including Grade 1), high concentration areas, Hi/Lo pressures, material failure, pipe ruptures, vehicle impacts, among others. No transmission events are included in the metric.

3. Metric Performance for Reporting Period

The range of data available to calculate the historical TRHC for Grade 1 leaks is from 2018 to 2023. In this timeframe, performance improved significantly, decreasing from 183.4 minutes in 2018 to 141.0 minutes in 2023. The performance in 2023 represents a 14.7 percent improvement over the performance of 165.3 minutes in 2022. This improvement is due to strategically prearranging construction crews in locations with high frequency of Grade 1 leaks after business hours and weekends, understanding root causes for long shut-in time incidents, sharing best practices system wide during weekly performance review calls, and improved partnership between Field Service and Maintenance and Construction (M&C) organizations.

C. **(4.7) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target**

1. **Updates to 1- and-5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

The 2024 target is set to the 2023 target minus 0.5 minutes for annual improvement. The 2028 target demonstrates a continued focus on improvement by reducing an additional 0.5 minutes each subsequent year.

2. **Target Methodology**

To establish the 1-year and 5-year targets, PG&E considered the following factors:

- Historical Data and Trends: The target is based on the average of the 2018-2021 historical data, plus 10 percent. The four-year period was used because 2018 is the first year of available historical data. The use of 10 percent allows for non-significant variability, as well as unknown variability given that this is a new metric that has not been well measured and tracked in the past.

- Benchmarking: Not available.

- Regulatory Requirements: None.

- Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Yes.

- Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and Enforcement: Yes, performance at or below the average of the 2018-2021 period, plus 10 percent, is a sustainable assumption for

1   maintaining the improvement from 2018-2023 time-frame, plus room for

2   non-significant variability and other unknown variables; and

3   • Other Qualitative Considerations: This is a new metric to PG&E that

4   has not yet been closely tracked or well understood.

3. 2024 Target

The 2024 target is to maintain performance at or lower than 182.5 minutes based on the factors described above. 2024 Target is the 2023 target minus 0.5 minute for annual improvement. This target aligns with our commitment to the safe operations of our assets. This target represents an appropriate indicator light to signal a review of potential performance issues. Target should not be interpreted as intention to worsen performance.

4. 2028 Target

The 2028 Target is to maintain performance at or lower than 180.5 minutes based on the factors described above along with stepped improvement of 0.5 minutes year-over-year.

D. (4.7) Performance Against Target

1. Maintaining Performance Against the 1-Year Target

As demonstrated in Figure 4.7-2, PG&E saw a median response time of 141.0 minutes in 2023 which is better than the Company's one-year target.

2. Maintaining Performance Against the 5-Year Target

As discussed in Section E, PG&E will continue mitigating the risk of loss of containment on Gas Distribution Mains and Services and employing its various programs to maintain performance in its efforts toward its five-year target.

E. (4.7) Current and Planned Work Activities

1   Starting in 2022, PG&E is applying the definition as stated in
2 Decision 21-11-009 to existing data for further visibility. There are on-going
3 efforts in place to ensure traceable and verifiable data. PG&E plans to
4 implement SAP controls to ensure that Field Service and Maintenance and
5 Construction (M&C) personnel are capturing this data at each occurrence. This
6 will drive visibility into the metric to allow for performance management. This
7 metric will continue to mitigate the risk of loss of containment on Gas Distribution
8 Main or Service by reducing distribution pipeline rupture with ignition.

       The metric is supported by the following programs which focus on improving
public safety: Field Services and Gas M&C.

- Gas Field Service: Field Service responds to gas service requests, which
  include investigation reports of possible gas leaks, carbon monoxide
  monitoring, customer requests for starts and stops of gas service, appliance
  pilot re-lights, appliance safety checks, as well as emergency situations as
  first responders.

1 • <u>Gas M&C</u>: Gas M&C performs routine maintenance of PG&E's gas
2   distribution facilities, which includes emergency response due to dig-ins, as
3   well as leak repairs.
4 The following process improvement initiatives are on-going to help achieve
5 metric results:
6 • Daily Operating Reviews to identify deviations from the targets for the
7   previous 24hrs and identify countermeasures for continuous improvement.
8 • Weekly Operating Review meetings weekly to share best practices and
9   review long duration events.
10 • Provide yearly plastic squeeze training for all Field Service employees as
11   part of Operator Qualification refresher.
12 • Live action drills to simulate emergency scenarios, practicing isolation
13   procedures and documenting lessons learned.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:

CHAPTER 5.1

CLEAN ENERGY GOALS COMPLIANCE METRIC

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SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL METRICS REPORT:
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CLEAN ENERGY GOALS COMPLIANCE METRIC

The material updates to this chapter since the October 2, 2023, report can be found in Section A concerning the introduction to the metric; Section B concerning metric performance; C concerning metric targets; Section D concerning performance against the targets; Section E concerning current and planned work. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

A. (5.1) Overview

1. Metric Definition

Safety and Operational Metric 5.1 – Clean Energy Goals Compliance Metric is defined as:

Progress towards Pacific Gas and Electric Company's (PG&E) procurement obligations as adopted in Decision (D.) 21-06-035, D.19-11-016 and any subsequent decision(s) in Rulemaking (R.) 20-05-003, or a successor proceeding, updating these requirements.

2. Introduction to the Clean Energy Goals Compliance Metric

The Clean Energy Goals Compliance Metric (CEG Metric) directs PG&E to report on its progress towards meeting the procurement obligations in the following California Public Utilities Commission (Commission) decisions: (1) D.19-11-016, (2) D.21-06-035, and (3) D.23-02-040 (together, the Integrated Resource Planning (IRP) Decisions).[1]

In November 2019, the Commission issued D.19-11-016 in part to address near-term system reliability concerns beginning in 2021. D.19-11-016 requires incremental procurement of system-level Resource Adequacy (RA) capacity of 3,300 megawatts (MW) by all Commission-jurisdictional Load-Serving Entities (LSE).[2] In line with state

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[1] See D.22-02-004 directing PG&E to make progress towards procuring a 95 MW 4-hour energy storage project at the Kern-Lamont substation and a 50 MW 4-hour energy storage project at the Mesa substation, pp. 160-162; Ordering Paragraph (OP) 13 of D.22-02-004 exempts these energy storage projects from the Clean Energy Goals Compliance Metric.

[2] D.19-11-016, p. 34.

policy goals, the Commission also expressed a preference that LSEs pursue "preferred resources" such as new clean electricity capacity.[3] Of the 3,300 MW procurement order, PG&E is directed to procure 716.9 MW of RA capacity on behalf of its bundled service customers with online dates between the years 2021-2023.[4]

D.19-11-016 also allowed each non-investor-owned utility (non-IOU) LSE an opportunity to "opt-out" of its procurement obligation and required notification to the Commission in February 2020 to exercise this option. On April 15, 2020, the Commission issued a ruling increasing PG&E's procurement obligation by 48.2 MW, to an aggregated total of 765.1 MW, to account for LSE opt-outs.[5] PG&E is required to procure the 765.1 MW with the following online dates: 50 percent (382.6 MW) by August 1, 2021, 25 percent (191.3 MW) by August 1, 2022, and 25 percent (191.3 MW) by August 1, 2023.[6]

On July 29, 2022, PG&E filed supplemental Advice Letter (AL) 6654-E-A, discussing the fact that three "opt-out" LSEs ceased serving customers in California. As stated in AL 6654-E-A, PG&E consulted with the Commission's Energy Division, and it was determined that the total opt-out procurement obligation assigned to these three LSEs is 1.2 MW. As set forth in D.22-05-015, in the event of an "LSE bankruptcy, or any other exit from the market," any associated costs attributable to the opt-out procurement shall be allocated to the traditional cost allocation mechanism (CAM). On January 12, 2023, the Commission adopted Resolution (Res. E-5239 and clarified that the 1.2 MW of procurement that PG&E conducted on behalf of opt-out LSEs that subsequently ceased serving

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[3] D.19-11-016, Conclusion of Law (COL) 22.

[4] D.19-11-016, OP 3.

[5] See Administrative Law Judge's Ruling Finalizing Load Forecasts and GHG Benchmarks for Individual 2020 IRP Filings and Assigning Procurement Obligations Pursuant to D.19-11-016, issued on April 15, 2020, p. 11.

[6] Due to rounding, numbers presented throughout this chapter may not add up precisely to the totals provided.

1	customers will continue to count towards PG&E's procurement obligation
2	under D.19-11-016.[7]
3	In June 2021, the Commission issued D.21-06-035 to address the
4	mid-term (period of 2023-2026) reliability needs of the electric grid and to
5	help achieve the state's greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction targets.
6	In the decision, the Commission ordered 11,500 MW of incremental
7	resource procurement exclusively from zero-emitting resources, unless the
8	resource otherwise qualifies under California's Renewables Portfolio
9	Standard eligibility requirements.[8] Of this total, PG&E is required to procure
10	2,302 MW with the following online dates: 400 MW by August 1, 2023;
11	1,201 MW by June 1, 2024; 300 MW by June 1, 2025; and 400 MW by
12	June 1, 2026. In addition, D.21-06-035 also required that 900 MW (of
13	PG&E's 2,302 MW) have specific operational characteristics to spur the
14	development of long-duration energy storage, increase the availability of firm
15	clean energy, and serve as a replacement source of clean energy for the
16	retiring Diablo Canyon Power Plant.[9]
17	In February 2023, the Commission issued D.23-02-040 which requires
18	incremental procurement of system-level capacity of 4,000 MW by all LSEs
19	to address projected increases in electric demand, increasing impacts of
20	climate change, the likelihood of additional retirements of fossil-fueled
21	generation, and the likelihood that delays beyond 2026 of long-duration
22	energy storage and firm clean energy (collectively, long lead-time resources)
23	required under D.21-06-035 will be necessary. Of this total, PG&E is
24	required to procure 777 MW with the following online dates: 388 MW by
25	June 1, 2026; and 388 MW by June 1, 2027. The decision also revised the
26	online dates of long lead-time resources from June 1, 2026, to June 1, 2028,
27	for all Commission-jurisdictional LSEs.

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[7] Res.E-5239, p. 11.

[8] D.21-06-035, OP 1.

[9] *Id.*, pp. 35-36; See also D.21-06-035, p. 56 requiring PG&E to procure 500 MW of zero-emitting resources by June 1, 2025, and 400 MW of long lead-time resources by June 1, 2026.

1   In aggregate, to date, the total amount of PG&E's procurement ordered
2   under the IRP Decisions is 3,844.1 MW with online dates between
3   2021-2028. Table 1 outlines PG&E's procurement obligation for each year.

TABLE 5.1-1
PG&E'S TOTAL PROCUREMENT OBLIGATION PURSUANT TO THE IRP DECISIONS
(PRESENTED AS MW OF NET QUALIFYING CAPACITY (NQC))

Line No.	Online Date	D.19-11-016	D.21-06-035	D.23-02-040	Total
1	8/1/2021	382.6			382.6
2	8/1/2022	191.3			191.3
3	8/1/2023	191.3	400		591.3
4	6/1/2024		1,201		1,201
5	6/1/2025		300		300
6	6/1/2026			388	388
7	6/1/2027			388	388
8	6/1/2028		400		400
9	Total	765.1	2,302	777	3,844.1

4   **3. Background on Net Qualifying Capacity**

5   For the purpose of assessing whether an LSE's procurement obligation
6   has been met in accordance with the IRP Decisions, the Commission uses
7   capacity counting rules based on the Commission's RA Program and the
8   results of effective load carrying capability (ELCC) modeling by consultants
9   E3 and Astrapé.[10] The counting rules are generally expressed as
10   a percentage that is applied to the nameplate capacity of the procured
11   resource. For example, a 4-hour energy storage resource with a nameplate
12   capacity of 100 MW can count 90.7 MW towards an LSE's 2024 requirement
13   (100 MW * 90.7 percent ELCC = 90.7 MW of NQC). PG&E's procurement
14   progress in this report is presented as MW of NQC based on the applicable
15   counting rules and guidance provided by the Commission.[11]

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[10] See D.21-06-035, p. 71 and D.23-02-040, pp. 28-29.

[11] See the Incremental ELCC Study for Mid-Term Reliability Procurement (January 2023 Update), p. 10 at: https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/divisions/energy-division/documents/integrated-resource-plan-and-long-term-procurement-plan-irp-ltpp/20230210_irp_e3_astrape_updated_incremental_elcc_study.pdf; See also the Staff Memo on Incremental ELCC to be Used for Mid-Term Reliability Procurement (D.21-06-035) at: https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/divisions/energy-division/documents/integrated-resource-plan-and-long-term-procurement-plan-irp-ltpp/2023-02-irp_mtr_elccs-public_transmittal_memo_v1.pdf.

B. (5.1) Metric Performance

1. Historical Data

Pursuant to the IRP Decisions, resource procurement obligations and compliance milestones began in 2021. The projects pertaining to PG&E's resource procurement obligations and compliance milestone date requirements of August 1, 2021, August 1, 2022, and August 1, 2023 have all achieved commercial operation.

TABLE 5.1-2
PG&E'S HISTORICAL METRIC PERFORMANCE (MW OF NQC)

Line No.	Online Date	Total Procurement Obligation	Actual Procured Capacity
1	8/1/2021	382.6	418.2
2	8/1/2022	573.8	585.2
3	8/1/2023	1165.1	1330.1

FIGURE 5.1-1
PG&E'S HISTORICAL METRIC PERFORMANCE (MW OF NQC)

PG&E relies upon three main sources of available data to monitor its procurement progress toward the IRP Decisions: (1) the baseline list of

resources used to establish the procurement targets, (2) Commission rules and guidance on determining the MW of NQC, and (3) PG&E's internal database containing all of its energy procurement contracts approved by the Commission.

1) <u>Baseline List of Resources</u>: In establishing the procurement targets in the IRP Decisions, the Commission established baseline assumptions of resources available to meet system reliability needs. LSEs must demonstrate that the MW of NQC of the procured resource, new and/or existing, are incremental to the Commission's baseline assumptions.[12] PG&E uses this information to ensure resources are eligible to count towards its procurement obligations.

2) <u>Commission Rules and Guidance on MW of NQC</u>: As described above, the amount of MW of NQC that can be used to count towards an LSE's procurement obligation is based on the Commission's rules and guidance. PG&E uses this information to determine the amount of MW of NQC that is eligible to count towards its procurement obligations.

3) <u>PG&E's Internal Database</u>: This database contains PG&E's energy procurement contracts approved by the Commission, including procurement contracts to meet PG&E's procurement obligations under the IRP Decisions. The data contained in this database is consistent with the procurement contracts and respective ALs filed for Commission approval.

2. Data Collection Methodology

As described above, PG&E uses the baseline list of resources and the Commission's rules and guidance on MW of NQC to monitor its procurement progress.[13]

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12 See the Commission's baseline assumptions at: https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/divisions/energy-division/documents/integrated-resource-plan-and-long-term-procurement-plan-irp-ltpp/20200103_procurement_baseline_list.xlsx (D.19-11-016) and https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-/media/cpuc-website/divisions/energy-division/documents/integrated-resource-plan-and-long-term-procurement-plan-irp-ltpp/d2106035_baseline_gen_list_20220902.xlsx (D.21-06-035).

13 See the information maintained by the Commission at: https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/industries-and-topics/electrical-energy/electric-power-procurement/long-term-procurement-planning/more-information-on-authorizing-procurement/irp-procurement-track.

3. Metric Performance for Reporting Period

As outlined in Table 5.1-2 above, PG&E has procured sufficient incremental MW of NQC to meet and exceed its procurement obligations for incremental capacity with online dates in 2023 pursuant to D.19-11-016 and D.21-06-035.[14] PG&E notes that the Commission stated that procurement:

> …amounts [that] are in excess of [an] LSE's obligation under D.19-11-016…may be counted toward the capacity requirements [in D.21-06-035] if they otherwise qualify.[15]

Moreover, D.21-06-035 stated that the Commission:

> …will allow LSEs to show procurement that they have conducted to support the Commission's orders or requirements in the context of the RPS program, as well as for emergency reliability purposes in R.20-11-003, as compliance toward the requirements herein.[16]

Accordingly, PG&E estimates that approximately 262 MW of NQC of its procurement toward the procurement for both D.19-11-016 and R.20-11-003 that have been approved by the Commission, and that are in excess of what is required by each of those decisions, may be applied towards its procurement obligations under D.21-06-035.[17]

On January 21, 2022, PG&E filed AL 6477-E requesting Commission approval of nine agreements resulting from PG&E's Mid-Term Reliability Phase 1 solicitation to meet its procurement obligations under D.21-06-035. These agreements total 1,434 MW of NQC and have been approved by the Commission.[18] Subsequently, unprecedented market upheavals affected the economic and commercial viability of several of the projects comprising of these nine agreements.[19] This unexpected market challenge posed a risk of project failures for all LSEs in the market procuring resources toward

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[14] PG&E's AL 5826-E, 6033-E, 6289-E, and 6477-E.

[15] D.21-06-035, p. 80.

[16] *Id*.

[17] PG&E's AL 6289-E.

[18] On April 21, 2022, the Commission adopted Res.E-5202 approving the nine agreements without modification as filed in PG&E's AL 6477-E.

[19] For example, on July 20, 2022, PG&E filed AL 6658-E, requesting approval of contract amendments for the AMCOR and the North Central Valley projects after each developer described external barriers to completing their projects in line with their existing contract obligations.

1 the IRP Decisions, including PG&E. As a result, to maintain the commercial

2 viability of the projects, PG&E negotiated amendments for four of the nine

3 project which amendments were presented to the Commission for approval

4 on September 23, 2022. The Commission approved these amendments on

5 December 1, 2022.[20]

6 On January 13, 2023, PG&E filed AL 6825-E, on February 14, 2023,

7 PG&E filed AL 6861-E, and on September 13, 2023, PG&E filed AL 7022-E,

8 requesting Commission approval of four additional agreements resulting

9 from PG&E's Mid-Term Reliability Phase 2 solicitation to further meet its

10 procurement obligations under D.21-06-035. These agreements have been

11 approved by the Commission.[21]

12 Despite the significant unprecedented market challenges PG&E has

13 made steady progress towards achieving its procurement obligations under

14 D.21-06-035.

15 As stated above, D.21-06-035 requires that 900 MW of NQC (of PG&E's

16 2,302 MW of NQC) have specific operational characteristics. Specifically,

17 PG&E is directed to procure 500 MW of NQC of firm zero-emitting resources

18 by June 1, 2025, and 400 MW of NQC of long lead-time resources by

19 June 1, 2028.[22] PG&E issued its Mid-Term Reliability Phase 3 solicitation

20 on February 7, 2023 to solicit additional resources toward fulfilling all of its

21 procurement obligations under D.21-06-035, including, the 900 MW of NQC

22 with specific operational characteristics.

23 On February 27, 2024, PG&E filed AL 7177-E, requesting Commission

24 approval of an agreement resulting from PG&E's Mid-Term Reliability

25 Phase 3 solicitation. This agreement is currently pending at the

26 Commission.

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[20] PG&E's AL 6711-E.

[21] On April 27, 2023, the Commission adopted Res.E-5262 and Res.E-5263 approving PG&E's AL 6825-E and AL 6861-E. On January 11, 2024, the Commission adopted Res.E-5297 approving AL 7022-E.

[22] The long lead-time (LLT) resources are comprised of: (1) firm zero-emitting generation with a capacity factor of at least 80 percent and (2) long-duration storage resources defined as having at least eight hours of duration.

C. (5.1) 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target

    1. Updates to 1-Year Target and 5-Year Target Since Last Report

        The 1-year target has been updated to reflect PG&E's required procurement for 2024 under the IRP Decisions which is to procure 2,366.1 MW of cumulative NQC by June 1, 2024, as outlined in Table 5.1-1. The 5-year target has also been updated to reflect PG&E's additional procurement requirements, as outlined in Commission decision—D.23-02-040—issued in February 2023.[23] The new 5-year target for 2028 is to procure 3,844.1 MW of cumulative NQC by June 1, 2028, as is also summarized in Table 5.1-1.

    2. Target Methodology

        To establish the 1-year and 5-year targets, PG&E considered the following factors:

- Historical Data and Trends: Not Applicable
- Benchmarking: Not applicable.
- Regulatory Requirements: The targets are set to match the cumulative procurement obligations set forth in the IRP Decisions.
- Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Yes.
- Appropriate/Sustainable Indicators for Enhanced Oversight and Enforcement: Yes.
- Other Considerations:
  - The target approach was established to meet the Commission's current procurement obligations. PG&E's procurement obligation may increase if other LSEs fail to meet their procurement obligations and PG&E is ordered by the Commission to make back-stop procurement on their behalf;[24] and
  - The ability for procured capacity to actually come online by established contractual online dates can be impacted by external factors, as has occurred recently due to impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, significant and unprecedent market challenges, supply

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[23] D.23-02-040, p.31.

[24] D.19-11-016, p. 67.

1   chain disruptions and the Department of Commerce's investigation

2   into potential solar module tariff circumvention.[25]

3. 2024 Target

4   The 1-year target for the CEG Metric is to procure 2,366.1 MW of

5 cumulative NQC with an online date by June 1, 2024, which is equal to the

6 cumulative procurement obligations for 2021, 2022,2023, and 2024 as

7 outlined in Table 5.1-1.

4. 2028 Target

9   The 5-year target for the CEG Metric is to procure 3,844.1 MW of

10 cumulative NQC with an online date by June 1, 2028, which is equal to the

11 cumulative procurement obligations for 2021-2028 as outlined in

12 Table 5.1-1. The potential exists under the IRP Decisions for PG&E to be

13 ordered by the Commission to perform backstop procurement on behalf of

14 non-IOU LSEs, which could increase the 5-year target in the future. PG&E

15 is not making any assumptions on this specific item and is continuing to set

16 its 5-year target for 2028 to be the cumulative procurement of 3,844.1 MW

17 of NQC from incremental resources, as updated in D.23-02-040.

18 Importantly, D.23-02-040 established a new online date of June 1, 2028, for

19 LLT resources and, as such, the 400 MW of procurement in this category

20 previously ordered by D.21-06-035 to come online in 2026 is now updated to

21 2028. Furthermore, in D.24-02-047 allows PG&E to request an extension to

22 bring LLT resources online by June 1, 2031 if it is unable to meet LLT

23 resource procurement requirements by June 1, 2028.

D. (5.1) Performance Against Target

1. Progress Towards the 1-Year Target

26   PG&E executed contracts for sufficient incremental capacity with online

27 dates on or before June 1, 2024 to meet the 1-tear target. However,

28 counterparties have cited ongoing supply chain disruptions, interconnection

29 delays, and permitting delays as impacting project development schedules

30 and their ability to meet contractual online dates. As impacts to project

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[25] Erne, David, Mark Kootstra. 2023. Final Draft Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Extension – CEC Analysis of Need to Support Reliability. California Energy Commission. Publication Number: CEC-200-2023-004.

1 online dates are identified, PG&E will look to procure bridge resources, as
2 permitted in D.21-06-035 and D.23-02-040 to mitigate against project online
3 date delays

4 **2. Progress Towards the 5-Year Target**

5 PG&E continues to make progress towards meeting the 5-year target.
6 Within this overall procurement target, PG&E has a requirement to procure
7 900 MW of NQC with specific operational characteristics and the
8 Commission decision for supplemental mid-term procurement as outlined
9 above. In September 2023, PG&E filed for approval of one contract that is
10 expected to count towards the operational characteristics as a Zero-Emitting
11 Resource.

12 PG&E reiterates, and as outlined above, that developers and LSEs have
13 experienced significant and unprecedented market challenges, increases in
14 component prices, continued supply chain constraints, and industry-wide
15 inflation on total project costs that have hindered the ability for developers to
16 bring projects online by their contractual online dates.[26] In recognition of
17 these challenges, the Commission has provided mitigation tools in
18 D.23-02-040 and D.24-02-047 for LSEs to continue making progress
19 towards their procurement obligations to ensure system reliability in the
20 mid-term. These mitigation tools include extending the online date of long
21 lead-time resources from 2026 to 2028, allowing LSEs to request for a
22 further extension for long lead-time resources until 2031 for cost
23 considerations or projects with later online dates, and allowing the use of
24 bridge resources, including import energy, to serve as a bridge resource for
25 all categories of procurement except for the zero-emitting resources.[27]
26 PG&E will continue to work with developers and the Commission to address
27 the challenges noted above in order to meet the current 5-year target, and
28 any additional procurement requirements in support of the state's reliability
29 needs.

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[26] Erne, David, Mark Kootstra. 2023. Final Draft Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant
Extension – CEC Analysis of Need to Support Reliability. California Energy
Commission. Publication Number: CEC-200-2023-004.

[27] D.23-02-040, COLs 7 and 12. D.24-02-047, OPs 16 and 19.

Clean Energy Goal
Historical Performance and Targets

E. (5.1) Current and Planned Work Activities

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2 Below is a summary description of the key activities that are tied to

3 performance and their description of that tie.

4 • Solicitation: As noted above, PG&E launched its Mid-Term Reliability

5 Phase 2 and Phase 3 solicitations in April 2022 and February 2023,

6 respectively, seeking to satisfy its remaining procurement obligations under

7 the IRP Decisions, specifically to procure 500 MW of NQC of zero-emitting

8 resources by June 1, 2025, and 400 MW of NQC of long lead time

9 resources by June 1, 2028. These solicitations are scheduled for

10 completion in 2024.

11 • Supplemental Procurement Order: As described earlier, on February 23,

12 2023, the Commission issued D.23-02-040 increasing PG&E's procurement

13 requirements through 2028. Accordingly, PG&E has incorporated the

14 supplemental procurements order by this decision into its current and

15 planned work activities.

16 • Bridge procurement to mitigate delayed resources: PG&E will pursue

17 permitted bridge resources to bridge procurement gaps where resources are

18 delayed, as authorized by the IRP.

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QUALITY OF SERVICE

The material updates to this chapter since the October 2, 2023, report can be found in Section B and Section D concerning performance against target. Material changes from the prior report are identified in blue font.

A. (6.1) Overview

Safety and Operational Metric (SOM) 6.1 – The Quality of Service Metric which is defined as:

The Average Speed of Answer (ASA) for Emergencies metric is a safety measure related to multiple risks, as well as quality of service and management measure, and is defined as follows: ASA in seconds for Emergency calls handled in Contact Center Operations (CCO).[1]

1. Introduction of Metric

A call is classified as an emergency when a caller selects the option of an emergency or hazard situation through the Interactive Voice Response (IVR) system. Once this option is selected the call is routed to an agent to receive the highest priority attention possible.

Not only is Emergency ASA a quality measurement of how efficiently we are able to answer customers calling us to report an emergency, but it is also a safety measurement. Answering the call is the first step ensuring the customer is safe.

The metric is calculated by determining the average amount of time it took to connect customers to a service representative for calls where the customer identifies via IVR that they are calling to report a hazardous or emergency situation, such as a suspected natural gas leak or downed power line.

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[1] D.21-11-019, Appendix A, p. 12.

2. Background

On an annual basis, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) handles between 5 to 6 million customer calls. Between 2017 and 2021, emergency-related calls averaged nine percent of total call volume; however, in the 2020 and 2021 years, emergencies calls have increased due to weather-related storms events, rotating outages, Public Safety Shutoffs (PSPS), and Enhanced Power Safety Settings (EPSS). In 2020 and 2021 emergency calls handled were 10 percent and 11 percent of total call volume, respectively.

Historically, PG&E has been able to successfully manage staffing needs to ensure emergency calls are answered quickly. The metric and associated targets are designed to maintain our performance.

B. (6.1) Metric Performance

1. Historical Data (2015 – 2023)

PG&E has eight years of historical data representing 2015 – 2023 to include the total emergency calls handled and ASA by month.

The historical data for this metric provided with this report provides total emergency calls handled and the ASA performance by month and year.

2. Data Collection Methodology

The performance data is gathered from PG&E's telephony system, Cisco Unified Contact Center Enterprise (UCCE). The data includes the number of emergency calls handled and the total wait times (in seconds). Data is compiled each day for daily, weekly, monthly, and yearly reporting.

Historical data is collected using Microsoft's Management Studio application via a Structured Query Language (SQL) server owned by the Workforce Management Reporting team.

The data is gathered by extracting summarized data for emergency specific call types. The call types are created by the Workforce Management Routing Team, to categorize the types of calls that are entering the phone system, Cisco UCCE.

PG&E began archiving historical call data in 2015 once it was identified that Cisco UCCE system was truncating historical data as it was running out of storage.

3. **Metric Performance for Reporting Period**

Between 2015 and 2023, the performance of Emergency ASA ranged between seven and 10 seconds, with a median performance of eight seconds (see Figure 6.1-1). In 2019, PG&E's call handle time was highest (10 seconds) primarily due to the increased scope of PSPS events, and the website failure, in the fall of 2019.

FIGURE 6.1-1
ANNUAL PERFORMANCE OF EMERGENCY ASA BETWEEN 2015 AND 2023

Quality Of Service: Annual Performance of Emergency Average Speed of Answer (ASA) (2015 - 2023)

In 2023, the Emergency ASA performance was eight seconds. Throughout the year, monthly performance ranged between five seconds and fourteen seconds (see Figure 6.1-2). The primary drivers to the performance were based on unanticipated incidents (e.g., weather incidents impacting power outages, unplanned power outages) and call center representative staffing availability.

FIGURE 6.1-2
MONTHLY PERFORMANCE OF EMERGENCY ASA IN 2023

1   **C.   (6.1) 1 Year Target and 5 Year Target**

2   **1.   Updates to 1- and 5-Year Targets Since Last Report**

3   There have been no changes to the 1-year and 5-year targets since

4   the last SOMs report filing. The 2024 1-year target is to be below 15

5   seconds and the 2028 5-year target is to be below 15 seconds.

6   **2.   Target Methodology**

7   To establish the 1-year and 5-year targets, PG&E considered the

8   following factors:

9   •   Historical Data and Trends: The target is based on the average of years

10   2015 to 2019 historical data. These years were utilized as they are

11   most consistent with current operational practices, including the

12   expansion of PSPS, EPSS, and Rotating outage programs. The

13   average of this period is used as a reasonable indicator for sustaining

14   and maintaining the performance going forward;

15 •   Benchmarking: Not available;

16 •   Regulatory Requirements: None;

17 •   Attainable Within Known Resources/Work Plan: Yes, performance at or

18   below the set target is sustainable; and

19 •   Other Qualitative Considerations: None.

3. **2024 Target**

   The 2024 target is at 15 seconds for the year to maintain performance based on the factors described above.

4. **2028 Target**

   The 2028 target is 15 seconds for the year to maintain performance based on the factors described above.

D. **(6.1) Performance Against Target**

   1. **Progress Towards the 1-Year Target**

      As demonstrated in figure 6.1-2 above, PG&E saw an average performance of 8 seconds a month for 2023, which is consistent with the Company's 1-year target.

   2. **Progress Towards the 5-Year Target**

      As discussed in Section E below, PG&E has implemented a number of processes to maintain longer-term performance of this metric to meet the Company's 5-year target.

E. **(6.1) Current and Planned Work Activities**

   The performance of this metric is significantly driven by Contact Center Representative resourcing. The CCO are staffed to handle forecasted volume based on historical trends. As staffing needs change due to upcoming events (e.g., PSPS, weather impacts, storm, or heat-related outages) overtime is offered and planned in advance to increase staffing needs. Mandatory overtime (employees are required to stay on shift) and Emergency overtime (PG&E's Workforce Management team will send out notifications to offer Emergency overtime to employees currently not on shift) are available options during same-day operations to support additional staffing needs. PG&E is forecasting to maintain the current level of staffing for 2023-2026.

   Additionally, providing customers upfront messages of extended wait times via IVR can be used to set expectations and advise customers to call back unless there is an emergency.